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“LIVING IN A FRONTIERLESS LAND” 
NADINE GORDIMER AND CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION 
 
ILEANA ŞORA DIMITRIU 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 
 
Abstract: Nobel laureate, Nadine Gordimer, was for over four decades over-
determined by the South African context of apartheid. However, in recent years, she 
has started to take a more involved interest in cultural globalization, in what she refers 
to as “living on a frontierless land” (1999: 207). Starting with Gordimer’s own 
rhetorical question – “How, in national specificity, does each country go about 
moving beyond itself to procreate a culture that benefits self and others?” (1999: 212 ) 
– in this paper, I shall analyse new tendencies in Gordimer’s more recent fiction.  
Keywords: cultural globalization, Gordimer, recent fiction, post-ideological 
 
 
1. Introduction: Whither Gordimer? 
Under apartheid, Nadine Gordimer was generally perceived to be an 
anti-apartheid spokesperson: the voice of reason and conscience against a 
tyrannical dispensation. However, with the demise of the old regime, new 
tendencies are becoming apparent in her writing: her excursions beyond the 
national question, the aspiration to step out of cultural isolation and plunge into 
the whirlpool of the larger, post-ideological world scene. Along with other 
critics, I have noted Gordimer’s post-1990 engagement with less dramatic 
social issues, as well as her new focus on global concerns. Without deserting 
the local, Gordimer’s understanding of globalisation – what Robbins calls 
“localised cosmopolitanism” (1998: 246) – informs her intellectual position as 
“locally inflected and globally mobile” (Cooppan 2001: 15). Starting with her 
novel, The Pick Up (2001), and the short story collection, Loot (2003), 
Gordimer deliberately looks beyond the local, in pursuit of cognate socio-
cultural paradigms – significant peripheries and cultural sounding-boards – 
elsewhere. By drawing on recent postcolonial theories, I shall seek answers to 
the questions: Is Gordimer primarily a world writer? A postcolonial writer? A 
postcolonialising world writer? I suggest the last of these categories: a writer of 
neither Centre, nor Periphery, but one inhabiting significant peripheries of 
becoming: processes of new adjustments between the old formulations of North 
and South. Gordimer seeks to show that there are no clear boundaries between 
Centres and Peripheries, and that it is important to adjust global interests to a 
series of intersecting margins. As Loomba said:  
 
it is important to forge links between the differently positioned subjects of the new 
empire [world order] ... reconciling the demands of local conditions with broader 
paradigms of colonial and postcolonial history. (2005: 14; 18)  
 
In the early1990s, after the demise of institutional apartheid and the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall, there was some uncertainty as to what Gordimer’s 
position – as a writer and public intellectual – would be under the new 
dispensation. Would her preoccupations in her fiction retain interest and 
significance? Would her work be of less relevance to a more normalised 
society? Gordimer did not disappoint her readers: in her first two post-apartheid 
novels – None to Accompany Me (1994) and The House Gun (1998) – she was 
still mainly preoccupied with the South African scene. Critics noticed her 
liberation from the burden of excessive social responsibility and the shift from 
large historical events to reconstitutions of the civil imaginary (see also 
Dimitriu 2001).  
The two works of fiction that followed – the novel, The Pickup (2001), 
and the short-story collection, Loot (2003) – signal a more radical shift of 
emphasis in her writerly preoccupations. Gordimer seems to have renounced 
her exclusive focus on South Africa, which she considers in the past to have 
been “the example, the epitome of cultural isolation”(1999: 212). Now that 
writers feel less morally pressurised to engage with a dramatic social context, 
she is keen to offer literary answers to an important question: “How, in national 
specificity, does each country go about moving beyond itself to procreate a 
culture that will benefit self and others?” (1999: 212). In this article, I shall 
present a new facet of Gordimer’s writerly profile: a tendency that can be 
detected in her more recent works of fiction and essays. What are new are her 
excursions beyond the national question and into the whirlpool of the larger 
post-ideological world scene. 
 
 
 
2. Gordimer and Cultural Globalization  
 
I shall start my investigation by pointing out new tendencies in her 
critical thinking as reflected in her collection of essays, Living in Hope and 
History: Notes from Our Century (1999). As compared with the tone of the 
previous collections of essays, which focused on the stringencies of the South 
African social scene, her new preoccupations with the need culturally to rejoin 
the world are explicitly foregrounded in some of her more recent essays. In the 
essay, “Our Century,” for example, she reflects on humanity’s achievements 
over the last hundred years, the focus being on the complex networks of 
cultures. Rather than emphasise the uniqueness of her locality, she explores the 
dimensions of “living on a frontierless land” (1999: 207), and how this 
inescapable condition relativises one’s relationship with the home base. She is a 
proponent of what Nederveen Pieterse calls “critical globalism” (1995: 5), 
which takes a neutral view of the process, neither blocking nor celebrating it, 
but rather blending the merits of ‘global’ and ‘local’ to focus on “global 
localization” (Gordimer 1999: 207).  
In the essay, “The Frontierless Land: Cultural Globalization”, Gordimer 
talks of “the ethic of mutual enrichment” (1999: 209) in the expansion of ideas. 
She is aware of the danger of various new orthodoxies in the artistic expression 
world-wide, the new straightjackets of “universal blandness” and “market-
realism” (209); Gordimer, therefore, suggests that a writer’s “aim [is] to value 
the differences and bring them into play across aesthetic frontiers” (209). 
Gordimer pursues her idea of cultural globalization in the critical essay, “The 
Status of the Writer in the World Today: Which World? Whose World?”. Here 
she insists on the need for writers’ vigilance against any political intimidation 
meant to corrupt their ‘search for truth’: “Let our chosen status in the world be 
that of writers who seek exchanges of the creative imagination ... and a vital 
mixture of peoples re-creating themselves.” (1999: 28; emphases mine). This 
bold post-apartheid/ post-Cold War Gordimer voice was also heard on another 
occasion, when she asked:  
 
So we have lost that status of what one might call national engagement. ... And I ask 
myself and you: Do we writers seek that status, the writer as politician, statesperson? 
(1999: 22).  
 
Gordimer stresses the need for writers to resist any political agendas that 
might infringe upon their freedom of expression. She suggests there is no need 
to fear the various cultural intersections, exchanges and networks; no need to 
fear mixing with foreign cultures, as “all civilisations – including China and 
Japan – have been the result of clashes” (28). And referring to the Congolese 
writer, Henri Lopes, she foregrounds “the interchange of ideas, of solutions to a 
common existence [for] every civilisation is born of a forgotten mixture, every 
race is a variety of mixtures that is ignored” (28). Gordimer has always been 
preoccupied with the concept of world literature. A change of emphasis is 
apparent, however, in the last decade. Inspired by Said’s work in the early 
nineties, Gordimer confesses to her new tendency of  
 
placing a new concept of ‘world literature’ alongside the one I had posited with my 
eyes fixed on Euro-North America as the literary navel-of-the-world. In the all-
encompassing sense of the term ‘world’, can any of our literatures be claimed 
definitively as ‘world’ literature? Which world? Whose world? (18)  
 
Interestingly, Gordimer’s renewed sense of literary globalisation is 
validated by recent critical engagements with the concept of world literature. 
There is a drastic literary move world-wide – i.e. beyond the, by now, well-
established postcolonial studies – a move away from the great canon of 
Western literature towards peripheral voices, and not necessarily postcolonial. 
The new yardstick is not so much a set of works, as a network-cum-intersection 
of ideas, of literary themes and patterns between and across any fixed 
boundaries. Summarising important current debates in the field of comparative 
literature, the American critic, Damrosh, says: “My claim is that world 
literature is not an infinite, ungraspable canon, but rather a mode of circulation 
and of reading ... a detached engagement with a world beyond our own” (2003: 
4). 
The link between local and global is essential: a work of world literature 
has to be seen, to borrow a phrase from Dharwadker, as “a montage of 
overlapping maps in motion” (2001: 5). In other words, world literature, like 
genuine cosmopolitanism, is never a bland, sanitised concept; rather it is one 
anchored in complex ‘localised’ circumstances. As mentioned before, 
Robbins’s notion of localised cosmopolitanism (1998: 246) is a useful 
conceptual tool for our discussion: “No one is, or ever can be, a cosmopolitan 
in the sense of belonging nowhere ... Cosmopolitanism is not a paranoid fantasy 
of ubiquity and omniscience; it is rooted in its local applications” (260).  
Far from being a rootless cosmopolitan, Gordimer, for all her global 
aspirations and achievements – she, is after all, a Nobel prize winner – has been 
linked to events both at home and abroad. She has continued to do so, while in 
her more recent works, for example, in The Pickup (2001) and Loot (2003) – as 
well as is manifest in her anthology of international short stories, Telling Tales 
(2004) – she has occupied increasingly multiple relations to the very terms 
‘home’ and ‘abroad’, as I will show in the course of this article.   
 
3. Globalization: Literary Reflections in the Recent Fiction 
 
There is no doubt that Gordimer is a well-established figure in world 
literature, but on her own terms. Just as she remains vigilant against new post-
independence impositions locally, so she refuses to subscribe to a totalising 
cultural globalism. Hers is an aspiration to hold a ‘membership card’ of world 
literature, ‘postcolonialising style’. This apparently paradoxical tendency has 
become increasingly pronounced in the last few years. Once the moral pressure 
for an exclusivist focus on South African issues has been lifted, Gordimer does 
not simply escape into de-contextualised meditations on love/ sex and power, 
her favourite themes; neither does she continue to do ‘navel-gazing’ at South 
Africa. Instead, she uses her new artistic freedom to enter more fully into the 
circuit of significant postcolonial Peripheries beyond her locality. The subtitle 
of this article, “Gordimer and Cultural Globalisation”, points the way towards 
new directions. On the one hand, as already mentioned, there are new emphases 
in Gordimer’s literary preoccupations: Gordimer looks ‘beyond’ the local, in 
pursuit of cognate socio-cultural paradigms elsewhere. On the other hand, the 
subtitle suggests the critic’s attempt to analyse Gordimer as seen via 
globalising/ postcolonial interpretative lenses. Let me start with the latter. 
It is difficult to talk about Gordimer and postcolonial literature in the 
same breath; in the past, she used to be seen as either a localised literary activist 
(anti-apartheid spokesperson) or as a world writer (Nobel prize winner) in the 
tradition of European realism. The difficulty of seeing Gordimer as a 
postcolonial writer lies partly in the configuration of the term ‘postcolonialism’ 
itself, which continues to be based on an eclectic critical practice. It is a general 
sense of undecidability that prompts in critics like Quayson (2000) the need to 
go beyond the binaries of theory and practice, and perceive postcolonialism as 
process. The term postcolonialising discourse (as process) has the advantage of 
removing ‘post-colonialism’ from its assumed chronological implication (of 
‘after colonialism’). As Quayson said: 
 
a ‘postcolonialising discourse ’ is meant to suggest creative ways of viewing a variety 
of cultural, political and social realities, both in the West and elsewhere, via a 
postcolonial prism of interpretation. (2000: 11) 
 
To see postcolonialism as a process of ‘coming-into-being,’ rather than 
as a fixed social reality, implies the critic’s willingness to explore the 
phenomenon in its complex intertwining with global tendencies. Attempts to 
theorise postcolonialism as a continuing process characterise recent debates. 
Childs and Williams, for example, having gone so far as to point to a reality 
beyond current postcolonialism, have coined the term “post-postcolonialism” as 
“anticipatory discourse” (1997: 7). A utopian condition of the future is 
embedded, accordingly, in contemporary postcolonialising processes of 
struggle against the current legacy of colonialism. Seeing postcolonialism as 
process means engaging with it epistemologically: that is, by focusing on the 
significant issues integral to the formation of the global world order after 
colonialism. This send me back to the subtitle of the current project. As already 
mentioned, my subtitle indicates not only the critic’s attempt to analyse 
Gordimer via a globalising/ postcolonial prism of interpretation; it suggests, 
concomitantly, a new emphasis in Gordimer’s literary preoccupations: her 
“looking awry” (to echo the title of Slavoj Žižek’s landmark book, 1991), 
beyond the local, in pursuit of cognate social paradigms and new edges 
elsewhere.  
 
4. The Pick Up (2001) 
 
This shift is particularly noticeable in Gordimer’s The Pickup (2001), 
her first novel to embrace the locality in a globally significant way. The novel 
unfolds in two locations, one South African, the other North African. Gordimer 
presents South Africa (after the demise of apartheid) as both a microcosm of 
world forces and as a country collectively seeking a better understanding of self 
by connecting with significant margins of the world, rather than by either 
imitating or resisting the Centre. By placing part of the action in North Africa, 
Gordimer offers a skilful way of exploring new post-apartheid issues at home, 
through a ‘distant reading’ of the local, particularly of its politics of identity and 
belonging.  
This short novel could have been two separate short stories: one dealing 
with the dreams and realities of illegal immigration to South Africa; the other 
dealing with the dreams and realities of escape (emigration to the United States) 
against the background of an unnamed desert country, indeed the desert itself. 
Having been expelled from his first mecca (South Africa), Abdu seeks another 
destination, whereas Julie, his South African wife, finds contentment in the 
unnamed North African state. There is no apparent reason why Gordimer feels 
the need to remove the protagonists from the familiar South African setting. Is 
the novel perhaps a parable meant to hide the author’s unease in dealing with 
painful issues of belonging to a new, post-1990 domestic reality?  
The second part of the novel deals with the two protagonists’ emigration 
from South Africa to Abdu’s unnamed home village, somewhere in North 
Africa. Here, Gordimer uses the novelistic technique of shifting the perspective 
to another plane of reality (another locality), so as to help the reader gain a 
better sense of the central story. Significantly, the couple emigrate from one 
Periphery to another, and not to the metropolis; in this way, by seeking familiar 
patterns elsewhere, Gordimer offers a ‘defamiliarisation’ of the local, a ‘distant’ 
reading of it. She presents the reader with the impact of exile on one’s sense of 
identity and belonging, and more specifically, with the phenomenon of illegal 
immigration and accompanying reactions of xenophobia. Gordimer reveals 
Abdu’s psychological turmoil, the continual internal contestation and 
interchange between different mind-states and hypostases of the self, or what 
Bhabha refers to as liminality, “this interstitial passage between fixed identities” 
(1994: 4).  
Julie needs to leave home (South Africa) and emigrate to a place similar 
to the one she has left behind – a world of severe discrepancies – in order ‘to 
see’ the real nature of her place of origin. An important aspect of postcolonial 
reality that Julie did not perceive at home, and now does, is the hybrid nature of 
everyday practices in the Third World. When Abdu takes her to the local 
market, she finds that, alongside traditional merchandise, are sold kitschy 
plastic utensils “decorated with flower patterns of organic ostentation that 
seemed tactless in a desert village” (2001: 126), all wares that the First World – 
through its multinational sweatshops – has dumped here, and which the locals 
are eager to buy because “they don’t break so soon” (126). As she learns more 
and more about the younger generation’s mentality in the face of 
westernisation, Julie realises that Abdu and his companions, who are all 
university graduates, are critically aware of global interactions and exchanges 
in the Third World, of what Raymond Williams would refer to as the dialectic 
of “residuality” and “emergence” (1977: 5) between global tradition and 
modernization, Centres and Peripheries. The generation that cherishes “Nike 
boots, cellphones, TV consoles, hi-fi and video equipment” (203) is, at the 
same time, aware that important changes have to be made for these status 
symbols to be truly affordable and integrated in everyday life. This generation 
understands that the Third World is constantly shaped by western images, by 
“the ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes” (Appadurai 1994: 
305) that are brought back by the returning migrants from the West. 
While Julie becomes a keen observer of these collective identities, she 
also feels a sense of profound alienation from them. She is thus forced to 
consider another type of dislocation, another significant Periphery: that of the 
internal exile in solitary communion with the North African desert. The desert 
is an echo of, and companion to, Julie as she challenges her old secure white 
South African experience. Apart from its being offered as support for spiritual 
pursuit, the desert may also be interpreted as embodiment of Julie’s scepticism 
about the meta-narratives of socio-political totalities, whether South African, 
North American, Australian (or North African, for that matter). The desert is 
outside of any social space, including that of the North African village itself: 
“The desert. No seasons of bloom and decay. Just the endless turn of night and 
day. Out of time” (172). This is an indirect authorial way of expressing doubt 
about the ultimate validity of any one social system of reference, whether local 
or global. It may also suggest Gordimer’s own sense of exhaustion with 
political overdetermination, or her disenchantment with recent social 
configurations, both locally and internationally. 
 
5. Loot  (2003) 
Gordimer has continued, since The Pickup (2001), to show an interest in 
the dynamics of the global beyond the local. Her collection of short stories, 
Loot (2003), is an explicit engagement with the new tendency in her artistic 
vision, her new focus on (dis)location, place and displacement in the world 
today. What strikes the reader at a first glance is the multiplicity of locales – 
more stories are set outside South Africa than inside the country – and the fact 
that eight of the ten stories relate to issues of post-liberation and global politics. 
The main thrust of the 2003 collection is identity and belonging in conditions of 
post-apartheid and post-Cold War indeterminacy and liminality, especially as 
applied to exile and dislocation in the world today. It is quite significant that 
“Loot”, the title story, is situated outside of South Africa. The story refers to a 
real incident that took place in Chile, a tsunami, which Gordimer makes use of 
in order to reflect on the consequences of extreme situations on the human 
psyche. Human greed – that is, the looting of the objects revealed by the 
receding sea – is shown to have no boundaries as it ‘contaminates’ people 
across all social barriers and everywhere in the world. Gordimer reveals the 
frailty of all human convictions in extra-ordinary circumstances: she even 
manages to introduce an allusion to the time of political uprisings under 
apartheid, when “the ordinary opportunity of looting shops was routine to 
people” (2003: 4). This short story is a reminder of Gordimer’s long-standing 
preoccupations with identity and betrayal in human interaction, but with a new 
touch: her opening to the world, to global perspectives, to ‘the ethics of 
beyond’. 
 “Visiting George” is situated in London and looks at the phenomenon 
of South African exile and dislocation under apartheid. It is a meditation on an 
old comrade of the struggle years, who lives in England, where he reflects on 
his profound disappointment with communism in the ex-Soviet Union. 
However, it is in her non-fiction that Gordimer fully analyses “the tragedy of 
the Russian attempt to improve our human lot” and “this sense of abandonment 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union brings to our century” (1999: 226-227). 
Gordimer pursues the saga of the corrupt Soviet Union, referred to as “the 
fallen star, the red star” in the last, untitled story in the novella, “Karma” (2003: 
153-173), which is part of Loot. The story unfolds against the background of 
the general collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. We look at this 
sinister social scene through the eyes of a young woman, Elena, whose young 
adulthood was marred by a social system that was unable to translate its own 
‘grand narrative’ into lived experience. Caught up in a schizoid routine – that 
included endless food queues, as well as regular State ballet shows – Elena 
grows up hoping to be free one day. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
brings with it the collapse of most social structures: “Old people [were] begging 
in the streets ... old women with the bewildered faces of former housewives, 
looked shamed under shawls” (220). When her own grandmother also starts 
begging at street corners, Elena starts an affair with a foreigner who helps her 
out of the country and “saves her from the chaos in Russia” (224). Trapped in a 
marriage of convenience, Elena has an illuminating insight into the new kind of 
unfreedom of the post-communist aftermath, which forces people to leave the 
country. While watching and then psychologically identifying with industrially 
managed cows in a model Italian farm, Elena has an epiphanic experience: she 
then and there decides to leave her marriage and abort her unwanted child – 
even if this means her becoming an illegal immigrant again. 
Another aspect of illegal immigration – as global phenomenon – is 
presented in “Homage”, which takes place in an unnamed metropolis, and 
whose protagonist is nameless too: “I am nobody; no country counts me in its 
census, the name they gave me doesn’t exist; nobody did what was done” (136). 
This person has assassinated a politician, a crime for which he was paid good 
money that helps him stay on in the West. The protagonist calls to mind Abdu, 
“the nobody Abdu” of The Pickup (discussed above), who too has to put up 
with an underground existence, in South Africa. Whether in Johannesburg or in 
any other big city of the world, the pain of clandestine existence is the same: it 
involves an annihilation of identity and a painful silencing of self. The nobody 
alien, although alive, has no life: he is socially invisible and has no rights: his 
name and life are buried, symbolically, next to the lifeless body of the man 
whom he has assassinated: 
 
All the time I was being pushed out of one country into another, I was afraid of having 
no papers, afraid of being questioned, afraid of being hungry, but now I had nothing to 
be afraid of. I still have nothing to fear. I don’t speak. (2003: 137) 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, let me pose the question: Do we perceive – in The Pickup 
and Loot, as discussed in this article – Gordimer as a world writer? A 
postcolonial writer? A postcolonialising world writer? I suggest the last of these 
categories: a writer of neither Centre nor Periphery, but one inhabiting 
‘significant peripheries’ of becoming: ‘post-postcolonial’ processes of new 
adjustments between the old formulations of North and South. These complex, 
new relationships among the various edges of the world have been reinforced 
by Gordimer in an unexpected project: she edited an activist-inspired collection 
of short stories, Telling Tales (2004), for which she approached twenty-one 
well-known contemporary world writers from both North and South, including 
five Nobel prize-winners. She asked them each to offer a short story without 
receiving royalty, so that the profits from the sale of Telling Tales could be 
donated to the HIV/ AIDS global fund. As Gordimer states in her Introduction: 
“We decided that we too should wish to give something of our ability, as 
imaginative writers, to contribute in our way to the fight against this disease 
from which no country, no individual, is safely isolated” (2004: 1). The artist 
literally steps out of the ivory tower into the world market place: the 
imaginative contribution is sold, then donated, as words become a material 
object, a book. Is this a further hint of Gordimer, the artist and activist, seeking 
a new stance in the postcolonialising process: that of an affirmative project 
without surrendering artistic integrity?  
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1. Introduction 
 
The contemporary city as an urban palimpsest is a composite 
environment, the product of overlapping forms that have emerged over 
centuries of growth and distinguish themselves in the different layers that are 
still visible at present. The present paper considers some texts that have 
acknowledged Johannesburg’s post-Apartheid transformation: Nadine 
Gordimer’s Get a Life, The Pickup, The House Gun, None to Accompany Me, 
Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, and Neill Blomkamp’s film District 9. 
In earlier narratives, the city of Johannesburg used to be the 
representation of the Apartheid nation and violence whereas after 1990, 
Johannesburg became a link in a series of portraits of the increasingly 
globalized world. Although urban renewal has often involved destruction of 
businesses, demolition of historic structures, relocation of people and private 
property becoming public, it has also had positive aspects, such as 
multiculturalism and multiracialism. The concept of home is also fundamental 
and it is examined from the point of view of the returnee from exile and of the 
immigrant. Thus, the city reveals its hidden layers: smelly crowded places, 
labyrinths, places for relocations and violent manifestations and finally, a place 
including residential areas, slums and glimpses of the veld.  
Michael Chapman (2008:11) observes that the new South African 
literature “portrays a multiracial, multicultural society rather than a society 
marked by cultural isolation or political ideologies”. Nadine Gordimer’s post-
Apartheid writings present “metropolitan centres” that are neither “African nor 
Asian nor Latin-American, nor indeed East European peripheries, but multiple 
margins and centres that are imbued with different degrees of significance”.  
Gordimer’s novels depict a Johannesburg of equal opportunities for 
Africans, Indians, coloured or white people, with violence being the major issue 
for everybody irrespective of their skin colour. Dangor looks at black people’s 
relocation from the slums to the new Suburbs, which are, in fact, another kind 
of slum. District 9 offers an alternate Johannesburg with images from real-life 
slums inhabited by aliens who are threatened by forced evictions.  
The redefinition of the city’s identity in the globalized world was 
affirmed the moment when South Africa won the right to host the 2010 Soccer 
World Cup. It is difficult to consider Johannesburg a city where Apartheid has 
been substituted by globalization. It is in fact a city whose identity is 
established by migrants from rural areas or from different South African 
countries, by the large number of people who moved from the black townships 
into formerly white areas. As Emma Hunt (2006:104) underlines  
 
Rural migrants and immigrants from the rest of Africa cannot compete with 
multinational corporations for control of the city. Yet the city has been altered as much 
by street culture, by Ethiopian and Senegalese immigrants, by hawkers, beggars, and 
buskers as by new forms of surveillance, by gated communities that emulate Tuscan 
villages and by air-conditioned shopping malls and casinos. The result is a city of 
paradoxical spaces, where the formal and the informal coexist in a proximity that 
would have dismayed apartheid urban planners. 
 
Nadine Gordimer warns that the city has become increasingly divided as 
it joins a network of global cities, whereas the director of District 9 goes further 
and underlines the separation of the white and black Suburbs from the black 
areas situated on the outskirts of the city. There is also a clear division between 
South Africans and African immigrants, the latter being presented as tribal, 
savage (cannibals, even) and completely ignorant of the fact that Johannesburg 
is the site of an ideal of cultural globalization.  
Gordimer’s understanding of what she calls “the ethic of mutual 
enrichment” of cultural globalization is represented by the ‘rate of exchange’ 
for writers all over the world, that is “the expansion of ideas […] as coming 
from the life and spirit of the Other, the unknown country and society”. She is 
interested in exploring “what the aim of globalization of culture is or […] could 
be” in order to determine if it is related to “emphasizing the unity, the oneness 
of cultural expression” and, thus, it could be used as a means to diminish the 
manifestations of xenophobia. The second aim of globalization (the one that 
Gordimer reinforces) is “to value the differences, […] across aesthetic 
frontiers” and refute the arguments provided by governments that divide the 
world according to political and national criteria (2000: 209). 
 
2. Accommodation: between private and public spaces 
 
A typical characteristic that can be traced through Gordimer’s novels 
and short stories is her examination of rural and urban space “as an index of 
repression and as a focus of political resistance” (Head 1995: 47). She describes 
township life in order to discover community values in the new black 
collectivity, to expose the secrets of people’s daily life in public, without being 
forbidden to do it. The squatter camps contrast with the glass and steel of 
modern Johannesburg or the old-fashioned houses from the suburbs that were 
built during the nineteenth and twentieth century, with “broken – pillared stoep 
and dust-dried pot-plants, battered relic of real bricks and mortar” that are home 
for scavenging dogs (Gordimer 1995:50). 
For Gordimer, place (as well as home) is not predetermined, but 
depends on the role assumed by her characters and their choice of action. This 
is the main reason why Sibongile Maqoma, the successful black woman in 
None to Accompany Me, cannot match her definition of ‘home’ to its actual 
location. Home is different from the place where she belongs ethnologically, 
rather it is “the place you were born to, the faces you first saw around you, and 
the elements of the situation among your fellow men in which you found 
yourself and with which you have been struggling, politically, personally or 
artistically, all your life” (Gordimer 1988:34). The personal, political or artistic 
endeavours that the South African writer has undertaken have defined her status 
and she has used this definition to situate her characters in the context of her 
novels. Sibongile’s search for home is one of the best examples in this respect.  
On her return from exile, the black woman refuses to go back to the 
little house in the township of Chiawelo, where she and her husband spent their 
youth, in fact a slum “with the crush of people doubling- and tripling-up for 
somewhere to live” (Gordimer 1995:43). They prefer to spend the first night of 
their interim in a black leader’s house “in what used to be a forbidden white 
suburb” (44). Their return is not as promising as they had expected: their status 
of exiles always on the run does not change immediately. After they move out 
of their first transient home, their next living quarters provided by government 
are in a hotel that seems to be another “wonderful concession” to what post-
Apartheid government calls desegregation: “a filthy dump, a whore house” that 
smells like cockroaches (45). She feels she does not belong to the slum 
atmosphere, even though she openly admits that all those living there are her 
own people. In spite of the fact that her husband is grateful for having shelter 
and sharing the same situation as thousands of returnees, Sibongile is not 
prepared to share the intimacy of exile and return with anyone. The issue of 
accommodation defines her new identity of returnee, as she is not ready to 
name any part of South Africa ‘home’ yet. She looks back to ‘the grey days’ of 
Stockholm and London that appear shinier now than ever before in comparison 
to what South Africa has to offer. A traditional definition of home seems 
suitable for all the other returnees, but not for Sibongile Maqoma:  
 
Home: that quiet word: a spectacle, a theatre, a pyrotechnic display of emotion for 
those who come from wars, banishment, exile, who have forgotten what home was, or 
suffered not being able to forget. (Gordimer 1995:44) 
 
The black woman’s private emotions are conditioned by her sense of 
home. Sibongile cannot afford to waste her emotions on her return to South 
Africa and the word home is replaced by accommodation. Privacy is no longer 
an issue: her life must be public and comfortable, as she detests the privacy and 
distress of exile.  
Her refusal to recognize ‘home’ is part of her alienation process from 
the values of the traditional black society, as she sees herself as the image of the 
future South African democracy. Unlike her husband, who is captive in the past 
and is “in there, at home in [his] country” (99), Sibongile fights against any 
memories or relationships that could trap her. 
The Maqomas move in with the Starks and Sibongile is content to live 
in a white only neighborhood. The final accommodation is in the same building 
where she has her office. Her working place becomes her home not only 
because they are situated in the same building but also because her working life 
takes over her personal life. She becomes the absent wife/mother but she has a 
sense of fulfillment, especially when she apparently reconnects with her black 
community: she is in charge of a programme that reintegrates exiles into the 
new South African environment. She considers herself as an example, 
particularly when she admits that she has arrived home: she meets one of her 
cousins and she feels drawn to “her other self”, “wakened [..], shaken alive into 
another light, another existence” (52); the blood ties revive her spirit and 
determine her to find the answer to the questions about her home and identity: 
 
The feel of the house, that was home, at last, changed. The dimension of rooms stood 
back, fragile. [...] The locks on the doors – nothing, to a force that had the keys to 
everything in everyone’s life, that had sent them into exile and let them in again. They 
carried on with routine lives during the day and at night sat on the furniture Sibongile 
had bought, as in a waiting- room. (265) 
 
In The Pickup, the city of Johannesburg is easily recognizable, although 
never named. The global city has not completely taken over the Apartheid city, 
as the disparities caused by wealth and education are still preserved. The novel 
shows a divided community: there are people who are able to move freely from 
country to country and those who enter illegally to work at the edge of global 
cities.  
Julie, the rich white daughter of a well-known businessman, despises the 
suburbs of her childhood and, above all, the privileges offered to their 
inhabitants. She moves into a “series of backyard cottages adapted from 
servants’ quarters” (Gordimer 2001:8), which she sees as a radical departure 
from her father’s house, but which, in fact, is not because leaving the Suburbs 
to live in a black neighbourhood and going to clubs in Soweto (the black 
township where bloody Johannesburg riots started on several occasions during 
the Apartheid years) on Saturday nights has become a norm in the new South 
Africa. Julie considers that her ‘place’ is sufficiently remote from the Suburbs’ 
ostentation and is accepted by the black community “as the kind of place they 
themselves moved to from the old segregation” (18). 
South Africa, like any other country, shelters its illegal immigrants 
underground, the dark place that “is the only freedom” (87) for people with 
different identities, like Abdu. The Arab immigrant’s inability to “conform to 
what others call the world” (58) throws him to the underground spaces where 
immigrants are hidden, to a “labyrinth to get lost in” (86), rather than into a 
global network. The illegal immigrant is forced to live in disguise, borrowing 
different names, perhaps eventually becoming a legal migrant who is still “a 
stray dog, a rat finding its hole as a way to get in” (227).  
In The Pickup, the quest for belonging demands a return to the concept 
of place, but not necessarily to the bordered space. Gordimer presents numerous 
alternative spaces including the multicultural and multiracial city. Her 
protagonists’ attempts to locate the self are examined in each of these spaces by 
using a sexual, racial, familial, spiritual, and cultural approach. Johannesburg is 
a mere example of the global city and it is left unnamed because it corresponds 
to any cosmopolitan city in any developing country.  
 
3. The legacy of violence 
 
With the decline of the rigorous and despotic Afrikaner government, 
crime in South Africa rose rapidly. In the 1990s, Johannesburg was constantly 
on top of the list of cities with the highest crime rate in the world. Although 
Apartheid is no longer the law, blacks and whites still live largely separate and 
unequal. Johannesburg is divided into the expensive (and mainly white) 
northern suburbs and separate poor districts, which are almost entirely black. 
The so-called ‘black on black violence’ – thus underlining its tribal side – has 
become colour-blind and one can speak of generalized violence. In 2002, there 
were bombings in black Soweto – and a right-wing organization has claimed to 
have organized them. In response, there were bomb attacks on the white 
suburbs of Johannesburg: 
 
The habit of violence has been instilled, and this is a problem we know will be 
inherited by a new South Africa. The vocabulary of violence has become the common 
speech of both black and white. (Gordimer 2000:142) 
 
Gordimer criticizes the fact that violence is repeating itself and is a form 
of communication in the city of Johannesburg. Violence must be understood on 
a social level, beyond individual experiences, affecting not only the perpetrators 
and their victims, but also everyone who “gathers against it […] in some sort of 
mutually constructed shelter, the cellar of the other kind of war, from the 
bombshells of existence” (1998:86). 
The city’s beggars looking for their daily bread, its boys with “glue-
sniffer’s plastic bottle half-stuffed under the neck of his garment” (180), its 
smell of “urine and street-stall flowers” (278) are traits that make it similar with 
other metropolises around the world. What makes it different is the way its 
people have learnt to reconcile with the past and deal with the present. This 
“jagged end of a continent” (278) has offered plenty of positive examples that 
are worthwhile following. 
The presence of the city of Johannesburg in Gordimer’s writings is a 
contributing factor in the remaking of culture and identity beyond racial 
conflicts and random violence. This is the place where the juxtaposition of 
races, nations and cultures leads to the exploration of intraracial and interracial 
violence. In the former city of Johannesburg – that belonged to the spatial 
geography Apartheid – people were confined, segregated, monitored and 
“rendered violently invisible to others” who were not part of their group 
(Nuttal, 2004:748). The post-Apartheid city has no limits, and order is 
established with difficulty as the newly acquired freedom makes South African 
citizens believe that they can take justice into their own hands. Violence in 
Johannesburg is a legacy of Apartheid and only confronting the fears 
implemented by that regime can bring peace of mind and end all hostilities.  
Harald and Claudia Lingard, the passively liberal white couple placed at 
the center of the story in The House Gun, do not consider that much has 
changed in the political transition to the post-Apartheid rule, from F.W. de 
Klerk to Nelson Mandela. Harald, a business executive, and Claudia, a medical 
doctor, are living in relative security, in a small and comfortable house in the 
Suburbs of Johannesburg, watching evening news of disasters elsewhere, when 
they are faced with a piece of news about violence that will affect their lives. 
The Lindgards have moved to “this townhouse complex with security-
monitored entrance” (Gordimer 1998:3) with the specific purpose to escape the 
outside world and its violence. The moment when “the intercom buzzes” (3), 
they enter into a state of alert. Any visitor ringing at that time of night cannot be 
a bearer of good news. 
Initially, at the beginning of the 1990s, the formerly white Suburbs of 
the post-Apartheid city were deserted by most of their inhabitants at the 
moment when black people had the right to become their neighbours. Some of 
the “white civil servants, mainly Afrikaners” who “lived neatly around their 
Apostolic and Dutch Reformed churches” could not accept the fact that the 
traditional city has become “a place where all that had been clandestine, the 
mixing of blacks and whites” is now accessible (Gordimer 2005:44). In her 
post-Apartheid writings, Gordimer has opted for the next stage in the 
development of the Suburbs; she presents them as lively, colourful and 
cosmopolitan instead of desolate and dismal. The 21st century inhabitants of the 
inner city area of Johannesburg are no longer exclusively the political activists 
of the 1990s, for there are also migrants from various parts of the world, who 
introduce “an alternative to corporate chic” (44). Rap and jazz bars, late-night 
bookshops and arts and crafts shops are frequented by former ‘minorities’, such 
as gay or black people, vegetarians or formerly illegal residents, mixed race 
couples and the black upper class doing business with their white partners.  
In the heart of Johannesburg, there are bookshops that offer a glimpse of 
nature, of the veld, vague indications that the urban space concealed “scuffed 
and rat-nibbled early accounts of pre-white-settled terrain, river courses, and 
information on pre-industrial climate” (45). Nature reveals itself in the Suburbs, 
sending some of its species from the swamps or from the bush to feed in the 
gardens of the well-off citizens. “The creatures ignore you”, they “have nothing 
to do with you”. They reclaim their habitat and, “unless they are hunted, 
expelled from their places in the universe […] by logging, burning off, urban, 
industrial and rural pollution”, wild creatures will survive any “radiant nuclear 
fallout” as they demonstrated in millions of years of existence (49) and, thus, 
nature has reconstructed the pre-urbanisation environmental conditions. 
Achmat Dangor’ Bitter Fruit follows a black family from their fight 
against Apartheid to their apparent success when they move into the houses 
they had longed for. Black people are relocated to the white suburbs. Yet, the 
houses in the middle-class black suburbs are economical, the walls breathe “the 
wrong way, they suck air out of the house, then clog up like the lining of some 
diseased lung that can’t suck any air back in” (2004:81). The former slums 
were transformed into black suburbs by relocating people to houses with 
additional rooms and swimming pools, gardens and water, “a cheap dream 
house” (82) impossible to sell and move out of the new real-life slums. The 
residents are “Apartheid astronauts, trapped in this damn twilight world […] 
between black and white, trying to be both and ending up as neither” (82). The 
tenants considered it “a wonderful place, just after Mandela was released, 
mixed of race and free in spirit” (204). The main characters, Silas, and his son, 
Michael, realize that they can write their own history of South Africa by 
following their family’s movement from one slum to another, from “one ruined 
neighborhood to the next”, witnessing their home destroyed by Government 
Acts only because an area is predominantly Indian, coloured or African, “filled 
with noise, loud music, people congregate in the street, it is squalid, it is a slum 
and therefore qualifies for clearance under the Slums Clearance Act” (186). 
Racism and xenophobia are still present in the newly established Suburbs:  
 
‘We don’t have rats and cockroaches in the suburbs.’ 
‘Like hell. What do you have?’ 
‘Nigerians, Pakistanis, Taiwanese…’ (212). 
 
The film I have chosen to illustrate the multiple layers of Johannesburg 
was released in 2009 and it was named after the divisions of some South 
African cities: District 9. The script was based on real-life events that took 
place in District Six, Cape Town, during the Apartheid era (1966), when the 
government declared this area as the property of whites only, and thus, started 
the forced removals. By 1982, more than 60,000 people had been relocated 25 
kilometers away from their homes, which were destroyed in order to build a 
University and its campus, but eventually, most of the whites-only territory 
remained undeveloped land.  
Director Neill Blomkamp presents a quarantined neighborhood where 
aliens are hosted until the government decides that there are too many of them 
and they have to be moved as inner city residential areas must be kept clean. 
The movie is more than science fiction as it was filmed on location in the slums 
of Chiawelo, Soweto, and it uses fictional interviews, news footage, and videos 
from surveillance cameras in a documentary-style format. The themes of 
xenophobia and social segregation are at the center of the script: the aliens, 
some kind of ‘prawns’ as the officials name them, are confined to District 9, a 
military camp set up by the South African government inside Johannesburg, a 
camp which immediately transforms into a slum. The governmental decision is 
to relocate the fast-breeding aliens to an internment camp outside the city, 
ironically called District 10. The attempt to evacuate the aliens to another camp 
leads to violence and slaughter by South African security forces.  
Another significant theme in District 9 is the support offered by 
multinational corporations to government funds for military equipment and 
training. As Salman Rushdie (2003:296-7) underlines, globalization and its 
military-political sidekick are impossible to avoid if we reject the idea “of pure 
cultures, in urgent need of being kept free from alien contamination” that led to 
Apartheid and ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, one of the downsides of 
globalization is the presence of multinationals that are involved not only in the 
economy of a country but also in its politics. The obvious advantage is 
represented by the jobs available to people who otherwise, would relocate.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The new space, between global and local, needs to be further explored 
and defined. The multitude of centres and margins provides the opportunity for 
the post-Apartheid city of Johannesburg to rediscover its buried layers of 
history and contemporaneity and to redefine its identity. The three different 
views of this South African city complete the image of the urban palimpsest, as 
they bring to attention the transformations of public space into private, of slums 
into suburbs due to forced removals from African settlements and the rise of 
other slums when the first are dismantled. As Scott Johnson (2009) accentuated 
in his analysis of District 9, “the city should not be alien to foreigners” and, I 
might add, it should encourage diversity and bring the best in its people by 
multiculturalism and multiracialism.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Like any other metropolis of the world, London has gathered in time a 
multitude of artistic representations so that almost all street corners and 
buildings find their echo in a piece of art. Despite the numerous representations 
of the metropolis, be it colonial or postcolonial, poetic or pictorial, fictional or 
geographical, the real image of London is impossible to be defined for it 
presents itself as a huge palimpsest relying upon the superposition of a plurality 
of maps and the conjoined results of a plurality of readings. 
Will Self’s novel The Book of Dave: A Revelation of the Recent Past 
and the Distant Future (2006) captures a glimpse of the present day metropolis 
anchored in a trite, automatic daily routine that restructures the texture of the 
city as seen through the eyes of a postmodern city observer – a taxi driver. 
Following Roland Barthes’s model of a semiological analysis of the urban 
space, Self resumes the same endeavour of looking for signs, signifiers and 
signifieds in the streets, buildings and monuments of London, focusing instead 
upon the empty signifiers of the Metropolis, upon the lost significances and the 
traces of a culturally meaningful past.  
 
2. Towards the Death of the Metropolis  
 
Due to the excessive economic growth and capitalization visible during 
the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, the traditional 
centre of the metropolis was challenged so that postmodernity brought an 
inherent decentralisation that, instead of changing and challenging the position 
of the centre, multiplied it into a diversity of sub-centres (economical, 
commercial, cultural, ancient, new etc). The parallel processes of de-/re-
centering the metropolis and redefining its boundaries by the continuous 
addition of suburb areas that threaten to pulverize it into a multitude of sub-
metropolises, are equated by the obliteration of the metropolis under the burden 
of representations. Most of the time this “burden of representation” is 
engendered by the domination of informatics and of its new means of 
communication and, some other times, by the relativisation of distances. The 
preponderance of the image over the written word sometimes leads to the 
proliferation of a fabricated representation of the metropolis present in 
brochures, illustrated guides, leaflets, tourist maps and websites; most 
frequently all these provide the viewer with a glossy, beautified though neuter 
image of a particular space. At the same time they seem to deprive the 
postmodern traveler of curiosity and of the ensuing pleasure of discovery. This 
is precisely what Will Self wants to avoid and, to this purpose, he finds – as 
always in his case – highly unconventional means of activating the perception 
of the Metropolis. 
The sites of memory, as imagined by Nora, become mere material 
absences, traces of some forgotten signifieds that have to be revived. The habit 
and the fact that we are constantly assaulted by trivial representations of the 
urban space we inhabit, transform the representative landmarks of a city into 
empty recipients of people’s indifference and oblivion. By gradually losing the 
significance that shaped their existence and due to an excessive emphasis 
placed upon consumerism and profit, metropolises, too, seem to fall into the 
trap already theorised by Baudrillard, of the originals replaced by simulacra. 
The erasure of the past, the metamorphosis of the cultural into 
commercial and of these sites of memory into empty spaces, the proliferation of 
centres, of beautifully neutral, impersonal metropolitan representations and the 
emergence of an ever increasing post-suburbia, made urban theorists declare the 
end of the Metropolis era, the Death of the Metropolis and the birth of the 
Exopolis and of fractal cities. This new postmodern nostalgia is directed 
towards that traditional type of city where “time becomes visible”, according to 
Lewis Mumford’s words, where traces of history, cultural tradition and social 
involvement combine into a complex urban space. The danger that postmodern 
metropolises might become pseudo-cities (celebrating the commercial 
simulacrum of a space of forgetfulness and erasure of memory, to which 
London makes no exception), was prophesized by such theorists as Norman 
Klein, Edward Soja, Lewis Mumford, and Thomas Bender. Such a pseudo-city 
“reveals no passage of time, no history. The City Lite does not age; it is 
consumed and replaced. It is any time and any place – it no longer holds culture 
nor provides an orientation to the past and present for its residents” (Bender in 
Soja 2000: 247). 
Will Self offers a disturbing reading of London which rises against this 
type of involuntary erasure of memory and transmutation of the metropolis into 
a depersonalized metroplex. Using his fictional representation of the city and 
superimposing several possible maps of the metropolis, though in a very 
unorthodox manner, Self attempts a revival of Soja’s theorization of the 
metropolis, based on a slightly reversed “trialectics” of spatiality. What Soja 
(1997) theorised as the three components of the social production of space (the 
perceived, conceived and lived space), reworking upon Lefebvre’s ideas,  
seems to have collapsed in Self’s urban landscape and mingled under the 
conjoint influences of consumerism and mercantilism. 
The former experience of inhabiting, creating and representing the City 
has been transformed into a superficial experience marked by indifference, 
oblivion and superficiality. Rushing between places without actually seeing 
them or being aware of their influence has become the common denominator of 
all the manners of experiencing the Metropolis. The traditional space-time 
chronotope seems to have been equally transformed – with the temporal 
dimension ever shorter and compressed, and the spatial dimension of the 
Metropolis ever larger, decentralized and apparently invisible to its inhabitants. 
All the reference marks of the City seem now to be devoid of their significance. 
This is, at least, what Self thinks and confesses through the voice of his lunatic 
taxi driver: 
 
The cabbie’s furious thoughts shot through the windscreen and ricocheted off the 
unfeeling world. Achilles was up on his plinth with his tiny bronze cock, his black 
shield fending off the hair-styling wand of the Hilton, where all my heartache began. 
Solid clouds hung overhead lunging up fresh blood. The gates to Hyde Park, erected 
for the Queen Mother, looked like bent paperclips in the gloom, the lion and unicorn 
on their Warner Brothers escutcheon were prancing cartoon characters. Evil be to him 
who thinks of it, said the Unicorn, and the Lion replied, Eeee, whassup, Doc? (Self 27) 
 
3. Driving in the City: Postmodern pilgrimages  
 
When placed among different observers of the urban space, Dave, the 
dejected London taxi driver, shattered by the recent divorce from his wife and 
the loss of his son’s custody, seems not to fall into one definite category but to 
gather specific features pertaining to several. An “Ambassador of the City” as 
he defines himself, he sees a cabbie’s profession as that of a “part driver, part 
tour guide” (Self 33) who measures the City, assesses its distances in terms of 
cab tariffs so that “time, distance and money” become “the three dimensions of 
Dave Rudman’s universe” (31). 
When distinguishing between travellers and flâneurs, between those 
who simply go from one place to the other and the ones who “botanise the 
asphalt” (Benjamin in Leach 2002:2), in search of its hidden signs and 
significances but never truly getting emotionally involved in its deciphering, 
between observers and voyeurs, theorists were mainly interested in the act of 
traversing the city on foot. Going on foot, feeling the pulse of the city, 
absorbing its flavors and embracing its rhythm, were considered to be the main 
methods of reading the city. 
Will Self suggests another type of “reading” the city by making his 
main character a taxi driver in love with London and an expert in anything 
related to its Knowledge (all the runs and points that any London taxi driver has 
to know) and to the statues and monuments in London. Dave’s experience in 
the metropolis is disturbing as he gradually loses his grip on reality – due to his 
personal problems and the history of mental illness running in his family – but 
reinforces his attachment to London. When his entire universe collapses, his 
love for the city and for his job is what “keeps his wheels on the ground”. 
Reciting the runs and points and taking refuge into the solid stability of the city 
and the closed, insulated universe of his car help him focus upon the only 
certain reality in his life – the streets of London – and prevent him from 
completely losing his sanity. These drives back and forth into the heart and 
suburbs of the metropolis are turned into almost mystical pilgrimages along the 
labyrinthine streets of London, a sacred rite of passage from mere dweller of the 
city to the rank of an all-knowing high priest of its avenues.  
 
I fucking know. I know it all – I hold it all. If all of this were swamped, taken out by a 
huge fucking flood, who’d be able to tell you what it was like? Not the fucking Mayor 
or the Prime Minister – that’s for sure. But me, an ‘umble cabbie. (Self 33) 
 
In this shattering universe and distorted reality, as seen by Dave’s 
troubled mind, which gradually disintegrates under the burden of psychological 
traumas and pressures of economic considerations, Self finds a particular 
pleasure in having Dave state his “points” and thus reaffirm the stability of 
space and redefine places of reference. While constantly counteracting the 
dissolution of his reality by recording names of streets and of buildings, by 
enumerating monuments and relating their history, Dave not only attempts to 
exorcise the demons of his mind but also to recreate the City and make people 
aware of its “spatiality”. 
 
The ghost drove on up the Broadway past the uglified slab of the Connaught Business 
Centre and on through Colindale, turning right down Colindale Avenue by the 
Newspaper Library, where ageing amateur genealogists sifted the dusty old doings of 
their ancestors between their arthritic fingers. The cooper roof of the National Institute 
for Medical Research at Mill Hill shone in a single faint beam from the setting sun. 
(39) […] Forward Regent’s Park Road. Forward Finchley Road. Left Temple Fortune 
Lane. Bear left Meadway Crescent. Bear left Meadway. Right Hampstead Way… (44) 
 
Under the tyres of Dave’s cab the streets of London come to life and 
through his windscreen, its edifices and monuments can be seen from a new 
perspective which shatters the layer of dust and indifference that has rendered 
them almost invisible, and makes them regain their significance. This idea finds 
its best illustration in a very suggestive episode when all the statues in London, 
heroes and saints, lions and dragons, poets and kings, all its forgotten emblems 
come to life and leave their niches, go down from their plinths and pediments in 
order to reassert their presence in the city.  
 
Achilles was getting off his plinth; first one big foot then the other tore from its base 
with a tortured screech. He cut at the rags of mist with his short sword and brandished 
his shield at the Hilton Hotel. […] 
Achilles stood by beneath Constitution Arch and beat shield with sword. With a bang, 
then a spatter of stony fragments, the four horses atop the arch came alive, tossing their 
leaden heads. The boy holding the traces struggled to control them. Peace, erect in her 
chariot, her robe coming off her shoulder in rigid folds, flicked the reins and the 
whole, mighty quadriga rose, banked sharply and came crunching down. […]  
The other statues on the traffic island were animated: the Iron Duke spurred down his 
horse, Copenhagen; the bronze figures that attended him – Guard, Dragoon, Fusilier 
and Highlander – wrenched themselves free from the polished granite and fell in 
behind their commander-in-chief. […] (321) 
 
Since they are no more than huge petrified effigies emptied of their 
history and symbolism, the only thing they manage to provoke is to unleash 
chaos among the sleepy pedestrians and disoriented drivers. Dave’s endeavour 
is that of reinvesting the city he loves more than he himself is aware, “craving 
London as an identity”, with its lost strength, reviving the forgotten histories of 
each significant locus and reactivating people’s memory. The writer achieves 
this by deliberately overlapping different types of spaces and for each of the 
spaces he creates Self imagines as many types of maps and ways of mapping 
London. These spaces might be physical (recognizable in Dave’s various runs 
in London which recreate parts of the city in a huge urban puzzle), emotional 
(as individual or collective, historic or social memory is activated through 
anecdotes or incidents related to a particular place), mental (Dave’s gloomy 
projections of London into an apocalyptic future), imaginative (schizophrenic 
urban delusions offering alternative realities of the city), religious (as Dave 
founds a new religion – Dävinanity – a parody of modern Christianity) and 
finally, discursive spaces (as Self uses an idiosyncratic combination of Standard 
English, Cockney dialect, the drivers’ jargon and, in the episodes related to 
Ham, the post-apocalyptic remains of London, a special language, a sort of 
mock Cockney called Mokni). In imagining this language of the future Self 
achieves a very interesting combination of discourses and language registers, a 
mixture of pronunciations and voices that he tries to accurately record. Invented 
words and literal or phonetic transpositions, acronyms, abbreviations and 
blends besides the intertextual references and satirical hints make The Book of 
Dave one of the most original books of contemporary British literature. 
 
4. London and its post-apocalyptic revisitations 
 
Self’s illustration of the concept of the Death of the Metropolis appears 
in the episodes allegedly inspired by Dave’s books, discovered 500 years later, 
after a flood has already destroyed London. Inspired by the fact that in case of a 
deluge, the only part of London uncovered by waters would be Hampstead, Self 
imagines a dystopian, post-deluge ex-London, now reduced to the island of 
Ham, populated by people and motos and living according to the laws of Dave. 
He introduces these post-apocalyptic visions of a flooded London, by using as 
an epigraph a quotation taken from Edward Thomas’s The South Country:  
 
I like to think how easily Nature will absorb London as she absorbed the mastodon, 
setting her spiders to spin the winding sheet and her worms to fill in the graves, and 
her grass to cover it pitifully up, adding flowers – as an unknown hand added them to 
the grave of Nero. (1993: 77). 
  
In an interview by John O’Connell, Will Self comments upon the way in 
which he imagines London in this novel and upon the parts ascribed to his main 
character: “Dave has two main roles in the book. One is to be this repository of 
knowledge about London. You know, if it was destroyed, who would rebuild it? 
So it’s about his cognitive life, about the fact that he’s a unique beast who 
knows so much. But he’s also this other modern and emblematic figure, the 
“loser dad”, as the redtops would coin it; an angry, emotionally deracinated 
man. There seemed to me to be a productive synergy between those two aspects 
of his character”. 
While he knows almost everything about London, he is ignorant about 
the tricky ways of life: he raises a child he thinks is his, he marries a woman he 
thinks is the mother of his beloved son, he finally dies being accidentally shot 
in a process of money recuperation but his violent death is generally taken as a 
suicide. His entire life is a series of failures, discontentments, disappointments 
and nervous breakdowns. During his delusional bouts he writes, following 
Moses’ example, two diaries on metallic plates. The first one represents the 
basis of Dävinanity and records the principles of this new religion and the 
prescriptions according to which the society on Ham should be organized. The 
arrangements following Dave’s divorce from Michelle and the loss of his son 
Carl become the governing social and theological principles on an island of the 
future where men and women live separately and children have to spend their 
childhood commuting between parents until they remain with their fathers. A 
very misogynistic, authoritarian, violent and unjust religion bitterly satirises 
Christianity in its fundamentalist views, in what Self considered to be “a 
theoretization of bad-ass patriarchy” (interviews with Self: Vincent, “Abuse of 
Self”, on-line). The second book is a correction made to the first one, 
containing the core of Dave’s wisdom, the attenuation of his lifelong bitterness 
and the final self acceptance.  
All the oddities he imagines on the island of the future represent strange 
literalisations of metaphorical analogies present in the alternating episodes 
placed in contemporary London. The general oblivion that pesters the 
Metropolis almost placing it outside time is translated in the Ham sections in 
the deep layers of sand covering the former city; the proliferation of centres is 
illustrated by the multitude of islands that form the archipelago of Ing. The 
grotesque realities in contemporary London find an even more grotesque 
correspondence on Ham promoting Self as one of the best satirists of the 21st 
century.  
Self’s tricky part is that he practically forces his reader to do a lot of 
detective work that simultaneously covers several plans: on a geographical 
level the reader is permanently challenged to juxtapose the real map of London 
and the one provided by Self, and discover the real correspondents of the places 
on Ham; on a fictional level the reader is asked to make his way in a labyrinth 
of allusions, stories, metaphorical episodes and their literalisation, and on a 
linguistic level, to decipher a strange language. Self provides a map even for 
this linguistic journey as he gives a glossary at the end of the novel that 
translates the Mokni words. 
All these maps create a vivid image of a complex metropolis, otherwise 
too difficult to be described if using only one method of cartography, and place 
London at the intersections of theoretical coordinates of postmodern urban 
studies. Self’s London is faced with the Apocalypse at two different levels: a 
real one, emerging from the most pessimistic prophecies of urban theorists 
related to the general dissolution of the traditional metropolis and the 
emergence of a Postmetropolis, seen as a “carceral archipelago” (Mike Davis 
1990) obsessed with an “ecology of fear” and perpetuating a “security-obsessed 
urbanism” (Soja 2000: 312). The metaphorical apocalypse translates on a 
fictional level the general process of reconfiguring the cognitive maps of our 
urban imaginary spaces. The metropolis becomes a non-existent, computer-
generated space that Soja calls Simcity, short-circuiting our representation of 
the self in relation to the inhabited space. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Highly interested in anything pertaining to psychogeography and the 
way in which space and mind intersect and engender psychological experience, 
Self dwells upon the many ways in which the contemporary human being may 
still experience the City/Metropolis. Even if he has recently declared himself an 
adept of the “solitary walker” whom he sees as “an insurgent against the 
contemporary world, an ambulatory time traveler” (see Will Self: On 
“Psychogeography and the Places That Choose You”) he prefers a taxi driver as 
the main agent of rediscovering London in The Book of Dave. Self’s novel 
warns about all these dangers lying at the core of postmodern representations 
and reconfigurations of urban spaces in a highly disturbing novel giving rise to 
conflicting interpretations and critical appreciations. The British writer 
concludes his novel in an open way that does not offer solutions for any of 
these problems except perhaps for an unbridled and unconditioned love for 
one’s city that succeeds in creating a healing space of resistance against the 
apocalyptic consequences of oblivion, indifference and cultural erasure. 
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Abstract: Osmond’s statement of the psychedelic ambivalence opens the discussion of 
the contradictions of American Beat literature: spiritual illumination vs. bohemian 
lusts, freedom vs. political oppression, artistic integrity vs. “selling out.” Examples 
come from Ginsberg’s, Kerouac’s, Burroughs’s and Broyard’s works, with references 
to Hawthorne, Thoreau or Sukenick. Finally, a brief assessment of the historical 
importance of Beat contradictions is attempted. 
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1. Introduction: Heaven vs. Hell? 
 
The second line of the couplet quoted in the title of this paper reads: 
“just take a pinch of psychedelic”: together, they constitute the classic 
definition of the mind-expanding experience, framed in 1956 by the English 
psychiatrist Humphry Osmond on the basis of the two-line poem by his famous 
literary friend Aldous Huxley, “To make this trivial world sublime/ Take half a 
gramme of phanerothyme,” the latter standing for “mescaline” (Ruck, Bigwood 
Staples, Ott, Wasson 1979: 146). Osmond’s improved version, instead of 
stressing only the positive aspect of the aforementioned experience, presented it 
as intrinsically torn between the extremes of “heavenly” bliss (“unio mystica”) 
and “hellish” suffering, usually resulting from inappropriate “set” and “setting,” 
the former denoting the mental disposition of the subject of an mind-expanding 
adventure, the latter – the actual conditions of its being undertaken (Grof 2000: 
31). Moreover, it introduced the term “psychedelic,” which, since that time, has 
become the most widely accepted and most frequently used name of any 
chemical or natural substance (primarily marijuana, hashish, psilocybin, 
mescaline and LSD, occasionally – narcotics form the opiates “family” or even 
alcohol) that may almost immediately change the human perception towards 
mystical illumination, traditionally available through time-consuming 
transcendental meditation pratices. 
Given the time when the term was introduced, it would be impossible to 
label any earlier instances of mind-expansion, e. g. for artistic purposes, as 
“psychedelic.”And yet, such instances have occurred since the ancient times of 
Homer, probably initiated to opium (De Quincey 1982: 139). With the advent 
of Romanticism, along with its principal idea of spiritual transcendence towards 
the pantheistic communion with God as well as the rejection of social and 
moral conventions of the time, drugs or psychoactive substances (as 
psychedelics are sometimes called, to be distinguished from their habit-forming 
“associates”) seemed a welcome aid – testifying to the considerably later 
statement by a well-known representative of the early 20th century French 
avant-garde that opium equals rebellion (Cocteau 1990: 34). And, indeed, 
numerous works by Romantics (e. g. Poe’s short stories from the co called 
“Ligeia” cycle), their fin-de-siecle followers (Rimbaud’s “The Drunken Boat” 
or Illuminations) or surrealists (Michaux’s Paix dans les brisements) were 
inspired by the authors’ drug and mind-expanding experiences, sometimes 
almost exclusively (Baudelaire’s Artificial Paradise, De Quincey’s Confessions 
of an English Opium Eater). 
American Beat writers may be comfortably located in this line of 
“rebellious generations” (Fischer 1965: 31-32) as legitimate successors of the 
European modernist bohemia – see Ronald Sukenick’s Down and In, a story of 
the post-WWII New York artistic cafes and their patrons (mainly its second 
chapter, “Bohemia is a country in Europe,” with a remarkable stress upon the 
Beats). The role of mind-expanding/ narcotic references in their works is 
definitely more significant than ever before and the evidence of the 
fundamental antinomy of the psychedelic experience in Osmond’s 
understanding – undeniably impressive. Thus “fathoming Hell” versus “soaring 
angelic” may be legitimately considered as the statement of one of the basic 
contradictions within the Beat movement itself – as well as a convenient 
starting point for the discussion of its other, closely related antinomies. 
 
2. Contradictions and dilemmas 
 
2.1. Holy beats or holy goofs? 
At this point, two meanings of the word “beat” must be briefly 
elucidated. The first referred to the beat in music, especially in be bop jazz, 
which, generally disregarded by the American “square” middle class of the late 
1940’s and 1950’s, was immediately welcomed by the beatnik bohemia as a 
legitimate attribute of their “alternative” image. The other, even more important 
for this image – and the present part of our discourse – concerned their spiritual 
condition of “beatitude” or “holiness,” attained by Zen Buddhist meditation 
(Allen Ginsberg, undeniably the most prominent poetic voice of the movement, 
being an outstanding member of the famous Naropa Institute in Boulder). A 
shorter, more convenient way to the same end was paved by appropriate mind-
expanding substances, mainly marijuana and peyote, also in its synthesized 
form of mescaline (LSD being hardly known in the USA at the time). 
The loudest Beat spokesman for the “holiness” was, arguably, Ginsberg 
in the “Footnote to Howl,” in which even parts of the human body considered 
most unholy are claimed to be exactly the opposite – the text basically 
consisting of the word “holy” repeated continuously, as if in a shamanic trance 
(shamen or “holy men” in the North or Central America being also known for 
regular mind-expanding practices – see Carlos Casteneda’s books on Don 
Juan). It was, however, Jack Kerouac, the most widely recognized fiction writer 
of this generation, who, having introduced the term “beat,” allegedly endowed 
it with the meaning of “beatitude.” At the same time, he was probably the first 
to observe how this highly desirable spiritual condition corresponded with the 
Beats’ bohemian lifestyle. 
Thus his most famous novel On the Road (1957), along with Ginsberg’s 
Howl frequently mentioned as the Beat manifesto, brings, in fact, a rather 
equivocal image of this generation. On the one hand, the characters of this 
roman a clef, such as Carlo Marx (Allen Ginsberg), Old Bull Lee (William S. 
Burroughs) or Sal Paradise (Kerouac himself), are portrayed as unrelenting 
seekers of even momentary “paradise” in their lives, accordingly filled with 
“digging” be bop jazz (e. g. of the pianist George Shearing) or indulging in 
narcotic/ mind-expanding adventures. These pursuits, from the perspective of 
the bohemian ethos considered “holy,” quite soon, however, reveal their 
“hellish” side. Dean Moriarty (Neal Cassady), arguably the central character of 
the novel, revered by his colleagues as a “Beat Master,” i. e. the living symbol 
of the whole generation’s lifestyle, towards the end is portrayed as a victim of 
uncontrolled erotic, alcoholic and narcotic consumption. In fact, Cassady 
became ultimately undone by his dissolute hedonism only some ten years later 
– having participated, in the meantime, in the psychedelic adventures of Ken 
Kesey and his Merry Pranksters, fundamentally important for the Hippie 
counter culture – it is, nevertheless, already in On the Road that he is 
perceptively identified as “HOLY GOOF” (Kerouac 1957: 236). 
The same contradiction between the “heaven” of spiritual illumination 
and the “hell” of straightforward consumption is even more clearly presented in 
The Dharma Bums (1958), also conceived as roman a clef (like all essential 
works by Kerouac). Two main heroes, Ray Smith (the author himself) and 
Japhy Ryder (Gary Snyder, a talented poet, appreciated by the Beats as an 
authority on Zen), attempt to follow the path of Siddhartha Gautama, later 
known as Buddha, leading from the indulgence in carnal pleasures to the ascetic 
discipline of mediatation. Still, walking along this path, they obviously lack 
their model’s consistency: instead of abandoning the pleasures in favour of 
discipline, they constantly hesitate between the two. Moreover, detailed 
descriptions of their consumption activities – as far as alcohol, drugs and sex 
are concerned – provoke close associations with the "Lost Generation” novels, 
such as Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises (1926), where regular indulging in 
such activities clearly implies spiritual emptiness and moral blindness. Whether 
these associations were intended or not, the relevance of Smith’s final spell of 
meditation on the Desolation Peak in the Cascade Mountains in the state of 
Washington seems, under the aforementioned circumstances, highly debatable 
(even more so in Desolation Angels, published in 1965 as the sequel to The 
Dharma Bums). 
The contradiction in question received, arguably, the strongest 
articulation in Big Sur (1962), a rather obvious attempt at reassessing Thoreau’s 
Walden experiment. This time Jack Dulouz (another fictional name of Kerouac) 
finds himself, after a long period of excessive drinking, in the cabin of his 
friend, Lorenzo Monsanto (Lawrence Ferlinghetti, a poet and efficient publisher 
of Beat literature), on the rocky Californian coast of the Pacific, trying to come 
to terms with himself through the solitary contemplation of nature. This 
transcendentalist adventure proves, however, surprisingly ephemeral: while 
Thoreau spent more than two years on the Walden Pond, Kerouac/ Dulouz 
leaves the cabin to resume his bohemian habits after only a few days, quickly 
reaching the state of protracted delirium tremens. His final illumination – 
becoming reconciled to reality in the Buddhist manner of “tathata” – arouses, 
therefore, even more doubts than the effectiveness of Kerouac/ Smith’s 
mediatation on the Desolation Peak. 
In the light of the above remarks, it becomes relatively clear that 
experiencing “beatitude,” i. e. the core value of the Beat ethos, basically 
remained a fleeting mirage – just like the psychedelic “heaven” that can hardly 
stand the confrontation with the “hell,” or, in Rimbaud’s words, “dirty pool” of 
everyday reality, to which one must inevitably return after a mind-expanding 
“trip.” As shall be seen later, other essential points of the Beat ideology bred 
similar contradictions or illusions.  
 
2.2. “Being in” or “staying (selling) out”? 
“To be in” was, perhaps, the ultimate statement of the Beat sociocultural 
identity: being among the “hip,” i. e. those initiated into “the thing” that was 
necessarily alien to conventional “squares.” “The thing” meant, as has already 
been mentioned, modern jazz in its be bop version, Zen Buddhist 
contemplation, mind-expansion and leftist political inclinations. It also 
embraced homosexuality, or, on the literary level, Kerouac’s “freely 
improvised” syntax or Ginsberg’s Whitman-inspired verse libre, punctuated by 
visionary outbursts, reminiscent either of Blake, or of the author’s psychedelic 
adventures (as in the second part of Howl, written under the influence of a 
peyote vision). In short: anything that went against the unsophisticated middle 
class taste and, consequently, needed protection from being accepted or even 
commerciaized by the “unhip.” 
As long as be bop musicians played in small clubs for “the happy few” 
(in Stendhal’s words) and the Beat writers promoted their texts either via jazz/ 
poetry readings for even more elitist audiences, or by low circulation books of 
independent publishing houses, such as, first of all, Ferlinghetti’s City Lights, 
the integrity of their “alternative” ethos remained unspoiled. Still, when, Howl 
started being widely praised as one of the definitive statements of American 
post-WWII poetry and On the Road received extensive media coverage soon 
after its publication (Sukenick 1995: 129), the situation was no longer so clear. 
The key figures of the movement became, at least to an extent, media 
celebrities, which meant discarding the “heavenly” purity of altenative ethos by 
“selling out” to the general, “square” public and, eventually, descending into 
the “hell” of mass media promotion and manipulation. 
The beginning of this process was perceptively registered by Anatole 
Broyard, a renowned literary critic, closely associated with the Beats. In his 
classic essay “A Portrait of the Hipster” (1948), published at the initial stage of 
the movement (“hipster,” derived from being “hip,” i. e. initiated into the “real 
thing,” being basically synonymous with “beatnik”), he observed early signs of 
the progressive loss of its alterrnative cultural validity – and possible 
commercialization – analyzing the evolution of jive, i. e. the hipster’s 
sociocultural code: “Jive, which had originally been a critical system, a kind of 
Surrealism... became a boring routine. The hipster – once an unregenerate 
individualist, an underground poet, a guerilla – had become a pretentious poet 
laureate” (Broyard 1958: 203).  
It should be observed, at this point, that in the history of “alternative” 
sociocultural movements in America similar tendencies were hardly a novelty. 
More or less one hundred years earlier, in the novel The Blithdale Romance 
(1852), Nathaniel Hawthorne – inspired by a longer stay in the famous Brook 
Farm commune, a living symbol of the transcendentalists’ opposition to the 
American middle class – showed their projected Arcadia as endangered by the 
“show-biz” trickery practised by the character named Westervelt. In the post-
WWII postindustrial American society, increasingly reliant on mass media and 
advertising, commercial pressures were incomparably stronger – for example, 
at the turn of the 1950’s, in the New York metro, there appeared the 
advertisements for the widely read magazine Evergreen Review featuring Allen 
Ginsberg in Uncle Sam’s hat, with the caption: “Join the underground.” Such 
facts meant that the Beat “alternative” movement started using the promotional 
strategies of the mainstream commercial culture for its own ends, or even that 
the traditional bohemian need to stay apart from the establishment – as well as 
from its ideological premises – had meanwhile become almost irrelevant 
(Sukenick 1995: 197-198). 
This might have spelled the death of the Beat “alternative” ethos, which, 
however, was hardly the case – considering that this ethos was effectively 
continued in the times of the 1960’s counter cultural revaluations. At the same 
time, the aforementioned commercialization did not undermine the ideological 
credentials of the Beats on the worldwide scale – see Ginsberg being removed 
from Prague in May 1965 for “subversive” propaganda – which is, of course, 
another vital contradiction to be observed here. 
 
2.3. “Beatific” or “beaten”? 
As has been shown above, the condition of “beatitude” or “holiness” 
found its opposite in the dissolute hedonism, extensively featured in Jack 
Kerouac’s novels. It should be remebered, though, that it was in the fictional 
works of William S. Burroughs that this lifestyle received its strongest 
exemplifications.  
Burroughs, together with Ginsberg and Kerouac forming the original 
“Beat Trinity” (having moved form New York to California in the early 1950s, 
they became integrated into the San Francisco Renaissance movement, which 
encompassed e. g. Ferlinghetti or Snyder), was, unlike his friends, far removed 
from any idea of “beatitude.” While the quest of yage, “a unique narcotic” 
(Burroughs 1982: 253), in The Yage Letters (1963), co-authored with Ginsberg, 
and in Queer (written in 1951-53, published only in 1985) may invite vague 
associations with an idea of “heavenly” bliss, detailed, matter-of-fact 
descriptions of the “technicalities” of drug transcations, injections and 
symptoms – see at least Junky (1953), his first published novel – read like 
nihilistic “Lost Generation” narratives taken to the extreme. Thus “I can feel the 
heat closing in...” (Burroughs 1982: 1), the famous opening sentence of Naked 
Lunch (1959), his best known fictional work, is actually more than just a 
statement of the police oppression of drug dealers and drug users: in the context 
of the whole book, it definitely sounds like a cry from the “hell” of addiction. 
In this way, Burroughs’ writings come to portray his generation as 
“beaten” (another relevant meaning of the word “beat”), i. e. marginalized and 
oppressed – not only by their own weaknesses or the conservative American 
establishment of the Eisenhower era, but also by the more universal and sinister 
“System,” controlling humanity by means of centrally administered narcotics. 
This idea, apparently borrowed from Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), was 
ingeniously developed in the so called “Nova trilogy”, arguably Burroughs’ 
most ambitious work, consisting of three novels: The Soft Machine (1961), The 
Ticket That Exploded (1962) and Nova Express (1964). Here, the drugs 
dispensed by the Nova Conspiracy denote any kind of mental intoxication 
(mass media information, popular culture); consequently, William Lee, the 
author’s porte-parole, changes from a hopeless case of “junk” dependence to 
Inspector J. Lee of the Nova Police, confronting the manipulative “System” in 
the manner defined by the tradition of American non-conformism (at least to an 
extent). 
In other words, what was meant to open the gates of “paradise,” even 
“artificial,” finally became transformed into a means of universal oppression. 
And the “beaten” ones were both the “hip” and the “square.” 
 
 
 
 
3. Conclusion: inspirational power of contradictions? 
 
Kenneth Rexroth, a leading figure of the San Francisco Renaissance, 
attempting to sum up the Beat phenomenon, stated that: “The end result must 
be the... despair, the orgies... I believe that most of an entire generation will go 
to ruin... What will happen afterwards, I don’t know...” (Rexroth 1957). 
Indeed, the contradictions that have been considered above seemed 
sufficient to undermine the ideological credibility of any artistic or 
sociocultural movement. Still, approaching the problem from the contemporary 
perspective, one finds it to be more complex. 
In the long run, the movement as such may not have retained its 
“alternative” integrity – in the still longer run, however, it appeared that at least 
Burroughs and Ginsberg managaed to survive as important literary and 
intellectual voices of the present. Until the end of their lives in 1997, they kept 
producing important works, such as Burroughs’ Ghost of Chance (1995), and 
enjoying the status of “alternative” cultural heroes. The latter may seem 
surprising, if we consider Allen Ginsberg’s frequent acts of “selling out” to the 
establishment – the same was even truer, though, about Bob Dylan, his friend 
and literary protege from the new “rebellious generation,” which apparently 
inherited most of dilemmas and contradictions of the Beats. 
In sociocultural terms, the Hippie sequel to the Beat movement proved 
equally short-lived – but, again, in the longer run, its leading artistic voices, 
such as the author of “Mr. Tambourine Man,” managed to preserve their 
credibility, despite any ideological inconsistencies. And it may well be argued 
that, without the necessity of confronting the contradictions inherent in various 
“alternative” programs or in American reality itself, the Beats’ or the Hippies’ 
artistic legacy would have lost a considerable amount of creative impetus. 
Under such circumstances, we probably would not have the possibility of 
enjoying Howl, On the Road or Naked Lunch – which definitely would be a 
loss. 
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1. Introduction: On Pop-Culture and Rock Poetry 
 
Once upon a time, the world of academia was a proverbial tweed-
wearing killjoy waxing lyrical on the beauties of Tennysonian metre, never to 
be tricked into lowering itself to the levels of the exploration of popular culture. 
Some decades later, enter Postmodernism and voila! – Buffy the Vampire Slayer 
becomes a legitimate focus of many an academic study and Bob Dylan is 
lauded as the ultimate poet. ‘Postmodernism’, as Angela McRobbie (1995:13) 
points out,  
 
has entered into a more diverse number of vocabularies more quickly than most other 
intellectual categories. It has spread outwards from the realms of art history into 
political theory and on the pages of youth culture magazines, record sleeves and the 
fashion spreads of Vogue.  
 
Trying to shake off the fuddy-duddy image of yore, criticism turned to 
the ‘things of the moment’ as props for serious intellectual analyses. Granted, 
much of this incentive lies behind the fact that popular culture slowly became 
the default, relegating its highbrow counterpart to the realms of something ‘old’ 
and ‘boring’ that newer generations couldn’t connect with. One of the best 
examples of this situation is the late 20th century prevalence of rock and pop 
poetry in public consciousness over the traditional forms that had dominated the 
hearts and minds of audiences in the old salad days. 
 
2. Why Lyrics Matter  
 
Continuing in the tradition of troubadours and other such artists-
entertainers, pop musicians took advantage of the fact that, in the mid-2Oth  
century era of affordable records and new technologies, traditional, written 
poetry started to lose its mass appeal. The poet-superstar of earlier epochs 
(epitomised in Romanticism’s Lord Byron) was no longer there, having been 
supplanted by a microphone-wielding showman, while words, previously filling 
the pages of books meant to be read in silence or enjoyed at recitals found their 
new home in songs, as lyrical accompaniment to the primary – melodic – 
content. Producer Gus Dudgeon says that “people don’t listen to songs for the 
lyrics” (Classic Albums: 2001), which is partially true – otherwise no one 
would ever listen to anything sung in a language they don’t understand – 
however, it must be said that, once people do pay attention to lyrics, they 
cannot not think about their meaning, or at least their emotional resonance. 
Once this process starts for the casual listener, it is only a matter of time before 
professionals start appropriating song lyrics for various research-related 
purposes. In the words of Simon Frith (1988:123), 
 
In a culture in which few people make music but everyone makes conversation, access 
to songs is primarily through their words. If music gives lyrics their linguistic vitality, 
lyrics give songs their social use. 
 
Thus, music and lyrics become part of wider socio-cultural study, not 
least in terms of being interpreted as indicative to or expressive of the plurality 
of meanings, contexts and truths. Once again, Frith (1988:107) points out that 
 
 [t]he most sophisticated content analysts have /.../ used lyrics as evidence not of 
popular culture as such, but of popular cultural confusion.  
 
3. Children’s Literature and Popular Culture 
 
Academic study of song lyrics is, therefore, usually (though by no 
means exclusively) seen as appropriation of pop-culture for literary or 
sociological purposes. When it comes to the world of literature proper, there are 
some creative forms similar to lyrics, in that they encompass both art and 
entertainment, and can be described as more ‘popular’ than ‘highbrow’. One of 
these is the ever-so-evasive (in terms of definition, at least) children’s literature. 
“Children’s books”, according to Peter Hunt (2007:1),  
 
have been largely beneath the notice of intellectual and cultural gurus. /.../ They are 
overtly important educationally and commercially – with consequences across the 
culture, from language to politics: most adults, and almost certainly the vast majority 
of those in positions of power and influence, read children’s books as children, and it 
is inconceivable that the ideologies permeating those books had no influence on their 
development. The books have, none the less, been marginalised.  
 
Just like song lyrics, children’s literature is a ripe playground for all 
sorts of scholarly pursuits – it has been the research focus of studies in fields 
ranging from sociology and psychology to literature and therapy. Both are often 
seen as pure entertainment, and although there are examples of both where such 
a view is justified (neither ‘Love Me Do’ nor the Goosebumps series have ever 
pretended to be particularly ‘deep’), the view that neither can ever be anything 
more than easy pastime is short-sighted and condescending. And, of course, 
there have been numerous instances of the two bouncing off and taking 
inspiration from each other – from Lewis Carroll’s presence in John Lennon’s 
work to Led Zeppelin’s take on Tolkien’s world. If one was to look for an 
example of a children’s book that has been so large a presence in public 
conscious that people have almost forgotten that there was a book in the first 
place, and not a folk tale carved in stone, they need not look any further than L. 
Frank Baum’s world of Oz. 
 
3.1. The World of Oz 
The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (1900), the first in the series of many 
books about the magical land of Oz that Baum would eventually write, has had 
generations in its thrall from the moment it saw the light of day. Is there anyone 
not familiar with the story of the little farm girl from Kansas who gets whisked 
away by a tornado to the fairyland of Oz, where she meets three new friends 
lacking in self-confidence, and together they set on a journey along the yellow 
brick road to the Emerald City in search of the omnipotent Wizard of Oz? The 
rub – for there is always a rub – lies in the fact that the said wizard is not 
powerful at all, but, as he himself says, a ‘humbug’ (Baum 1993:103), and the 
magical greenness of Emerald City is all mirrors and smokescreen, for its 
existence depends on green-coloured lenses everybody is made to wear. And of 
course, both Dorothy and her friends do not really need the wizard to get the 
things they desire, for they possess them already and he merely provides them 
with a placebo. The tale of pretty fantasy and ultimate self-reliance has struck a 
chord in the hearts of many; the case, however, can be made for the Emerald 
City as a nasty little dystopia, even if not deliberately created as such by its 
author.  
Although at first glance a timeless tale of fantasy, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (1900) 
expresses more about the age, as a period of disruption and uncertainty, than its author, 
who claimed himself to be non-political, probably intended. (Cogan Thacker, Webb 
2002:85) This falseness [of the Emerald City and the Wizard himself] suggests a 
comment on American consumerism and the uneasy relationship between appearance 
and ‘truth’. (Cogan Thacker, Webb 2002:89) 
 
This uneasy relationship gets even rockier when Dorothy, who for a 
while settled for trusting even ‘The Great and Terrible Humbug’ (Baum 
1993:107) loses what hope she had of ever returning home. Disappointment, 
sadness and loss all conflate and it is unclear if either appearance or ‘truth’ has 
got the slightest chance of resolving her situation. It comes as no surprise then 
that the wonderful, dazzling place comes across as a metaphor for 
disillusionment.  
 
4. Rockers, Poets and Oz 
 
Finally merging all of the previously mentioned concepts together, we 
can see how exactly Emerald City came to signify disillusionment to pop-
culture artists. Since The Wizard of Oz is part of children’s fiction canon, and 
given Hunt’s idea that children’s fiction informs the development and 
ideological construct of all individuals who read it, it is not much of a stretch to 
posit that for the individuals who are familiar with Baum’s work and who, as 
creative artists, are looking for an apt representation of the double-edged sword 
that any seemingly perfect place or state is, Emerald City and Oz itself might 
serve as a particularly convenient metaphor. Add to that the fact that the 
presence of Oz was forever cemented in minds of audiences round the globe by 
the famous 1939 film adaptation, starring Judy Garland, and this metaphor is 
more or less a given for any pop-culture observer, connoisseur or aficionado. 
Two such examples from rock poetry are to be examined more closely in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
 
4.1. Goodbye Yellow Brick Road 
The first of these is the titular song from Elton John’s seminal 1973 
album, Goodbye Yellow Brick Road. Often lauded as John’s Sgt. Pepper, the 
album boasts such hits as ‘Candle in the Wind’, ‘Saturday Night’s Alright for 
Fighting’ and ‘Bennie and the Jets’, but the most memorable track in it is easily 
‘Goodbye Yellow Brick Road’ itself. Music critic Stewart Mason calls the song 
“a small masterpiece of ‘70s soft rock’”, claiming that “lyrically, the song is 
evocative of faded Hollywood glamour in the manner of Sunset Boulevard.” 
(Mason web) The song consists of a series of what seem to be rhetorical 
questions demanded of an unnamed person; and complaints about the kind of 
existence the lyrical subject feels is not right for him. Throughout the song, 
there is a distinct feel of nostalgia – in  
 
I should have stayed on the farm 
I should have listened to my old man 
 
we can see that the lyrical subject is regretting his decision to, presumably, 
come to the big city and that he is a young person, probably wide-eyed and 
filled with great expectations at the beginning, but now disillusioned and bitter. 
The ‘farm’ is an interesting choice of words, for it points to the connections 
between Dorothy Gale, the simple farm-girl protagonist of The Wizard of Oz, 
and our disappointed hero. When speaking of the book, Cogan Thacker,Webb 
(2002:88) state that 
 
 [c]ompared to the colour of the Emerald City and the liveliness of the characters 
encountered in Oz, a desire to return to the prairie is difficult to understand. 
 
However, the protagonist of ‘Goodbye Yellow Brick Road’ offers his 
experience in the city in a much more negative light, when he says 
 
I’m not a present for your friends to open 
This boy is too young to be singing the blues 
 
thus giving us a possible context of someone being in a relationship with an 
older person where he is regarded as a trophy, or perhaps referring to the high 
society in general, or both. The second verse reinforces the idea of an older, 
powerful lover who is not really in love with the lyrical subject, for, when he 
leaves as he is apparently threatening/deciding to do, said lover won’t lose 
much sleep over it: 
 
It’ll take you a couple of vodka and tonics 
To set you on your feet again 
Maybe you’ll get a replacement 
There’s plenty like me to be found 
 
The disillusionment with this kind of life can best be seen in the chorus: 
 
So goodbye yellow brick road 
Where the dogs of society howl 
You can’t plant me in your penthouse 
I’m going back to my plough  
Back to the howling old owl in the woods 
Hunting the horny back toad 
Oh I’ve finally decided my future lies  
Beyond the yellow brick road 
 
The motif of farm is again mentioned (‘plough’), and another one is 
reinforced – the one of returning to the sphere, if not the world of, childhood 
(‘hunting the horny back toad’ as a pastime activity ties in nicely with the regret 
of not having listened to ‘my old man’ and ‘this boy’ being ‘too young to be 
singing the blues’). Another connection with The Wizard of Oz is present in the 
decision that the ‘future lies beyond the yellow brick road’ – this is in keeping 
with Dorothy’s realisation that the solution to her problems and the road to her 
happiness are actually not ‘somewhere over the rainbow’, but, on the contrary, 
that ‘there’s no place like home’.  
 
While talking about the song, journalist Robert Sandall said that  
The strength of ‘Yellow Brick Road’ or certainly something that contributes to its 
lasting appeal is the fact that it does actually reflect on the dark side of life and the 
dark side of celebrity. (Classic Albums:2001) 
 
While it is certainly possible to interpret the content this way, and this 
interpretation does tie in rather nicely with the Sunset Boulevard theme, the 
actual author of the lyrics, Bernie Taupin, states that 
 
I don’t think it was about disillusionment of fame, I think it was more about the battle I 
had of being a country kid coming to town, being originally a little out of my depth. 
But at the same time I think it could have been about the all-encompassing world of 
fame and rock and roll. Is it all that it’s cracked up to be? Possibly not. (Classic 
Albums: 2001) 
 
Or, in the words of one of the most respected British lyricists, Sir Tim Rice,  
 
Often the fulfilment of the ambition can be worse than not fulfilling it. (Classic 
Albums: 2001) 
 
4.2. Return to Oz 
‘Return to Oz’ is the closing number on Scissor Sisters’ 2004 debut 
album, entitled simply Scissor Sisters, and penned by the band’s frontman Jake 
Shears. The song takes its title from the 1985 film sequel to The Wizard of Oz, 
based on two subsequent novels in Oz lore, The Land of Oz and Ozma of Oz. In 
the film, Dorothy returns to Oz and finds it in a horrible state – everything is 
destroyed, the yellow brick road is desecrated and the people have been turned 
to crystal. This introduction itself is enough to show us that, no matter how 
cruel the world in Elton John’s ‘Goodbye Yellow Brick Road’, it cannot 
compare to the utter devastation that is present in ‘Return to Oz’. Shears 
himself said that the song was about the abuse of crystal meth in the American 
gay community. 
The first line of the lyrics – ‘once there was a man’ – starts off as a fairy 
tale; this, together with the title, may lead us to believe that the song may be 
fantasy-themed, like the ones brought forth in the ‘70s by Led Zeppelin and 
early Queen. However, the next few lines shatter this illusion, and establish the 
theme of real suffering instead: 
 
But when his night came to an end 
He tried to grasp for his last friend  
And pretend that he could wish himself health on a four-leaf clover  
 
The last line also introduces the theme of terminal illness, something that will 
be mentioned again, in the middle eight: 
 
Deep inside their sunken faces and their wild rolling eyes, 
But their callous words reveal  
That they can no longer feel 
Love or sex appeal 
The patchwork girl has come to cinch the deal 
 
If ‘sunken faces’ and ‘wild eyes’ aren’t enough to create an image of 
illness, the loss of any possibility to feel (presumably physical) ‘love or sex 
appeal’ points to an incurable STD, and the idea is driven further home with the 
introduction of ‘the patchwork girl’ who has come to ‘cinch the deal’. The 
patchwork girl may refer to The Patchwork Girl of Oz, another one in the series 
of Oz novels, but is could also be a reference to the AIDS Memorial Quilt, 
made of many patches, serving as a memorial and celebration of the lives of 
those who died of the disease. Given that the theme of the song is the abuse of 
crystal methamphetamine, which has, in recent years, been the number one 
cause behind the rising number of HIV infections among young gay people; it 
is not too much of a stretch to interpret this verse as referring to AIDS.  
The chorus is, again, a sorrowful lament over the state of things: 
 
Is this the return to Oz? 
The grass is dead, the gold is brown 
And the sky has claws. 
There’s a wind-up man walking round and round 
What once was emerald city’s now a crystal town. 
 
The yellow brick road has turned from gold to brown, and the sky with 
claws indicates something threatening. The ‘wind-up man’, on the surface level, 
refers to Tic-Toc, a mechanical man Dorothy finds upon her return to Oz, but, 
on a metaphorical level, it might refer to people who can no longer function 
without external help (‘winding-up’) of drugs. Finally, the last line which 
describes the literal state of Emerald City filled with crystallised figures of its 
enchanted denizens is, underneath the surface, a metaphor for the big city of 
one’s dreams turning into a threatening place filled with drugs, pain and death. 
When asked about the meaning of the song, Scissor Sisters member Baby 
Daddy said 
 
You’d have to ask Jake about it. I think he wrote it with Seattle in mind, with all the 
crystal meth tragedy over there. To me it’s a song about San Francisco and to a lot of 
others it’s about New York but it can be about anywhere. I wouldn’t say that it was 
one specific incident, but I think everyone in the band and in our group of friends has 
been touched in some way by the problems it’s talking about. (The Crystal Prison: 
web) 
 
Elton John’s world, while undoubtedly harsh and disillusioning, seems 
quite warm in comparison with the world of Scissor Sisters. The reasons for 
this may lie in the fact that John’s song deals with the personal, giving the 
listener hope that the lyrical subject will make it, having decided to seek his 
future ‘beyond the yellow brick road’; while Shears’ lyrics describe a 
communal problem that is slowly destroying many lives, leaving the listener 
with little indication that things will improve. The world of 2004 is certainly a 
lot different from the world of 1973. Still, the metaphor of Oz seems to work 
just fine for both of them. And Baum would probably be thrilled about it. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our boring old tweed-wearer from the beginning may not be too happy 
with pop-culture’s forms of expression being used together with ‘real’ literature 
(though he probably wouldn’t consider children’s literature to be ‘real’ anyway) 
in a single research paper, but he would soon be proven wrong. In a world 
where everything can be – and indeed is – a text worthy of exploration, one 
cannot simply choose to ignore the connections that are there for the taking and 
playing with. When it comes to both music and children’s literature, 
entertainment and play are absolutely necessary for the proper enjoyment and 
understanding of the work in question. And after all, is there anything wrong 
with being entertained? 
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1. Introduction 
In his work entitled The Century, Alain Badiou explains the 20th century 
with “the passion for the real”. The blind drive to demystify the latent and to 
face with the authentic has been emphasized by Badiou as the key to the age. 
According to Slavoj Žižek, this drive has intensified in the 21st century through 
virtual reality. Referring to diverse examples such as decaffeinated coffee or 
warfare without casualties, Žižek points out to the fact that we are living in an 
age of illusions that stand for reality, therefore our need to face with reality has 
become more and more desirable. The consequence of this experience is, in 
Žižek’s words, “the Real in its extreme violence as the price to be paid for 
peeling off the deceptive layers of reality” (Žižek 2002:5-6). Illustrating and 
explaining this condition in late capitalist societies, Žižek deems that “snuff 
movies which deliver the ‘real thing’ are perhaps the ultimate truth of Virtual 
Reality” (Žižek 2002:12). That is, snuff film is the extreme example of “the 
passion for the real”, because it is a medium through which the spectator 
witnesses “real” torture and death without the physical presence of the victim. 
 
2. American Psycho and snuff film 
 
Depicting the same social conditions, a specific genre of literature called 
“blank fiction” in the American literary scene has merged and mirrored the 
language, narrative and themes of the subject’s experience in late capitalist 
societies. The genre is specifically preoccupied with, in James Annesley’s 
words, “violence, indulgence, sexual excess, decadence, consumerism and 
commerce” (Annesley 1998:1), all of which not coincidentally define the 
practice of snuff films. In this sense, “the passion for the real” apparently finds 
its echo in literary works of transgression: Authors such as Bret Easton Ellis, 
Chuck Palahniuk and Dennis Cooper have shown in detail how, in snuff film, 
spectators are mesmerized and satisfied with the atrocities they witness and 
how actors become preys for enjoyment. The subject of this study, Bret Easton 
Ellis’s American Psycho shows why and how Patrick Bateman, the narrator, 
builds up his violence firstly by discrimination, then by murder and finally by 
recording the deaths of his victims as the ultimate gruesome act he can do. 
American Psycho is a novel that partially deals with snuff film, not only 
as a motif, but also as a narrative apparatus. The novel is the narration of 
Patrick Bateman, a 27-year-old investment specialist who works in Wall Street. 
As a typical example of blank fiction, the novel is preoccupied with 
consumerism and excess in contemporary American society. In accordance with 
this social context, Bateman’s narration heavily relies on the physical 
appearances of other characters, their clothes, the objects they use and the 
quality food they eat. Patrick Bateman spends his daytime at his office and 
nighttime at clubs and fancy restaurants; yet although he is rich, good-looking 
and in a social circle (which are supposedly the ultimate forms of satisfaction 
and recognition for an upper-middle class subject in capitalist ideology) he can 
hardly be recognized and addressed by other characters. People who meet him 
in social gatherings greet him with false names, and usually they do not even 
see him. This is the key point of the novel because the whole narrative 
functions as Bateman’s proof of existence in society. About this Mark Storey 
writes: 
 
The question is not whether the “action” really takes place – a careful reading reveals 
that was never the point – but what the “action” tells us about the person who recounts 
it. The narrative is life through the prism of Patrick Bateman’s psyche, but closer 
inspection reveals his psyche is nonexistent. Instead, Ellis gives us a central identity 
created by external forces, a fictional world encased in the language of the society that 
created it and told through the voice of a man who in real terms is not actually there. 
(Storey 2005:58) 
 
Therefore only through his narration can Bateman manifest “himself”, and to 
overcome his ambiguous reality in the narrative he gets involved in various 
types of violence. He talks about violence, he kills homeless people, women, 
men, or animals indifferently, and he records his murders, all of which are part 
of his narration. All the more ironic, Bateman is a completely unreliable 
narrator; therefore his building of violence to the extremity of snuff film is 
again a narrative device to document in language how he can establish his 
presence. In other words, Bateman’s “passion for the real” is the need to 
confirm his own reality, his physical and mental integrity through narrative.  
In spite of Bateman’s atrocities throughout the novel, the first reference 
to fear and violence occurs when Bateman and his friend Timothy Price are on 
the way to a dinner invitation by Evelyn, Bateman’s girlfriend. This reference is 
a quotation from Dante’s Inferno: The opening sentence of the novel is 
“ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE is scrawled in blood red 
lettering on the side of the Chemical Bank […]” (Ellis 2000:3). In the very first 
sentence, the notion of violence is introduced, but with a fictional reference. 
The quotation is emphasized with capital letters, not in quotation marks, and 
thus naturally adapted to the New York scene. It is identified with the blood-red 
colour, which is neither real blood nor an ordinary red, but an imitation of the 
colour of blood. In addition, the writing is located “on the side of Chemical 
Bank” which was a “real” bank in New York City until 1996, and thus further 
implies the relationship between investment and virtual reality. The language of 
violence and the language of commerce have been merged in this opening 
statement to foreshadow what is yet to come. In her article titled “Right Here 
Nowheres”, Naomi Mandel deems that the narrative complexity of the first 
sentence shows that “the extent to which much of the violence in the novel 
actually happens or is merely hallucinated is never entirely clear” (Mandel 
2006: 9). Although Bateman strives for his own reality throughout the novel, 
the combination of the real and fictional references in the setting in which he is 
situated hampers a resolution. This is the reason why Bateman is gradually 
drawn to the “passion for the real”: unable to tell the difference between fiction 
and reality, he is trapped forever in this ambiguity, which further indicates that 
he is himself the product of such language. And, ironically, only through this 
language can Bateman try to understand the real, the reality that he is the 
product of a fictional world.  
Bateman’s indecisiveness towards this ambiguity matches the way he 
narrates Timothy Price’s monologue on life in New York. While Price 
mentions his disgust towards violence, diseases, poverty, ethnic diversity and so 
on, Bateman almost records his action and words with expressions indicating 
camera movements. In this section of the novel, Bateman says “just as Timothy 
Price notices the words a bus pulls up, the advertisement for Les Misérables on 
its side blocking his view” (Ellis 2000:3) as if he is using the POV technique; 
he says “like in a movie another bus appears” (Ellis 2000:3-4) as if his whole 
narrative were lines from a script; when Price is reading the newspaper 
Bateman says “Panning down to the Post” (Ellis 2000:5) and then “panning 
down to the sidewalk there’s an ugly old homeless bag lady” (Ellis 2000:5) as if 
he has exchanged his eyes with that of a camera. The same narrative device can 
be traced when Bateman describes Price’s outlook: “Price is wearing a six-
button wool and silk suit by Ermenegildo Zegna, a cotton shirt with French 
cuffs by Ike Behar, a Ralph Lauren silk tie and leather wing tips by Fratelli 
Rosetti” (Ellis 2000:4-5).  
Used like a trademark of Bateman’s narration throughout the novel, this 
camera-like documentation marks his confusion of reality and fiction on a 
narrative scale. James Annesley writes:  
 
Bateman is, in a very literal sense, screened off from reality: he gets his economic data 
from the computer screen; his understanding of life in New York from the glimpses he 
sees of the world through his limousine’s smoked-glass windscreen; his cultural 
information from the media (Annesley 1998:18).  
 
Serving as “the deceptive layers of reality”, the media and computers work just 
the same as Bateman’s vision, offering him a gradually unfolding narrative 
pattern to “peel them off” to the extremity of thinking and acting like a snuff 
film. 
In American Psycho, the subject’s blurred sense of reality is also 
foregrounded with the exaggerated mimicry of political discourse on violence. 
During Evelyn’s dinner invitation, Vanden (one of the characters invited by 
Evelyn) mistakes Sri Lanka for The Tonka (the name of a club). At that point 
Timothy Price gets furious at her ignorance and says “I mean don’t you know 
anything about Sri Lanka? About how the Sikhs are killing like tons of Israelis 
there?” (Ellis 2000:14). This apparently confused remark, merging the Kashmir 
conflict with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which were both important 
political issues during the 80’s, is followed by Bateman’s mock-political 
address: “There are more important problems than Sri Lanka to worry about 
[…] we have to end apartheid for one. And slow down the nuclear arms race, 
stop terrorism and world hunger […]” (Ellis 2000:14-5). Here, Bateman’s 
childish and ignorant views on world politics emphasize his absence in history 
as an individual. Also, mimicking the typical discourse of a U.S. president, 
Bateman doubly lacks an individual presence. Living in an environment 
surrounded by fictional references, only recording and not at all participating 
life, and finally repeating the political clichés of the 80’s, Bateman experiences 
the same virtual reality as his own narration. Yet however hard he tries to “peel 
them off” he faces with another “deceptive layer” that he considers real, just 
like his imitation of 80’s political discourse for solving the Sri Lanka issue. In 
this way, he is even lost in the social context of his own narration and thus 
drawn into further illusions. 
These examples show that Bateman’s non-existence and his verbal 
expression of violence correspond. Yet this relationship is not sufficient for 
Bateman. Gradually he is drawn into his indifferent murders in order to prove 
his existence, to feel that he is alive by taking lives of others. The first account 
of his murders is his killing of a homeless black man with the dog. Bateman 
comes across this man while he was walking along Broadway after a party. The 
homeless man is black and is surrounded by shopping carts on which a 
cardboard sign says “I AM HUNGRY AND HOMELESS PLEASE HELP 
ME” (Ellis 2000:128); like Dante’s quotation this sign is written in capital 
letters. The sign, like the previous quotation, marks the novel’s ambiguity about 
the social context: Bateman is doomed to be indifferent to the homeless man’s 
misery because his social condition is only to be inscribed with letters, and not 
contextualized. Furthermore, the shopping carts around the man show how 
Bateman’s daily routine of consumption imprisons the poor in a hellish life in 
New York. 
Indifferent to the man’s misery, Bateman comfortably kneels down to 
offer money to him; and after talking to him for a while about his 
unemployment, he tricks the homeless man by searching for something in his 
pocket and eventually taking out a knife. Bateman does not kill him in an 
instant; he first takes out one of his eyes and then stabs him numerous times on 
his stomach. Then he turns his attention to the dog and breaks his front legs, 
and as Bateman says, “it falls on its side squealing in pain, front paws sticking 
up in the air at an obscene, satisfying angle” (Ellis 2000:132). Here, Bateman’s 
narrative is nothing more than a snuff film. His eyes function as a camera, his 
narration works as its film script, and Bateman is more interested in the 
spectacle of violence than in his act of murder. Because of this, he adds: “I 
can’t help but start laughing and I linger at the scene, amused by this tableau” 
(Ellis 2000:132). Still confused by the reality of what happened, Bateman’s 
eyes consider this act as a picture, which can only be perfected by finding the 
right angle. And it is the satisfaction of the perfect spectacle that satisfies 
Bateman: after the murder he remarks: “I feel hardy, ravenous, pumped up, as if 
I’d just worked out and endorphins are flooding my nervous system, or just 
embraced that first line of cocaine, inhaled the first puff of a fine cigar, sipped 
that first glass of Cristal” (Ellis 2000:132). Yet shortly after that his joy 
decreases and he complains: “my high slowly dissolves, its intensity 
diminishing. I grow bored, tired; the evening seems horribly anticlimatic and I 
start cursing myself for not going to that Salvadorian bistro with Reed 
Thompson and the guys” (Ellis 2000:132). 
The narrative of Bateman’s first murder, like all the others, shows that 
he is satisfied with the narration of the snuff film in his mind. The narrative of 
Bateman’s first murder offers some clues about his existence and his narration 
of violence. From the Dante quotation to the homeless man’s murder, 
Bateman’s narration moves from the cultural production of violence to his 
actual murders. The intense satisfaction that he derives from violence is 
temporary and he immediately desires that it should be compensated with the 
language of consumption and commodification. This is the reason why the 
scale of violence is never enough for Bateman: he reads, he talks and he acts; 
but he desperately wishes to document what he does. This aspect of Bateman’s 
narration can be supported with Žižek’s proposition about “the fundamental 
paradox of the passion for the real”. For Žižek, this paradox manifests itself in 
the spectacle of its complete opposite: the goal of finding one’s existence and 
integrity is replaced with the crude violence one exerts to achieve it, because, in 
Žižek’s words, “the ‘postmodern’ passion for the semblance ends up in a 
violent return to the passion for the real” (Žižek 2002:10). 
Similarly, Bateman exaggerates the spectacle of his violent acts as he 
returns more assertively to the passion for the real, yet he finds even more 
deceptive layers of reality. The chapter titled “Girls” shows how extreme 
Bateman’s violence has become. In an obscene narration of sex, which 
Bateman calls “hard-core montage” (Ellis 2000:303), he says that “[…] in an 
attempt to understand these girls I’m filming their deaths” (Ellis 2000:304). 
Here, the word “understand” is decisively important: what Bateman tries to 
understand is not the mind of the victim. It is also impossible for a character 
like Bateman to try to empathize with people. Bateman’s word choice here 
indicates both the way he thinks and the thing he needs to understand; in other 
words, he needs to understand the reality of man’s physical integrity in a 
fictional world that only tolerates its commodified version. What Bateman 
means by the word “understand” is “peeling off the deceptive layers of reality” 
as Žižek remarks: even the human body is materialized and commodified, and 
to go beyond what is seen in this world is to mutilate it (as it is ultimately 
material). However, it is not only mutilation that counts; Bateman needs to 
document and share this so-called reality. Deceived by his “fictional” eyes, he 
needs to prove that everything is real by depending on another fictional device, 
the camera. In this endless loop of fictions, Bateman’s passion for the real 
violently returns repeatedly, because it is never satisfied. 
Interestingly enough, Bateman adds another piece of information about 
the filming process. Referring to the prostitutes, he explains that “With Torri 
and Tiffany I use a Minox LX ultra-miniature camera that takes 9.5mm film, 
has a 15mm f/3.5 lens, an exposure meter and a built-in neutral density filter 
and sits on a tripod.” (Ellis 2000: 304). This detailed description of the 
technical devices used for snuff film is directly related to the experience of 
commodification in late capitalist societies. Commenting on the apathy in 
Bateman’s narration, James Annesley writes:  
 
The tone he uses mimics the register of a commercial brochure and he appears to have 
lost the ability to differentiate between his casual and abusive treatment of human life 
and jargon-studded analysis of his electronic toys (Annesley 1998:13-4).  
 
By focusing on Bateman’s mimicry of the language of commerce, Annesley not 
only explains the destructive effect of commodification on Bateman’s character 
and narration, but also his hopeless fictionality and the endless loop of 
overcoming this with further fictive devices. Yet sharing these technical details 
may offer another perspective: Bateman may be sharing these details with the 
thought that those who are the witnesses of his narration would be interested in 
such information. It is as if Bateman is having a technical talk, thinking that he 
is not alone.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
And when you think about it he is not: from the inscription of 
“ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE” (Ellis 2000:3) to the last 
statement of the novel, which is “THIS IS NOT AN EXIT” (Ellis 2000:399), 
Bateman has integrated the reader as a company to his narration. In her 
interpretation of American Psycho, Elizabeth Young draws attention on this and 
argues that  
the imprisoning, claustrophobic qualities [in the novel] are deftly manipulated in order, 
not only to force us to live as close to Patrick as is possible in a fictional sense, but to 
imprint the reader with such a force that we cannot ever go out (Young 1992:93).  
 
Young’s argument not only marks the endless loop throughout the novel, but 
also reminds us of the function of the narrative: to witness Bateman through his 
narration. Furthermore, to be a part of his communication, the narrative would 
require someone who speaks the same language as Bateman, as the snuff film 
requires someone to watch it with certain generic expectancies. Thus, 
Bateman’s narration echoes not only his own passion for the real, but also the 
reader’s. Surrounded by the spectacle of images from stories that envelope the 
real, the reader experiences the same multilayered fiction in his or her social 
context. 
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1. Introduction 
An analysis of visual images is basically grounded, like any analysis of 
signs, on the signifier/ signified syntagmatic schema identified by Saussure, but 
also, and more importantly, on the semiological model developed by Roland 
Barthes in his 1973 seminal study: Mythologies. Starting from Saussure’s 
model of the linguistic sign, Roland Barthes identifies, in “Myth today,” a 
model for reading popular culture. The novelty lies in the adding of a second 
level of signification to the structural model already offered by Saussure. In 
doing so, Barthes does not only create a structural reading of myth, but he also 
envisages a mechanism of myth production and consumption. According to 
Barthes (1973: 301), myth production “is constituted by the loss of the 
historical quality of things”. If things (i.e. reality) are emptied of history, they 
offer a different kind of reality, a reality focused on essences, timelessness, and 
the natural. In Barthes’s view, therefore, myth is “depoliticized speech” (301), 
because it describes “the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, 
in their power of making the world.” Yet, Barthes himself sees that the fixing of 
new connotations in the production of myth leads to the production of ideology. 
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Therefore, if myth can be used for ideological (i.e. political) purposes, myth 
consumption may have an important politicized dimension. The use of myth for 
ideological and political purposes is one of the basic characteristics of popular 
culture in general and visual culture in particular.  
Umberto Eco’s semiotic research on the visual image also tackled the 
question of reality in its connection with the picture that represents it. Eco 
(1979: 191-218) proposes to exclude the factor of reality reference from the 
communicative logic of pictures. He argues that, due to the two-dimensional 
characteristic of the picture, any resemblance, or “iconicity” of the picture with 
the three-dimensional model existing in reality is never complete. Therefore, 
the relation between the visual representation and the object represented is 
arbitrary and fragmented. In order to reach the full meaning of the visual 
representation our consciousness completes the representation of the object in 
the picture by adding to it its missing component: the third dimension. The 
missing component in a visual image, the third dimension, is crucial in the 
formation and reception of meaning, even though it is identified by absence and 
not by presence. Yet, to unveil its message(s), one needs a set of codes, 
comparable, to a certain extent, to language rules in linguistics.   
A first conclusion can be drawn so far: that any visual representation is 
a sign and therefore functions like one. Reading a picture is similar to reading a 
linguistic sign: it reveals only the connotations that we can decipher, that are 
grounded on our culture, beliefs and general understanding of the world. Image 
creation and production is not equal to image reading and comprehension. 
Images speak specific visual languages encrypted in codes of visual perception 
and visual literacy.  
 
2. Iconic codes and visual representation 
 
Combining Barthes’s and Eco’s approaches to the visual image (to 
which we can add Pierce’s as well), Benedikt Feldges (2008: 232-237) 
identifies two categories of codes behind visual perception: empirical and 
historical. The former category counts two codes: the dialectic and the 
conceptual. The dialectic code is concerned with “the demarcation of visual 
shapes within contrast lines” (Feldges 2008:232), which allows for a sign-based 
structure of pictorial significance. The dialectic code offers a logic of 
communication based on the use of color, spatial alignment, lightness, pattern, 
frame, which are interconnected and project a dialectic syntax of the sign. The 
dialectic code would stand for what Saussure calls ‘the signifier,’ the written 
form of the word. The conceptual code stands for the perception of the visual 
patterns and recognition of their generic significance (a house, man, tree, 
crowd, a forest and so forth). The conceptual code creates “a grid of signifiers 
through chaining visual signs according to their respective generic concept” 
(Feldges 2008: 233). In this way, the generic concepts not only interrelate 
dialectically, but also activate a third concept which has the function of “visual 
verb” (e.g. “belongs to,” “pertains to,” “is standing in front/ behind of”) 
(Feldges 2008: 233). While the dialectic code makes the reader distinguish lines 
and patterns, the conceptual one connects them into a syntagmatic reading by 
focusing on the arrangement economy of the visual signs. Translated in to 
linguistics, the dialectical and the conceptual codes would be similar to the 
printed form of phrases or full sentences in language.   
The latter category, labeled as “historical codes,” also counts two codes: 
the symbolic and the iconic. According to Feldges, the symbolic code 
“combines the formal structure of visual signs with the cultural and historical 
plane of visual literacy” (2008:234). Objects are thus endowed with 
significance, which may be transferred or negotiated between groups of objects 
or among objects within a certain group. What Feldges means by the symbolic 
code is the importance which individual or collective history attaches to 
decoding the significance of an image by a certain receiver or by a group of 
receivers. For instance, a colonial house could be symbolical of the American 
South with receivers with historical knowledge of the American South 
(2008:210). Otherwise, a colonial house could be perceived only as an example 
of architectural style. The symbolic code endows the image with significance, 
whose arbitrariness and power depend on the viewer’s knowledge background. 
The iconic code draws on the historical plane of visual language 
“through differentiating icons and emblems from general categories or types of 
visual symbol” (Feldges 2008:236). Symbols are thus classified according to 
established categories, while recurrent types of symbols could turn into icons. 
For example, while a colonial house may be symbolical for the American 
South, the White House transcends the symbolical level, being charged with a 
more complex individual field of meaning, and becomes an icon of both 
architectural style in America and American presidency. Another example 
could be the image of a suspension bridge which could be read as a symbol of 
communication or connection among people. The image of the Golden Gate 
Bridge, however, recognizable in any picture, assumes an iconic status, 
referring to San Francisco in particular, and providing a whole range of 
additional meanings besides the one concerning general communication and 
connection among people (Feldges 2008:213). 
It is in the interplay of the symbolic and iconic codes that myth may lie. 
A myth (which implies a narrative dimension) is both symbol and icon 
producer. The myth of the cowboy, for instance, has produced both the 
symbolical image of the cowboy (the typical outfits, hat, boots, pistol or rifle) 
and the iconic image that the cowboy represents (a handsome, honest, hard 
working, and justice seeking young man), the icon of the American west. 
 
3. Electoral posters and popular myths 
 
In what follows, I will attempt to discuss a few American and Romanian 
electoral posters by combining the analysis of the symbolic and iconic codes 
used in their conception with specific reference to myth. The posters chosen for 
analyses were made to promote Barack Obama’s democratic ideas in his 2008 
campaign; they will be compared with those made for Traian Băsescu in his 
2009 campaign. My argument is that the visual reading of the posters reveals 
the use of mythical patterns and, as far as the Romanian posters are concerned, 
an influence of popular American myths, a transfer of American icons to 
Romanian visual culture. 
The 2008 posters of Barack Obama are a 
wonderful example of how symbolic and 
iconic codes function and how they 
intermingle with myth. In Poster 1, the 
colors of the US flag: red and white form 
the background against which Obama’s 
blue image both completes the three-color 
flag and stands out as unusual for a 
candidate’s visual representation. It is 
unusual as the former candidates had a 
different skin color. However, the choice of 
the poster creator was very inspiring: he/ 
she transferred the blue color of the flag, 
representing freedom of choice and 
thought, to the candidate’s pictorial 
representation. The picture becomes even 
more suggestive with even stronger symbolic dimensions. Moreover, the 
caption “Yes, we can” placed close to the right-hand side corner, the catchword 
of the entire presidential campaign, is a direct reference to American 
exceptionalism, the myth that is featured in most American pictorial 
representations about itself. The myth concerns the special mission which 
America as the “city on the hill” is supposed to have had since its first settlers. 
Their vision was to build “the best democratic system and to give the world the 
best example of a perfectly happy prosperous people whose life is rooted in 
strong religious values” (Ciugureanu 2002:16). In other words, to create a 
terrestrial Eden which is actually represented in the next poster featuring a 
second catchword: “progress.”  
The symbolic and iconic codes 
are most visible in Poster 2: the tree, an 
iconic representation of the tree of life, 
the pigeons, symbol of liberty and peace, 
the walking of the people from right to 
left, signifying change and progress from 
an old life of poverty, injustice, insecurity 
to a new life of happiness, justice, and 
freedom. It is interesting how the eye 
movement is used to read the picture. 
Contrary to the reading of the catchword 
“progress” (left to right), the direction of 
the birds’ flight and the people’s walking, 
from right to left, are a symbolical 
representation of the envisaged, yet 
radical, change from the Republicans to 
the Democrats. 
Obama’s political advisers were 
not the only ones to have used the myth 
to their candidate’s advantage. Ronald 
Reagan’s presidential campaign had been 
based on the same mythical narrative of 
American exceptionalism, which proved 
to be a good choice and helped him to 
win the elections in 1980.  
The Obama “Yes we can” poster stresses both the deep implications of 
the city-on-the-hill myth and the candidate’s ability to make it work. The poster 
sends back to the similar highly successful visual representation of Rosie the 
Riveter, another iconic figure of American culture. Created in 1940, Rosie the 
Riveter’s poster became emblematic of women’s patriotic work to boost the 
war effort, while in the 1960s it was successfully used again in the women’s 
liberation movement. “Yes we can” resonates well with “We can do it!.”  
The implication of this similarity runs much deeper. Just as the “We can 
do it” poster proved highly influential and managed to talk women into doing 
men’s jobs during the war, which eventually helped America to be victorious 
alongside the allied troops, so would (and did) the “Yes, we can” poster 
convince the American people that the Democrat candidate could make a 
difference and produce the long-expected change. The Rosie-Obama poster 
transcends the symbolical signification of “Yes we can” and reveals the iconic 
codes that Rosie highlights: change set in motion by the underprivileged and 
the marginalized (women and people of color). While the reference of the “yes 
we can” poster to Rosie the Riveter was only implicit and, possibly, obvious 
mainly to the Americans in whose popular culture the Rosie figure has long 
been celebrated, in the Rosie-Obama poster (Poster 4) the reference is made 
purposeful and explicit. In this way, the picture of Obama, superimposed on 
Rosie’s, acquires symbolical and iconic dimensions: it symbolizes the rebirth of 
the people’s belief in American exceptionalism and it becomes an iconic 
representation of the unprivileged in the country. Thus, through symbolical and 
iconic codes and through reference to popular myths, the Obama posters 
manage to extend the message and address the categories that were usually left 
unrepresented (African-Americans, Latin-Americans and other immigrant 
communities).  
The 2009 posters for the electoral campaign in Romania reveal different 
symbolic and iconic codes in the two official posters created for the occasion: 
the one representing Băsescu and the other one, representing the Democrat-
Liberal Party’s support for the nominated candidate. Both posters foreground 
the major colors of the party: orange, green, and blue against a white 
background. The poster containing Băsescu’s photo (Poster 5)  uses orange and 
green for the catch-phrases while also hinting at the controversial color purple 
(used for the candidate’s tie). Like in Obama’s poster, the use of the colors is 
tightly connected with the word caption. Orange is the color of energy, warmth, 
and involvement in action, while green means change and growth as well as 
protection form fears and anxieties. The choice of colors goes very well with 
the slogan: “De ce le e frică, nu scapă” (“what they fear, they won’t escape”) 
spelt in orange, juxtaposed to “Hai la referendum!” (“Come to the 
referendum!”), spelt in green. The color symbolism intensifies the message of 
the slogans, by revealing both the idea that real action is to be taken and the 
soothing feeling that things will change for the better if the electorate cast their 
votes, as suggested by the poster, in the referendum. As anyone can notice, the 
call does not imply a choice (voting for or against the issue stated by the 
poster); it is a call to follow the suggestion expressed by the slogan: to vote for 
the reduction in the number of parliament members and the joining of the two 
houses into one.  
Unlike Obama’s poster, whose address covers everybody, including the 
underprivileged and the marginalized, Băsescu’s call for a referendum 
addresses a fraction of the electorate. It is more than obvious that the poster 
aims at dividing the people into two opposing groups: a larger majority, whose 
living standards are moderate and low, on the one hand, and a smaller minority, 
who is supposedly filthy rich and represented in/ by the Parliament, on the 
other. Though rather aggressive and somewhat vindictive, the poster seems to 
draw on the Romanian myth of the “outlaw,” the brave peasant who robbed the 
rich to help the poor. Yet, the poster reveals much more than the well-known 
Romanian myth; it interrelates the autochthonous “outlaw” with the American 
western sheriff, whose popular image is the brave guy who catches the bad 
boys and brings them to justice. Băsescu’s whole campaign was actually based 
on flagging the very rich and influential people, supposedly the cause of all 
evils. 
The influence of 
American popular culture on 
Băsescu’s electoral poster is 
supported by the creation of an 
alternative poster that circulated 
at the time and is now to be 
found on the Internet. Dwelling 
on the American myth of the 
sheriff in his fight against crime 
and corruption, the poster re-
writes the symbolism of the 
popular American prints of the 
nineteenth century (the bad guy 
is wanted to be brought to justice) and creates a new image which aims to 
represent the redeemer, not the criminal. In the absence of reward money, the 
picture offers at least a double reading: (1) the person in the picture is wanted to 
do the job and (2) the person in the picture is wanted because he is doing the 
job. The double reading could not be possible without the allusion to the 
American myth, which, in this way, has been appropriated and adapted to the 
Romanian context. Through symbolic and iconic codes (the use of the colors 
and the allusion to myth), both posters create a well-targeted message whose 
strength lies in cultural and cross-cultural references.  
Băsescu’s referendum poster is completed by the one representing the 
Liberal Democrats’ candidate for presidency (Poster 6). As colors, it uses 
orange, blue and white, but it targets at the whole Romanian electorate through 
the slogan “Băsescu pentru România” (Băsescu for Romania!). Beneath the 
slogan, there is the catch-phrase: “for better and for worse.” It actually alludes 
both to the former catch-phrase used in the 2005 campaign (“Live in 
prosperity” – “Sa trăiţi bine!”), which had actually proved successful, and to the 
wedding vows uttered during the religious ceremony in the Catholic and 
Protestant churches (“for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness 
and in health”). The poster recollects, therefore, the myth of happy marriage, in 
which the spouses agree to share the ups and downs of life. Yet, the wedding 
vows are slightly changed as the conjunction “or” in the original text was 
replaced by the conjunction ”and” (“for better and for worse”). Thus, what the 
party’s candidate proposes is a political matrimonial contract with the country 
“for better and for worse” (“la Bine şi la Greu”). While Poster 5 alludes to the 
myth of the redeemer, Poster 6 refers to one of the fundamental institutions of a 
sane and solid community: the institution of marriage. However, the slogan 
suggests that the better and the worse living standards of ‘the other half’ (= the 
people, the country) during the contract are not the result of the chance (a 
suggestion inferred by the ‘or’ conjunction, if it had been used); they are living 
conditions on which the elected president may decide as he pleases. The poster 
suggests that the key to Romania’s future is one man, thus creating a patriarchal 
relationship with the country and strongly diminishing the free will of ‘the other 
half’ (= the people). The candidate is introduced as an all-knowing, problem-
solving leader who possesses all the answers to the country’s future and the 
only thing he needs is empowerment through elections.     
Unlike the American Democrats’ posters which foreground their 
candidate as both the initiator of a new era and the guarantee for change and 
progress (in other words, for the accomplishment of the American dream of 
freedom and democracy), the Romanian Liberal Democrats’ posters present 
their candidate both as a redeeming sheriff of the wild west and as a patriarchal 
would-be partner in a political marriage contract. In this way, the American 
popular myths which were appropriated in the conception of the Romanian 
posters have not only been dislocated, but also misread.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Visual symbols create semantic fields decoded by individual perception 
based on individual experience and education. Visual literacy depends, 
therefore, on individual knowledge. Yet, the semantic fields created by political 
posters have as point of reference collective knowledge and experience, the 
purpose being to reach as many categories and communities of people as 
possible. This may be one of the reasons why popular myths and institutions are 
used as symbol providers. If multiple symbolic vectors standing for general 
categories meet, then icons are contoured. They could be either explicit (as in 
the Rosie-Obama poster) or implicit (as in the sheriff poster). Their role is to 
create a stronger message by antithesis, controlling the eye and the mind to see 
and believe the exact message which the creator of the pictorial representation 
intends to convey.      
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Abstract: The paper focuses on the issue of identity projected on a postmodern 
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1. Introduction 
The postmodern trend is one of the literary directions whose features are 
most difficult to pinpoint because of their striking resemblance to features 
belonging to modernism, realism or even 18th century (enlightenment) 
literature. Many a theorist has tried to define postmodernism and could only 
yield an eclectic nucleus. Its lack of originality emphasizes the literary crisis 
that one has been facing for more than half a century and that has resulted in 
turning books into a commodity, thus blurring the value of culture and creation. 
Nevertheless, despite the apparently uncertain situation of postmodern 
literature, there are several representatives who succeeded in adding an original 
vein to the seemingly undistinguishable body of the trend and thus managed to 
consolidate its status. Writers, such as James Joyce, Samuel Beckett or Salman 
Rushdie, to name just a few, have formulated and made use of new literary 
concepts and techniques that later became an inspiration for other artistic 
figures and helped them create their own distinctive literary realms. 
John Fowles is stated to have played a great part in the development of 
postmodernism and to have created intricate microcosms which did not readily 
give away their secrets to the reader’s inquisitive mind. Among his complex 
imaginary worlds, The French Lieutenant’s Woman has been considered a 
milestone of postmodernity and, as a consequence, it has been much debated 
and analysed. The dialectic revolves around the opposition between modernism 
and postmodernism and their presence under various forms in the pages of the 
book. 
Malcolm Bradbury (1973: 257) points out that the book may be labelled 
a “very Whig novel, a novel about emancipation through history, with Victorian 
hypocrisy and ignorance yielding up to modern truth and authenticity, to good 
faith and freedom, the whole enterprise aided by appropriately sympathetic 
techniques in which the characters are set free from the formal containments of 
traditional Victorian fiction”. He does not fail to note the postmodern features 
of the novel later in his text, although he does not explicitly mention their 
belonging to the trend. The novel, in his opinion, is “baffling to criticism” 
(Bradbury 1973: 258), as it is a mixture of realist and modernist elements. 
The whole concept of the novel is based on pastiche and thus belongs to 
postmodernity, as Fowles set out to criticise Victorianism and, to this end, 
constructed a work of art in which he combined the styles of Henry James’ The 
Turn of the Screw, Alain Fournier’s Le Grand Meaulnes and Charles Dickens’ 
Great expectations (Brînzeu 2001: 55). This is not, however, the only 
postmodern element characterising the novel. As William Stephenson (2007: 9-
10) explains, there are a series of postmodern features which define the novel 
and which have made it become a part of the postmodern curricula:  
 
… critics have read The French Lieutenant’s Woman as a postmodernist text since the 
1980s (…). It conforms to the stereotype of postmodernist writing in that it blurs the 
boundary between literature and popular fiction: it uses an extensive vocabulary, 
engages with philosophy and literary theory, and yet relies on popular conventions, 
such as dealing with separate plots in alternating chapters to increase suspense, and the 
gradual heightening of erotic tension until the obligatory sex scene. Moreover, like a 
typical postmodernist novel, it does not pretend to have made a radical break with the 
past (as modernist literature tried to do). 
 
Although the critic grasped and listed most of the book’s postmodern 
traits, he failed to notice the simulacrum creation process that determined the 
enterprise of writing. In order to create his female main character, Fowles 
(1977: 136) drew his inspiration from an image that came back to his mind, of a 
woman with her back turned towards the viewer, while standing at the far end 
of a pier and presumably gazing into the far horizon. He could not tell whether 
that image had been inspired by a real person, an object – a picture or a painting 
– or was just a figment of his imagination. 
He provided this mental image, whose source he could not remember, 
with a larger contextual reference, a controversial plot and an innovative 
ending, which leaves the reader in the lurch as to the characters’ evolution. This 
process of turning the image into a part of a literary work is called an 
“ekphrastic transposition”. 
 
The distinction between an imaginary and a real work of art as the object of ekphrasis 
is of high relevance. While the former has to be fancied, obliging the readers to 
undertake an active operation of reverse ekphrasis, similar to that performed by theatre 
of film directors when transposing a literary text into a show, the latter can be seen and 
interpreted by the readers themselves (Pârlog et al. 2009: 109). 
 
The source object need not be a work of art at all, it can be a simple 
imaginary element which gains artistic connotations, once a literary work is 
built, based on its implications. A process of reverse ekphrasis thus takes place 
in which the original object is recreated in order to give imagination a real 
referent. In Fowles’s case, the source object is lost and this results in a 
“notional ekphrasis”, as John Hollander calls it (cf. Pârlog et al 2009: 109). The 
notional ekphrasis has the effect of blurring the boundaries between reality and 
imagination, thus providing the reader with a postmodern illusion of reality. 
In Simulacra and Simulations, Baudrillard (1988) explains how this 
postmodern phenomenon of offering an illusion of reality through the medium 
of a literary work can be engendered by generating, with the help of models, “a 
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal”. He gives the example of a map, 
which no longer mirrors a real territory, but creates it. He further focuses on 
explanations concerning our “age of simulation” which begins, according to his 
theory, by “a liquidation of all referentials”. 
It is quite interesting to see the lack of importance we, as readers, attach 
to the identity of the woman in the mental picture mentioned by Fowles. She 
has originally no identity, as the writer does not remember who she is or where 
she comes from. She is nobody in particular. The postmodern process, through 
which the writer recreates her identity, only to toy with it throughout the story 
and to modify it yet again at the end of the novel, can serve to define the main 
steps Fowles took in shaping his protagonist’s identity. 
Sarah, together with the rest of the characters, is placed in the setting of 
Lyme Regis, in the beginning of the story. Although a real referent, the town is 
also recreated, as it is given a Victorian identity, it is filled with people acting 
according to the precepts of the time and, as a result, endowing the various 
parts of the setting with new meanings which they lack in reality. “Fowles was 
then [i.e. while writing the book] living in the Underhill Farm, an old building 
in the woods to the west of Lyme Regis” (Stephenson 2007: 6). Consequently, 
he knew the place quite well and still he does not describe it in a realistic 
manner, creating a written copy, but rather produces an illusion of reality, 
employing a postmodern technique in order to recreate the locus of action. 
The issue of the simulacrum can be discussed again, as Fowles’s town 
plays the same part that Baudrillard’s map does. It is the process of recreation 
that draws the readers’ attention, as Fowles’s imaginary Victorian society 
leaves an indelible mark on the real town. Thus, the simulacrum somehow 
manages to take over, leaving the impression that it is the imaginary setting 
which describes the real one and not the other way around, especially in this 
case, in which Fowles’s imaginary Lyme Regis is much more popular than the 
real referent. 
 
2. Linear Identity 
 
The characters populating the Victorian environment seem to have no 
qualms about living and acting according to the requirements of the time. 
Ernestina Freeman, Charles Smithson’s fiancée, is the perfect exponent of that 
society. She has no job, is interested in supervising household issues, in 
obtaining a husband, does not dare walk unaccompanied, and succeeds in 
maintaining a formal and artificial behaviour through the best part of the story. 
She is a predictable character, whose ups and downs do not impress the reader. 
Her linear identity or predictable and conformist evolution describes an 
apparently uninteresting character who complies with the conventions of the 
society. 
Ernestina can be seen as a personage who is to live an easy life, as all 
the women of the time who belonged or were to belong to a higher social 
stratum did, i.e. to enter marriage, be housewives, have children, busy 
themselves with their education and concern themselves with their husbands’ 
happiness. Then, women did not really matter when it came to taking decisions, 
only heads of families did, i.e. men.  
At the time of the novel, 1867, “John Stuart Mill tried (but failed) to 
persuade his Parliamentary colleagues to grant women the vote” (Acheson 
1998: 33). This rather feminist streak introduced by Fowles is meant also to 
establish a difference between the types of women in the story – those who 
contend themselves with the part they play in the Victorian society, the truly 
Victorian women, such as Ernestina, Mrs Talbot, Mrs Poulteney and, the 
modern ones, who are more open-minded and favour free choice / change, such 
as Sarah Woodruff and partly, Miss Tranter, Ernestina’s aunt.  
Ernestina is, as stated above, not among the modern women and as a 
result she is not concerned with the transformation of the role that women play 
in that society. She apparently enjoys the rules of the Victorian society and 
seems to have a linear identity; as a result, the reader can expect to be offered 
no surprise as far as her evolution is concerned: she will live happily and 
formally ever after and never complain about the constraints imposed on her 
freedom. Together with her father, a rich industrialist, she can also be viewed as 
an arriviste, seeking to improve her social status by marrying Charles, who 
belongs to the nobility. Their union is an arranged transaction.  
Nevertheless, even such characters might prove to be exciting, if 
analysed in depth. The formality, artificiality and coldness in fashion at the time 
influence Ernestina’s character, who, in order to reach her end, behaves 
according to the Victorian rules, thus playing a role. She can be viewed as 
carrying the Victorian mask that in time deforms character. 
 
Ernestina had exactly the right face for her age; that is, small-chinned, oval, delicate as 
a violet. (…) At the first meetings she could cast down her eyes very prettily, as if she 
might faint should any gentleman dare to address her. But there was a minute tilt at the 
corner of her eyelids, and a corresponding tilt at the corner of her lips – to extend the 
same comparison, as faint as the fragrance of February violets – that denied, very 
subtly but quite unmistakably, her apparent total obeisance to the great god Man 
(Fowles 1996: 31). 
 
Psychologist Erving Goffman analyses the degree to which a person 
identifies himself/ herself with the part that s/he plays in a certain situation and 
the identity modification that this brings along. There are two cases: (1) “the 
performer can be fully taken in by his own act; he can be sincerely convinced 
that the impression of reality which he stages is the real reality” or (2) “we may 
find that the performer may not be taken in at all by his own routine” (Goffman 
2007: 53). Ernestina may be identified with the former case, as she feels 
compelled to act according to the societal requirements which contradict any 
spontaneous response to inputs produced during daily interactions. Responses 
are established beforehand, and consequently people hide under the convened 
etiquette. She thus cannot express her true self, as that society disregards 
persons who do that, and that is not her pursuit.  
Her linear identity is not existentialist in nature, because “existentialism 
necessitates a choice independent of any sustaining community” (Lynch 2008), 
whereas she never thinks of recreating her person according to an original set of 
values and beliefs. All in all, Ernestina chooses social freedom avoiding to form 
an objective opinion regarding her role in the community and refusing to 
understand that continuing to do her Victorian duty can only serve to further 
falsify her character.  
 
3. Shifting Identity 
 
Victorianism is defied by Sarah Woodruff, through whom the reader 
becomes acquainted with the authorial voice. She feels oppressed by the close-
knit Victorian community and more akin to the Edwardian age to come at the 
turn of the century. Her existentialist streak is rather common to the postmodern 
age, whose writing is characterised by an interest in ontology (McHale 2002: 
283-284). 
Fowles set out to prove that among other things, Victorianism and 
postmodernism share the issue of existentialism (Fowles 1977: 140). This 
common feature surfaced as a result of the shallowness characterising both 
centuries, even though this stems from radically different reasons. Sarah 
changes from a Victorian character into a modern one, as she proves indifferent 
to societal limitations. At a time when women depended on men for a living, 
she earns her own money; despite customs, she moves about the town 
unaccompanied and claims to have slept with a French lieutenant, although this 
makes her fall into disrepute. 
The diligent governess at the beginning of the novel turns into a rebel, 
as she leaves Lyme Regis to have a one-night stand with Charles, and then 
becomes a modern artist, part of the Rossetti house, this time enjoying a whole 
new identity, that of Sarah Roughwood. Her shifting identity, which makes the 
reader perceive her as an unstable character, subject to the personality changes 
that that society squeezes out of her, places her on a postmodern literary axis. 
She is unable to adapt to the Victorian society and breaks away in order to find 
a more friendly environment. 
Her authenticity has been questioned by critics (for example, Acheson 
1998), as sometimes her choices are not the expected ones – nevertheless 
postmodern writing is meant to be puzzling and unpredictable, which is to say 
that the character can sometimes be evolving in a different manner than we 
thought she would. No society has enjoyed absolute conformity and her 
network of personal relations and her personal interests at times cause her to act 
illogically. 
The playfulness with which Fowles constructs and deconstructs Sarah’s 
identity seems not only postmodern, but also Freudian, as according to The 
Merriam-Webster Encyclopaedia of Literature 1993-2000, Freud was the one 
who “torpedoed the idea of a stable ego”. The protagonist’s shifting identity is 
also associated with a psychologically disturbed person by Dr. Grogan, who 
tells Charles that she suffers from “obscure melancholia” (Fowles 1996: 151). 
He mentions similar cases of women who seem to have fallen under the 
spell of melancholia – such as the young widow Weimar, whose husband, a 
cavalry officer, died during some field exercises. She keeps mourning for a 
long period of time, somehow relishing her misfortune. Nevertheless, here, 
Fowles, the manipulator, sends the reader on a wild goose chase, as the real 
problem is not the existence of a character with a disturbed psychology, but 
rather that of one who has a habit that was fashionable during the epoch – 
maintaining long mourning.  
Following the example set by Queen Victoria herself, going through 
elaborate rituals to commemorate the dead became customary for the families 
of the time. The rules that people had to obey were outlined in popular journals 
or household manuals such as The Queen and Cassell’s, which were Victorian 
books addressing housewives. According to them, widows were required to 
wear full mourning for a period of two years (Chevalier 2010). 
Thus, the explanations given earlier by Fowles’s Dr. Grogan are to be 
ignored as they do not describe the isolated case of a sick woman, but point to a 
national custom, instituted by Queen Victoria herself. The attempt to expose 
Sarah’s true identity by giving the widow as an example is unsuccessful as a 
result. Sarah is still the riddle that one must solve, as implied by Fowles from 
the very beginning of the novel: 
 
Stretching eyes west 
Over the sea, 
Wind foul or fair, 
Always stood she 
Prospect-impressed; 
Solely out there 
Did she gaze rest, 
Never elsewhere 
Seemed charm to be.  
Hardy, ‘The Riddle’ (Fowles 1996: 9). 
The lines above, by Hardy, indicate a narrative gambit with which 
Fowles starts his game. The central place is occupied by Sarah, who is the 
riddle that the reader, together with Charles; has to solve. If one wishes to 
understand the female protagonist, one needs to play the game, i.e. read the 
book.  
Postmodernism is once more present in the narrative technique used, as 
one can notice. A case in point is Roy Ascott’s statement regarding art. In his 
opinion, the manner in which postmodernism operates is by involving the 
reader, who becomes part of the literary work, as s/he is the one who will 
rearrange events, giving meaning to the apparently ambiguous story through 
his/her interaction with it.  
 
Art does not reside in the artwork alone, nor in the activity of the artist alone, but is 
understood as a field of psychic probability, highly entropic, in which the viewer is 
actively involved, not in an act of closure in the sense of completing a discrete 
message from the artist (a passive process) but by interrogating and interacting with 
the system “artwork” to generate meaning. This field provides for transactions to take 
place between the psychic system “artist” and the psychic system “viewer, ” where 
both are, to use Umberto Eco's phrase, “gambling on the possibility of semiosis” [Eco 
1976].  
Thus the viewer/ observer must be a participator and is of operational importance in 
the total behaviour of the system (Ascott 2003: 179). 
 
4. Multiple Identity 
 
As a result, not only does the reader become involved in the act of 
retracing the main story line, but the author, as well, takes part in his own plot, 
appearing at various moments in order to finish the postmodern construction. 
Thus, Fowles enjoys a multiple identity, as he plays the parts of author, writer, 
narrator and character at the same time.  
According to Lodge (1992: 10), around the turn of the century, the idea 
of intrusive authorial voice lost its fashionable status, “partly because it detracts 
from realistic illusion and reduces the emotional intensity of the experience 
being represented, by calling attention to the act of narrating.” He further 
explains that in modern fiction, this intrusive authorial voice is used with an 
ironic self-consciousness.  
Fowles is ironic and playful in the novel, and interferes with the story in 
order to explain how he created it, thus producing meta-texts which leave the 
impression that the book is a collage made up of literature, literary theory and 
criticism. As one can notice by reading his theoretical remarks, he sides with 
the postmodern approach to story telling, which allows the characters to be 
authentic and thus, behave in a life-like manner (Fowles 1996: 97). 
The writer is also present behind the narrator, who at times acts as the 
God of the story and at other times as the unreliable modern observer. The 
writer can also be seen as being mirrored by Sarah herself, who plays the role 
of an outcast, just as Fowles does in real life. He allows his character to seep 
into that of his female protagonist and as a result, manages to attach a new type 
of identity to his own person who is in and out of the narrative at the same time.  
The multiple identity he enjoys is due to the overlapping of all the roles 
mentioned above, culminating with Fowles’s active part in the novel, as a 
character. He appears three times in the literary realm - as a bearded character, 
then flipping a coin and, in the end, turning his watch a quarter of an hour, in 
order to adjust the plot versions (another postmodern device used in order to 
give the reader the freedom of choosing the ending which seems the most 
appropriate). He, as a character, always scrutinises his own creation in an 
attempt at glimpsing its flaws. 
Under the guise of the character, there hides a writer who continuously 
criticises, though jocularly or covertly, the idea of an omniscient narrator, such 
as used by himself, as artificial, arrogant and inauthentic. One cannot take this 
as a form of pure self-criticism, but as a mere reminder that the writer dislikes 
the attitude of superiority implied by the traditional type of a narrator: “He [i.e. 
the writer playing the part of a character] looks very much as if he has given up 
preaching and gone in for grand opera; and done much better at the latter than 
the former” (Fowles 1996: 441). 
Fowles’s multiple identity can be best explained by Madan Sarup’s 
view, according to which, identity can be seen as a multi-dimensional space in 
which a variety of writings blend and clash (1996: 25). Each of these 
dimensions is filled by a role that Fowles chooses to play. The multi-
dimensional space is inhabited by the author, writer, narrator and character, 
each with his own particular story. The layers that form his identity create a 
complex figure who, while jesting can still tactfully maintain control over his 
miniature world. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The issue of identity is quite intricate and there are those who consider  
that it cannot be dealt with objectively, as it implies one’s absolute knowledge 
of a person’s life. Sarup argues that “identity is not self-sufficient; it is 
necessarily accomplished by a certain absence, without which it would not 
exist” (1996: 24). Discovering the meaning that absence is to be filled with 
helps one draw a clearer contour of one’s identity. 
Postmodernism is defined by an overall interest in this topic, thus 
proving that psychology still plays a major role in our understanding of the 
world. The way people think and act is mirrored by the literary realms which 
help the reader encounter unusual situations that one rarely deals with in one’s 
real life (especially if the novel focuses on a different century than the one 
which one lives in).  
Postmodern writers have developed this literary direction with an eye to 
the details of character interactions and to protagonists’ general evolution. It is 
a subtrend that stems, on the one hand, from the feminist current, whose women 
writers are concerned with the female self and feminine experience, and, on the 
other hand, from the internationalist current, whose writers of non-British 
origin try to illustrate their struggle to preserve their identity. They wish to 
make the reader acquainted with the themes above in order to prove that what 
we thought of as an isolated case is in fact a recurrent situation and that, 
although this might seem to be a cul-de-sac, it always points to a door that leads 
one to a new way of life. In order to find it and go beyond it, one must change 
and accept the identity transformation that this passage brings along.  
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Abstract: The experiments related to cloning are not only physically dangerous for the 
human species as they imply transhuman mutations which might ultimately be 
destructive, but also threatening in the way in which they change the perception of 
space from an exterior, objective, well-determined territory to a subjective, prohibitive 
place of trauma and conflict. In Ishiguro’s novel “Never Let Me Go” memories of 
various spaces are repeated over and over until they all become the same.  
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1. Introduction  
In this essay I wish to examine Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let me Go 
from the point of view of the spaces described by the main heroine, Kathy H., a 
clone who lives in a world where the apocalypse of physical proliferation has 
become sickeningly possible. Ishiguro pushes the problem of fictional spatiality 
to a vivid extreme, guiding us to contemplate seriously the implications of 
cloning for the surrounding world and for the way in which this world is 
rendered in literature.  
It is true that when the novel was published, its reviewers ignored the 
inciting way in which Ishiguro had developed its chronotope. Never Let me Go 
was seen as an “oblique and elegiac meditation on mortality and lost 
innocence” (Kakutani 2005), a novel about “genetic engineering and associated 
technologies” (Menand 2005), about “friendship, love and loss” (Eek 2005), 
about humanity and “how it can be honored or denied” (Yardley 2005), and 
about the “[i]nescapable death, loss, the destruction or dissipation of what once 
was valued, love and life reduced over time to detritus cast on the wind” (Scurr 
2005). Neither has later criticism dealt with the landscapes described in Never 
Let me Go (Britzman 2006; Seaman 2007; Griffin 2009). Only Shaleem Black 
(2009: 789) considers that  
 
Never Let Me Go can be read as a meditation on a world shaped by the eugenic 
fantasies of Nazi-era incarceration. Hailsham, the English boarding school-like 
institution where Ishiguro's characters grow up, provides precisely such a shadowy 
territory beyond the admissible political life of the realm it inhabits and enables. Such 
a space strips its inhabitants of their claims to any forms of political identity; denuded 
of citizenship and culture, they represent a form of life that challenges traditional 
definitions of what it means to be human. 
 
It also seems that Ishiguro wanted to insist more on the way in which 
space was affected by cloning than on the other problems generated by the 
possibility of an infinite materialization of selves – called by Baudrillard (2006: 
97) “the delirious apotheosis of a productive technology” –, such as the 
disturbing dilemmas related to the clones’ families, their gender rights, the 
relationship with their models, etc. Ishiguro is more interested in the way in 
which Kathy undertakes a journey of discovery, trying through nostalgic 
meanderings in interior spaces to understand the details of her clone condition, 
only gradually revealed to her as she is growing into adulthood.  
Such retreats in some form of fictional second-world are not new in 
literature. They are undertaken by at least three characters in Shakespeare’s 
Twelfth Night, to take one of the most obvious examples. The three distinct 
second worlds in the play are created by Sir Toby, through all rejections of 
responsibility, by Olivia, through ritual actions of mourning, and by Orsino, 
through imposing his will on his environment and transforming it into a mere 
object for his contemplation and commentary. Elliot Krieger (1996: 45) 
comments: 
 
Each of these three private, inward retreats of Twelfth Night extends and expands the 
protagonist’s ego, not by projecting the self into nature but by making the world 
smaller than, or an aspect of, the self. In each of the second worlds in Twelfth Night the 
protagonist – Sir Toby, Olivia, Orsino – diminishes the time, conditions, and people in 
the primary world so that the desires and emotions of the self can predominate in, or 
over, the world. 
 
Ishiguro’s Kathy does not want to enlarge her ego through repeated 
retreats to her inner memories. It is true that in this way she feels she can 
control the outer environment better and can – at leats partially - solve the 
dilemmas of her clone identity. What she does not realize is that through 
recollections, repeated over and over in the same way, she clones her past and 
remains the prisoner of multiplied identical spaces. This is the novelty of 
Ishiguro’s technique: Kathy’s fantasies as well as those of the other characters 
are a form of spatial cloning, confusing the reader and making him fell 
uncanny, alienated, and lost in a labyrinthine world. 
 
2. Places, memories, journeys of discovery 
 
Kathy’s process of self discovery covers three distinct periods, 
intricately connected to the three different environments which mark her life: 
the Hailsham boarding school, where Kathy and her two friends, Ruth and 
Tommy, live until they are sixteen; the “Cottages”, a residential complex for 
young adult clones, where they are prepared to become donors or “carers” for 
the donors who provide organs; and the different recovery centres organized for 
the clones chosen to undergo surgery, where Kathy works as a carer. These are 
the distinct “realistic” frames of a science-fiction story, situated in an after-war 
period when great breakthroughs in science are described as “following one 
after the other” and when “suddenly there were all these new possibilities laid 
before us, all these ways to cure so many previously incurable conditions. This 
was what the world noticed the most, wanted the most” (257). This statement is 
an explanation offered by Miss Emily, one of the Hailsham teacher-guardians, 
contacted by Kathy and Tommy when the two decide to learn more about their 
condition of clones. Miss Emily tells them that Hailsham was one of the first 
places organized for bringing up clones. Due to her efforts to demonstrate that 
the clones were close to normality, since they had a soul and remarkable 
creative potentialities, the living conditions offered by the school were 
considerably ameliorated. Therefore Hailsham had become a place of 
reputation, a privileged estate in comparison to other centres such as 
Glenmorgan House or Saunders Trust.  
However, in spite of Emily’s efforts to improve Hailsham, the clones 
who live there grow up deprived of relatives and parental love, imprisoned 
within the bounds of the boarding school, and isolated from the rest of the 
world: “any place beyond Hailsham was like a fantasy land; we had only the 
haziest notions of the world outside and about what was and wasn’t possible 
there” (66). Crawling with students, the place lacks intimacy. If she wants to be 
alone, Kathy can either take her favourite footpath, going round the back of the 
main house to reach a place hidden behind shrubs, almost out of the bounds, or, 
when looking out of the window, she can notice when there is nobody in the 
playing field, and prolong the moment as much as she wants in a dream which 
shuts off all the noises and gives her the illusion of solitude. Moreover, the 
children are frightened by the dark woods at the top of the hill that rises behind 
Hailsham House. The fringe of trees casts a ghostly shadow over the school and 
looms in the distance, nourishing horrible stories of violence and cruelty in the 
inflamed minds of sadistic guardians and hysterical children. Hailsham appears 
thus in Kathy’s recollections as a limited, imprisoning, sinister place, outside 
whose walls normality threatens with death.  
When Kathy and her two friends, Ruth and Tommy, who in the 
meantime have fallen in love, move to what is called the “Cottages”, they have 
to adjust to a damp, cold, shabbily furnished place. They have already 
discovered that they are clones, but they fight to understand other important 
issues, such as love and sex, how they are related to their models, and when 
organ donations will follow. Interestingly enough, although the clones are free 
to leave the place, they have no contact to outsiders. Instead, they seem to be 
even more frightened by their condition, to lose all illusions, and to accept 
without any opposition the donation programmes, although they know that they 
will inevitably die after the fourth donation. Kathy’s condition becomes even 
more dramatic in the final part of the novel, when she becomes a carer for both 
Ruth and Tommy, the latter having become her lover after Ruth’s death. In 
Kathy’s descriptions, the recovery centres she visits are reduced to a single 
room, where, alienated and unhappy, she spends the time with dying clones. 
When she rushes from one centre to another, commuting between Dover, 
Kingsfield or Norfolk, as her presence is required by different donors, she has 
only “the roads, the big grey sky and my daydreams for company” (204). 
Exhausted, facing pain and death, Kathy can no longer establish a harmonious 
relationship with the surrounding environment. Although she travels a lot now, 
she remains completely cut off from the “normal” world. She knows that the 
cruel, violent, inhuman environment in which she is forced to live can only 
bring about death. Accordingly, she is given no chance to integrate. 
Rejected by her “normal” fellows, Kathy also rejects their world, which 
is synonymous with the world of the reader. She turns inside, preferring to 
reminisce about her past instead of fighting with the present. She is more and 
more pleased to evade from reality into her inner territories, where Hailsham 
plays the greatest part. Hailsham becomes in her thoughts a sheltering place of 
unaware peacefulness, offering, in spite of all its grim aspects, a happiness that 
is otherwise refused to clones. This is the reason why all the other landscapes 
remind her of the first place she inhabited:  
 
Driving around the country, I still see things that will remind me of Hailsham. I might 
pass the corner of a misty field, or see part of a large house in the distance as I come 
down the side of a valley, even a particular arrangement of poplar trees up on a 
hillside, and I’ll think: ‘Maybe that’s it! I’ve found it! This actually is Hailsham!’/…/ 
Not long ago I was driving through an empty stretch of Worcestershire and saw one [a 
pavilion] beside a cricket ground so like ours at Hailsham I actually turned the car and 
went back for a second look. (6) 
 
Kathy has repeatedly tried to leave Hailsham behind, to stop 
contemplating it as an inviting landscape and, instead, to reject it as a useless 
image of the past. But there was a point, she confesses, when she stopped 
resisting, not so much under the pressure of a future which would bring her 
nothing else but pain, depression, and death, but under the influence of one of 
the donors she had in her care, who had just come through his third donation 
and was not feeling well. Although he grew up in a different place, he asked 
Kathy to remember Hailsham and allow him to join her recollections so that 
their memories might overlap: 
 
He knew he was close to completing and so that’s what he was doing: getting me to 
describe things to him, so they’d really sink in, so that maybe during those sleepless 
nights, with the drugs and the pain and the exhaustion, the line would blur between 
what were my memories and what were his. (5)  
 
The donor makes Kathy understand that the places the clones come 
from are the only link that unites them into a family. Under his influence, Kathy 
comes to speak about “us, all the students who’d grown up with me and were 
now spread across the country, carers and donors, all separated now but still 
somehow linked by the place we’d come from” (208). That is why Kathy does 
not want to forget anything, although at the Cottages the Hailsham students had 
a period when forgetting helped them gain a serene condition:  
 
Maybe once Hailsham was behind us, it was possible, just for that half year or so, 
before all the talk of becoming carers, before the driving lessons, all those other things, 
it was possible to forget for whole stretches of time who we really were; to forget what the 
guardians had told us; to forget Miss Lucy's outburst that rainy afternoon at the 
pavilion, as well as all those theories we'd developed amongst ourselves over the 
years. It couldn't last, of course, but like I say, just for those few months, we somehow 
managed to live in this cosy state of suspension in which we could ponder our lives without 
the usual boundaries. Looking back now, it feels like we spent ages in that steamed-up 
kitchen after breakfast, or huddled around half-dead fires in the small hours, lost in 
conversation about our plans for the future. (140) 
 
By contrast, Ruth practises the strategy of forgetting, and when Kathy 
reminds her twice that the short-cut to the Hailsham pond leading through a 
rhubarb patch was out of bounds, she answers with the same words: “What 
does it matter anyway? What’s the rhubarb patch got to do with any of this? 
Just get on with what you were saying” (187, 198). The repetition of the same 
words, like the donors desire to embrace Kathy’s memories as his own, made 
Shallem Black (2009: 800) see Kathy's rereading of her past as a symbolic 
cloning of experience. She comments: “Kathy thus creates memories as a 
repetition, or clone, of experience, and then copies them for others who have 
even less than she to fall back on during the agonies of donation. The clone 
comes to supplant the original through the gesture of memory.”  
Past landscapes and events are presented as real, apparently 
subconsciously censored by Kathy in order to offer an objective description of 
her life. When she announces in the first paragraph of the novel that she is 
thirty-one years old and is going to recollect her past (because, as we find out 
later, she will soon become a donor herself and approach the end of her life), 
the reader has the impression that her memories will follow a straightforward 
rendering of the incidents that make up her life. In fact Kathy’s efforts of 
remembering and understanding her condition are nothing else but the result of 
an introvert projection which helps her cope with the otherwise traumatic 
restrictions imposed by a cruel environment. This procedure situates the 
narrator on the level of improvisation, where she filters reality and offers untrue 
revelations, deformed under the pressure of secrets, lies, and a constantly 
failing memory. The readers can never be sure of what Kathy tells them, since 
the heroine herself insists on her faulty memory with such statements as “I've 
never been sure” (26,32), “I suppose” (100), “I don’t know” (94), “my guess 
is”(95), “I can’t even say for certain” (189), “[t]his was all a long time ago so I 
might have some of it wrong” (13), etc. The confusion is amplified by mise en 
abime, the commentaries on a recollected scene being embedded within another 
recollected scene, creating the impression of a narrator lost in an internal 
labyrinth, where the reader is also hopelessly entrapped. That the persons 
addressed might be clones is suggested by the repeated statement „I don’t know 
how it was where you were, but at Hailsham...” (13, 67, 94). Britzman 
(2006:307) comments on Kathy’s narrative strategy: 
 
Retroactive time collapses from memory’s weight; she is never sure if the events she 
recalls match any meaning, then or now. Her story is affected. Everything feels 
mismatched and unclear. Early events register, leaving vague impressions. Later, 
accidental occurrences lift into terrible significance what is felt before it can be known. 
Meaning is deferred and her theories cannot help that. Her memories as fragments of 
life are addressed to us readers and she always asks, ‘do you know what I mean?’ 
 
When they acknowledge the potential inaccuracy of the heroine’s recollections, 
the readers can judge the information related by Kathy; the more the reader 
learns about Kathy, the more we are able to interpret the sub-textual intention 
of the fragments of memory presented by her. Repeated several times, even to 
the point of narrative tedium, the same recollections and verbal formulations 
come to resemble the act of cloning. Ishiguro himself calls Kathy’s oblique 
narratorial device “tangential meandering” (qtd. in Eek 2005), considering the 
heroine’s journey of discovery as a travel in the ambiguous territories of her 
past life; “tangentially” touching similar trajectories, her excursion in time 
determines Kathy to clone the same memories, dreams, and illusions. 
 
3. Narratological overlappings 
 
It is also interesting to approach Ishiguro’s chronotope from the 
viewpoint of narratology. Obviously, it cannot be categorized according to the 
classifications offered so far for the spaces of fiction. Thus, if we want to define 
the space described in Never Let me Go using Marie-Laure Ryan’s (2009) 
classification, we have to take into consideration the categories of spatial 
frames (the immediate surroundings of actual events), setting (the general 
socio-historico-geographical environment in which the action takes place), 
story space (the space relevant to the plot, as mapped by the actions and 
thoughts of the characters), story world (the story space completed by the 
reader’s imagination on the basis of cultural knowledge and real world 
experience) and narrative universe (the world presented as actual by the text, 
plus all the counterfactual worlds constructed by characters as beliefs, wishes, 
fears, speculations, hypothetical thinking, dreams, and fantasies). In Never Let 
Me Go the setting belongs to a past period but is situated within a science-
fiction context of the future, the story space, spatial frames and narrative 
universe overlap in a confusing way, while the story world created in the 
reader’s mind is a shadowy, ambiguous domain.  
Neither can my classification of fictional spaces be of any help. As I 
have shown elsewhere (Brînzeu 2010), the fictional space in a novel can be 
seen as a real space, where the events take place (one variant of it being the 
hyperspace of science-fiction novels), setting (the general socio-historico-
geographical environment in which the action takes place), imagined space (all 
the worlds constructed by characters as beliefs, wishes, fears, speculations, 
hypothetical thinking, dreams, and fantasies) and heterotopic space (which 
includes both the ambiguous, non-totalisable, contradictory places, defined by 
Foucault (1991: xvff) as unusual, and the contested, inversed, or deceiving 
spaces). This classification highlights once more the way in which the places of 
otherness described by Kathy in Ishiguro’s novel make the real, imagined, and 
heterotopic spaces overlap in an unsettling illusion of juxtaposition, 
destabilizing the traditional categories of space and challenging the 
conventional ways of thinking about them. It also brings us to the conclusion 
that the experiments related to cloning are not only physically dangerous for the 
human species, as they imply transhuman mutations which might ultimately be 
destructive, but they are also threatening in the way in which they change the 
perception of space from an exterior, objective notion to a subjective, 
prohibitive place of trauma and conflict.  
Kathy’s final imaginary picture, created after having lost Tommy, is a 
last proof of how skillfully Ishiguro can deal with the ambiguity of real and 
recollected spaces. While driving to Norfolk, Kathy recognizes the same flat 
fields and huge grey skies she was familiar with at Hailsham. She stops on a 
side road to admire the landscape, but is shocked by all sorts of rubbish 
clustered along a barbed wire fence. She cannot refrain from thinking about  
 
the flapping plastic in the branches, the shore-line of odd stuff caught along the 
fencing, and I half-closed my eyes and imagined this was the spot where everything I’d 
ever lost since my childhood had washed up, and I was standing here in front of it, and 
if I waited long enough, a tiny figure would appear on the horizon across the field, and 
gradually get larger until I'd see it was Tommy, and he'd wave, maybe even call. The 
fantasy never got beyond that – I didn't let it – and though the tears rolled down my 
face, I wasn't sobbing or out of control. I just waited a bit, then turned back to the car, 
to drive off to wherever it was I was supposed to be. (282) 
 
It is worth noticing that this image of Norfolk is similar to a dream Ruth 
had before dying, in which she saw Hailsham flooded with rubbish. The littered 
landscapes of Norfolk and Hailsham, symbols of loss and disturbance, are 
remarkably different from the places visited by Stevens, Ishiguro’s butler in 
The Remains of the Day, when he takes a tour to visit a former acquaintance of 
his, Miss Kenton. Stevens notices in the Salisbury fields the fundamental 
attributes of Englishness – a sense of restraint, discretion, calmness, distinction, 
and, especially, dignity –, attributes which a butler should also develop to be a 
great servant. They are best summed up by the term ‘greatness’, Stevens says, 
not to be found in other countries, even if their landscape is more dramatic. 
Neither of the characteristics noticed by Stevens can be applied to the regions 
described by the two clones.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The supposed “healthy” life fabricated with the help of organ donors 
pollutes the entire world of Ishiguro’s heroines. Both Kathy and Ruth face the 
same littered landscape beyond which nothing else but death is in store: 
whether in reality, in a fantasy, or in a nightmare, the landscape makes the 
heroines understand that the future of the “normal” world depends on whether 
or not genetic engineering will preserve both land and bodies unlittered, as 
sacred territories given by God to be kept in natural beauty and harmony.  
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FROM THE MIRROR TO THE SEA: THE MODERN SEMIOTIC 
NATURE OF IDENTITY IN JEAN RHYS’S WIDE SARGASSO SEA 
 
CRISTINA-GEORGIANA VOICU 
“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi 
 
Abstract: This paper attempts to show the way in which Rhys’s metaphors reach a new 
pitch of vividness and power through imagistic detail, but also draw on the natural 
dimensions of intellectual and sense experiences, including colour, shape and texture. 
Such focused patterning and reworking of her own metaphors creates a sense of 
fatalistic inevitability, generating a hypnotic, spellbinding effect. 
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consciousness 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper particular levels of meaning will be discussed with respect 
to the theory of metaphors and symbols (archetypal criticism, Bakhtin’s 
chronotopes, Paul de Man’s Lyric and Modernity) and attention will be paid to 
the ambiguity of imagination, which represents an important harmonizing as 
well as disruptive element in Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea. The text has an 
entirely successful, transformative, intertextual relationship, both with Jane 
Eyre and with other texts. The looking-glass metaphor comprises a striking 
example of Rhys’s intertextual writing strategy. Rhys’s white Creole heroine, 
Antoinette Cosway, realises that her black friend Tia serves as her own mirror 
image: “Blood on my face, tears on hers. It was as if I saw myself. Like in a 
looking-glass.” (Rhys 27). However, Antoinette’s reference to blood, tears, a 
face and a looking-glass equally evokes Brontë’s bleeding child Jane’s 
incarceration in the red-room, where her own face appears as “half fairy, half 
imp’ in the mirror’s visionary hollow.” (Brontë 1992: 78). 
 
2. Reading intertextual metaphors 
 
Rhys’s intertextual reference reflects Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s  
(1984) theories in The Madwoman in the Attic. They demonstrate how the mad 
wife functions as Jane Eyre’s truest and darkest double or repressed selfhood, 
often through Brontë’s use of the looking-glass motif. By alluding to the 
precursor text in this way, Rhys’s metaphor also suggests a re-interpretation of 
the Lacanian ‘Stade du Miroir’ in which the writer discovers herself as a being 
both apart from, but also allied to, the mother/ precursor author. 
Lacan argues that subjectivity arises when an infant catches a glimpse of 
herself in the mirror and takes that image to be herself. However, Rhys subverts 
the search for selfhood exemplified by Lacan’s ‘Stade du Miroir’ when she re-
configures her use of the intertextual looking-glass metaphor. Instead of 
experiencing an epiphany of Lacanian self-discovery, Antoinette seems unable 
to recognise herself in the mirror: “The girl I saw was myself yet not quite 
myself.” (Rhys147). Incarcerated in Thornfield Hall, she becomes the 
quintessential alienated subject, unable to trust the validity of her own 
reflection: “It was then I saw her, the ghost, the woman with streaming hair. 
She was surrounded by a gilt frame, but I knew her.” (Rhys 89).  Moreover, 
Antoinette’s description of the ghost’ echoes Brontë’s description of Bertha in 
Jane Eyre: “She was a big woman, and had long black hair, we could see it 
streaming against the flames as she stood”. 
Therefore, in these examples, Rhys’s use of the looking glass metaphor 
serves to emphasise Antoinette’s loss of selfhood as she is moved progressively 
through the novel’s three sections, into contact with Brontë’s precursor text. 
Rhys’s intertextual allusions to other writers’ ghost metaphors also display her 
ability to draw on, and destabilise, their original significance. In Jane Eyre, 
Bertha Mason is the mysterious ghostly presence feared by the inhabitants of 
Thornfield Hall. However, in Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette thinks that Jane 
Eyre, a pale girl in a white dress humming to herself as she walks past, might 
be a ghost. Their roles are reversed through the use of intertextual metaphor: the 
ghost Jane Eyre hovers on the periphery of Antoinette’s consciousness, 
haunting the ever-tenuous boundaries of her selfhood. Jane Eyre is also the 
ghost of Antoinette’s lost youth, since the white dress she wears features in 
Antoinette’s favourite childhood painting of the Miller’s Daughter. Antoinette, 
like her mother, also wears a ghostly white dress on her honeymoon, which her 
husband notes slips untidily from her shoulder, as in the painting. 
One of Rhys’s original choices of title for her novel was Le Revenant, 
meaning The Ghost. This ghost, who always uncannily returns without ever 
having been properly present in the first place, is a central motif of her novel, 
expressed repeatedly through intertextual metaphors. Thus, when the husband is 
lost on a mysterious paved road in the woods, a little girl mistakes him for a 
zombie reincarnation of the cruel, slave-owning priest, Pere Lilievre. The 
metaphor of the reincarnated zombie, signifying loss of soul or selfhood, is in 
fact an intertextual allusion to stories about the ghost of Pere Jean-Baptiste 
Labat, told in order to frighten children into good behaviour. The husband’s 
own character and destiny, as a soulless being neither fully dead nor truly 
emotionally alive, are also subtly evoked. This section of the novel also seems 
an intertextual allusion to the opening of Dante’s Inferno: “Midway in the 
journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, For the straight way was 
lost”. 
Rhys thus skilfully draws on Dante’s re-interpretation of the 
conventional metaphor, life is a journey’ which may indeed pass through a dark 
wood: an example of unconventional language that is conceptually based on an 
unused element of the source field. By using Dante’s metaphor intertextually, 
Rhys also suggests that no life, no narrative ever really begins: all have in some 
sense already begun before they began. In this way, she evokes the plight of 
Antoinette and her husband, doomed to their own particular circles of hell by 
Brontë’s precursor text. For any reader, but especially for a reader who is also a 
writer, ghosts inhabit all literary texts. Rhys’s prevalent, intertextual ghost 
imagery alerts us to Harold Bloom’s concept of apophrades, that is, the dismal 
or unlucky days when the dead return to inhabit their former houses. Bloom 
suggests that the strong intertextual writer is able to make it seem as though the 
latter had written the precursor’s characteristic work.  
That Rhys persistently generates the impression that she is being copied 
by her ancestors is the result of her skilful deployment of intertextual 
metaphors. For example, the moth who blunders into the candle flame carries 
obvious metaphorical associations of danger and attraction. However, it is the 
husband who chiefly identifies with that gay gentleman more stunned than hurt. 
His words not only suggest his own character and situation, but are also an 
intertextual allusion to a similar speech by Brontë’s Mr Rochester: “Look at his 
wings,’ said he, ‘he reminds me rather of a West Indian insect; one does not 
often see so large and gay a night-rover in England; there he is flown away.’” 
(Brontë 1992: 89). 
In Jane Eyre, the moth reminds Mr Rochester of “a West Indian insect.” 
Rhys’s use of the moth as an intertextual metaphor therefore suggests that 
Brontë’s Mr. Rochester remembers a moment which occurs in Wide Sargasso 
Sea. 
Rhys generates a similar uncanny effect when Antoinette describes how 
as a child, she slept “too long in the moonlight.” (Rhys 67).  Her words refer to 
the belief that sleeping under the full moon will cause madness, so that she is 
later described as “blank, hating, moonstruck.” Similarly, in Jane Eyre, 
Bertha’s periods of insanity seem to occur when the moon is full. Mr Rochester 
relates how one fiery West Indian night “he is awakened by her mad yells, 
while the moon was setting on the waves, broad and red, like a hot cannon-
ball.” His description of the moon’s “bloody glance” clearly evokes Jane’s 
description of Bertha’s “savage face” and “roll of the red eyes.” Thus, Brontë 
makes the moon a metaphor for the mad wife. Through her intertextual use of 
the same metaphor, Jean Rhys is made to seem like the precursor of Charlotte 
Brontë, a chronological impossibility.  
Rhys’s use of intertextual metaphors thus demonstrates her ability to 
adopt Harold Bloom’s strategy of clinamen or misprision, that is, to swerve 
away, to transform the meaning, of the precursor text. Rhys’s intelligent, 
subversive use of intertextual metaphor results in her novel’s entirely successful 
image world. For example, Daniel Cosway, in his First letter to Antoinette’s 
husband, writes: “Richard Mason is a sly man and he will tell you a lot of nancy 
stories, which is what we call lies here, about what happen at Coulibri and this 
and that.” (Rhys109). The word ‘nancy’ is an intertextual allusion to West 
Indian and Carribean tales about Anancy, a cunning and greedy spider which 
can take on different forms and which succeeds not by strength but by trickery. 
The metaphorical linguistic expression ‘nancy’ therefore evokes the husband’s 
attempts to discover who the deceptive spider is, and to unravel a web of lies. 
However, the fact that the spider reference appears in a letter from one male to 
another suggests that it is Antoinette who is trapped in patriarchy’s collusive 
web. 
In fact, Antoinette’s side of the story is ultimately disregarded, so that 
her plight is reminiscent of the female writer, discounted by such male theorists 
of intertextuality as Barthes and Bloom. Barthes’s The Death of the Author and 
Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence significantly ignore or underplay the female 
writer’s efforts to break into art, to demarcate her own creative spaces. The 
dangers of failing to recognise the female writer within theories of 
intertextuality are exemplified by some of the images within Rhys’s novel. In 
Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette recalls a patchwork counterpane her Aunt Cora 
is making when she tells her she is leaving: “The diamond-shaped pieces of silk 
melted one into the other, red, blue, purple, green, yellow, all one shimmering 
colour. Hours and hours she had spent on it and it was nearly finished. Would I 
be lonely? she asked and I said, No, looking at the colours. Hours and hours 
and hours I thought.” (Rhys 123). 
The patchwork can be read as a metaphor for intertextuality, in 
accordance with Barthes’s appealing trope in The Death of the Author that the 
textual is textile. However, it also signifies a growing sense of the inevitability 
of fate: the pattern of Antoinette’s destiny, like the pattern of the counterpane, 
is nearly finished. Moreover, “hours and hours” have been spent in making it, 
rather than in expending energy in altering the course of her life. Nancy Miller 
similarly suggests that theories of intertextuality such as Barthes’s have 
employed a whole mythology of weaving and making webs whilst, at the same 
time, underplaying or even erasing those myths’ connection to women’s efforts 
to break into art. 
 
3. Dreams of Reality 
 
As the following discussion attempts to show, it is the concern with the 
power of metaphors that allows Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea to revive the 
disturbing potential of particular themes and motifs in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane 
Eyre, to question the suggested interpretations, to search for other and different 
points of view. The genre or romance, moreover, opens space for both authors 
to intensify the relativity of meaning by employing dream and nightmare 
visions and mingling the rational with the irrational. 
Accordingly, Jean Rhys’s story of alienation is centred on two crucial 
metaphors: the sea and the island. The sea as an image of separation and an 
increasing distance suggests the split in both space and time: the conflict 
between different civilisations, between the past and the present (e.g., the 
destructive effects of slavery) as well as between the inner world of the 
individual and the surrounding reality. Both Antoinette (Brontë’s Bertha) and 
her husband (Brontë’s Rochester) are trapped in an imposed and painful 
isolation. The heroine is introduced as an orphaned daughter of a Jamaican 
plantation owner, whose family sank into destitution after the liberation of 
slaves. Her widowed Creole mother belongs neither to the black community nor 
to the dominant class, and is despised by both groups. As a white Creole, 
Antoinette becomes a double outsider: “white nigger” for the Europeans and 
“white cockroach” for the Blacks. Jean Rhys herself was a white Creole and 
Antoinette’s story reflects the author’s own “sense of displacement”: her 
feeling of being “dispossessed at home” and “living as an exile in England” 
(Howells 1991:106). 
In the constant atmosphere of hostility, imagination (or, in Kantian 
terms, the ability to consider the absent, the invisible or even the 
unrepresentable) becomes a device of escape from an unbearable reality. The 
appealing charm of the unknown is reflected in Antoinette’s dreams of England 
as well as in Rochester’s obsession with the hidden secrets of the Caribbean 
islands and of his wife’s personality: “What I see is nothing – I want what it 
hides” (Rhys 73). These dreams correspond with another symbolic level of the 
title image: the notion of mystery and infinity, the desire for transcending 
boundaries and limitations, or, in other words, for the experience of the 
sublime.  
An interesting discussion of this subject can be found in Levinas’s 
philosophy. The idea of infinity inspires a real desire, the desire in its deepest 
and absolute sense, and the desire for the ‘other’: for the “land where we were 
not born” and which “we can never reach” (Levinas 1997:20), for the ‘other’ 
person, whose otherness, however, does not mean contradiction. According to 
Levinas, to characterise someone as one’s opposite is to derive his identity from 
one’s experience, that is to say, to deprive him of his individuality. 
A hidden threat connected with the voyage is implied by the reference 
to the sargassoes, mentioned only in the title of Rhys’s novel and suggesting the 
windless space of the ocean with a great quantity of seaweed. In other words, 
the difficulty or even impossibility of movement is hinted at, the empty space 
of the split widens and the desire for infinity turns into a horror of nothingness. 
It is this anxiety that is reflected in the Gothic and Romantic images of lost or 
cursed ships. 
Nevertheless, the more rational he attempts to be, the more incomplete 
his view of the reality is: “everything I had imagined to be truth was false [...] 
Only the magic and the dream are true – all the rest’s a lie” (Rhys 138). The 
confusing mixture of reality and illusion recalls, in fact, Northrop Frye’s 
analysis of romance. In connecting the real with dreaming and the unreal with a 
waking world, Wide Sargasso Sea gets closer to the tradition of this genre then 
Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre. The notion of uncertainty and ambiguity 
permeating through Wide Sargasso Sea is further supported by the use of 
intertextual allusions. For instance, there is no explicit reference to feelings of 
guilt.  
Without any attention to gender issues, theories of intertextuality 
threaten to consign the women writer to figures in the position of Aunt Cora, 
“who ends up passively turning her face to the wall” (Rhys 89).  However, as 
Rhys claims her literary kinship with Brontë, the counterpane ceases to evoke 
the exclusion of the female writer from the intertextual web. Like books in 
which readers and writers search for their literary foremothers, the counterpane 
becomes instead a repository of collective memory, of the relationship between 
aunt and niece: “I saw the grandfather clock and Aunt Cora’s patchwork, all 
colours. I saw the orchids and the stephanotis and the jasmine and the tree of 
life in flames.” (Rhys 109).  
This re-configuration of the counterpane’s metaphorical significance is 
similar to the way in which Gilbert and Gubar substitute a female affiliation 
complex, in which female writers seek affiliation with literary foremothers they 
admire, in the place of Bloom’s distinctly male, patriarchal model of the 
anxiety of influence. The desire for, rather than the anxiety concerning, a 
precursor of tradition for the woman writer makes influence and/or 
intertextuality, when established, a matter of legitimation rather than of 
emasculating belatedness. Gilbert and Gubar (1984:159) write: 
 
The son of too many fathers, today’s male writer feels hopelessly belated; the daughter 
of too few mothers, today’s female writer feels that she is helping to create a viable 
tradition which is at last definitively emerging. 
 
Similarly, when Antoinette looks at the tapestry she recognises her mother 
inscribed inside it. It is as if the figure of the female has finally been re-instated 
in the intertextual web. Thus attention to the gender issues inscribed mythically 
and metaphorically within the notions of text and textuality can, Kate Miller 
and Rhys imply, return us to the figure of the strong female artist, Arachne, the 
spider woman, to use an example from Miller’s theories. This female affiliation 
complex’ suggests it is helpful to think of the creative, intertextual space as a 
kind of metaphoric, amniotic sea, or Julia Kristeva’s semiotic chora. In 
Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva finds intertextuality functions within 
the semiotic chora, that is the womb or receptacle of becoming, a space of pre-
linguistic, prelapsarian plenitude initially totally identified with the maternal 
body. For Antoinette, this lost paradise or chora is likewise located within her 
mother’s body, before their disastrous fall into patriarchy: “Once I made 
excuses to be near her when she brushed her hair, a soft black cloak to cover 
me, hide me, keep me safe.” (Rhys 19). It is similarly located within the songs 
of her substitute mother and nurse, Christophine: “I couldn’t always understand 
[Christophine’s] patois songs she also came from Martinique but she taught me 
the one that meant, The little ones grow old, the children leave us, will they 
come back? and the one about the cedar tree flowers which only last for a day” 
(Rhys 23).. 
Christophine’s songs provide examples of complex metaphors because 
they make use of culturally based conceptual frames. Antoinette defines her 
reality in terms of the metaphors of her nurse’s songs, and then proceeds to act 
on the basis of that reality. She also sings them back to her husband on their 
honeymoon, so that he too comes to think of her metaphorically, a golden-
brown flower “which he later tramples into the mud.” (Rhys 26). Thus, for 
Antoinette and her husband, as for Rhys, and for Kristeva, storytellers are 
influenced by other storytellers. The images found in songs and texts are 
intertextual. The title of Rhys’s own novel therefore seems an appropriate 
metaphor for an interpretation of intertextuality in which the literary work is 
viewed not as a fixed container of meanings, but as a shifting sea, in which a 
potentially vast number of relations coalesce. Lethal and fertile, the Sargasso 
Sea is a place of renewal and stagnation, of creation within repetition, of 
intertexuality in fact. 
By adopting a title which evokes intertextuality, Rhys suggests that, for 
her, repetition is by no means a fruitless, plagiaristic imitation. Within the 
metaphorical, intertextual sea of stories, there are as many different 
interpretations of stories as there are people to read them. For Antoinette, the 
sea of her own story changes its meaning as it flows into the unreal cities of the 
famous Victorian novel: “When I woke it was a different sea. Colder. It was 
that night, I think, that we changed course and lost our way to England.” (Rhys 
148). 
In the words of Carole Angier (1990: 163), Rhys’s metaphors reach a 
“new pitch of vividness and power”. This is because her image-based 
metaphors of, for example, moths, clothes and flowers, are rich in imagistic 
detail, but also draw on the natural dimensions of intellectual and sense 
experiences, including colour, shape and texture. Moreover, they take on a 
mirror-like, self-reflexive quality, becoming intertextual, not only with other 
texts but with their own cohesive image world, developed throughout the three 
parts of the novel. Such focussed patterning and reworking of her own 
metaphors creates a sense of fatalistic inevitability, also generating a hypnotic, 
spellbinding effect, and a structural intensity/more frequently found in poetry 
rather than prose. The intensity of these re-worked images is exemplified at the 
end of the novel when Antoinette dreams of the patchwork which is also the 
sky, and it becomes the pool at Coulibri where she used to swim with her 
childhood friend Tia. In it, she sees her whole life flash by, like a drowning 
person about to be re-born. 
In the concluding scene of Wide Sargasso Sea, the flame of a candle, a 
symbol of dreams and imagination, is related to the experience of waking up 
and to the theme of a passage. In accordance with Bachelard’s psychoanalytical 
approach to the motif, the final image does not suggest the heroine’s suicidal 
death but rather her “waking to being” (Bachelard 1997:18), her new awareness 
of herself and of her particular ties to the past (Rhys’s description of her 
childhood) as well as the future (the intertextual links to Charlotte Brontë’s 
novel). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In terms of contemporary literary theory, the repeated motifs of deserted 
houses and ruins in Wide Sargasso Sea correspond with the repeated 
displacement of the story’s centre. Such a pattern involves the idea of a decline 
as well as regeneration and this ambiguity is also suggested by the recurring 
image of the Sargasso Sea. According to Sylvie Maurei, it may symbolise 
stagnation; as a place where eels return every year to lay their eggs, however, it 
can also evoke the feeling of a “cyclical renewal” (Maurel 1998:129). With 
respect to Levinas’s concept of infinity, the idea of a renewal can arise also 
from the notion of a boundless space created by the metaphorical image of the 
sea: the space for a dialogical relationship between Rhys’s novel and Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre, for the possibility to consider and to tell the story from the point of 
view of the ‘other side’ (Rhys 106). 
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1. Introduction: the Texts  
At first glance, the textual construction of the history house as a post-
colonial literary motif is characterized by poetic fragmentariness. It is a 
fragmentariness that resists easy reconstruction because it reduplicates itself, 
proliferates and recurs at several levels. Fragmentariness is in the order of 
things in poetry, but when it is carried into shorter or longer fictional narratives, 
then it is worth observing more closely.  
Our (archaeological?) incursion into fragmentariness began from an 
abbreviated historical and poetic narrative, in W. B. Yeats’s late poem “The 
Curse of Cromwell”, included in the 1937 volume of “New Poems”. After 
several ballad stanzas, towards the end of the poem, the history house appears 
accompanied by an epiphoric indefinite pronoun, as a momentarily haunting 
image, a dilapidated homeland of invasions, open to the existence of the lower 
natural orders and to the elements. Imported, as it were, forty-five years later in 
Seamus Heaney’s poem “Bogland”, the history-house or homeland has become 
porous, and as vestigial as to allow its shards to be ultimately invaded by the 
ocean itself, from a bottomless planetary centre. Its invaded being and 
fragmentariness have extended to planetary dimensions: 
 
I came on a great house in the middle of the night, 
Its open lighted doorway and its windows all alight, 
And all my friends were there and made me welcome too; 
But I woke in an old ruin that the winds howled through; 
And when I pay attention I must out and walk 
Among the dogs and horses that understand my talk. (Yeats 201) 
 
The bitter denial of reality/history that terminates the vision of Yeats’s 
ghostly house seems continued in Seamus Heaney’s poem, which heaps self-
deprecating denial upon denial in the first tercets that complain “We have no 
prairies/ To slice the eye of the sun....Our unfenced country is bog/ Crusting 
between two [mere] sights of the sun....They never dug coal here....” Restrictive 
determiners and oscillations between extremes make the poem move towards 
the paradoxical, highly poetic, wet centre of a bottomless world called Ireland. 
It is a land that both refuses itself to pioneers who would come here to disturb 
the soil, digging for coal, and offers itself as solace to the people who speak the 
vernacular existential language.. In this last oblatory quality (that resembles the 
river and branch invoked by Mircea cel Bătrân’s address to the proud Sultan in 
Mihai Eminescu’s Third Epistle), the land is a house which proffers the objects 
of its miraculous geology naturally, as gifts. There is a history of the home 
inscribed on finds such as the great Irish elk as a saintly relic, recovered “salty 
and white” from the matrix of black butter in the earth that surrounds, in order 
to preserve, it. The earth itself is a protective, sacred home. And only 
afterwards in the poem is there a ground which opens itself insidiously to 
engulf the pace of the colonizing foot that treads it down.  
There is ambivalence here, too, just as in Yeats’s poem, because 
decolonization involves both reverence and denunciation. One can and should 
reach down to the fertile soil which cooperates with man, poetically dwelling, 
to find the sacred home among the shards of the invaded historic land. This 
means moving backwards, as it were, into the sacred vision of Yeats’s poem, 
when recalling the cursed pioneers who came here to dig for coal. The post-
colonial poem by Heaney invites its readers to sort shards, because it aligns 
both the colonizers and the Irish denizens on the poetic start-line. 
 The interaction with the history house is made more explicit in the 
longer narrative of Arundhati Roy’s novel, The God of Small Things. Firstly, it 
is called by its own full name and described in all its implications in the sermon 
delivered by Chako, the uncle, to the twin children, the protagonist(s) of the 
book, in chapter two, as shall be seen in the quotation. The entire book will 
subsequently do no more than convey in a fully dramatic and poetic manner the 
competition between the various meanings accomodated within the (post-) 
colonial history house. The headings of the lucid sermon addressed to innocents 
are given life in the plot development. We meet in action and feel the powers of 
the crumbling, whispering house in its interaction with the rising generations of 
people who must repeat the history house fate.  
 
Chacko told the twins that though he hated to admit it, they were all Anglophiles. They 
were a family of Anglophiles. Pointed in the wrong direction, trapped outside their 
own history, and unable to retrace their steps because their footprints had been swept 
away. He explained to them that history was like an old house at night. With all the 
lamps lit. And ancestors whispering inside. (Roy 1997: 52) 
 
So far the image seems a narrative remake of the poetically radiant house in The 
Curse of Cromwell, the last stanza. It can be seen to radiate, of course, an 
ambivalent, disquieting energy, rather than the usual soothing welcome of a 
home. 
‘To understand history’, Chacko said, ‘we have to go inside and listen to what they’re 
saying. And look at the books and the pictures on the wall. And smell the smells.’ 
Estha and Rahel had no doubt that the house Chacko meant was the house on the other 
side of the river, in the middle of the abandoned rubber estate where they had never 
been. Kari Saipu’s house. The Black Sahib. The Englishman who had ‘gone native’. 
Who spoke Malayalam and wore mundus. Ayemenenem’s own Kurtz. Ayemenem his 
private Heart of Darkness. He had shot himself through the head ten years ago when 
his young lover’s parents had taken the boy away from him and sent him to school. 
After the suicide, the property had become the subject of extensive litigation between 
Kari Saipu’s cook and his secretary. The house had lain empty for years. Very few 
people had seen it. But the twins could picture it. 
The History House. 
With cool stone floors and dim walls and billowing ship-shaped shadows. Plump, 
translucent lizards lived behind old pictures, and waxy, crumbling ancestors with 
tough toe-nails and breath that smelled of yellow maps inside gossiped in sibilant, 
papery whispers. 
‘We can’t go in,’ Chacko explained, ‘because we’ve been locked out. And when we 
look in through the windows, all we see are shadows. And when we try and listen, all 
we hear is a whispering. And we cannot understand the whispering, because our minds 
have been invaded by a war. A war that we have won and lost. The very worst sort of 
war. A war that captures dreams and re-dreams them. A war that has made us adore 
our conquerors and despise ourselves.’ (Roy 1997: 52-53) 
 
The underlined words in the quoted passage are stages of experience and 
details of the figural picture that conveys the history house. Interestingly, they 
rehearse with variations the tighter, poetic words and phrases in Yeats’s or 
Heaney’s poems. At the same time, they are more akin to the festering, deserted 
history house which is allegorically presented in another explicit post-colonial 
poem by Derek Mahon’s “A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford”. There is a 
similarly adult voice which draws a convincing picture of the burnt out hotel 
that has become a plantation of fungi. They reminisce about the “departed 
mycologist”, the former colonial ruler, with his light-meter – a possible 
miniature image of the Enlightenment culture in a culture of fungi. By 
comparison to Heaney’s piety that cures the shards, the voice in Mahon’s poem 
is scathing, wishing to undercut the plaintive score of the lament of the inmates, 
reduced to mere fungi. Quite explicitly, Mahon’s poem looks through a lens, 
from a lucid distance, both at the deserted Indian compounds and at the disused 
shed of the Irish colonial hotel and at the vestigial culture (in both senses) of the 
Anglophiles; they are a hybrid race, neither just denizens, nor too different from 
the colonizers, and are caught together in this urbanite, decayed avatar of the 
history house. We are invited/compelled to contemplate and judge the history 
house through the lens of Mythistorema (which is the equivalent of “history 
lesson” in modern Greek, just as in the title of Seferis’ poem from which 
Mahon’s Motto is lifted; in the mythographers’ Greek, it points to the 
conglomerate of myths and history which people are compelled to live with). 
Also, we are confined to the perspective of the fungi, as lower order history 
house inhabitants. They are like living shards of past identities because they are 
spawned by disorder. But the lament of the powdery prisoners and moonmen 
who lead a pseudo-life, like ghosts among the asphodels in the decolonized or 
burnt-out hotel of Mahon’s poem, is turned into a satirical target. And this 
makes it differ from Heaney’s lyrical poem, which means its own emotions and 
images infinitely and literally. Just as it differs from Yeats’s revivalist lament 
that underwrites the merely fleeting vision of the history house. 
 
2. Ghostliness, Fragmentariness, Ambivalence: Trauma. The Post-Colonial 
Context. 
 
After looking at the literary implications of the ways the history house 
image is delivered by lyrical emotion investments and satirical distancing, we 
shall trace back the common features of the history house, i.e., ghostliness, 
fragmentariness and ambivalence, to their respective contexts.  
As just mentioned, the indirect, fleeting occurrence of the history house 
as a ghostly vision in Yeats’s Curse of Cromwell is connected to the Irish 
literary revival. Yeats’s poem is torn between a modern, angry lucidity (that 
prompts the poem’s cursing title) and a sense of indebtedness to a ghostly, 
grandiose past (poetically incorporated in the splendid history house image, 
which haunted eighteenth-century poetry in visions that were in keeping with 
the Irish word fis, or dream). In addition, the poem binds us, readers, to the 
chilling realization that people who dream splendidly awaken to a tough reality. 
If the first investment of emotion makes the poem a curse and the second a 
lament, the third one makes it a more complex kind of ritual poem for whose 
interpretation we need further data. If we peer intently enough through the 
Celtic twilight motifs, we can reach to the inherent plea for decolonization that 
this poem makes. The house-splendid is a spectre and is lost in a palimpsest of 
history-bits that fragment the continuities of emotion. The feelings expressed 
vacillate between hatred, self-pity and yearning. Because the vehicle/channel of 
literary communication is steeped in ambivalence and fragmentariness, which 
makes the tenor hard to decipher, we must disengage the shards of significance 
from the layers in which they lie buried and work as archaeologists cleaning 
their shards before interpretation becomes possible.  
The first shard of the history-house image is the old Irish form of the 
caoineadh (keening), a species of dirge that places the history house in the 
realm of the dead, and does so ritually. The lines quoted in the first section of 
our paper come framed by the following burden: 
 
O what of that, O what of that  
What is there left to say? (Yeats 201) 
 
The function of the burden is to embed the local lament into a public 
discourse, to retrieve its solitary meditation and appropriate it into a wider 
meditative space. In the double vision of the poem, the curse is uttered as a pre-
requisite to meditation. The theme in the title and the first stanza take us to a 
house of hatred while the vision proffers a house full of yearning. The poem 
announces itself as a vehicle for venting Gaelic/Catholic Ireland’s hatred of this 
Protestant father-figure: Cromwell, the military-founding-father of Irish 
Protestantism. He is one figure from the “pantheon” of fiends who surface in 
the nationalist subtext of Yeats’s poetry as targets of embittered emotion: 
Cromwell the explicit fiend in the title stands side by side with “the drunken 
soldiery” who are “abed” in “Byzantium and occupying the home like some 
suitors, wooing the married Penelope; in “Lapis Lazuli” we hear of King Billy 
(alias William III of Orange) as an insidious circus puppet figure ready to pitch 
its bomb from a First World War Zeppelin. Yeats’s later poetry adds angry 
accents to the earlier, allusive dreaminess of the Celtic Twilight, and as such it 
faithfully preserves the whispers of the ancestors heard in the history house, 
shredded to pieces in reality and reconstructed only in dreams. The dream of the 
house rehearses the Romantic titanic, otherworldy power(s) of poetry. It 
facilitates the contact with the archetypal netherworld and cosmic forces. The 
history house is enveloped in the dark aura of the nocturnal regime in poetry, 
apud Gilbert Durand, since it “dawns at midnight” and is richly inhabited, 
dense with life – or is it dense with the afterlife? For it feels, rather, like the 
heavenly father’s mansion in which there is room for all men-elect once they 
have been summoned to set foot on the path that leads into heaven. (the poem’s 
reading as a revivalist caoineadh points in this direction). Moreover, in The 
Curse of Cromwell, the poetic intensity is bardic because it re-enacts the 
performative powers of the poet who “calls down a curse” on most people in 
the neighourhood but “calls down a blessing on the blossom of the May/ 
Because it comes in beauty and in beauty blows away”, in The poet, Owen 
Hanrahan, under a bush of May.  
Shifting from the literary to the psychoanalytical hermeneutics, Cathy 
Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience offers very useful insights for the interpretive 
ordering and cleaning of the cultural shards inherent in the post-colonial 
experience. It relegates to trauma the ghostly fragmentariness and ambivalent 
feelings that we have encountered so far. Caruth speaks of “stories of trauma”, 
whose textual itinerary consists of insistenty recurring words or key figures of 
“departure”, “falling”, “burning” or “awakening”, which are components of 
“trauma narrratives”, and their fragmentariness “convey[s] the impact of [the 
traumatic event’s] incomprehensibility”(Caruth 1996: 6)  
Once we can equate history with trauma in the post-colonial house of 
words that literature administers, we can “set our lands/shards in order”. 
Observing the disarray, we can assess the degree of incomprehensibility and 
fragmentariness; also, we can place the vectors of ambivalence on the graph 
that approximates the order of the discourse.  
First, there are poems/literary texts whose fragmentariness is assumed 
and constitutive, in a way which is quite normal for modern lyricism. This is 
the case of both Seamus Heaney’s poem Bogland, which dwells in the 
fragmentary world in order to pierce to its core, as far as the wet, bottomless 
centre, and of Arundhati Roy’s narrative, which represents a typically 
discontinous story of trauma. Stories of trauma grow (stunted) from the 
fascination with the history house, in a fatalistic way. Fragmentariness is their 
substance, modelled by trauma. By contrast, the linear, coherent, categorical 
statements characteristic for Derek Mahon’s vein in poetry show impatience 
instead of fascination with the history house, its shards and its whispers. 
Ambivalence is refused, fragmentariness is left behind. “A Disused Shed in Co. 
Wexford” reads like Uncle Chako’s history lesson – it may be unsettling in its 
(in)sights, but it is a crystal-clear discourse. Even, as we can read explicitly in 
another poem by the same author, “The Last of the Fire Kings”, this kind of 
discourse is craving to see the last of the angry, (vain)glorious fire creatures 
ready to claim others with the whispers of history.  
We can analyze the announcements in the poems’ titles. “The Curse of 
Cromwell” is clear in its announcement of hatred but its hazy revivalist 
intertextualities are ambivalent since they encourage both angry curses and 
pious yearning to co-exist in the intensely radiant spectre of the history house. 
In “A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford”, Mahon chooses a place of ambivalent 
memory which sends us to two different loci of Irish history. On the one hand, 
Wexford is a county that recalls the beginnings of Anglicization, since it was 
here that Henry II set foot in Ireland in Anglo-Norman times; but it also speaks 
of the resistance to Anglicization in the military decolonization rebellion led by 
Theobald Wolfe Tone in 1798. By comparison to Yeats and as a poet writing at 
two remotes from the T. S. Eliot’s pronouncement about the dissociation of 
sensibility, Mahon writes a poem that continues its title after the Motto by 
offering an exemplary, programmatic and hard line palimpsest of cultural 
framings that would keep the trauma at a distance. Mahon creates a decisively 
intellectual, satirical distance from raw emotion in sending us to Seferis through 
the Motto, which resembles T. S. Eliot’s references to Dante and to myth-
histories lifted from the cultural pantheon in his own mottos or in the Notes to 
The Waste Land. This poet follows T. S. Eliot’s high modernist advice to poets 
to shun the direct expression of emotion. His urbanite framing elevates thinking 
before it allows emotion to burst forth. In post-colonial theory terms, this means 
that the settler-culture voice encourages the reader to become ironically 
detached from the torturing homeliness and havoc of the history house and to 
repudiate the dreams re-dreamt. The ambivalence of the poem’s allegories 
(since we are encouraged to have mixed feelings towards the Irish population of 
fungi) induces mixed feelings of pity and self-deprecation and recalls the self-
love, self-hatred and impotent dreaming that keeps in thrall the (Anglophile) 
people who live in the Indian history house. Hence the characteristic accents in 
“A Disused Shed in Co.Wexford” and “The Last of the Fire Kings” of 
“verseful-wishing” (wishful thinking, wistful thinking) about the need to sweep 
the history house clean of parasites that threaten to colonize ever more recent 
hosts. 
Having made a case for the similarities between the Anglo-Irish context 
and the Indian one (which also allows us to claim the Irish cultural space for 
post-colonial theory, although it is explicitly absent from the relevant entry in, 
for example, Irena Makarik’s Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Literary Theory, 
1995: 155-158), we must ask a more general question about the possibility of 
escaping from the traumatic emotion in the history house. The sceptical 
preaching of the Anglophile uncle in Arundhati Roy’s novel and the fatal 
fulfilment of his dire prophecy in the novel’s plot suggest the impossibility of 
actually escaping from trauma and the nightmare of the history house. Reading 
the history house imagery in the light of Cathy Caruth’s text, we can notice that 
there is actually no complete escape from the history house even for poets who 
work in the metropolitan, high-modernist vein, like Derek Mahon. For they 
inevitably handle some of the same images of Caruth’s above-mentioned series, 
but “forbid mourning” and sulking when they stop short at others. There is 
“departure” and “falling” but no “burning” or “awakening”. In the urbanite 
home-world, both addressing and silencing the violent voices cooperate as a 
pre-condition for equilibrium.  
Imagologically and aesthetically speaking, we can read the syllogistic 
and poetic associations delivered in an adult, categorical, declarative and sad 
tonality by the speaking voice in Mahon’s allegory of Ireland in the age of 
decolonization. But we can also read in wonderment the series of revelations in 
various keys occasioned by Seamus Heaney’s “Bogland”. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
To approach a conclusion, we should look at the formal and existential 
implications of constructing a declarative and a mystery-weaving expression of 
trauma in the history house. Heaney’s poem brings up from the peat a relic that 
dates back to the pre-history vernacular world: “the miraculous Great Irish Elk 
– an astounding crate full of air”; consequently, the whole soil is hallowed, 
“butter sunk under – recovered salty and white”, “the ground itself is kind, 
black butter” (a gift offering itself to a people starving in the years of the mid 
19th century famine). Though the merciless – and useless – advance of the 
colonists, as pioneers on Irish soil are mentioned, the poem lends itself to a 
reading that gives precedence to the treasure trove of nationalist memories over 
the declarative resistance to invasions in the past, just as in the present. The 
sense of wonder prevails in the multiple-layer reminiscences of the poem. The 
paradoxical figure of the wet centre bespeaks the need to transcend 
ambivalence in a world of fragmentariness, while trauma would wrap itself in 
wonder. There is more piety for the history house, which still feels like home in 
Heaney’s astounding lyrical verse. In Mahon’s poem, lucidity prevails and 
there is a pressing need to sweep the house clean in the deliberation 
underwriting the slightly cynical bravado of trauma. On the other hand, 
Arundhati Roy’s fiction begins in the lucidity of experience but allows itself to 
be claimed by innocence and remains in the realm of unclaimed experience. 
The innocent children are fated to rehearse the trauma as a first-hand experience 
in the plot and they are compelled to return to the scenario outlined by the adult 
in the first pages of the book. Wrapped in fatefulness, the plot performs again 
what the initial sermon states. 
It was to be expected that the most complete and enlightening 
presentation of our motif should be found in the novel which explicitly and 
figurally posits the terms of the unclaimed experience in the history house, 
foregrounding the voices/points of view that take up the theme. This allows us 
to discriminate the narrators from the actors, whose fate is entwined in/with the 
history house. Consequently, we can recognize and balance against each other 
the voice of first-hand experiencers of trauma and the voice of its 
commentators. Yeats deliberately foregrounds the experiencers’ voice but 
copiously resorts to the intertextual techniques of the commentator. Heaney’s 
lyrical text gives precedence to the voice of experience and lyrically captures its 
unclaimed experience. Mahon, just as the uncle preaching to the innocent, 
excels in the flat, categorical sermonic voice of lucidity, and the result is an 
excessively ornamental, manneristic, allegorical and florid style. In addition, 
Derek Mahon’s voice speaks on behalf of the silenced and regressive fungi. The 
same happens in Arundhati Roy’s book where the uncle not only opens the eyes 
of the children but also gives them a more articulate voice than their unclaimed, 
first-hand experience would allow of. The history house contains both the 
innocent and the experienced in their attempt to move the grindstones of good 
and evil. The fragmentary, dramatic, mysterious and ambivalent whispers of 
direct and unclaimed experience, always inscribed in the history house walls, 
can be blown up, as it were, to become sermonic and collective voice messages. 
The twins’ voice, as transcribed by Rahel while Estha remains sworn to silence, 
is puzzling. Its rhythmical fragments and compulsive repetitions, translated by 
literary and experiential reminiscences, makes a poetic counterpoint to the 
linear, clear narrative of Chako’s sermon. Its progress through accents, rhyming 
and allusions (such as the allusion to Conrad’s Heart of Darkness) resemble the 
burden in The Curse of Cromwell: Oh What of that, Oh what of that/ What is 
there left to say? We are invited to listen to experience appropriating innocence 
while the latter gets the better of experience – in turns. This is the most 
authentic score to be obtained when trauma narrates itself inescapably from 
within the house. We understand that the commentator narrates trauma in the 
past tense, while innocence is discovering it progressively, in the present. 
Hence the dialectic movement between what one voice tries to articulate and 
what the other hushes. This points to two species of narrative and two species 
of trauma. The narrative of unclaimed and first-hand experience is fragmentary, 
ambivalent, tortuous, emergent and in progress. Caruth refers to the “plea by an 
other who is asking to be seen and heard” and to “listening to an address that 
remains enigmatic yet demands a listening and a response” (Caruth 1996: 9). 
The past participle experienced narrative contains experience, claimed and 
classified, no matter how dissatisfied it may be. In it speaks the settler culture, 
capable of controlling emotion in ascertained ways. This self-assured voice 
does not suffer from being spurned or perceived mistakenly when it is 
downtrodden by the invading pioneers, as in Heaney’s Bogland. The point of 
insertion of the nationalist trauma in the history house is the arrival and the 
subsequent stay of the invader. In Derek Mahon’s settler culture poem, the 
mycologist’s departure and traumatic parting, dreaming and re-dreaming, which 
inhere in an assimilation that hurts the experienced Anglophile, recurs, 
forbidding mourning. 
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1. Introduction 
Although documented cultural and social contacts between Hungary and 
Ireland extend back to the Middle Ages, it is through a series of nineteenth-
century writings that mutual interest by leading figures of Hungarian and Irish 
public life in the contemporaneous events of their countries is first revealed. 
The mental connection that is observable between Hungary and Ireland at the 
time must have drawn its inspiration from a shared sense of national 
subordination. 
Political as well as cultural-linguistic sovereignty was central to the 
Hungarian concept of independence in the first half of the 19th century, and the 
success of the language movement was proved by the official recognition of 
Hungarian as a state language in 1844. In the same period, the Irish language 
experienced a dramatic decline, threatening the complete extinction of the 
native tongue of Ireland in a generation or two. 
Thomas Davis, the intellectual leader of the fledgeling Young Ireland 
Movement, was the first to propose a coherent programme for the revival of 
what he called Ireland’s national language. In some of his essays, Davis makes 
references to the status of Hungarian and uses the achievements of the 
Hungarian language movement as an example which could be used by Irish 
language revivalists. In what follows I shall rely on Davis’s ideas as a 
foundation for comparing tendencies and ideologies of cultural and linguistic 
nationalism in Ireland and Hungary within the context of nineteenth-century 
Europe. 
 
2. Hungarian-Irish Parallels 
 
The first extant references to a Hungarian in Ireland are to Lőrinc Tar, a 
Hungarian cleric living in the time of Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387-1473), 
King of Hungary and Holy Roman Emperor. Tar paid a visit to St Patrick’s 
Purgatory in Lough Derg and wrote a medieval account of his journey in Latin, 
mixing legend with travelogue, real with religious and imaginary experiences 
(Fügedi 1974: 156-157, Glatz 2000: 155, see also Kabdebo 2001: 19). Religion 
was also the background of an Irishman fleeing Oliver Cromwell’s troops to 
Hungary. Walter Lynch, Bishop of Clonfert, stayed in the northwestern 
Hungarian city of Győr from 1655 to 1663, and donated an image of the Holy 
Virgin to the local cathedral, which was in subsequent centuries revered as the 
‘Virgin that shed tears’ on St Patrick’s Day in 1697 (Kabdebo 2001: 19-20). 
Religious orientation also permeates 17th-century Hungarian chronicles 
referring to contemporaneous Irish events and commenting upon them in 
harmony with their own protestant or catholic loyalties (see e.g. Cserei 1983, 
Rosner 1677). This, on the other hand, also reflected religious divisions in 
contemporary Hungary itself. 
The Hungarian idea of drawing a national parallel between the two 
countries originates from Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II, leader of a prolonged 
military campaign (1703-11) to gain independence from the Habsburgs. 
Although the fight for freedom eventually failed in 1711, at the height of his 
success in 1707 Prince Rákóczi dethroned the Habsburg House in Hungary, and 
compared this act to Stuart James II’s attempt in 1690 to regain the English 
crown via Ireland (Universis orbis Christiani 1707 in Kabdebó 2001: 21). 
Rákóczi argued that Hungary’s connection with Austria was constitutionally 
similar to that of Scotland and England, yet Austria handled Hungary as 
England treated Ireland, that is as a “conquered country” without “ever having 
conquered it” (Hengelmuller 1913: 111-200). 
Yet, it is through a series of nineteenth-century writings that mutual and 
genuine interest by leaders of Hungarian and Irish public life in the events of 
their countries is first revealed. Written reflections upon the major, sometimes 
cataclysmic experiences by the two populations inform us about the existence 
of a certain mental link between Hungary and Ireland, a connection which drew 
its inspiration from a sense of belonging to politically dependent European 
nations. 
Irish Catholic emancipator and constitutional nationalist Daniel 
O’Connell’s figure and mass movements attracted remarkable attention among 
Hungarian intellectuals with a political orientation. The development of 
Hungarian as a printed language in the first half of the 19th century gave rise to 
a number of periodicals, some of which, like Rajzolatok (“Sketches”) in 1835 
and Atheneum in 1837, informed the Hungarian reading public about 
O’Connell’s achievements (in Kókay 1979: 458, 509). 
Also in the latter half of the 1830s two of Hungary’s leading nationalist 
politicians, Bertalan Szemere and Ferenc Pulszky, visited Ireland, and in their 
separately published travelogues they both write about the economic 
backwardness of the rural Irish and the growing strength of political agitation in 
Ireland. As his book Utazás külföldön, or “A journey abroad” (1840) proves, 
Szemere, also Prime Minister of Hungary’s short-lived sovereign responsible 
government in 1849, became especially appalled by the poverty and hunger of 
the Irish countryside, and identified the causes as follows: Ireland’s political 
and economic ‘slavery’ in relation to Britain, the resultant lack of native 
industry and commerce, the feudal system of land tenure, payment of tithes to 
the Church of Ireland, potato being the nearly exclusive food crop for the poor, 
and rapid population growth among them (1983: 352-365). In his social essay 
Szegénység Irlandban or “Poverty in Ireland” (1840) Baron József Eötvös 
relied upon the experiences of Szemere and Pulszky, both being friends to him, 
for his own study of the causes and effects of poverty. 
The year 1848 was witness to a revolutionary upsurge in Europe, and 
the Hungarian social upheaval was transformed into a prolonged fight for the 
country’s liberation from the Habsburg Empire. Lajos Kossuth, leader of the 
1848-49 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, had shown great 
admiration for Daniel O’Connell in the previous years, and the 1843 issues of 
his Pesti Hírlap (“Pest News”) include multiple references to the “Liberator’s” 
Repeal Movement (in Kókay 1979: 675). 
Hungary’s War of Independence was crushed by the overwhelming 
military might of the combined Russian Tzarist and Habsburg forces, and the 
defeat was followed by cruel revenge and years of severe oppression on the part 
of the Austrian government. Hungary’s failure to liberate their country and the 
ensuing execution, exile and sufferings of those involved in the heroic struggle 
evoked sympathy in some of those who had played a leading role in the 
abortive Young Ireland Insurrection of 1848. Michael Doheny in his The 
Felon’s Track (1914), John Mitchel in his Jail Journal (1913) and William 
Smith O’Brien in his unpublished travel journals, often referred to as his 
“Diaries” made references to the Hungarian War of Independence (in Kabdebó 
2001: 23-25). Mitchel’s reflection upon the suppression of the Hungarian 
freedom fight during his stay in the Cape of Good Hope in 1850, expresses 
feelings of shock as well as a clear awareness of events going on in this 
Central-European “fellow/comrade-nation”: 
 
The Austrians are hanging and shooting general officers. Kossuth, the immortal 
governor, and Bem, the fine old general, are refugees in Turkey, other Hungarians and 
Poles flying to the US. Justice and right everywhere buried in blood (Mitchel 1913: 
205). 
 
Each of these former Young Irelanders appear to have discovered 
parallels between the Hungarian and the Irish cause of independence. This, 
however, was not without precedent. Thomas Osborne Davis (1814-45), the 
leading intellectual of the fledgeling Young Ireland Movement, who, because 
of his early death in 1845, could not be witness to the European revolutionary 
wave of 1848, had already compared the position of O’Connell’s Ireland to that 
of other subordinate nations, including Hungary, in the early 1840s: “And 
Austria on Italy, the Roman eagle chained, Bohemia, Servia, Hungary, within 
her clutches gasp; And Ireland struggles gallantly in England’s loosening gasp” 
(in Griffith 1914: 73). The very fact that this quotation comes from the volume 
Thomas Davis, edited by Arthur Griffith in 1914, gives credit to Thomas 
Kabdebó’s (2001: 24) supposition that the Young Irelanders were among those 
inspiring and instructing Arthur Griffith’s The resurrection of Hungary (1904), 
a national parallel of historic importance between Ireland and Hungary. 
 
4. Hungarian and Irish in Davis’s Our National Language 
 
Throughout the 19th century non-sovereign nations and nationalities 
increasingly began to underscore their demand and right for political autonomy 
or separate statehood by emphasizing their cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness. While loosening political dependence on the Habsburgs was the 
main constitutional objective, campaigning for cultural and linguistic 
sovereignty was also of outstanding importance in the so called Hungarian 
Reform Age, a determining phase in the process of our national awakening 
preceding the 1848 Revolution. The success of the language movement was 
proved by the official recognation of Hungarian as a state language in 1844. 
Whereas the revival of the Irish language became a central theme of 
Irish nationalist ideology at the turn of the 20th century, the recovery of the 
grossly endangered native tongue had not been an issue of real weight to either 
Daniel O’Connell or to most of the Young Irelanders in mid-19th century 
Ireland (Pintér 2008: 189-192). As an exception to his contemporaries, Thomas 
Davis expressed deep concern over the loss of language and proposed a 
programme for the revival of what he called “Ireland’s national language.” In 
some of his essays, Davis makes references to the status of Hungarian and uses 
the achievements of the Hungarian language movement as an example which 
could be used by Irish language revivalists. In his Our National Language 
Davis contrasts a country which through experiencing language change 
becomes a real colony with countries which despite the loss of political 
freedom have preserved their native vernacular. “To lose your native tongue, 
and learn that of an alien, is the worst badge of conquest – it is the chain on the 
soul” (Davis 1998: 175), says Davis with reference to Ireland’s advanced Irish-
English language-shift. Then he continues with regard to Hungary, where there 
is “sure hope” because the “speech of the alien is nearly expelled” (Davis 1998: 
176). In the case of Hungary this observation held true of Latin, which, for long 
centuries, had functioned as Hungary’s official lingua franca, as well as to 
German, the language of our Austrian oppressors. 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), the theoretician of Sturm un 
Drang, had a great impact on both his contemporaries and on the coming 
romantic generations. As John Kelly (1998: 5-7) observes, Thomas Davis fits 
into a pattern of cultural nationalism first articulated by the German 
philosophers Kant and Herder. Some of Herder’s famous statements, like “Has 
a nation anything more precious than the language of its forefathers?” or “Even 
the smallest of nations […] cherishes in and through its language the history, 
the poetry and songs about the great deeds of its forefathers” (in Edwards 1985: 
24) find an echo in Davis’s conviction that the language reinforces the distinct 
existence of a nation: “A people without a language of its own is only half a 
nation. A nation should guard its language more than its territories – ’tis a surer 
barrier, and more important frontier, than fortress or river” (Davis 1998: 174-
75). 
Herder’s plebeian democracy also influenced some of the most 
outstanding Hungarian poets of the 19th century, János Arany and Sándor 
Petőfi, both contemporaries of Thomas Davis. A paradox provoking thought is 
that whereas Herder in his late-18th century work Thoughts on the Philosophy of 
Human History (1784-91) envisages the short-term extinction of some 
European nations such as Hungary, a few decades later Davis, who relied on the 
German philosopher as one of his major theoretical sources, sets Hungary’s 
success in their linguistic revival as an example for the Irish. 
Benedict Anderson in his Imagined Communities (1991) makes the 
observation that print language is what invents nationalism, and not a particular 
language per se. Following this line of thought Declan Kiberd (1996: 137) 
claims that “Irish, being largely part of an oral culture, was supplanted by 
English, the logical medium of newspapers, and of those tracts and literary texts 
in which Ireland would be invented and imagined.” Thus, in Ireland English 
became the language of printed books, newspapers and modern journalism, 
which, on the other hand, were essential channels to disseminate political ideas 
and influence public opinion (Pintér 2008: 205). In fact, the importance of the 
printed version of a national language in shaping national consciousness was 
already realized by Thomas Davis, who in his Our National Language 
emphasises that the absence of at least bilingual, Irish-English newspapers 
excludes Ireland from the international and European context and makes the 
country a “backwater of England.” Among countries set as examples for Ireland 
in this respect, Davis refers to Hungary as a multi-ethnic country where 
“Magyar, Slavonic and German” all appear in print despite the very fact that 
Hungarian is the vernacular language of the majority of the population (Davis 
1998: 182). 
Considering the remarkably different positions of Hungarian, which was 
the language of everyday communication for people born Hungarian – with the 
exception of those aristocrats who primarily lived in Vienna – and that of Irish, 
which by 1842 had approximately 2.700.000 monoglot speakers (in Pintér 
2008: 169), that is less than half of the native population, with the upper and 
urban middle classes almost thoroughly Anglicized, Thomas Davis’s parallel 
between the two “national languages” appears striking. The question arises 
whether this national parallel regarding Hungarian and Irish is valid or just 
influenced by ideas of romantic nationalism. Kabdebo (2001: 29) holds the 
following view on the theme of “national parallels”: 
 
Historical veracity of parallels […] does not depend on the minutiae of chronological, 
social or istituitonal or even economic details but on the similarity of situations. 
Parallels are drawn by active agents of the historical process who discover similar 
agents acting in a similar historical process. In that sense parallels are always 
discovered against not dissimilar backgrounds, in situations fairly akin, such as: 
’method of rule’, dependency, ’empire building, ’colonizing’ or ’being colonized.’ But, 
perhaps, the most relevant is the correlation of contexts: emerging nationalism, 
nationalism in its assertive phase, […] could bring two geographically distant countries 
into a valid parallel. 
 
For Davis, whose mother tongue was English, Irish was the national language, 
because of its unique way to express Irish thought and imagination: 
 
The language, which grows up with a people is […] mingled inseparably with their 
history and their soil, fitted beyond any other language to express their prevalent 
thoughts in the most natural and efficient way (Davis 1998: 173). 
 
Davis’s ideas on the importance of linguistic awakening in the formation of a 
nation’s character appear to be reinforced in the words of Laszlo Hadrovics, a 
Hungarian linguist living and working more than a century later: 
 
Nations which have started from different stations of linguistic consciousness; the 
levels they have reached in political fragmentation or unity; the extent to which they 
have been influenced by alien impact; and the effort they have taken to shake off 
foreign influences show great diversity. However, each national movement shares the 
ambition of creating a literary language which meets all the requirements of European 
civilization, a standardised norm, which stands above national dialects. These national 
movements have at the same time a great importance in shaping national identity (in 
Nádor 2002: 58, my translation). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Thomas Davis was the first Irish linguistic ideologist, who beyond 
antiquarian interest, and preceding the nation-wide Irish-language movement of 
the late-19th-century, the Gaelic League, gave a programme for the revival of 
Irish as a languge of everyday communication. In this respect he was not just 
contemporaneous with the Hungarian language movement but shared with 
Hungarians what Anthony Smith (1991: 11-13) says about the ethnic as 
opposed to the civic conception of a nation: genealogy and presumed descent 
ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions play an 
important role in the formation of a nation even if the ancient language and 
language revival has failed, as in the case of the Irish. 
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Abstract: The present paper centres upon a discussion of Kenneth Branagh’s 2007 
remake of Sleuth in comparison to the 1972 adaptation of Anthony Shaffer’s play. The 
paper discusses the main strategies which contribute to the creation of the remake, 
such as celebrity intertextuality or update. It also focuses on the way in which the 
remake replays the mise-en-abîme dimension of the play on the level of filmic 
strategies.  
Keywords: adaptation, déjà-vu, intertextuality, remake, update  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Part of the cinema of allusion, the remake is born out of “a desire to link 
filmmaker and viewer with the cinema’s past” (Kolker 1998:36) and often ends 
up broadening the base of the original film, “adding resonance to its narrative 
and a sense of play, and, through all of this, increasing narrative pleasure” 
(Kolker 1998:36). The present paper proposes a comparative analysis of a 1972 
film and its remake, attempting to discuss the way in which the remake 
attempts to add extra depth or extra meaning, as an acknowledged comment on 
the original. At the same time, the aim of this paper is to analyse in more detail 
the mechanisms that help the 2007 movie function as an acknowledged remake 
of the 1972 film and in this manner give insight into the nature of an intriguing 
category such as the remake. “The remake is intriguing because it intensifies 
basic critical conflicts between the intertextuality of film meaning and its 
contextuality, between the uses of taxonomy in grouping films and the renewed 
look at the individual text, between artistic intention as a gesture of originality 
and artistic intention as a gesture of mediation” (Braudy 1998:331). 
 The films chosen for discussion are Sleuth (1972), a film adaptation of 
the Tony Award-winning play of the same title by British playwright Anthony 
Shaffer and the 2007 remake by British director Kenneth Branagh. The 
screenplay of the 1972 film was adapted by Shaffer himself, directed by Joseph 
L. Mankiewicz and starred Laurence Olivier and Michael Caine. The 2007 
remake is based on a screenplay by Harold Pinter and stars Michael Caine and 
Jude Law.  
The 1972 film is an adaptation of a play. However, the second film does 
not function as yet another adaptation of the same play, but, as will be shown, 
as an updated remake and finally as a remake that “acknowledges” or playfully 
emphasises its remake quality and, as such, its dependence on a previous film.  
 
2. Movie Synopsis 
 
For a better understanding of the comparative analysis of the 1972 film 
and its 2007 remake, a movie synopsis has been offered, which emphasises, 
through the use of italics, the parts of the original film that do not appear in the 
remake. By examining the synopsis, one can perceive that, while there are 
significant areas of conformity between the two films, the remake functions as 
an abridged version of the original. The reduced length of the remake 
emphasises once again the close kinship between adaptation and remake. One 
of the devices lying at the basis of adaptation of literature to screen is 
compression, a strategy that has been employed here in the creation of a 
remake. The movie synopsis indicates the elements present in both productions, 
highlighting (in italics) those which are absent in the 2007 remake:  
Milo Tindle, the owner of a chain of hair salons, is invited to the 
impressive home of Andrew Wyke, a well-known detective novelist with a 
passion for elaborate games. Wyke reveals that he is aware that Tindle has been 
having an affair with his estranged wife and seems delighted, since this affair 
offers him as well the opportunity to start a new life with his own mistress, Teja. 
Wyke proposes a scheme that will profit both men: Tindle is supposed to steal 
the wife’s jewels in order to fence the gems, allowing Wyke to collect the 
insurance money. The advantage of the scheme is, as Wyke explains, that 
Tindle will be able to support his new lover in the style to which she has 
become accustomed as Wyke’s wife. Tindle readily agrees to the scheme and 
breaks into the manor, only to find himself in a trap set by Wyke. After 
ridiculing Tindle for his Italian origins and humble working class background, 
Wyke gleefully announces to him that he has the legal right to shoot him as an 
intruder and actually fires his gun. The scene leads the viewer to believe that 
Wyke has indeed shot Tindle. When, sometime later, eccentric police inspector 
Doppler arrives at Wyke’s door, imperatively inquiring about Tindle’s 
whereabouts, Wyke is forced to reveal that his meeting with Tindle was nothing 
but an elaborate game meant to humiliate his wife’s lover. Wyke protests his 
innocence, explaining that the shots he fired at Tindle were just blanks and that, 
after recovering from shock, his wife’s lover left his house very much alive. 
However, Inspector Doppler does not seem to believe Wyke’s story and 
produces evidence incriminating Wyke, who panics and tries to get away. At 
the height of Wyke’s panic, Doppler dramatically reveals that he is none other 
than Milo Tindle in disguise, who has adopted the costume only to pay Wyke 
back. Wyke shows himself impressed by Tindle’s set-up and seems ready to 
acknowledge him as an equal, however Tindle, who feels insulted by Wyke’s 
former remarks about his background, requires further satisfaction. He calmly 
announces that he has murdered Wyke’s lover, Teja and that he intends to pin 
the murder he has committed on Wyke. Incredulous at first, since this could be 
just another game, Wyke is finally persuaded that Tindle has framed him for 
murder. Now master of the game, Tindle announces to Wyke that, until the 
police’s arrival, he has only thirteen minutes to dispose of the planted evidence 
that will incriminate him as a murderer and proceeds to give Wyke riddle-clues 
to the location of the hidden evidence. A distraught Wyke manages to locate all 
the clues in time only to be informed by a smug Tindle that everything has been 
just another game. Humiliated, Wyke decides to kill Tindle for real and, in spite 
of the fact that Tindle tells him that he did go to the police, informing them 
about the writer’s strange games, he no longer believes the story. Wyke shoots 
Tindle in the torso, but soon realizes that the police has actually been called, as 
a police car reaches Wyke’s front door and somebody begins to knock.  
The synopsis serves to emphasise the “syntactic/semantic” areas where 
the remake deviates from its original. If the two films share the first part: the 
trick Andrew Wyke plays on Milo Tindle and Tindle’s subsequent revenge, 
namely the symmetric structure in which both men prove that they are worthy 
opponents in the game of wits they have started to play, Sleuth 2007 is 
considerably trimmed down concerning the second part of the game. The first 
Sleuth is literally longer than the compressed remake, which is shorter by a full 
hour. 
In terms of missing elements, the remake no longer concentrates on the 
part where Michael Caine’s character stages yet another elaborate game, which 
places Olivier’s character in the position of a “sleuth” desperately working 
against the clock in order to find and destroy the clues, previously planted by 
Tindle, that might get him framed for murder. Instead, Sleuth 2007 chooses to 
concentrate on the homoerotic game between Wyke and Tindle and the 
alternative power positions that the two men assume in the game. In spite of the 
differences, the two films end, in a similar manner, with Wyke killing Tindle, 
although, as will be shown, the ending of the remake is much more open to 
interpretation.  
 
3. Remake taxonomies 
 
In order to be able to discuss the relation between the original film and 
its remake, I will present a couple of useful taxonomies that have been 
attempted concerning remakes in general, while taking into account the 
difficulty characterising categorisation in general and also the tension, 
regarding remakes, between “sharable terms” (shareability) and “accurate 
designation” (accuracy) (Verevis 2006:11).  
 According to a classification such as that of Greenberg, Sleuth 2007 
qualifies as an “acknowledged, transformed” remake. Greenberg’s tripartite 
classification opposes the “acknowledged, close remake”, which involves a 
replication of the original film with little or no change of the narrative, to the 
“unacknowledged, disguised remake” and the “acknowledged, transformed 
remake”, which is based on significant transformations of characters, time and 
setting, but which nevertheless acknowledges the original to a greater or lesser 
extent (Greenberg 1991:164-171). According to Leitch’s taxonomy, which 
relies on the tripartite distinction readaptation/update/true remake (Leitch 
1990:138-149), Sleuth 2007 could be considered a “true remake”, a film which 
attempts to make the original relevant by means of updating it, and by no means 
an independent “readaptation” of Shaffer’s play, since it heavily relies on the 
previous cinematic adaptation. 
While the taxonomies above underline key-traits of the remaking 
process, such as acknowledgment or the tension between remake and 
readaptation, their generality excludes significant strategies present in the 2007 
remake. In this respect, a more detailed classification, such as that of Robert 
Eberwien, allows us to highlight these strategies. While necessarily qualifying 
as a true or acknowledged, transformed remake, Sleuth 2007 functions at the 
same time as “a remake that reworks more explicitly the sexual relations in a 
film” (Eberwien 1998:30), since it focuses on the homoerotic relation between 
Wyke and Tindle, which was absent in the 1972 film. Simultaneously, Sleuth 
2007 may also qualify as a “remake that updates the temporal setting of a film” 
(Eberwien 1998:29). The reworking from a sexual point of view of the relation 
between the two protagonists is undoubtedly connected with the update 
component, since it may be viewed as part of the process of making the text of 
the film relevant for contemporary target audiences.  
 
4. Shaffer/Mankievicz versus Branagh/Pinter 
 
As Constantine Verevis underlines, remaking does not depend “only on 
prior knowledge of previous texts” (Verevis 2006:2) and should be seen as a 
“by-product” of broader discursive activity. As part of this broader discursive 
activity, many of the remakes address the cult status of the auteurs, star 
directors and make that a central point of their marketing strategies. Sleuth 
2007’s functioning as a remake is thus dependent not only on its connection to 
the previous text, but also to its auteur. Here I use a broader notion of the term 
auteur, since we deal not only with star director Kenneth Branagh, but also with 
acclaimed writer Harold Pinter.  
As previous scholars underline, in the case of contemporary remakes it 
is the “re-writing” dimension that is emphasised, since auteur remakes function 
due to the individual vision of a film maker. Terms such as re-imagining 
(Verevis 2006:10) or re-envisioning (Verevis 2006:10) have been used to 
describe such contemporary remakes. By examining some of the texts referring 
to Sleuth 2007, we notice that this remake is presented by employing keywords 
such as “re-working” (in order to use Branagh’s own words) or “different” or 
“fresh”. As shown by the excerpts below, the director and cast insist upon the 
fact that Pinter has made major alterations in his script, literally rewriting the 
original:  
 
Sleuth with Pinter, Branagh, Law and Caine  
“Then I read the screenplay and I couldn't put it down. What I thought was already an 
excellent marriage now had Pinter's darker, more blackly comic sensibility behind it. It 
still had this page-turning, what-will-happen-next quality from the original, but the 
script seemed very confidently to be so different as to be altogether another film. It 
shares a central part of the idea and the characters have the same names but so much 
was changed from the word go "visually and in terms of mood, in relation to the 
characters and then as one went on, in relation to the plot (Kenneth Branagh quoted in 
2008 on http://www.emanuellevy.com)”. 
Now Caine is returning to the Sleuth world, but in a very different form. (…) In 
Kenneth Branagh's new movie, a fresh take on the Tony Award winning play by 
Anthony Shaffer, rather than a reworking of the previous film. ("Exclusive: First Look 
at Sleuth: Michael Caine and Jude Law Star", Empire. EMap Consumer Media. 
http://www.empireonline.com) 
 
Pinter’s rewriting in the 2007 remake can be seen as an instance of 
superimposition, which is a term Thomas Leitch uses in his classification of 
screen adaptations. According to Leitch, superimposition refers to the influence 
of well-known authors, actors or even literary sources on the cinematic material 
which is adapted or, in the case of the remake, re-worked. (Leitch 2007:103). In 
the same manner as the 1995 Sense and Sensibility functions as Emma 
Thompson’s adaptation of the novel or as the 1963 Cleopatra revolves around 
the persona of Elizabeth Taylor, the 2007 film becomes a Pinter text.  
 
5. Olivier/Caine versus Caine/Law 
 
While Sleuth 2007 “legitimates” itself by emphasising the elements of 
novelty and by stating its independent status as “another film”, the connection 
to the original Sleuth is reinforced by an instance of what Robert Stam refers to 
as “celebrity intertextuality” (seen as a sub-category in Genette’s highly 
suggestive definition of intertextuality) in order to define “those situations in 
which the presence of a film or television star or celebrity evokes an earlier 
version of a film property” (Verevis 2006:20). 
Celebrity intertextuality refers in this case to Michael Caine’s presence 
in both films – as young Milo Tindle in the first Sleuth and in the remake, as the 
elderly writer Andrew Wyke, who in the original film was played by Sir 
Lawrence Olivier. The presence of an actor from the original cast is by no 
means a new strategy to be used in a remake. As underlined by previous 
scholars, other directors have made use of it, such as Martin Scorsese, who 
rotates Paul Newman from the younger to the older role in the The Colour of 
Money, which is a remake of The Hustler (Braudy 1998:332). Other examples 
include the presence of former Maverick star, James Garner as Mel Gibson’s 
father in the big screen remake. As Leo Braudy notes, the generational change 
and the passage of authority through castings is a significant aspect of the 
process of rereading launched by the remake (Braudy 1998:332).  
I will attempt to show how Caine’s presence in both films, first as 
young challenger and finally as old lion, helps to construct the film as an 
acknowledged, transformed remake, which explicitly underlines its status as a 
remake. Let us not forget that the very existence of the remake depends on film 
literacy and that Caine’s presence in the second film clearly builds the general 
expectations of an audience and for an audience that is supposed to have seen or 
at least to have heard of the original. Moreover, the presence of Caine in the 
role of his former opponent is a significant emphasis on the role reversal 
strategy that lies at the core of Shaffer’s play. Last but not least, from the point 
of view of film literacy, the presence of Caine and Law in a remake playfully 
reminds us of yet another remake, namely Alfie, where Law played Caine’s 
former role. This is yet another instance of mise-en-abîme.  
As many of the texts of presentation for Sleuth emphasise, Caine’s 
presence is both a connection to the original (an instance of “déjà-vu”) and an 
indication that this original has been updated or re-worked (the actor is the 
same, but the part of different). In the following sections, I will attempt to 
discuss the part played by what I consider to be two significant axes, update on 
the one hand and déjà-vu on the other. I look upon these two axes as essential 
elements that help Sleuth 2007 to function as a remake.  
 
6. Sleuth with no sleuth  
 
It is interesting to note that, faithful to Shaffer’s play, who was 
responsible himself for the adaptation, Sleuth 1972 emerges as a crime film or 
as the filmic adaptation of a modern comedy thriller, in order to mention one of 
the labels given to Shaffer’s play. Like the play it was based on, the original 
film emerges as comment on the British whodunit and, implicitly, as a broader 
comment on the British class system.  
The first film presents Andrew Wyke, a representative and defender of 
an already antiquated social order and, as such, a writer of detective stories in 
the vein of Agatha Christie or Dorothy L. Sayers. The creator of a private 
detective called St. John Lord Merridew reminiscent of characters such as Lord 
Peter Wimsey, Wyke becomes the opponent of Milo Tindle, a self-made man 
coming from a family of Italian immigrants.  
Like many crime narratives, the 1972 film, which is faithful to the play, 
is based on a confrontation and on typological archetypes, in spite of the 
continual reversal of roles (victor/victim) that take place as the plot progresses. 
Although the detective writer is outsmarted at his own game, Olivier’s 
character ends up as the real murderer and young Caine as his victim. All this 
takes place in a clockwork, baroque setting, filled with contraptions that remind 
of the setting of British classical detective stories and filled with the 
memorabilia of a pre-war Golden Age. In spite of making an open comment on 
the conventions of the detective subgenre, Sleuth 1972 still qualifies as a crime 
film, a detective film, where the two opponents take turns in outsmarting one 
another, playing sleuth, uncovering clues and setting traps.  
Sleuth 2007 emerges as an updated version of the original and, under 
Pinter’s pen, as a broader comment on the nature of power relations, on fiction 
or on the self. From this point of view, the remake manages to transcend the 
boundaries of the crime film. Shaffer’s clockwork world is replaced by an 
absurd universe, supported by a type of dialogue which is known as the 
trademark of Pinter’s work  
 Other significant elements contribute to the update. Olivier’s baroque 
mansion, crammed with works of art and curiosities is updated to a high-tech, 
claustrophobic, voyeuristic building, which nevertheless preserves the same 
feeling of control, artificiality and oppressiveness that the former mansion 
conveyed. The Machine Age makes way here for the high-tech era, but with 
similar connotation of the loneliness and isolation of the author/self. Gone are 
the contraptions and mechanisms present in the 1972 film, and in the same 
manner gone is the “sleuth” or “detective” part of the story.  
In a new script that justifies its connection to the title Sleuth only by 
professing that this is a remake of the 1972 original, the roles are no longer 
those of killer/ victim/ avenger. Interestingly, as the open ending shows, in 
Pinter’ there seems to be no higher moral code in Pinter’s re-worked universe, 
no punishment and as such no moral of the story.  
 In Sleuth 1972, in the grotesque end scene, which is an ironic rendering 
of “he who laughs last laughs best”, Olivier’s character is waiting for the police 
cars after having finally killed his young adversary, Milo Tindle. The 2007 
remake ends with a scene that is very similar to the illusion created by the first 
fake shooting of Milo Tindle (Jude Law). The shot leaves the audience 
wondering if this new killing is fake as well and the imminent arrival is not that 
of police cars, but of Caine’s wife’s car. There seems to be no retribution for 
the killer here and the film ends with the arrival of the wife, the third member 
of the game, which suggests a new film or a new game about to begin.  
The emphasis in the remake is not laid on the outcome, but on 
repetition. The open-ending suggests a never-ending cycle which brings us back 
to the very dimension of the déjà-vu that the remake relies upon. There is, after 
all, no better way to reinforce the feeling of open-endedness, than the 
comeback, in the character/actor game of illusions, of Sleuth star Michael 
Caine. Caine’s presence in the second film suggests that the death of a character 
is not a closed ending. At the same time, the open-ending emphasises once 
again the fact that Sleuth 2007 is in itself a second film, a link in the open-
ended chain of signifiers.  
 
7. Double, déjà-vu and “intratextuality” 
 
Caine’s presence in the second film, in the role of his former co-star, 
emphasises the dimension of role-reversal, which was one of the premises of 
the first film. The first Sleuth was, in itself, a film based on the strategy of mise-
en-abîme, built as a comment upon play-acting, duality and the game of 
illusions. While in the first film the role-reversal was emphasised by the 
presence of “spectres”, namely mirrors, photographs, dummies, the second film 
has even more key-scenes which place both Caine and Law in symmetrical 
positions, playing with the tension between opposition and identity. In a similar 
manner in which Sleuth 1972 functioned as a metatextual comment on fiction in 
general, Sleuth 2007 is also based on intratextuality, while broadening the 
metatextual comment present in the original film. Robert Stam's category, 
intratextuality, might be employed here, since it is used to describe the way in 
which a remake refers to the process of remaking through strategies of 
mirroring or mise-en-abîme structures (Stam in Verevis 2006:21). The fact that 
Sleuth 2007 playfully acknowledges its status as a remake becomes very 
apparent if we compare two key-scenes in the film.  
 The 1972 film is famous for the scene where Tindle disguises himself 
as a police inspector in order to pay Wyke back for his earlier trick. Wyke 
stands accused of having murdered Tindle and he becomes terrified when the 
police inspector produces evidence incriminating him for a murder he did not 
actually commit. In the 1972 version, the revelation that the police inspector 
(Inspector Doppler, with obvious associations to the term “double”) is none 
other than Tindle in disguise comes as an unexpected revelation, as a clever 
trick meant to be anticipated only by the sharpest members of the audience. 
What is significant is that the 2007 remake does not attempt to make Tindle’s 
impersonation of a police inspector a credible one. On the contrary, Law’s 
extravagant acting and outré mannerisms together with the lingering close-ups, 
make the revelation of the real identity of the police inspector quite predicable 
and leave the impression that the disguise is part of an old game between the 
two protagonists.  
Critics have made a predictably unfavourable comparison between the 
original and the remake, stating that the remade scene lacks the cleverness of 
the disguise present in the former film. However, a legitimate point to make is 
that Tindle’s disguise as a policeman could after all be nothing but predictable, 
since the whole disguise is just a repetition of the original scene, a déjà-vu. In 
my opinion, Branagh constructs the scene, conspicuously, as something 
unsubtle, predictable, giving the impression of a game that has been played and 
re-played. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Sleuth 2007 emerges as an acknowledged, updated remake, heavily 
relying upon and consciously highlighting the mechanisms of intertextuality. 
Helped by Caine’s presence as an instance of celebrity intertextuality, 
Branagh’s remake of a Mankiewicz film emerges as a broad comment on the 
nature of cinema, fiction and finally identity. It is a Pinter re-working of a 
Shaffer play, which attempts to replicate, on the meta-level of the remake, the 
play-within-a-play motif that lay at the core of the original plot.  
By placing the remake within the broader theory of adaptation, I 
conclude that Sleuth 2007 functions as an adaptation of the first film, as an 
intertextual/intra-textual comment of the original, which was, in its turn, an 
adaptation. 
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1. Introduction 
Popular political debates in the United States often end up being framed 
in terms of the Constitution and the Founding Fathers. Be it the separation of 
church and state, gun control, or issues of race, the concept of original intent is 
invoked to ask what the framers of one of America’s foundational documents, 
the Constitution, meant when they wrote it in the late eighteenth century. 
Indeed, one supposition almost seems to be that they had all the answers to the 
problems of the coming centuries. What is often misunderstood, however, is the 
influence of contemporary thinking on how any particular era interprets any 
document. A case in point is the influence of science in general, and Darwin in 
particular, on American thinking during the Gilded Age. 
In this paper I will examine how Darwin’s ideas influenced American 
political thinking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I will look 
first at how Social Darwinism developed and then discuss how some of its 
opponents looked at the same phenomena and reached totally different 
conclusions. What is particularly interesting here is that both sides – Herbert 
Spencer and William Sumner, America’s leading proponent of Social 
Darwinism, as well as opponents such as Lester Ward and Henry George – 
framed their arguments in terms of Darwin and the theory of evolution. 
Reference to major Supreme Court cases will help demonstrate the impact of 
Darwinist thinking on political life. 
 
2. Background 
 
The stated intent of the Founding Fathers “to form a more perfect 
union” reveals – both in the implied comparison and the somewhat illogical 
phrasing – that these men were building upon past experience as they tried to 
form a framework for the future. Specifically, it was the events of the 
Revolutionary era, the experiences with the Articles of Confederation, and the 
legacy of English political thought that they were building upon in their attempt 
to create a system that could promote individual and communal welfare with a 
minimum of conflict between the two. 
The legacy of conflict with the crown had taught them to view 
government and the unchecked use of power as a major source of tyranny. An 
aristocratic heritage, on the other hand, as well as an awareness of how a 
majority could easily impose on a minority, led them to be wary of pure 
democracy and the rule of the mob. The result was a tripartite system of 
government in which no one branch at the federal level could easily dominate 
the others. 
From English political thought they brought with them the idea of 
society as a social compact and the notion that liberty is inextricably bound 
with the unimpeded exercise of property rights. Underlying these ideas is the 
concept of Natural Rights, the belief that the individual is not given rights but is 
born with them. The duty of the state was both to act as a referee between 
individuals exercising their property rights and to create the conditions 
necessary to freely exercise these rights while at the same time promoting the 
common good. The concept of property rights was even extended so far at the 
time as to sanction slavery; the idea of promoting the common good was carried 
in Massachusetts to the point where the state was made responsible for uplifting 
the morals of the individual. Ultimately, here as elsewhere, matters of 
conscience were left to the individual and the state was left to balance concerns 
in the material world between individual rights and the common good. 
A central issue at the time was also reflected in the discarding of the 
Articles of Confederation, namely the balancing of power between the states 
and the central government. If power comes from the bottom up – as the 
Founding Fathers believed – then powers not specifically listed were retained 
by the people and the lower parties, in this case the states. However, since this 
had proved ineffective in regulating interstate affairs, the supremacy clause was 
adopted into the new Constitution. At the level of the individual and the state, 
the Bill of Rights was enacted in order to prevent abuses by the government 
against the Natural Rights of individuals. The language was kept broad enough 
to allow the principles to be adapted to changing historical circumstances. 
 
3. Social Darwinist Thinking 
 
Inevitably, of course, society and the economy did change, and by the 
middle of the nineteenth century industrialization had swept through Britain 
and was emerging in the United States to replace the largely agrarian society 
that the framers of the Constitution had known. Fueled as industrialization was 
by technological developments and the scientific methodology that brought 
these about, it was no wonder that scientific principles found their way into 
philosophy and the newly emerging social sciences. From Britain came the 
doctrines of Social Darwinism, developed by Herbert Spencer as a 
comprehensive philosophy that applied theories and observations from biology 
and the natural world to the social world of man. Although he published his 
views on society a few years before Charles Darwin published The Origin of 
Species (1859), Spencer’s philosophy borrowed from ideas about evolution 
already prominent in the world of natural science and profited from the later 
association with the biologist’s theories. Darwin’s name lent the weight of 
scientific theory and evolution to make Spencer’s ideas appear to be inevitable, 
much as Spencer himself thought they were. 
Spencer saw the individual’s struggle for survival in society as 
analogous to the struggle of plants and animals to survive in nature. The 
strongest survived in both, and this was as it should be. The most capable 
thrived, while the plants, animals, and people least suited to their environment 
did not – all of which led to overall improvement in the species. The idea of 
progress – which was not a feature in the theories of Darwin, who held that not 
the best but the best suited to a particular environment survived, and thus saw 
no grand design or inherent overall betterment behind the process – was a 
central feature of Social Darwinism. Spencer believed that societies moved 
through stages: after going through a militant phase in which society organizes 
itself to survive in competition by forcing the individual to submit to the needs 
of the group, society then grows in size until it enters a more peaceful and 
industrial phase. At that point society emerges into “a regime of contract rather 
than status” (Hofstadter 1992:42), where militancy is no longer required and 
human nature improves towards a general condition which would “solve all 
other problems” (Hofstadter 1992:43). 
The key element propelling man and society with machine-like 
inevitability towards this goal was competition. Spencer viewed society simply 
as the arena or garden in which competition was held and considered any 
intervention in the contest not only needless but subversive of natural 
processes. The role of government, therefore, was simply to ensure that the 
“equal freedom” of each person should not be infringed upon in any way. The 
best method for promoting public good was to not give help in any form to 
anyone, and so his doctrines came out against a governmental role in education, 
public health, and enacting tariffs or trade regulations. 
Although advocacy of such public policies may appear to be simply a 
smokescreen for greed to some, Spencer believed this to be the only way to 
achieve a better man and a better society. Intervention could only lead to the 
weaker party winning and this ultimately would be bad for society. Values such 
as altruism could only prevail if they won in a fair fight, and so to enforce 
philanthropy through taxation or governmental policy would not only give 
unfair help to the weaker members of society, it would also inhibit the 
development of giving for giving’s sake. If Natural Rights were to be realized – 
and Spencer firmly believed in the concept – then nature had to be given the 
right to produce them in the struggle for survival of the fittest. 
One of the chief proponents of Social Darwinism in America, William 
Sumner, argued along the same lines in dismissing all attempts at government 
intervention in the economy. One could not, he believed, apply the same 
interpretations of society that the Founding Fathers had had to the situation of 
America in the latter half of the nineteenth century, for the contemporary 
society and economy were now an entirely different animal and had to be 
treated as such. The economy had evolved and changed society along with it; 
this process had entailed different forms of social control and organization – 
much more impersonal and inhumane ones, he admitted – but had also 
produced amazing wealth. Everyone profited from this development, and if a 
few profited much more than the rest, then they deserved it because this was a 
result of natural laws. Social and economic changes were part of a natural 
dynamic that had occurred precisely because the most talented were allowed to 
rise to the top, and interventions such as establishing an income tax would only 
hinder these natural processes. Indeed, Sumner believed that great wealth in the 
hands of a few “is [not], as a rule, in the ordinary course of social affairs, put to 
a mischievous use. This cannot be shown beyond the slightest degree, if at all” 
(1919). 
The same dispassionate scientific methodology that Sumner advocated 
for the newly developing field of sociology was to be applied in the field of 
politics. If one person were rich and the other poor, then this was simply 
nature’s way of separating the wheat from the chaff; sentimentality that led to 
intervention was not only bad policy, it was a useless undertaking. “[O]ur 
efforts are like those of a man trying to deflect a river, and these forces will 
have changed the whole problem before our interferences have time to make 
themselves felt” (1919). 
That Social Darwinism as advocated by Spencer and Sumner was not a 
strict interpretation of Darwin’s theories is borne out by their attitude towards 
the transmission of acquired wealth from generation to generation. Allowing 
this to happen is actually more analogous to the Lamarckian idea that acquired 
traits can be passed on to succeeding generations than to Darwin’s concept of 
the most useful random genes being passed on. Andrew Carnegie, who himself 
believed in the inevitability of a few obtaining great wealth for the benefit of all 
and codified this belief as the Law of Accumulation of Wealth, came to a 
different conclusion regarding large inheritances. Carnegie generally approved 
of inheritance taxes, but felt that philanthropy was an even higher good. His 
ideas were generally in line with Spencer’s belief that giving improves the giver 
not the receiver, and the objects of Carnegie’s largess – libraries, universities, 
and other institutions of self-improvement – were an expression of Sumner’s 
belief in encouraging a meritocracy instead of a condition of material equality. 
Carnegie’s concern was with using wealth in order to improve society, and he 
believed that “[n]either the individual nor the race is improved by alms-giving” 
(1889). 
Carnegie’s example demonstrates some of the attractions of Social 
Darwinism for nineteenth-century Americans. The concept of continual 
material progress may not have been completely Darwinian but it was – along 
with a belief in the power of self-improvement – completely in line with 
traditional American beliefs as well as America’s historical experience. 
Calvinism had already planted the idea of material reward as an expression of 
God’s grace, and now this idea appeared to be sanctioned as well by the new 
secular religion, science. Additionally, in this form it allowed Darwin and God 
to be brought under one roof. All in all, Social Darwinism gave a 
comprehensive explanation for the development and present condition of 
American society and its economy, and did so with an analogy to nature that 
seemed to echo the language of Natural Rights used a century before during the 
founding of the nation. 
It is no wonder then that a majority of Supreme Court judges could be 
found to interpret the Constitution in a Social Darwinian light. In Lochner v. 
New York (1905), for example, the Court interpreted the due process clause of 
the XIVth Amendment along the lines of Spencer’s “equal freedom” and 
refused to intervene in a contract between employer and employee. Due process 
became synonymous with natural process, and just as Spencer rejected the idea 
of government dictating health policy or the terms under which a patient could 
buy medicine, the Court rejected New York’s authority to limit the number of 
hours a baker could work. 
Similarly, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) extended Spencer’s equal freedom 
to the realm of race. The Court rejected the notion that the government could 
legislate equality between the races as this could occur only under the 
“voluntary consent of individuals.” As long as equality of opportunity existed – 
as the Court pretended it did – then it was no business of the government to 
intervene. The Court cemented the nineteenth-century notion of race – itself a 
derivation of Darwin’s idea of species – under the guise of freedom of contract, 
thus allowing individuals to form contracts only with those they desired and 
denying that any common good was being served with racial mixing. 
 
4. Reactions to Social Darwinism 
 
But just as the Supreme Court decisions were not unanimous, neither 
was the entire country under the sway of Social Darwinism. Many looked at 
society and saw the same inequality, and they believed as well that society and 
the economy were evolving. Many agreed with Sumner that the American 
political system had developed into a plutocracy and believed as well that 
“[e]very one of us is a child of his age and cannot get out of it” (1919). But they 
disagreed about the direction this evolution was taking and they had different 
ideas about how people, and especially the government, should respond. 
The primary disagreement centered on the role of evolution in man’s 
social development. Though people such as Henry George agreed that 
“[b]etween the development of society and the development of species there is 
a close analogy” (George 2005:1), they did not believe that society was purely 
the result of natural forces. Evolution had produced and developed the human 
intellect, and with this faculty man was capable of not only influencing the 
direction of social development but also of actually controlling it. William 
James used the examples of Bismarck and Napoleon to demonstrate that 
individuals could be at least as influential as any historical forces shaping the 
direction of national destinies. The human mind, they argued, puts man outside 
the natural forces that Spencer saw at work everywhere; to adopt a fatalistic 
attitude in the face of Spencer’s deterministic philosophy was not good policy. 
Ultimately man, not nature, controlled society. 
In this vein, they viewed material inequality not as a natural state, as 
Carnegie claimed with his laws, but as a result of inefficient social 
organization. Critics such as Lester Ward argued that outdated forms of social 
thinking were “still taught in the higher institutions of learning” (1893:Ch.38), 
although economic conditions had completely changed. The Malthusian idea of 
scarcity as man’s economic reality had been replaced by technological 
developments with a new era of plenty. It was therefore man’s obligation to 
replace old notions of political economy with new systems of thinking that 
would allow for a more efficient production and distribution of the wealth 
humans were capable of creating. The doctrine of evolution applied as well to 
man’s thinking, and this was leading towards a social consciousness based upon 
solidarity rather than individualism.  
Both Social Darwinists and those who opposed them saw competition as 
a fact of the world around them, but had differing notions about where this was 
all heading. The former saw competition as the key to progress that should not 
be interfered with, while the latter believed that it was leading to a change in 
social thinking that would render competition itself obsolete. If people were 
allowed to develop within the bounds of their own “equal freedoms,” Spencer 
believed, virtue would develop automatically and not have to be coerced from 
people. In the course of competition, the weaker, less productive individuals 
were simply winnowed out. Opponents such as Henry George, on the other 
hand, believed that this was not nor ever could be the case because competition 
itself simply bred selfishness, nothing more. What developed were “habits of 
greed” that the individual would abandon only at death (2005:68). The system 
would eventually produce such inequality that it could be overthrown only by a 
radical change in man’s social thinking. Edward Bellamy believed that when 
such a mystical state arrived it would take little argument to convince the entire 
nation to think differently. After a short while, man’s social thinking would be 
so drastically altered that people would be unable to comprehend how the old 
system could ever have existed. 
Plutocracy, which all viewed as the reality of the late nineteenth 
century, was accordingly evaluated differently. Social Darwinists considered it 
natural that the wealthy, since their material success had proved them the ablest 
in this environment, should dominate the political system; Carnegie’s concept 
of the duty of the rich to improve society expressed the Social Darwinist sense 
that all would turn out well. If the right to private property were ensured, 
noblesse oblige would be the safeguard against tyranny. To their opponents, 
such as Lester Ward, democracy was but an adaptation in man’s social 
development that had evolved into plutocracy. The next stop for Ward was 
what he called sociocracy, where technocrats would control the economic 
machinery for the benefit of all. Edward Bellamy’s vision, as he described it in 
Looking Backward (1887), foresaw a similar development he called 
Nationalism, which was much like a Marxian withering away of the state. In 
both systems – and in George Herron’s Christian Socialism – group solidarity 
would emerge as the natural outcome of the tremendous growth in size and 
complexity of the economy and society. The fusion of the individual into group 
consciousness took on a spiritual aspect, for like Social Darwinists, these critics 
envisioned a synthesis of Darwin’s evolutionary principles and God. As 
children of nineteenth-century America, they all felt compelled to fuse science 
and religion. 
All this points towards differing interpretations of the emphasis to be 
placed on the language of the Constitution. For the Social Darwinists, it meant 
promoting a strict interpretation of individual rights as the road to achieving 
progress in public welfare. Just as it was to the Founding Fathers, liberty meant 
to them the free exercise of private property rights, and ‘free’ was to be 
interpreted along the lines of Spencer’s equal freedom. For George and 
Bellamy, on the other hand, promoting the public good did not mean leaving 
everything to natural forces and doing nothing. On the contrary, it required an 
aggressive intervention on the government’s part, since through the emergence 
of social solidarity the government would become the true expression of the 
will of the people. In the most radical assessment, the changes in the economy 
and social organization since the Revolution demanded a reinterpretation of 
how liberty was to be secured, namely through the abolishment of private 
property as it had been known before. Only through evolutionary change in the 
social organization to meet the conditions created by the new economy could 
efficiency be realized and happiness freely pursued. 
Bellamy’s and George’s visions were, of course, never realized; 
abolishing private property proved to be too radical a step for most Americans’ 
sense of social consciousness. Instead, the mood of the country moved the 
government to take the opposite course: trusts were busted as America moved 
to restore competition as a key element in society. But the ideas espoused by 
those opposed to Spencer and his philosophy foreshadowed a shift in thinking 
about government’s role in promoting the common good. This thinking paved 
the way for Progressivism, which resulted in such anti-Spencerian legislation as 
the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the institution of the income tax that both 
bolstered the financial resources of the government and was a first small step in 
leveling wealth, and the direct election of the Senate as a step towards a popular 
democracy and away from plutocracy.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In its first hundred and twenty years the nation had seen tremendous 
changes. The economy had developed away from Jefferson’s vision of yeomen 
farmers and, especially in the wake of the Civil War, had become an 
industrialized, urban nation. Its material wealth had increased greatly, though 
power and wealth were becoming ever more concentrated in the hands of a few. 
In the course of all this, however, the debates about the political life of the 
country remained in the context of the language used by the framers of the 
Constitution. Despite suggestions that the economy be nationalized in reaction 
to the tremendous growth and centralization that was occurring in economic 
life, the idea that private property was the key to securing the liberty of the 
individual remained firmly entrenched. 
In the Supreme Court, the debate over balancing the rights of the 
individual with the desire to promote the common good swung back and forth, 
usually centered on the concepts of commerce and contract. In Dartmouth v. 
Woodward (1819) the Court asserted the inviolability of the contract against 
state interference, while a little bit later the Court affirmed the right of the state 
to promote the common good when it did not expressly violate a private 
contract in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837). With the emergence 
of Social Darwinism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the 
Court increasingly interpreted the public good to be a by-product of the 
individual’s right to enter into contracts and refused to allow the state to dictate 
too many conditions to private contracts, such as in Lochner v. New York 
(1905). 
The pendulum started swinging back, however, as the executive and 
legislative branches of government slowly began leaning to the view that there 
was a need for society to work collectively rather than individually for the 
public good. They never went so far as to nationalize large industries in the 
name of the common good, but they were obviously of an opinion similar to 
William James’s. Man did have the natural right to assume some form of 
control over social organization, although the steps taken were never radical 
and – at least until the Depression of the 1930s – always slow and incremental. 
It is noteworthy that the background to all these seemingly contradictory 
views in the late nineteenth century was no longer the strong influence of 
earlier English philosophers. Instead, all relied on the new religion of science as 
an authority to back them up. Be it Sumner’s disinterested study of science in 
order to observe but not intervene, or Ward’s professional technocrats who 
could produce greater efficiency, all sides called upon the scientific 
methodology to support their views. Natural laws of the animal world or of the 
human mind were all employed to justify Natural Rights. 
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1. Introduction 
The Innocents Abroad (1869), “the best-selling book of the century,” 
(Melton 2002: 1) is the first of Mark Twain’s five travel books. Its sales 
“reached 100,000 even before the second anniversary of its publication. [and] 
launched Mark Twain’s national career” (Obenzinger 1999: 164). All of 
Twain’s travelogues turned out to be great commercial successes and 
contributed to establishing their author at home and abroad as a leading travel 
writer: “half a million copies [of The Innocents Abroad] had been sold by 
Twain’s death in 1910” (Obenzinger 1999: 165); “Roughing It [1872] sold over 
76,000 copies in its first two years and 96,000 by 1879, and A Tramp Abroad 
[1880] sold 62,000 in its first year” (Melton 2002: 1). His last two travel books 
were Life on the Mississippi (1883) and Following the Equator (1897). 
 
2. The Innocents Abroad 
 
The Innocents Abroad relates the adventures of the author’s 
peregrinations in Europe, the Holy Land and Egypt in 1867, as he had 
embarked on what is viewed as one of the very first transatlantic cruises. Still a 
journalist, his expenses were paid for by his major employer, the Alta 
California, which published the letters he sent from around the globe. The 
stories are told by his anti-intellectual persona, who must be distinguished from 
the empirical author and will thus be referred to in the present study as 
“Twain.” He fits the definition by Genette (1996: 256) of the metadiegetic 
character, who is simultaneously the hero, the narrator and the author. 
As a tourist, “Twain” visits the most picturesque places and the 
renowned landmarks of high art, providing his own comments. He particularly 
denounces the amateurs of classical painting who rave over the works they 
contemplate, though the latter have now become mere ruins. In Milan, crowds 
of such critics—or would be critics—shower praise over Da Vinci’s “Last 
Supper,” though “The colors are dimmed with age; the countenances are scaled 
and marred, and nearly all expression is gone from them; the hair is a dead blur 
upon the wall, and there is no life in the eyes.  Only the attitudes are certain.” 
(Twain 2003:191-192) “Twain” mocks their seemingly spontaneous response to 
the encounter with the masterpiece, which they tend to express in pseudo-
critical fashion: 
 
They stand entranced before it with bated breath and parted lips, and when they speak, 
it is only in the catchy ejaculations of rapture: 
“O, wonderful!” 
“Such expression!” 
“Such grace of attitude!” 
[…] 
“Such faultless drawing!” 
“Such matchless coloring!” 
[…] 
“What delicacy of touch!” 
“What sublimity of conception!” (192) 
 
Despite his own original enthusiasm at the prospect of discovering the 
European masterpieces, “Twain”’s candid innocence precludes any pretense. 
His disappointment at the decrepit state of the painting leads him to reflect upon 
the nature of the invariably stereotyped attitude that surrounds it:  
 
I only envy these people; I envy them their honest admiration, if it be honest—their 
delight, if they feel delight. I harbor no animosity toward any of them. But at the same 
time the thought will intrude itself upon me, How can they see what is not visible? 
(192) 
 
To him, the damage of time prevents any contemporary assessment of 
the painting and only critical discourse keeps the memory of The Last Supper’s 
former glory: “After reading so much about it, I am satisfied that the Last 
Supper was a very miracle of art once.  But it was three hundred years ago.” 
(193) 
Laudatory discourse contributes to compensating the failings of a work 
of art which has virtually disappeared, and threatens to obliterate the object of 
its analysis. It is a mythologizing enterprise in which “Twain” refuses to 
participate. His aesthetic assessment is mostly of a creative nature; lampooning 
the critics prompts him to demonstrate an alternative attitude to representing the 
experience of the confrontation with the ineffable.  
The Last Supper is one of the masterpieces sought after by any self-
respecting art lover on his Grand Tour. As such, “Twain”’s ruthless, sketchy 
description of the painting and ridiculing the travelers’ ecstatic response make 
up a provocative statement, which he carries further by relating his 
confrontation with another ineffable experience. Far from the cathedrals and 
palaces housing the productions of high art, “Twain” then visits a “tumble-
down old rookery” (196), which boasts an exceptional echo. Seemingly 
following the example of the art admirers’ bent for substituting their 
preposterous ekphrasis for a totally faded work of art, “Twain” says he 
endeavored to represent a marvel that he could not see either, but that he was 
able to perceive by ear: the echo itself. His approach is minimalistic: he jotted 
down dots on a page of his notebook, each corresponding to a repetition of the 
original sound (“Ha!”) uttered by a local country girl (196). He states he 
managed fifty-two before giving up on his attempt, as the echo was still running 
its course. His evidence is the reproduction within his text of the page and its 
opposite: 
 
 (197) 
 
The raw appearance of the sketch as well as the telegraphic, barely 
legible text that follows denote their immediacy, which proves to be revealingly 
problematic. 
To start with, although it is difficult to get the precise number of dots on 
the left-hand page the number approximates the double. Even if “Twain” 
wished to represent one distinct dot for each “distinct repetition,” the total 
number of clearly delineated specks reaches beyond the stated figure. The 
persona either lied about his count or the reproduction of his original 
production is blatantly unfaithful. Given “Twain”’s definite textual precision 
and the obvious approximation of the illustration, the point is that even vouched 
for by the author himself, a reproduction may not be faithful to the intended 
message. 
As for the text on the opposite page (supposed to follow the chronology 
of “Twain”’s trip and to be found, if not immediately after the echo anecdote, at 
least to follow it in its vicinity), it is not found in The Innocents Abroad at all. 
We are thus given access to notes that were discarded by the author but that still 
appear in the body of his text. As such, this text originally forbidden to the 
reader remains, but in the form of a picture which has lost its ideological value 
and has become a mere illustration. What matters here is the discourse on, not 
in the text. – 
In the end the echo transcribed by “Twain” makes up: “‘Ha!———
ha!——ha!—–ha!—ha!–ha! Ha! H-a-a-a-a-a!’” (196), which is both a 
meaningless sound made up of a most basic vocal utterance and the 
conventional expression of laughter. The humorous outcome of this meta-
artistic experiment is carried further on the opposite page of the notebook, 
which may be interpreted as the caption of the sketch. Its opening phrase, 
“Picture by Titian in the Cathedral” presents “Twain”’s ultra minimalist 
drawing as if it were the copy of a painting by the Italian master. This makes 
the persona the equivalent of the droves of talented contemporary painters who 
successfully replicate the masters. He included the picture of the former a few 
pages previously: “Wherever you find a Raphael, a Rubens, a Michelangelo, a 
Carracci, or a Da Vinci […] you find artists copying them, and the copies are 
always the handsomest. Maybe the originals were handsome when they were 
new, but they are not now.” (191) 
Adorned with what looks like two columns of an indefinite classical 
order (a full one on the right hand side and a faded one on the left), the left-
hand page of his notebook actually looks like a classical, monumental work of 
architectural art rendered illegible by time. The page, then, may be said to give 
an iconic representation of the cathedral mentioned in the text. Similarly, the 
right-hand column happens to overlap the two pages of the notebook and 
becomes the middle, main supporting pillar of “Twain”’s iconic work, 
sustained by three columns, the left-hand and the right-hand ones having 
virtually disappeared but still being detectable to a careful eye. The notebook 
reproduces the appearance of the book that the reader is holding at the same 
time: 
“Twain”’s mise en abyme is thus given the shape/appearance of a 
diptych, which bestows on it a most respected artistic aura reminiscent of that 
enjoyed by the old masterpieces displayed in the cathedrals and churches of 
Europe.  At the same time it ridicules the pretention of the prevalent critical 
discourse that seeks to arouse admiration for a work bearing the same 
characteristics, regardless of any intrinsic aesthetic quality. 
 
 
 
The text that follows (“subject forgotten /illegible/of a date — Priest 
said History of it was very curious It was painted in the dark—”) further 
illustrates “Twain”’s thesis, for the painting that “it” refers to is either by Titian 
or by some unnamed artist. The impossibility of determining the identity of the 
author relativizes the importance of the issue, since not only have most old 
paintings virtually disappeared because of the ravages of time, but also because 
even their original quality may be doubted. One may indeed only guess at the 
probability of painting a masterpiece in the dark… Given the promising 
hilarious start, the rest of the text proves frustrating, for it leaves the anecdote 
unfinished and skips to an anticlimactic allusion to a train departure. Given the 
textual analogy between “Twain”’s sketch and the unknown classical work 
alluded to by the monk, the latter’s comment might as well apply to the dotted 
page, which is the very type of result that one might get by fumbling with a 
pencil at night in a sketchbook. Just as all critical comments on any faded 
painting are written in a predictable style and become interchangeable, a doodle 
drawn by an amateur looks like any darkened masterpiece. The subsequent 
trivial allusion to the train contrasts with the flowery discourse of art criticism, 
which ends up absorbing the actual object of its study. It also reveals “Twain” 
as a down-to-earth dilettante, for whom the classics are merely one ingredient 
among others in his tourist trip. 
He appears as a consumer of artistic products aware of a damning lack 
of culture which prevents him from appreciating the fundamental qualities of a 
work whose subtleties will remain inaccessible. To him, such arcane knowledge 
is a privilege afforded to creators only: 
 
I am willing to believe that the eye of the practiced artist can rest upon The Last 
Supper and renew a lustre where only a hint of it is left, supply a tint that has faded 
away, restore an expression that is gone […] But I can not work this miracle. (193) 
 
“Twain,” then, does not consider himself as an artist, which is hardly 
surprising considering his hasty sketch, but which also indirectly raises the 
question of his status as the author of the present text. His flash of modesty 
(true or false) makes up yet another ironic jibe against critics, whom he puts in 
the same position of ignorance. 
 
3. Later travel books 
 
The Innocents Abroad was followed by the publication of other travel 
books, notably A Tramp Abroad, which relates “Twain”’s going back to the 
same places some twelve years later, having seemingly undergone an aesthetic 
sea change: “When I wrote about the Old Masters before, I said the copies were 
better than the originals. That was a mistake of large dimensions. The Old 
Masters were still unpleasing to me, but they were truly divine contrasted with 
the copies.” (Twain 2002: 268) Having taken painting lessons in Heidelberg, 
the traveler in A Tramp Abroad now pretends to claim artistic standing and 
lapses into the jargon of the critics he so vehemently used to criticize. His 
apparently earnest ekphrasis of a painting of a hair trunk in Venice turns out to 
compose a parody of empty critical discourse, alternating the lofty and the 
ridiculous: 
 
The Trunk is bound or bordered with leather all around where the lid joins the main 
body. Many critics consider this leather too cold in tone; but I consider this its highest 
merit, since it was evidently made so to emphasize by contrast the impassioned fervor 
of the hasp. The highlights in this part of the work are cleverly managed, the motif is 
admirably subordinated to the ground tints, and the technique is very fine. […] The 
details are finely worked out; the repose proper to hair in a recumbent and inactive 
attitude is charmingly expressed. There is a feeling about this part of the work which 
lifts it to the highest altitudes of art; the sense of sordid realism vanishes away,—one 
recognizes that there is soul here. (272 -273) 
 
Such jargon is ironically lent credence by the writer’s pretentious claim 
to artistry, given his supposedly successful pictorial training in Heidelberg, and 
sustained by the proud display of his own creation: 
 
 (270) 
 
The unmistakably amateurish quality of “Twain”’s sketch of the original 
Lion of St Mark makes it blatantly inadequate, whether as a mimetic 
representation or the expression of pictorial genius. His pseudo-artistic 
achievements definitely disqualify him both as a painter and as the enlightened 
critic he pretends to be. His praise of the Old Masters, then, proves totally 
ironic and confirms his original negative judgment.  
It is easy to perceive the sarcasm at the persona’s expense when his 
hubris prompts him to put his pathetic pictorial creations on a par with those of 
the virtuosos of the past. Yet the irony becomes all the more biting when he 
convincingly points to stylistic analogies in the course of a discussion with an 
artist in Venice: 
 
 “I have been in the Doge’s Palace and I saw several acres of very bad drawing, very 
bad perspective, and very incorrect proportions. Paul Veronese’s dogs do not resemble 
dogs; all the horses look like bladders on legs; one man had a right leg on the left side 
of his body; […] there are three men in the foreground who are over thirty feet high, if 
one may judge by the size of a kneeling little boy in the centre of the foreground; and 
according to the same scale, the Pope is 7 feet high and the Doge is a shriveled dwarf 
of 4 feet.” 
The artist said, — 
“Yes, the Old Masters often drew badly; they did not care much for truth and exactness 
in minor details.” (269) 
 
The flaws readily recognized in the masters (“bad drawing, bad 
perspective, bad proportions” [269]) obviously apply to “Twain” himself, 
thereby proleptically depriving beholders/readers of stable aesthetic guidelines 
to condemn his own creations. His clever discourse comically transforms him 
into a latter-day Veronese or Da Vinci, whom he equals in their technical 
imperfections. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
By equating his sketch of the echo in The Innocents Abroad with a 
generic masterpiece and ironically demonstrating his (non)artistic abilities in A 
Tramp Abroad, “Twain” does not merely provide an entertaining illustration of 
his thesis. The combination of his pathetic pictorial creations and his subversive 
candid remarks contributes to the construction of a lowbrow aesthetic scheme 
that aims at underlying the vanity of ascribing any scientific value to critical 
discourse. In its humorous way, it also obliquely underlines the social 
implications of any approach to art, for the comic effect created and denoted by 
the end result of the echo (“‘Ha!———ha!——ha!—–ha!—ha!–ha! Ha! H-a-a-
a-a-a!’” [Twain 2003:196]) is utterly devoid of sophistication—and seemingly 
groundless. Whether in real life or in the artistic realm, the original sound, 
uttered by an unsophisticated yet lovely country girl, becomes an expression of 
pure vitality. Free from any witticism or artifice, it is pitted against the 
ludicrousness of the refined society that will worship any faded “Old Master,” 
backed by empty jargon. 
“Twain”’s instinctive mistrust of high art and of a cultured approach to 
it is evocative of an American innocence which, while acknowledging the 
existence of history and its impact on the present, tends to minimize its 
contemporary relevance. Revealingly, it does so mostly by associating such 
claim to sophistication with a decaying Europe, typifying a relative denial of 
the past. 
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Abstract: The paper aims to demonstrate how the notion of sensus communis is 
ironically dismanted and seen as idiosyncratic through the lens of the refined 
sensibility advocated by Harley, the protagonist of Henry Mackenzie’s novel, The Man 
of Feeling (1771), who mingles joy and grief when facing public action. His excessive 
charity and sympathy appear as an endeavour to reshape manners, a project which 
fails because Harley can only deplore the socio-economic practices of his time. 
Harley’s sentimentalism is best expressed by tears. His benevolence runs parallel with 
the sceptical view of the world that prevents him from acting virtuously. Filtered 
through the history of ideas, sentimentalism is deemed in this paper as self-regarding 
emotion and ‘outraged’ morality. 
Keywords: sentimentalism, charity, sympathy, unprincipled sentiment, public action. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Associated with the term ‘sentimentalism’, a coinage of the eighteenth 
century, ‘sensibility’ referred primarily to reason, intellect and mental 
perception. Spawning a wide range of meanings and connotations in the late 
eighteenth century, such as ‘shallow’, ‘excessive’, ‘insincere’, the word 
‘sentimental’ simply overlapped with ‘sensibility’ to such an extent that no 
clear distinction could be made between them. A community of feeling was 
thus possible by analogy with a community of sense (sensus communis). If 
experience is their common denominator, then we can understand why 
‘sensible’ also acquired the meaning of physical perception. “Human 
experience, which is constantly contradicting theory, is the great test of truth”, 
aphorises Samuel Johnson (Parker 2003:8), when the intellect endeavours to 
pursue true knowledge. If John Locke was highly suspicious of confident 
opinions formulated in the process of gaining true knowledge, the 
sentimentalists asserted the “cultural rightness” of the observer’s private 
judgements (Motooka 1998:20). It was David Hume’s Pyrrhonian scepticism 
that paved the way for the subsequent confusion of the two terms. According to 
Hume, the mind cannot attain to certain knowledge whereas morality is deep-
seated in sentiment, which gives birth to an empirically unverified moral truth. 
Furthermore, in his A Treatise of Human Nature, sentiment – synonymous with 
passion – turns into an “ideological strategy” (Mullan 2002:23) which imposes 
a model of social relations based on sympathy understood as an interaction of 
sentiments able to create social harmony in a disinterested manner. Hume 
summarises this point as follows: 
 
Twill be easy to explain the passion of pity, from the preceding reasoning concerning 
sympathy. We have a lively idea of everything related to us. All human creatures are 
related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, 
their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an 
emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is easily converted into an 
impression. If this be true in general, it must be more so of affliction and sorrow. These 
have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure of enjoyment. 
(Hume 2003: 262; emphasis added) 
 
Partially echoing the Latitudinarian divines’ precepts of benevolence, 
charity and good action, furthered by Shaftesbury under the form of innate 
moral good, Hume’s notion of sympathy elevates sentiment, if not passions, to 
the rank of virtue, by “complete and immediate communication” (Mullan, 
2002:30). It has nothing to do with the Mandevillian self-interest, which 
produces public benefits. Viewed in this manner, sentimental benevolence is 
labelled in the second half of the century as “moral refinement” or “Delicacy”. 
The Universal Magazine writes in 1778 that  
 
it must be allowed that Delicacy of Sentiment… adds greatly to the happiness of 
mankind, by diffusing an universal benevolence. It teaches men to feel for others as for 
themselves; it disposes us to rejoice with the happy, and by partaking to increase their 
pleasure…It excites a pleasing sensation in our own breast, which if its duration be 
considered, may be places among the highest gratifications of sense. (in Ellis 1996:5) 
 
Easily and ambiguously defined, the sentimental praised as virtue brings 
into question the dilemma “enclosed self – outgoing sympathy” (Golden, 
1966:viii). Based on weak thought, since, in Hume’s terms, reason is the slave 
of the passions, the sentimental self, able to produce this type of sympathy for 
the sake of social order, unalterable communication and harmony, becomes 
virtuous as long as it is only the projection of an ideal, as long as it remains just 
a feeling, not a principle, to paraphrase Henry Mackenzie. The harsh 
discrepancy between feeling and understanding, between private feeling, socio-
economic conventions and public action is part of the critique addressed by 
sentimental novels. Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) is a case in point. 
 
2. The effect of unprincipled sentiment and excessive sympathy 
 
Starting from the above-mentioned premises, the present paper – an 
improved version of an article entitled ‘“The Sentimental Tribute of a Tear”: 
Self-Regarding Emotion, Wrong Sympathy, and Sentimental Irony in Henry 
Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling’, published in University of Bucharest 
Review, vol. X, no. 2/2008, which resulted from my research conducted within 
the CNCSIS Project PN II IDEI, no. 1980 called The Cultural Institution of 
Literature – tries to demonstrate that Mackenzie’s novel, apart from being a 
paragon of sentimentalism qua genre, highlights the social and philosophical 
implications of the term ‘sentimental’ and critiques, at the same time, Hume’s 
coherent social model, whose applicability to “a world of feeling” is both risible 
and impossible. The Man of Feeling is, in John Mullan’s words, “the terminal 
formula of the sentimental novel because, with all its talk of virtue, it cannot 
reflect at all on the problems of conduct, the practices of any existing society” 
(Mullan 2002:118-9).  
A member of the Edinburgh elite, lawyer by trade, editor and writer for 
two popular periodicals, The Mirror (1779-80) and The Lounger (1785-87), 
Henry Mackenzie was “both personally and professionally concerned with 
social morality” (Benedict 1994:117). Dividing society into sentimental (private 
feeling) and pragmatic individuals (public action), he desperately, and 
idealistically, wanted to see them as complementary. As a lawyer, therefore as a 
practical man in real life, he gave birth to an epitome of fictional sensitive 
virtue which found no correspondent in everyday life and society. In other 
words, “the practical man”, comments Mullan, “produced the impractical 
model” (Mullan 2002:118). Mullan also informs us that  
 
the gap between the social identity that Mackenzie styled for himself and the 
exemplary Man of Feeling that he created was recorded retrospectively by Henry 
Cockburn, a fellow Edinburgh lawyer: ‘Strangers used to fancy that he must be a 
pensive sentimental Harley (i.e. the hero of the novel); whereas he was far better – a 
hard headed practical man, as full of worldly wisdom as most of his fictitious 
characters are devoid of it; and this without in the least impairing the affectionate 
softness of his heart. (D. Craig qtd. in Mullan 2002:118) 
 
Despite his benevolent sentimentalism, Harley is an impractical model 
because his exceedingly refined sensibility is at loggerheads with civic and 
conventional background. He becomes a Quixote whose sentimental “weapon”, 
i.e. tears, has no real target in the physical world. Far from being didactic, the 
novel displays sympathy in the wrong way, if we follow Hume’s model, and 
pathetic emotion as self-regarding and, after all, as virtue replacing judgement. 
The focal point of Mackenzie’s novel is precisely the “distrust of sentimental 
literary values, especially the formula that feeling guarantees virtue” (Benedict, 
1994:118). It deconstructs’ Hume’s idea of communicable passions in that 
Harley is seized with a storm of feelings that annihilate logos: “There were a 
thousand sentiments; - but they gushed so impetuously on his heart, that he 
could not utter a syllable” (Mackenzie 2001:78).  
In her seminal book entitled The Age of Reasons, Wendy Motooka 
analyses the pejorative sense of ‘sentimentalism’, since the moral truth cannot 
be empirically accessible. If so, “the fact that it must go empirically unverified, 
allowing plausible alternatives to flourish and multiply”, gives rise to 
sentimentalism’s tendency “to ground itself by locating superior sensibility in 
particular communities” (Motooka 1998:21). Such a particular community (of 
sense) is depicted and produced in The Man of Feeling and set against the 
background of a sentimental individual who claims that this community is 
characterised by moral uniformity. In this respect, the passions lead to 
“fundamental sociability found in every encounter with others” (Mullan 
2002:29). The refined sensibility advocated by Harley mingles, in the words of 
Hume, joy and grief when facing public action. His sympathy appears as an 
endeavour to reshape manners, a project which fails because Harley can only 
deplore the socio-economic customs of his time. His benevolence runs parallel 
with the sceptical view of society and the world which prevents him from 
acting virtuously. Hence, the idea of sentimental irony translated by pathetic 
tears. Harley’s self remains secluded and veiled by unprincipled emotions 
which trigger the physiological act of crying because the hero “confuses self-
regard with the regard for and of nature” (Benedict 1994:120). It is in this way 
that tears exacted by a spectacle of virtue in distress was “an acknowledgement 
at once of man’s inherent goodness and of the impossibility of his ever being 
able to demonstrate his goodness effectively” (Brissenden 1974:29). Harley’s 
“inherent goodness” does not lead to public actions, as it should do, but remains 
only a sentimental discursive practice that makes him sensible in the proper 
sense of the word: since reason cannot give any boost to motivation, according 
to Hume, it can at least capture, empirically again, the way of the world. 
Reason is practically obliterated yet discursively useful. On the other hand, the 
“ambiguities of sentimental irony” (Benedict 1994:118) illustrated by 
Mackenzie’s novel can be clarified if we refer to passions as passive and non-
stimulating in Harley’s case, for moral judgments, which are the product of 
feeling rather than judgement, are supposed to guide man’s action in order to 
achieve his potentiality and “telos”, as Alasdair MacIntyre (1984:52) argues. 
Here is a reasonable Harley, “a child in the drama of the world” (Mackenzie, 
2001:14) who moans the corrupted, hypocritical and Mandevillian world he 
lives in: 
 
The immense riches acquired by individuals have erected a standard of ambition, 
destructive of private morals, and of public virtue […] The frivolous and the interested 
(might a satirist say) are the characteristic features of the age; they are visible even in 
the essays of our philosophers […] And the manly tone of reason is exchanged for 
perpetual efforts at sneer and ridicule. This I hold to be an alarming crisis in the 
corruption of a state; when not only is virtue declined, and vice prevailing, but when 
the praises of virtue are forgotten, and the infamy of vice unfelt. (Mackenzie, 2001:62; 
emphasis added) 
 
This quotation raises two major ambiguities related to ideology and 
gender, both triggered by sentimentalism as thinking through feeling. It speaks 
volumes about the sensibility of manhood, as depicted in novels written 
between 1760 and 1770. On the one hand, the “destruction of private morals, 
and of public virtue” actually filtered by Mackenzie through Mandeville’s 
private vices and public benefits in order to justify the allegedly meritocratic 
and commercial society of the time alludes to the impossibility of sympathy to 
manifest itself in “a state” or in society. These bad attributes are not endemic, 
but expanded all throughout the world, which rejects the idea of “wrong 
sympathy” viewed as “the spirit of faction” leading to opposing or warring 
groups/societies adopting “partisan companies” (Mullan 2002:27). This is a 
“feeling” experienced by the whole world which is inimical to Harley’s type of 
sympathy, but which  
 
gives it scope and reason for its most grandiloquent gestures […] The world is not 
society; indeed, with respect to the attempts by philosophers and essayists in the 
eighteenth century to describe social relations, it is imagines as non-‘society. ‘The 
World, I know, is selfish and looks for Virtues by which something may be gain’d to 
itself’, wrote Mackenzie in a letter to Elisabeth Rose in 1771. The formula of his 
novels can be seen as one by which the ‘World’ is distanced from any association with 
the actual society in which he lived and advanced himself. (Mullan 2002:122) 
 
On the other hand, the manly tone of reason is softened in such a piece 
of writing. Sentimental fiction belongs to middle-class female readers who have 
a passionate heart, so the cliché goes. However, as Stephen Bending and 
Stephen Bygrave claim in the Introduction to The Man of Feeling (2001:xiii), 
“the sentimental novel addressed the question of masculine representation in an 
age in which the heroic was gone”. Harley’s effeminate self may stand for 
another variant of sentimental irony and wrong sympathy: 
 
In culture at large, to ‘civilize’ is also to ‘feminize’, and while this was on the one hand 
to be welcomed, on the other it ran the risk of leaving those males who constituted 
civilization effeminate and weak. So there is a paradox, in that while empire relies 
upon a traditional heroic masculinity, what it produces may be a feminized masculinity 
no longer capable of sustaining that empire”. (Bending and Bygrave 2001:xiii).  
 
For instance, the Ghost, one of the two narrators of Harley’s story, 
mourns the sharp difference between the past “roar of mirth” (Mackenzie 
2001:8) illustrated by Ben Silton, the baronet of Silton Hall who embodies a 
glorious, uncorrupted England, and the effeminate present in which the 
baronet’s place is “occupied “by my young lady’s favourite lap-dog covered 
with cambric handkerchief” and in which Harley was a species of “bashful 
animals” (Mackenzie 2001:8). Despite that, his secluded self is not autistic 
because his suffering needs an audience. If there is a private world of feeling, 
“the sensibility which for Harley is a touchstone of authenticity, that sensibility 
cannot be wholly divorced from the social world in which it is experienced” 
(Bending and Bygrave 2001:xviii).  
The novel is actually “a bunch of papers lacking art, but having 
something of nature” (Mackenzie 2001:4-5). The Ghost, “an oddish man”, 
informs us that Harley’s “heart, uncorrupted by its ways, was ever warm in the 
cause of virtue and his friends” (Mackenzie 2001:4). Going to London to claim 
his inheritance, he meets several social types, including a beggar, a cardsharper 
and a misanthropist, and rescues a starving prostitute to her agonizing father. 
He also visits Bedlam, a madhouse full of patients seized with imaginative 
excess. He is a sentimental picaro looking for sentimental adventures. Viewed 
from this perspective, the novel – apart from presenting sentimentalism as a 
“project for the depiction of virtue” (Mullan 2002:122) – addresses an audience 
familiar with successive frames, fragmentariness, the discovered manuscript or 
the trope of physiognomy. 
Declaring that “in short, man is an animal equally selfish and vain” 
(Mackenzie 2001:32), the misanthropist underlines two facets of his state of 
mind: on the one hand, affliction, since he rejects the corrupted world and, on 
the other, dissatisfaction to which he wants to put an end. If misanthropy can 
be/is a mode of perception, “an alter ego of feeling” (Mullan 2002:121), then 
the novel’s aim is to point out that sensibility is unattainable because it is 
unworldly compared to misanthropy. To be sensible means to sympathise 
without any selfish advantage, according to Hume. Paradoxically, the novel 
creates an ambiguity translated as superior sensibility/refined sentiment and as 
inapplicability of these capacities. Harley indulges himself into what I call 
autonomous hedonism, being totally ignorant of the socio-economic context in 
which he is steeped. Harley’s reforming policy is promoted as self-regard, 
wrongly understood as sympathy for “he sees the world as himself and loves it 
accordingly” (Benedict 1994:122). For example, his skill in physiognomy leads 
him to think that an elderly gentleman is virtuous and benevolent simply 
because he gives alms to an obtrusive beggar. However, his aunt’s words 
uttered when he was a child, “all’s not gold that glisters” (Mackenzie 2001:34) 
echo in his mind when he learns that at an inn the stranger fleeces him at cards. 
In superficially reading society, Harley “exemplifies the naiveté and solipsism 
of sentimentalism” (Benedict 1994:123), which mistakes self-regard for 
sympathy. Hesitating to reward a parasitic, deceitful fortune-teller who, instead 
of telling his own misfortunes, began to prophesy happiness to others, “virtue 
held back his arm: – but a milder from a younger sister of virtue’s, not so severe 
as virtue, nor so serious as pity, smiled upon him: His fingers lost their 
compression” (Mackenzie 2001:18). Harley’s sentimental benevolence defeats 
virtue and turns itself into physical weakness, since he ignores the sad but real 
truth the fortune-teller tells: “every one is anxious to hear what they wish to 
believe” (Mackenzie 2001:18).  
Coming back home without any inheritance and in love with Miss 
Walton, whose “beneficence was unbounded” and whose ‘humanity was a 
feeling, not a principle (Mackenzie 2001:13), Harley dies of moral and social 
disgust, fever and frustrated love. Unable to reveal his love for Miss Walton, he 
dies because he cannot “socialise the feelings of benevolence” (Benedict 
1994:125) as she does. Mackenzie’s character’s faulty political agenda 
underlines the social and moral consequences of “unprincipled sentiment” 
(Benedict 1994:125). His attempt to reform the morals and manners of a state 
“undergoing an alarming crisis” (Mackenzie, 2001:62) triggered by general 
corruption is a failure because Harley cannot associate principled feeling with 
social engagement.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Harley fails to be what Adam Smith has termed as “impartial spectator”, 
defined as “that perfect harmony and correspondence of sentiments that 
constitutes approbation” (Smith 1982: 44; emphasis added). Rather than 
becoming a self-commanded man, he remains a passive agent unable to 
interrogate his passions by considering the figure of the spectator understood as 
the surrounding world. Harley’s failed project of understanding human nature 
proves once again Hume’s ineffective sociability based on disinterested feeling 
and alludes to Smith’s “impartial spectator” that ought to turn the sentimental 
hero into a principled and controlled individual entitled to reconcile feeling and 
understanding, a dichotomy that has been severely critiqued by sentimental 
literature.  
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Keywords: Italian Risorgimento, Italy, Mary Shelley, short stories, tyranny,  
 
 
1. Introduction: Mary Shelley and Italy  
Mary Shelley’s interest in Italy and in the Italian struggle for freedom 
and independence dates back to as early as October 1814, when she read in 
translation the autobiography of the anti-tyrannical dramatist Vittorio Alfieri 
(Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:37), and began to cherish the idea 
of learning Italian, as she wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson Hogg on 
January 24th 1815, prompting him to act as her teacher (Feldman and Scott-
Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:57n). Her prolonged residence in Italy, in the time 
span between 1818 and 1823, followed by her “rambles” from 1840 to 1843 
(recorded in Rambles in Germany and Italy, published in 1844), further 
deepened her passion for that country, as well as her involvement in its political 
turmoil. Mary Shelley became proficient in the language, knowledgeable in 
Italian culture and literature (including the output of her contemporaries, such 
as Foscolo and Manzoni); she turned into an expert in previously unbeaten 
tracks, which led her to Vico Pisano, Spoleto, Terni, Capo Miseno and other 
unusual and spectacular stops in her singular “Grand Tour”. Moreover, similar 
to Lord Byron, she grew quite familiar with the Carbonarist movement and its 
insurrections in 1820-21, which, as Nora Crook (2001:76) pointed out, are 
actually hinted at in Valperga (1824), her novel on the historical figure of 
Castruccio Castracani. 
Mary Shelley’s admiration for Italy and her support for the Italian 
patriots can be easily detected in works such as The Last Man (1826), a novel 
whose final scenes focus on “the ornament of the world, matchless Rome” 
(Shelley 1994 [1826]:468), and Rambles in Germany and Italy, a travelogue in 
which Mary Shelley launched a heartfelt appeal to her countrymen “to regard 
with greater attention, and to sympathise in the struggles of a country, the most 
illustrious and the most unfortunate in the world” (Shelley 1844:xiv). On the 
other hand, despite the Italian setting of ten out of the twenty-three short stories 
she wrote between 1819 and 1835 (i.e. “A Tale of the Passions”, “Recollections 
of Italy”, “The Bride of Modern Italy”, “The Sisters of Albano”, “Ferdinando 
Eboli: a Tale”, “Transformation”, “The Brother and Sister: an Italian Story”, 
“The Trial of Love”, “The Heir of Mondolfo”, “Valerius: the Reanimated 
Roman”), the real significance of Italy in Mary Shelley’s tales has been 
frequently overlooked by critics. Charles E. Robinson (1976:xv), who first 
collected and edited the entire corpus in his 1976 volume, Mary Shelley: 
Collected Tales and Stories, pointed out that the author essentially aimed at 
removing “her characters from the dull and sometimes painful realities of 
contemporary English life” and, for this reason, she had decided to set her 
“tales of passionate love and hate” mainly in “idealized places” and distant 
times, ranging from medieval Italy to Sixteenth-century France. Since her 
stories were published in prominent and remunerative journals such as The 
Keepsake and London Magazine, scholar Maria Schoina (2009:63) connected 
Mary Shelley’s periodical writing to the “extreme topicality of ‘Italy’” in those 
days, asserting that “Mary Shelley utilized her ‘adoptive land’ as a resource for 
literary topics in order to support herself financially”, thus exploiting the 
“symbolic text of Italy” like many other authors did.  
This paper sets out to demonstrate that the visions of Italy in Mary 
Shelley’s short stories are not to be perceived as mere digressions in her literary 
discourse, tailored to please the taste of a demanding audience, eager to read 
about a fashionable or romanticized land. Conversely, the tales are perfectly 
aligned with the rest of the writer’s production concerning Italy, and therefore 
feature the same, above-mentioned characteristics, despite the reveries about 
the glorious weather and the picturesque landscapes the writer seems to 
frequently indulge in. After setting the ground for the analysis through 
“Recollections of Italy”, a story that well portrays Mary Shelley’s attitude 
towards Italy and the Italians, this paper will show how the writer’s reflections 
on the current political situation are dealt with in her short-story narratives. 
 
 
2. “Recollections of Italy” 
 
In “Recollections of Italy” a dull and confrontational Londoner engages  
in an argument with a fellow citizen, Edmund Malville, over the country the 
latter loves to such an extent that he would even like to be buried there: Italy. 
While the Londoner expresses his deep disappointment at “the bad taste of the 
gardens […] the suffocating scirocco; the dusty roads” (Robinson ed. 1976:25), 
Malville cannot refrain from praising the charms of Venice, Naples, Rome (just 
to name a few of the sites he mentions), and the “courteous and civilized” 
(Robinson ed.1976:28) manners of their inhabitants. What is noteworthy in the 
story is Malville/Mary’s challenging description of the English in Italy. Far 
from flattering the readers of the London Magazine, where the story was first 
published in 1824, the writer seems to ridicule the foreign travellers in order to 
urge her audience to reconsider their often superficial and biased attitude 
towards the country: 
 
“Shall I tell you”, continued Malville, with a smile, “how you passed your time in 
Italy? You traversed the country in your travelling chariot, cursing the postillions and 
the bad inns. You arrived at a town and went to the best hotel, at which you found 
many of your countrymen, mere acquaintances in England, but hailed as bosom friends 
in that strange land. […] You dined; you went to a conversazione, where you were 
neither understood nor could understand […] you found yourself in Paradise at the 
drawing-room of the English ambassador, and fancied yourself in Grosvenor-Square. 
(Robinson ed. 1976:27) 
 
The English seem to travel just with their bodies, whereas their minds 
are trapped in their mother-country. Mary Shelley would later expand on this 
issue in a review article entitled “The English in Italy” (published in the 
Westminster Review, in 1826), which promotes the picture of the “Anglo-
Italian”, who understands the foreign language, appreciates the “native talent 
and simple manners” of the Italians, and is not affected by the widespread 
disease displayed by many English travellers: the “stay-at-home-ativeness” 
(Bennett and Robinson eds.1990:343). It is not by chance that Lord Byron is 
acknowledged by the writer as the prototype of this new figure: his active 
engagement in the Italian cause should not pass unnoticed, as well as his plea to 
Europe, in the fourth Canto of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, to undertake 
actions for a brighter future of Italy: “Mother of Arts! […] Parent of our 
religion! […] Europe, repentant of her parricide,/ shall yet redeem thee” (CHP, 
IV, xlvii). 
3. The Italian short stories 
 
Mary Shelley’s interest in medieval Italy – as in “The Heir of 
Mondolfo” (mid-1820s), “A Tale of the Passions” (1823), and “The Brother 
and Sister” (1833) – might be connected with her reading of Sismondi’s 
volume, History of the Italian Republics in the Middle Ages, published in 1818. 
As Nora Crook (2001:75) pointed out, she “assimilated [Sismondi’s] 
presentation of the medieval Italian city states as forerunners of modern 
republics, a destiny projected into a future united nation”. Mary Shelley was 
possibly also influenced by her acquaintance with Alessandro Manzoni, who 
released the first version of his historical novel I Promessi Sposi (The 
Betrothed) in 1827, featuring a story set in the past (in Seventeenth century 
Lombardy during the oppressive Spanish rule), which actually concealed 
Manzoni’s antagonism to the present Austrian domination in Northern Italy. It 
should not pass unnoticed that Mary submitted a proposal for the translation of 
I Promessi Sposi into English to John Murray (a well-known publisher). As it is 
possible to read in a letter addressed to Murray himself (August 20th 1828), the 
proposal was not accepted: “I was sorry to hear from Mr. Marshall that you 
decided against the Promessi Sposi” (Jones ed. 1944: 5). Far from being an 
“idealized time”, therefore, Mary Shelley’s Italian Middle Ages appear to be a 
complex scenario, where hostility, alliances, betrayals and fights between 
factions are daily staged. Notwithstanding the seemingly romantic title, in “A 
Tale of the Passions”, for example, the rivalry between Guelphs and 
Ghibellines is the background for the death of a beautiful and bold heroine, 
Despina, who sacrifices her life to support the Ghibelline cause and Corradino, 
against Charles d’Anjou, “King of Naples, the head of the Guelphs in Italy, and 
then Vicare of their republic” (Robinson ed. 1976:5). Allusions to the Italian 
situation in Mary Shelley’s times may be noticed in Despina’s anachronistic 
mention of the “united voice of Italy” (Robinson ed.1976:12), or in her long 
speech aimed at persuading her enemy to join forces against the French 
oppressor: 
 
Let him return to Provence, and reign with paltry despotism over the luxurious and 
servile French; the free-born Italians require another Lord. They are not fit to bow to 
one whose palace is the change-house of money-lenders, whose generals are usurers, 
whose courtiers are milliners or monks […] their king, like them, should be clothed in 
the armour of valour and simplicity. (Robinson ed. 1976:14) 
 
The Italians’ resistance against a tyrannical political power is once again 
described in “The Sisters of Albano” (1828), a tale probably set during the 
Napoleonic Wars, according to critic Arnold Schmidt (2001:25-32). In this 
story, Anina, a young peasant, is taken prisoner while she tries to bring 
provisions to her lover, a revolutionary besieged, together with other rebels, in 
his hiding place by the foreign troops, and therefore doomed to starve. What 
Mary Shelley seems to highlight is the cruelty of the invaders, ready to kill even 
a child if rules were infringed; in the words of the “cold-hearted” soldier, 
“[Anina] ought not to disobey orders; mine are so strict, that were she but nine 
years old, she dies” (Robinson ed.1976:59).  
The writer’s disdain towards the oppressor is certainly the source of 
inspiration for “Valerious, the Reanimated Roman” (1819), an unfinished story 
that, according to Miranda Seymour (2000:229), was prompted by the Austrian 
Emperor’s visit to Rome for the Holy Week celebrations in 1819, while, in 
Charles Robinson’s opinion, the tale can be merely regarded as a good example 
of the writer’s use of “a fantastic element to idealize her narratives even 
further” (Robinson ed.1976:xv). In a letter to her friend Mrs. Gisborne, on April 
9th, Mary describes Emperor Frances II’s arrogance, while he wanders about the 
Eternal City preceded by an officer, “who rudely pushes the people back with a 
drawn sword”; her “English blood”, she adds, “would, I am afraid boil over 
such insolence” (Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:256n). In Mary 
Shelley’s story, Valerious, a Roman consul strangely revived in contemporary 
Rome, grieves over “fallen Italy” (Robinson ed.1976:333), and the decline and 
degradation of his native city. After exploring the ruins of what once was the 
Empress of the world, he decides to take his abode in the Coliseum where, 
eventually, he hopes to die, in the vain attempt to pour forth his “last awakening 
call to Romans and to Liberty” (Robinson ed.1976:336). His utmost dejection is 
only soothed by a British lady, who frequently visits him together with her 
young son, two characters in which Mary Shelley and little Will-mouse might 
be recognized. The writer’s passionate love for the city and its past, her hope 
for a future resurrection from its ashes, her admiration for ancient heroes, 
whose values are still alive and can be transfused into the enslaved Italians’ 
exhausted blood, resonate in the character’s comforting words to Valerious: 
 
I worship the spirit of ancient Rome and of those noble heroes, who delivered their 
country from barbarians […] Rome is fallen, but she is still venerated […] When a 
stranger resides within their bounds, he feels as if he inhabited a sacred temple – 
sacred although defiled. […] It seems to me that, if I were overtaken by the greatest 
misfortunes, I should be half consoled by the recollection of having dwelt in Rome. 
(Robinson ed. 1976:340-342) 
 
One may wonder whether even the recurrence of strong-willed and 
dynamic female characters in Mary Shelley’s short-story narratives could be 
connected with the author’s activism for the Italian cause, with her wish to 
undermine what Alison Chapman and Jane Stabler (2003:6) identified as “the 
gendered portrait of Italy as ‘a woman in distress’”, perceived as “a disturbing 
legacy for many women writers and artists”. Apart from the above mentioned 
Despina, Flora, in “The Brother and Sister”, does not hesitate to undertake a 
long and dangerous journey on foot to rejoin with her lost brother; a similar fate 
belongs to Adalina, the protagonist of “Ferdinando Eboli, a Tale” (1828), who 
escapes from her betrothed (an impostor), disguised as a page, and 
courageously wanders in the Apennines. Viola, in “The Heir of Mondolfo”, is 
another meaningful female character, a country-girl who secretly marries above 
her class, but eventually triumphs against all odds, thus upsetting social 
hierarchies and the ‘political marriage’ policy. 
 
4. Conclusion: two atypical Italian short stories 
 
A few remarks should be made about “The Bride of Modern Italy” 
(1824) and “The Pole” (1832), two stories that apparently clash with what has 
been argued so far. In the former, set in a Roman convent, Clorinda is an 
inconstant and frivolous young girl, who changes saints in her prayers “as [her] 
lover changes name” (Robinson ed.1976:33). She falls for the charming English 
friend of her fiancé, only to be humorously deserted by both, and then forced to 
marry an older man selected by her father. As many critics pointed out (just to 
mention a few, Seymour 2000:267, and Sunstein 1989:195), “The Bride of 
Modern Italy” is a satiric tale, aimed at mocking Emilia Viviani, the young 
Lady P.B. Shelley (the Englishman in the story) fancied, and to whom he had 
dedicated his Epipsychidion (1820), “Verses addressed to the noble and 
unfortunate Lady, Emilia V---”. As for “The Pole”, through the analysis of the 
Shelleys-Clairmont correspondence, critic Bradford Booth demonstrated that 
the tale was actually written by Claire Clairmont, with only minor corrections 
by Mary Shelley. After all, the harsh portrayal of the “lazy Italians”, “tedious 
race” of beggars, “teazing for alms” (Robinson ed.1976:348), “unprincipled” 
(Robinson ed.1976:354) banditti in a “land of assassins and traitors” (Robinson 
ed.1976:361) would not match the visions of Italy and the Italians Mary Shelley 
always displayed in her writings, the same visions that prompted her, in closing 
her Journal, to say, like her character Edmund Malville: “preg[o] dio che mi sia 
permessa di tornare in Italia e lasciare la Matrigna Inghilterra per sempre, o 
morire”, “I pray God to allow me to go back to Italy and leave my Stepmother 
England forever, or die” (Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:570). 
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1. Introduction 
The present article will be concerned with the notion of construction and 
the way constructions are integrated into one another in the process of meaning 
construction.  
Our theoretical framework is the Lexical Constructional Model 
(henceforth LCM), as originally propounded by Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 
(2008) and Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2009). The LCM is a comprehensive 
meaning construction model built around four basic conceptual constructs as 
well as two basic cognitive operations, the latter of which are operational at 
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four representation levels: argument structure (level 1), implicational (level 2), 
illocutionary (level 3) and discursive (level 4). 
The basic conceptual constructs are cognitive models of four kinds: (i) 
low-level non-situational cognitive models, which roughly correspond to 
argument structure lexical predicates (e.g. run, kill, give); (ii) high-level non-
situational cognitive models (e.g. notions such as ‘process’, ‘result’, ‘action’), 
which are at the core of level-1 argument structure constructions, but are also 
operational, when used in logical (e.g. ‘action-result’, ‘condition-consequence’, 
‘evidence-conclusion’), temporal (e.g. ‘precedence’, ‘simultaneity’) and 
conceptual connections (e.g. ‘similarity’, ‘contrast’, ‘conditioning’) at the 
discourse level by creating conditions for discourse coherence; (iii) low-level 
situational cognitive models (e.g. ‘taking a taxi’, ‘going to the dentist’, ‘making 
a hotel reservation’), which make up the conceptual structure of level 2 of the 
model; and, finally, (iv) high-level situational cognitive models (e.g. ‘asking’, 
‘offering’, ‘apologizing’), which constitute the conceptual material for level 3 
activity.  
The cognitive operations are conceptual integration and cued 
inferencing, which are constrained by a number of principles. Cued inferencing 
is the activation of implicit conceptual material through inferential mechanisms 
such as completion, metonymy, enrichment, among others (cf. Ruiz de 
Mendoza 2010). Conceptual integration is the principled combination of 
conceptual structure either within or across levels. So far the LCM has only 
explored level-external integration processes through so-called subsumption 
operations, i.e. the incorporation of low-level conceptual structures into higher-
level configurations, as a result of which the high-level structure becomes 
parametrized. For example, the LCM accounts for the principles that license the 
incorporation into the caused-motion construction of verbal predicates such as 
laugh (The children laughed him out of the camp), which do not have a causal 
element, while other predicates are blocked out (*She described/owned/longed 
him out of the place), including some that are causative (e.g. kill ‘cause to 
become dead’ in *They killed him into his tomb/death, etc.). Part of the answer 
to this problem is found in the way metaphorical and metonymic processes 
work in grammar (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007), as will be discussed 
in some detail in section 4 below. But in the present paper we will especially 
devote our attention to level-internal conceptual integration processes, which 
will be referred to as conceptual amalgams, and the way they affect 
subsumption processes. 
 
2. The Lexical Constructional Model: levels of description and 
representation 
 
The LCM is organized into four descriptive levels. First, the argument 
structure level (level 1) mainly deals with lexical predicates and argument 
structure constructions of the kind investigated in Goldberg (1995, 2006), such 
as the ditransitive (Peter baked Mary a cake), caused-motion (Mary sneezed the 
napkin off the table) and resultative (The blacksmith hammered the metal flat) 
constructions, to mention but a few illustrative cases.  
Second, there is an implicational level (level 2), which yields conceptual 
representations that result from the combination of situation-based inferences of 
two kinds: (i) those that are supported by a metonymic schema (cf. Panther and 
Thornburg 2004), which correspond to the traditional notion of implicature 
(e.g. ‘I stopped a taxi’ can be made to stand for ‘I stopped a taxi to go to the 
airport’ in the context of the question How did you get to the airport?); and (ii) 
those that are arise from the properties of lexical and constructional 
configurations, which have traditionally been referred to as presuppositions 
(e.g. I [don’t] regret stepping on your toe presupposes that the speaker actually 
stepped on the hearer’s toe, because of an inherent property of the verbal 
predicate). Alternatively, level 2 meaning can be accessed directly through 
highly entrenched (i.e. conventionalized) form-meaning pairings of a non-
parametrizable nature. For example, the oft-quoted What’s X Doing Y? 
construction (e.g. What’s your cousin doing in our class?) discussed by Kay 
and Fillmore (1999) conveys the idea that there is a situation that either 
concerns or bothers the speaker, which evidently suggests that, according to the 
subject/speaker, there’s something wrong about the cousin being in the class.  
Third, the LCM features an illocutionary level (level 3), which accounts 
for the derivation of speech act meaning through either inferential or 
constructional mechanisms. Level 3 inferences are obtained through the 
application of metonymic schemas to high-level situational models that define 
the conditions for a speech act value to be possible. This kind of activation 
follows the same rationale as the metonymic activations at level 2 for the 
generation of low-level implicated meaning. For instance, the sentence Those 
books are going to fall on your head, at level 2, depicts part of a situation, 
where it is considered to be inevitable that the addressee will be harmed by the 
books falling on his/her head, which, at level 3, affords access to a more 
abstract scenario, according to which people are expected to avoid harmful 
situations and someone who detects a situation which is potentially harmful for 
other people is expected to do his or her best to prevent this situation from 
taking place (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007). At level 3, the resulting 
value of this operation would be that of a warning, whereas at level 2, we only 
obtain the implication that the addressee is going to be harmed. In addition to 
inferential mechanisms, construction mechanisms should also be taken into 
account. Level 3 meaning can also be accessed directly through constructional 
mechanisms. Just like their level 2 counterparts, level 3 constructions are non-
parametrizable. For example, Be careful, X, and Be careful or X, Mind X, Watch 
X, Beware X, etc., are representative possible ways of expressing warnings. 
Finally, there is a discourse level (level 4) that makes use of high-level 
non-situational cognitive models establishing (i) logical connections such as 
action-result, cause-consequence, condition-consequence, evidence-conclusion, 
exemplification, etc, (ii) temporal relations such as precedence or simultaneity 
and (iii) conceptual relations such as similarity, contrast, conditioning, 
contingency, additioning, excepting, alternation, specification, exemplification, 
etc. Such discourse relations can also be expressed via non-parametrizable 
constructions, i.e. constructions that contain fixed elements (see next section 
below). A case in point is, for instance, the X Let Alone Y construction 
discussed by Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988) (e.g. Peter won’t eat prawns, 
let alone squid), which illustrates logical connections analogous to scalar 
implicatures (i.e. quantity implicatures based on the use of an informationally 
weak term in an implicational scale*, such as the one illustrated by some, few, a 
few in relation to e.g. all; cf. Kay 1997). In other words, this would be an 
instance of addition with scalar strengthening (for further details on 
strengthening, the reader is referred to Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2003 and 
Ruiz de Mendoza 2010, inter alios). A more complex case obtains in an 
utterance like You may be my boss, but that doesn’t give you the right to be 
nasty to my husband, which involves in principle a contrasting relationship in 
which the contrast in question is, however, not between what is literally 
expressed by the two contrasting elements. Rather, the contrast takes place 
between an implicit assumption that is accessed metonymically on the basis of 
be my boss and the assertion in the second clause. Therefore, may does not 
combine with be my boss, but rather with the speaker’s assumption that the 
                                                          
* http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAnImplicationalScale.htm 
addressee believes that, because s/he is the speaker’s boss, s/he is entitled to 
behave inappropriately. Thus, be my boss is metonymic for this broader 
assumption. For a more comprehensive account of constructions based on 
various discourse relations, see Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2009).   
 
3. Basic construction types 
In constructionist approaches to language there currently appears to be 
some controversy on the nature and scope of the notion of construction. The 
notion of construction has been defined as follows: 
 
C is a CONSTRUCTION iff def  n is a form-function pair, such that some aspect of the 
form or some aspect of the function is not strictly predictable from C’s component 
parts (Goldberg 1998: 205, emphasis added to the original). 
 
Two important considerations emerge from the above quote that need to 
concern us here: First, constructs such as Pat faxed Bill the letter or Joe bought 
his way into the exclusive country club meet the criterial property of 
idiosyncrasy or non-compositionality stipulated in the above definition. Thus, 
the fact that Pat succeeded in letting Bill get the letter by fax or that Joe paid so 
as to become part of an exclusive country club can be attributed to the 
meanings of the constructions involved rather than the meaning of the  
components of the construction. Second, in addition to sentence patterns and 
idiomatic expressions (e.g. let the cat out of the bag), single lexical items or 
even morphemes can be taken to be constructions, since the meaning of e.g. 
dog is not predictable –though nevertheless motivated– from its form and vice 
versa. Moreover, with the emergence of usage-based linguistics, the original 
definition is now broadened to allow for fully compositional configurations. In 
the words of Goldberg (2006: 5): 
 
Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its 
form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts of from other 
constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even 
if they are fully predictable as long as they occur with sufficient frequency (see Ch. 3 
for discussion). [emphasis added to the original] 
 
The LCM has taken sides with this broader definition of construction 
and has identified constructions at its four descriptive levels. It thus 
distinguishes between argument structure, implicational, illocutionary and 
discourse constructions. This distinction, besides providing an important 
classification criterion for constructions, has allowed LCM proponents to study 
the way in which constructions from lower levels are integrated into 
constructions from higher levels. We will briefly refer to such processes under 
the label of subsumption in section 4 below.  
Pursuing this line of thinking, in this section we posit a distinction 
between parametrizable and non-parametrizable constructions. This 
distinction, which provides us with an additional classification criterion, will be 
useful to understand cases of level-internal integration, called constructional 
amalgams, which we propose to incorporate into the LCM. Parametrizable 
constructions are high-level conceptual configurations with values such as 
cause, result, transfer, etc., capable of accommodating more specific, low-level 
structures of the kind provided by lexical predicates. For example, in the 
caused-motion construction (X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z), the high-level 
elements CAUSE and MOVE can be parametrized by the semantic make-up of 
lexical configurations such as kick out of, push into, hit into, throw into, and 
send off, among many others. By contrast, non-parametrizable constructions are 
idiomatic or non-idiomatic configurations that contain variable and fixed 
elements, as is the case of the What’s X Doing Y construction mentioned above. 
As will be seen in sections 4 and 5 below, parametrizable constructions are only 
sensitive to subsumption, while non-parametrizable constructions can be the 
object of both subsumption and amalgamation.  
 
4. Lexical-constructional subsumption 
 
At level 1 of the LCM, constructional integration is the combination of 
lexical and constructional structure. It occurs through a process called 
subsumption (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 2008; Peña 2009; Pérez 
and Peña 2009). By way of illustration of this process, consider the cases of the 
incorporation of the non-causative verb laugh into the caused-motion 
construction (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006), as in They laughed him out of town, or 
the resultative construction, as in He laughed himself sick, both of which have a 
causal ingredient. In Goldberg’s constructionist account (Goldberg 1995), the 
solution to the mismatch between the combination of the non-causal 
configuration of the lexical item and the causal configuration of the 
constructions in question is a matter of coercion. According to Michaelis 
(2003), coercion is the resolution of a conflict between lexical and 
constructional denotata, in such a way that the conflicting element ends up 
conforming to the semantico-pragmatic profile of the construction. This in turn 
confirms the role of constructions as the best and most reliable overall 
determinants of sentence interpretation. With this scenario in mind, we 
certainly concur with Michaelis and other constructionist grammarians (e.g. 
Goldberg 2006, Croft 2001, inter alios) that the notion of coercion is indeed 
useful. However, one of the main drawbacks that could be leveled against the 
exploitation of this notion is that it does not provide, in our opinion, a fully 
principled account of why certain lexical items can actually be coerced, while 
others cannot. In this connection, we believe the LCM provides a more 
satisfactory solution in terms of two sets of constraints on lexical-constructional 
subsumption: internal and external to the process. The former take the form of 
licensing or blocking factors that depend on lexical class ascription, lexical-
constructional compatibility, and either predicate or internal variable 
conditioning of external variables or arguments. For example, the lexical class 
constraint accounts for the fact that break verbs, which are change of state 
predicates, can be used in the inchoative form (e.g. The vase broke), while 
destroy verbs, which are cessation of existence predicates, cannot (e.g. *The 
city destroyed), even though both involve doing damage to an object. Lexical-
constructional compatibility is a matter of the event structure of the lexical and 
constructional configuration. A straightforward example is provided by the 
great difficulty or even the impossibility of integrating some stative predicates 
into a be-imperative construction: *Be tall/crazy/ill. The imperative 
construction requires an agent-controller that is not compatible with states that 
cannot be seen as the result of a covert willful action underlying the be-
imperative expression. If there is a way to give a resultative interpretation to the 
adjective of the construction, the integration is feasible: Be kind/honest/brave. 
However, there are some examples that can be regarded as limiting cases. 
Consider #Be happy/rich/handsome. (The sign “#” is used to indicate the 
acceptability of an utterance only in an adequate supporting context). Generally 
these examples are odd except in very specific contexts, where it is possible to 
think of the addressee as acting in such a way that as a result s/he will be happy, 
rich, handsome, etc.  
This observation takes us to the domain of external constraints, which 
are the result of performing high-level metaphoric and metonymic operations 
on the lexical items involved in the subsumption process (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Mairal 2007, 2008, 2010; Peña 2009; Baicchi 2010). Thus, whether a 
straightforward or a limiting case, the resultative use of the adjective in the be-
imperative construction can be analyzed as a case of coercion which is licensed 
by the high-level metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION, initially proposed by 
Panther and Thornburg (2000), and more extensively explored, from the point 
of view of its implications for grammar, in Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2001). 
Basically, in its application to the be-imperative construction, what this 
metonymy does is allow the language user to understand an adjectival predicate 
as resultative rather than as predicative, provided that it is possible to postulate 
–on the basis of our world knowledge– an underlying action that may lead to 
the ascription to the addressee of the attribute the adjective denotes. The 
metonymy may thus be paraphrased as ‘act in such a way that as a result you 
will be [attribute]’. Obviously, it makes more sense to say ‘act in such a way 
that as a result you will be kind/honest/brave’ than ‘act in such a way that as a 
result you will be happy/rich/handsome’ and even more than ‘act in such a way 
that as a result you will be tall/crazy/ill’.    
Let us now go back to the aforementioned examples with laugh, i.e. 
They laughed him out of town and He laughed himself sick. The verb laugh is 
typically a non-telic activity verb, i.e. a verb denoting an activity that has no 
inherent goal (e.g. She laughed and laughed and laughed, over and over again). 
When it has an object, the object, which is syntactically introduced by the 
preposition at, is what we can call an experiential object, i.e. a person or thing 
that is the psychological or emotional target of the activity denoted by the verb. 
An experiential object is to be differentiated from what the LCM terms an 
effectual object, i.e. one that is physically affected by the action denoted by the 
verb in such a way that it either acquires a new property (e.g. Superman bent 
the train track) or it undergoes a change of state (e.g. The king burned the 
scroll) or of location (e.g. He shoved the crate out of the way). In the case of 
They laughed him out of town and He laughed himself sick, we have a special 
use of laugh, where the experiential object is presented as if it were an effectual 
object that undergoes a change of location, in the first example, or a change of 
state, in the second example. This special treatment of the object, which has 
been syntactically marked by the absence of the preposition at (cf. the 
impossibility of e.g. *They laughed at him out of town, *He laughed at himself 
sick), is metaphorical, since it arises from the possibility of interpreting 
experiential objects metaphorically as effectual objects. Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Mairal (2007), who first identified this metaphor, labeled it AN 
EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS AN EFFECTUAL ACTION. This metaphor 
licenses expressions such as The captain stared him out of the room, She 
practically smiled him into the ladies' room, and The guy shouted me out of the 
pool in the middle of my swim. However, it blocks out the subsumption of verbs 
into the caused-motion and resultative constructions if it is not possible to 
construe the verb as having some kind of psychological impact on the object: 
*He defended/described/owned me out of the room.  
So far the LCM has posited the different levels of representation of 
conceptual structure and has established the way inferential activity and 
constructional subsumption processes work. On the face of it, this involves a 
bottom-up approach to meaning construction. However, we would like to 
suggest that conceptual operations at lower levels may be constrained by 
operations taking place at higher levels, including the context of situation. For 
example, in the complex sentence If you believe me capable of that, then our 
friendship is over, the then part of level-4 relationship, signaled by the if-then 
(condition-consequence) connectors, somehow determines the selection by the 
speaker of the level-1 subjective-transitive construction that takes the form NP 
V NP XPCOMP (i.e. ‘you believe me capable of that’) (Gonzálvez-García 
2009), among other competing complementation strategies (i.e. you believe me 
to be capable of that, you believe that I’m capable of that), for the if part. What 
distinguishes the subjective-transitive construction from the other two 
alternatives is the fact that it expresses a personal, direct, evaluative stance by 
the speaker towards the state of affairs/event expressed in the clause. The use of 
construction other than the subjective-transitive would be less adequate for such 
a harsh consequence as is expressed in our friendship is over. In addition, the 
level-4 construction with if-then is typical of threats at level 3 when the then 
part designates a state of affairs that is potentially harmful for the addressee (cf. 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007). So, what we have is a threat (level 3) that 
is achieved by means of a level-4 condition-consequence configuration, whose 
consequence part requires a level-1 subjective transitive construction. The 
complex way in which the different levels of the LCM interact is captured in 
the figure in Appendix 1. 
 
5. Subsumption at other levels of meaning construction 
 
Consider again the sentence If you believe me capable of that, then our 
friendship is over. The general constructional pattern that it instantiates is the 
level-4 condition-consequence configuration If X, then Y. However, there are 
subtle differences in meaning depending on the kind of lower-level material 
that we subsume into its variables. We have already discussed some of these 
differences in relation to the subjective-transitive construction, as exemplified 
by the sequence you believe me capable of that. Others have to do with the 
realis-irrealis (or even counterfactual) nature of the condition part of the 
construction (cf. If you had believed me capable of that, which luckily never 
happened, our friendship would have been over) and with the more or less 
assertive nature of the consequence part (cf. #If you believe me capable of that, 
then our friendship may/will be over). Besides, the if-then conditional 
construction, with all its variants, is but one way of expressing conditional 
meaning or, more precisely, it is one construction from a set of constructional 
variants that in turn belong to the more complex constructional family 
expressing condition-consequence relationships (e.g. You do that, and you’ll be 
in trouble, Watch out or you’ll trip over the steps; cf. Sweetser and Dancygier 
2005). In this section, we will only discuss the if-then pattern in a partial way to 
illustrate subsumption processes beyond level 1 of the LCM.  
Let us compare If you believe me capable of that, then our friendship is 
over with the sentence If you think she’s crazy, then you’ll have to think I’m 
crazy too. At level 4, the If X, then Y supplies a general interpretative 
framework. The construction conveys the idea that, if some event takes place, 
then there will be associated consequences that will only occur if the event 
takes place. In its application to the first sentence, the event is one where the 
speaker accuses the addressee of misjudgment: the speaker believes the 
addressee is wrong about the speaker’s intentions. Basically, this is the same 
message that is conveyed by the second sentence, where the speaker believes 
that the addressee is wrong about a third party’s behavior. It is the consequence 
part of the two sentences that differs. In the first sentence, the consequence is a 
threat that the speaker will put an end to his/her friendship with the addressee. 
In the second sentence, there is no threat but rather an indirect invitation by the 
speaker for the addressee to change his/her mind about the third party. This 
invitation is carried in a very subtle way: the speaker constructs his/her message 
on the assumption that the addressee would not like to suggest that the speaker 
is crazy. However, this assumption is not part of the level-4 If X, then Y 
construction. It arises from level-2 and 3 structure that is compatible with the 
overall conceptual makeup of the consequence part of the level-4 construction. 
Thus, at level 2, you’ll have to think I’m crazy too makes use of the non-
parametrizable construction You’ll Have to Think Y. This construction adds to 
its obvious level-1 argument-structure meaning, i.e. the idea that the addressee 
will be compelled to think that some state of affairs is the case, the level-2 
conventionalized implication that the Y element depicts a situation which the 
addressee should have been aware of by him or herself. At level 3, the output 
from level 2 is further elaborated. Here, you’ll have to think I’m crazy too 
acquires a complaint value through cued inferencing. The inference is based on 
the idea that it is best to avoid having derogatory beliefs about other people 
(even if ultimately true), especially if our behavior may somehow result in 
making such beliefs manifest to someone else. The derogatory belief arises 
from the combination of level-1 and level-2 structure: the addressee should 
have been aware that the speaker behaves in the same “crazy” manner as the 
third party. This structure in turn affords metonymic access to a more complex 
scenario, in which people who are viewed derogatively, if they find out about it, 
may feel offended or otherwise altered emotionally and have a culturally 
sanctioned right to make such feelings manifest. This is the complaint value, 
which is thus the result of a cued inferencing process supported by a metonymic 
schema (for other such metonymic activations of high-level scenarios, see Ruiz 
de Mendoza 2007; Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007, inter alios). This level-
2 and level-3 structure is then incorporated into the “then” component of the 
level-4 construction. The “if” component, in turn, takes in you think she’s 
crazy, which designates a potential derogatory belief on the part of the speaker, 
i.e. that a third party is crazy or acts in a crazy manner. In the context of this 
condition, the complaint value of the “then” part takes on a further illocutionary 
value as a suggestion that the addressee had better change his or her mind about 
the third party’s purported craziness. The rationale behind this value is the 
speaker’s assumption that the addressee would not dare think that the speaker is 
crazy; if the speaker behaves in a way similar to that of the third party, then it 
makes no sense to think the third party is crazy, unless one wants to judge the 
speaker as being crazy, which might be taken as an offence.  
As we hope the foregoing discussion has illustrated, constructional 
subsumption takes place at all four levels of description of the LCM and 
alternates with cued inferencing to create increasingly more complex meaning 
representations. In this process, the higher-level constructs guide the specific 
way in which conceptual integration occurs, while the lower-level constructs 
contribute their own meaning. Thus, the same level-4 constructional schema 
may be used to produce different meaning representations, with such clearly 
distinct illocutionary interpretations as a threat (the case of If you believe me 
capable of that, then our friendship is over) and an invitation to change one’s 
mind (as evidenced by our analysis of If you think she’s crazy, then you’ll have 
to think I’m crazy too).  
 
6. Constructional amalgams 
 
Another important aspect that has not yet received attention in the LCM 
is the issue of the integration of constructions belonging to the same level of 
description. To illustrate, consider the epistemic modality construction with 
may, as in The package may arrive before the anticipated date. The may 
construction, which we will symbolize as X May Y, is combined with the 
intransitive construction (i.e. the package arrives), which has previously 
absorbed through subsumption the lexical predicate arrive. In other words, the 
X May Y construction, which is more abstract, incorporates into its two 
variables the argument and the predicate of the argument structure construction. 
In this case, ‘the package’ is built into the X variable, and the verbal predicate 
‘arrive’ into the Y variable. This incorporation process follows the pattern of 
conceptual interaction postulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002), 
according to which more specific patterns tend to be incorporated into and thus 
enrich more abstract patterns (see also Peña 2003, 2008, for a detailed study of 
the notion of schematic enrichment). In the combination of the intransitive and 
the X May Y constructions, which illustrates what we will call herein a 
constructional amalgam, the X May Y construction contributes the speaker’s 
subjective stance, which would otherwise be absent from the representation 
arising out of the initial subsumption process.   
This example is a fairly straightforward case of constructional amalgam, 
where there is hardly any restriction on the integration. Therefore, virtually 
almost any instantiation of the intransitive construction can be assessed in terms 
of probability, thus being compatible with the epistemic X May Y construction. 
For current purposes, suffice it to mention the following two exceptions: (i) 
instances of the intransitive construction implying a high degree of factuality, 
as in #Obama may emerge as the successor of Bush in the US Presidency (said 
two years after Obama was elected president of the US), and (ii) instances of 
states of affairs involving universal truths which clash with a probability 
assessment by the speaker, such as #Today the sun may rise at noon. In these 
two examples, the X (i.e. Obama/the sun) and Y variables (i.e. emerge as the 
successor of Bush in the US Presidency/ rise at noon (today)) of the intransitive 
construction cannot be instantiated, because of their incompatibility with the 
epistemic value of the X May Y construction (i.e. the expression of an 
intermediate degree of probability) (Halliday 1994: 88). 
As a more complex case of constructional amalgam, consider sentence 
(1c), which we will contrast with (1a) and (1b): 
 
(1)  (a)I found the finale of ‘Lost’ disappointing. 
   (#but I actually did not see the finale of ‘Lost’) 
   (#but in my opinion the finale of ‘Lost’ at least lived up to my 
   expectations) 
   (#but I really do not think that the finale of ‘Lost’ was disappointing 
   at all) 
  (b)I found the finale of ‘Lost’ to be disappointing. 
   (according to the reviews posted on many blogs, but I personally 
   ound it not that bad) 
  (c) found that the finale of ‘Lost’ was disappointing. 
   (This is what I gather is the widespread opinion on the show finale, 
   although I personally found it truly superb). 
 
Upon superficial consideration, the three sentences in (1)(a)-(c) would 
appear to convey the same meaning. However, upon closer inspection, a 
number of subtle differences can be observed. The first sentence conveys a 
direct, personal and forceful stance by the speaker on the proposition (the finale 
of ‘Lost’ being disappointing). In other words, (1a) implies that the speaker 
actually saw the finale of this TV show and that s/he is personally convinced 
that it was disappointing. In contrast, (1b) conveys a mediated, tentative, 
subjective-within-objective stance on the proposition in question. This sentence 
could, for instance, be felicitous in a context in which the speaker is acting as 
the spokesperson voicing the results of a poll carried out among the fans of the 
series. The stance is mediated, or other-initiated, and as such it may not 
necessarily coincide with the speaker’s opinion on the finale of the series. By 
virtue of this, it is subjective-within-objective, as the speaker is only voicing 
what other people think about the show finale. Finally, (1c) conveys an indirect, 
impersonal and forceful stance. This sentence implies little or no involvement 
at all on the part of the subject towards the proposition. The speaker is only 
stating the general opinion that people hold on the series finale. An important 
corollary emerging from the discussion of these examples is that the higher the 
degree of syntactico-semantic integration (1a), the higher the degree of 
involvement by the speaker towards the proposition envisioned in the 
complement construction (Borkin 1973, Gonzálvez-García 2009). 
With this scenario in mind, our contention is that only (1c) qualifies as a 
case of constructional amalgam for several reasons. First, although all three 
sentences deal with the same proposition (i.e. the season finale of ‘Lost’ being 
disappointing), only the third sentence can do without I found to convey a 
complete thought. By contrast, in (1a)-(b), the omission of I found would yield 
a conceptually defective thought. Second, while all three sentences are 
apparently instances of the general transitive pattern X V Y, only (1c) is actually 
a true instance of this pattern. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Y 
variable in (1a) and (1b) is an argument complex (i.e. the finale of ‘Lost’ 
disappointing, and the finale of ‘Lost’ to be disappointing, respectively), but not 
a construction, as in the case of the finite “that”-complement construction in 
(1c). Therefore, an utterance will be considered a case of structural amalgam 
with the proviso that one of its variables is filled in by a constructional 
configuration. In the case of (1c), the receptor construction, namely, the 
transitive construction X Vtrans Y, instantiated by I found, takes in a predicative 
construction, instantiated by the that complement construction (i.e. that the 
finale of Lost was disappointing). On the other hand, (1a) and (1b) are instances 
of argument structure constructions, namely, the subjective-transitive and 
subjective-within-objective transitive constructions, respectively (see further 
Gonzálvez-García 2003, 2006, 2009). 
 
7. Subsumption meets constructional amalgams: the case of I know X must 
Vcognition Y 
 
Consider the following examples involving cognition verbs again: 
 
(2) ('a) I know you must consider this strange, extraordinary, unaccountable 
 conduct. (http://www.home.earthlink.net/~bsabatini/Inimitable- 
 Boz/etexts/Lamplighter.html, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010). 
(b) I know you must find this hard to believe 
 (http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Loved-Someone-That-Didnt-
 Love-Me/3050, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010). 
 
These examples instantiate what we may refer to as the I know X must 
Vcognition Y construction. The constructional status of this configuration is 
evidenced by the fact that its constitutive elements display a high degree of 
fixation, which precludes variation regarding the following: 
 
 (i) The subject-verb relationship in the matrix clause (I know) is 
restricted to either the first person singular or plural. Thus, a sentence 
such as, for instance, He knows you must find this intrusive is a factual 
expression that lacks the anticipation by the speaker of an emotional 
reaction on the part of the addressee. In addition, the verb know is hardly 
exchangeable with other cognition verbs, such as e.g. understand, 
believe, think, find, acknowledge, etc. Two exceptions are be sure and 
guess, as in (3)(a)-(b), which can be contrasted with 3(c)-(d):  
 
(3)  (a) I’m sure you must consider me very prosaic. 
  (http://traumwerk.stanford.edu:3455/philoformance/356, Google, 
  accessed on July 19, 2010). 
(b) Well, I guess you must find me beautiful. Or interesting. 
  (http://www.sexandthecityscripts.com/S01E01_Sex-and-the- 
  City.php, Google, accessed on July 19, 2010).  
(c) #You must believe this true. 
(d) #You must acknowledge him a good scholar. 
 
(ii) The subject and the epistemic modal auxiliary form a fixed 
combination that cannot be replaced by any other near-equivalent modal 
expression (e.g. have to, need to, be to, etc), as evidenced by the oddity 
of realizations like #I know you have/need/are to find this hard to 
believe. The status of I know as a highly fixed constructional element is 
further evidenced by the difficulty to use epistemic markers such as 
surely and certainly to enhance its overall epistemic value: #I 
certainly/surely know you must consider this strange.  
(iii) The cognition verb that is within the scope of must can only 
be one of a restrictive set of verbal predicates, such as consider, find, 
think, etc, which capture the addressee’s expected judgment of his/her 
own emotional reaction on the situation described: I know you must 
consider/find/think this all very unfair. 
 
But what is special about this construction is a singular feature: I know X 
must Vcognition Y  is a level-2 implicational construction that arises from the level-
1 amalgam of the epistemic X Must Y construction and the subjective-transitive 
pattern (V XPCOMP). The amalgam is the result of incorporating the 
subjective transitive pattern into the Y part of the epistemic construction, all of 
which is then subsumed into the Y part of a partially parametrized (by I know) 
level-4 specificative construction (see Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009: 177) 
that can be represented as I Know Y. Interestingly enough, this combination of a 
level-1 amalgam and a level-4 construction has conventionalized the following 
level-2 non-compositional meaning: the speaker anticipates a plausible positive 
or negative reaction on the part of the addressee to the content of the speaker’s 
message, as is even more evident from (3)(a)-(b).  
 
(4) (a) I know you must consider each day a blessing. 
(http://www.topix.com/forum/who/annette‐funicello/ 
T9PMISVDL8BG1BK00/ p13, WebCorp, accessed on July 19,  2010).  
 (b) I know you must find this intrusive 
  (http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The‐Angel‐Inside/Chris‐
 Widener/e/9780739343142, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010). 
 
In origin, this added constructional value stems from a conversational 
implicature that has become conventionalized through the frequent use of this 
linguistic expression in contexts in which the speaker, when faced with a 
predictable reaction on the part of the addressee, wants to show in an assertive 
way his/her own awareness of what the situation is like and therefore his/her 
ability to assess the situation adequately. This conventionalization process has 
resulted in a level-2 non-parametrizable construction with fixed and variable 
elements. The reason why the combination of a level-1 amalgam and a level-4 
specificative construction has reached a level-2 status is its ability to activate –
through a ‘cued inferencing’ process– a low-level situational cognitive model 
that places the speaker in the relationship with the addressee that we have 
described above. In fact, this process is supported by a metonymic schema 
whereby part of a model stands for the whole model, i.e. the expression of the 
speaker’s self-assurance about the addressee’s reaction stands for a more 
complex situation, in which, by anticipating the addressee’s reaction, the 
speaker tries to avoid the consequences of such a reaction on himself/herself.  
Besides, the level-1 amalgam places constraints on the conceptual 
material that is subsumed from level 1 into the variables of its level-2 
formulation, i.e. I know X must Vcognition Y. The constraints, which are internal to 
the subsumption process between level 1 and 2 elements, can be stated as 
follows: 
(a) The so-called ‘stimulus’, i.e. the NP realizing the variable 
between the cognition verb (generally know) and the modal must, cannot 
be an expletive (e.g. existential there, weather it, etc), since an expletive 
encodes abstract settings and cannot be construed as a stimulus of the 
evaluation by the speaker of the situation in question. This is one of the 
reasons for the impossibility of *I know there/it must find it hard to 
believe (cf. I know you/he/she/they must find it hard to believe). But 
even in the related constructional configuration I know X must Y, which 
makes no use of the subjective-transitive pattern, but preserves the 
speaker’s anticipation of the addressee’s reaction, as in I know you must 
be upset, the use of an expletive cancels out this idea of anticipation. 
Thus, I know there must be a reason is definitely not an example of this 
construction, since here the speaker is only trying to reassure others –
and perhaps himself too– that someone will be able to explain whatever 
has happened. In a similar way, the sentence I know it must be cloudy 
only expresses the idea that the speaker is confident on his epistemic 
assessment about the weather conditions.  
(b) The XPCOMP instantiating the Y variable of I know X must 
Vcognition Y cannot be a referential NP, on the grounds that it is 
systematically incompatible with a subjective construal (at both the 
ideational and the interpersonal levels), i.e. the expression of a direct, 
personal and forceful stance by the speaker towards the situation 
depicted by the linguistic expression. The following example illustrates 
this constraint on the Y variable: 
 
(5) I know you must find me *the woman who is just sitting there right now/the ideal 
woman. 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, subsumption processes are not 
only constrained by level-external conceptual compatibility issues and by 
construal factors (i.e. so-called internal and external constraints respectively), 
but also by other co-occurring conceptual integration processes, such as level-
internal constructional amalgams. Our brief study of the I know X must Vcognition 
Y construction has further allowed us to explore how elements from a higher 
descriptive level –as is the case of the discourse level– can lose their higher-
level status through a conventionalization process and thus become 
incorporated into the conceptual makeup of a lower-level configuration.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The present paper has discussed relevant aspects of constructional 
integration within the Lexical Constructional Model. With Goldberg (2006) the 
LCM adopts a broad definition of construction as any meaningful linguistic 
pattern that is recognizable as such by language users, whether its meaning 
structure is compositional or not. However, the LCM has two distinguishing 
features in its treatment of constructional activity: (i) the distinction of levels of 
meaning construction and the distribution of constructional configurations 
among such levels; (ii) the postulation of cognitive constraints on the 
integration of lexical and constructional structure and of constructions from 
lower levels into those belonging to higher levels. We have provided one more 
axis of constructional characterization, i.e. the sensitiveness of a construction to 
being parametrized, and we have correlated this property of constructions with 
the kind of constructional integration process in which they can take part. One 
of these processes, called subsumption, takes place across descriptive levels and 
is subject to a number of conceptual consistency and cognitive construal 
constraints that have received a lot of attention in the literature on the LCM. 
The other integration process, which is for the first time described in the present 
paper, is level-internal and gives rise to what we have labeled constructional 
amalgams. We have explored how amalgamation works and, through a case 
study, how constructional amalgams further constrain level-external 
subsumption processes. The resulting analysis has provided a richer picture of 
constructional integration within the LCM than has so far been discussed in the 
literature. 
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Figure 1. The overall architecture of the Lexical Constructional Model 
LT = lexical template; IT= idiomatic template CT = constructional template;  
CS = Conceptual Structure 
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Abstract: As figurative uses of the caused-motion construction are not discussed 
extensively and systematically in the literature, this paper focuses on the following 
cases: (a) motion involved when the conditions of satisfaction of the predicate are 
realized, (b) actual motion without motion verbs, (c) figurative motion indicating a 
change of state, and (d) metaphorical motion with motion verbs 
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1. Introduction  
The term ‘construction’ as used in Construction Grammar constitutes a 
broadening of the traditional notion. In traditional grammar the term is used in a 
somewhat loose manner and usually refers to a rather abstract, recurrent 
configuration of morphosyntactic categories, which is typically smaller than a 
sentence and larger than a word, such as the infinitive construction, the 
participle construction, etc.  
In construction grammars the notion of construction is of central 
importance; these theories of language regard constructions as the basic units of 
grammar. Construction grammarians define ‘construction’ in Saussurean terms, 
seeing it as a symbolic configuration, a complex sign, a pairing of form and 
meaning. 
One of the assumptions made by Construction Grammarians is that the 
meaning of a particular construct is the result of the integration of the meanings 
of lexical items into the meaning of the construction. According to Construction 
Grammar, syntactic phenomena can never be described adequately without 
reference to semantics and pragmatics. 
 
 
 
2. The Caused-Motion Construction: form and semantics 
 
Goldberg’s (1995) influential book on argument structure constructions 
is one of the main recent studies that embody the cognitively-oriented approach 
to the notion of construction. In it, Adele Goldberg discusses five types of 
argument structure constructions: the ditransitive construction, the caused 
motion construction, the resultative construction, the intransitive motion 
construction and the conative construction.  In Goldberg’s (2003) view, 
constructions are units learnable on the basis of input and general cognitive 
mechanisms and are expected to vary cross-linguistically: 
 
Crucially, all linguists recognize that a wide range of semi-idiosyncratic constructions 
exist in every language, constructions that cannot be accounted for by general 
universal or innate principles or constraints. (Goldberg, 2003: 222) 
 
In English, the form of the caused-motion construction is as follows: 
[SUBJ [V OBJ OBL]] (Goldberg (1995)). The slot of V is occupied by a non-
stative verb (or perfective verb according to Langacker’s terminology, 1999), 
and OBL, which stands for ‘oblique’, is realized by a directional prepositional 
phrase, as in the following examples, taken from Goldberg (1995: 152) 
 
 (1) They laughed the poor guy out of the room. 
 (2) Frank sneezed the tissue off the table. 
 (3) Mary urged Bill into the house. 
 (4) Sue let the water out of the bathtub. 
 (5) Sam helped him into the car. 
 (6) They sprayed the paint onto the wall. 
 
The semantics associated with the caused-motion construction in 
English is roughly the following: X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z, that is, the 
causer argument causes the theme argument to move along a path indicated by 
the directional prepositional phrase. Goldberg (1995: 152) claims that “such a 
construction must be specified in the grammar to account for certain cases in 
which the semantic interpretation cannot plausibly be attributed to the main 
verb”. Likewise, there are some cases when the semantics of the construction is 
not inferred from the lexical elements which occur in it. 
The semantics ‘X CAUSES Y to MOVE Z’ exemplified in (7a) below is 
considered to be the central sense of the caused-motion construction, for the 
verb entails motion. In the Romanian version of the caused-motion construction 
(7b), ‘manner’ is expressed by a subordinate clause, unlike English, which 
encodes both ‘manner’ and ‘cause’ in the verb. 
 
(7a) The man shouldered Sam to the ground. 
(7b) Omul l-a trântit pe Sam la pământ, împingându-l cu umărul. 
 
From the comparison of the English example with its Romanian version,  
we can conclude that English encodes ‘cause’ and ‘manner’ in the verb and 
‘path’ in the prepositional phrase, while Romanian encodes ‘cause’ and 
‘motion’ in the first verb and ‘manner’ in the second verb (the non-finite 
‘gerunziu’).  
This conclusion confirms the view according to which Romance 
languages (e.g. Romanian) belong to the class of verb-framed languages and 
English belongs to satellite-framed languages. 
 
3. Related senses associated with the caused-motion construction.  
 
Besides the basic sense of the caused-motion construction, Goldberg 
(1995: 161-162) discusses four extended categories of related senses: 
The first extension differs from the central sense, in that motion is not 
strictly entailed; only if the conditions of satisfaction of the predicate are met, is 
motion involved. Examples include verbs that are force dynamic verbs that 
encode a communicative act and express directives such as persuasion (8), 
request (9) and invitation (10): 
 
 (8) Sally implored Jane into the shop. 
 
 In (8) above, Sally imploring Jane into the shop does not necessarily 
mean that Jane actually moves into the shop. Motion is implied if the conditions 
of satisfaction designated by the predicate are fulfilled. In example (8), Jane 
will enter the shop eventually, if the persuasion is satisfied. 
 
 (9) Sally asked him into the cottage. 
 
 Likewise, if the request in (9) is satisfied, the person will enter the 
cottage. 
  (10) Sally invited him into the car. 
 
Similarly, the invitation in (10) is satisfied if the person gets into the car. 
 The second extension of the central sense is ‘X ENABLES Y TO 
MOVE Z’. This subset includes verbs that encode the removal of a barrier (e.g. 
allow, let, free, release). This subset is exemplified in (11) and (12) below, 
which contain verbs that express enablement or permission (allow, let):  
 
(11) The gaoler allowed Allen out of prison. 
(12) They let Allen into their hotel room. 
 
The third subset of constructions which derives from the central sense 
has the following function: ‘X PREVENTS Y from MOVING Comp(Z)’. The 
path argument ‘CompZ’ codes the complement of the potential motion. This 
subset, unlike the previous one, can be described in terms of the force-dynamic 
schema of imposition of a barrier, causing the patient to stay in a location. It 
includes verbs, such as lock, keep, and barricade. Examples include: 
 
 (13) John locked George into a dark cellar. 
 (14) The work kept George at the office. 
 (15) Her ex-lover barricaded Jessie out of her own home. 
 
 Therefore, (13) above entails that John prevented George from moving 
out of the cellar. Likewise, in (14), the work prevented George from moving out 
of the office, and (15) implies that Jessie’s ex-lover prevented her from entering 
her house. 
 The fourth subset includes constructions having the meaning ‘X HELPS 
Y to MOVE Z’. This subset implies continuous assistance to move in a certain 
direction, as illustrated in the following examples: 
 
(16) Allen helped Helen into the wheel chair. 
(17) The nurse assisted Mr. Brown out of his bed. 
(18) Helen guided Allen through the cold empty streets. 
(19) Helen invited Allen into her quaint sitting room. 
(20) Helen walked Allen to the bus stop. 
 
4. The relation between caused-motion and resultative constructions 
 
 In Goldberg’s (1995) approach, caused-motion and resultative 
constructions are treated distinctly, due to the differing meanings of the two 
constructions. The resultative construction is associated with a particular 
argument structure configuration and has its own constructional semantics X 
CAUSES Y TO BECOME Z, independently of the verbs which instantiate it. 
The syntactic form of the resultative construction in English can be represented 
as follows: NP VP NP AP/PP. Consider for instance: 
 
 (21) Pole shot the bear dead. 
 (22) Scot hammered the metal flat. 
 (23) Amy talked herself hoarse. 
 (24) She kicked the door open. 
 (25) He cried himself asleep.  
 
 The resultative predicate explains the end of the state of the direct object 
(patient) as a result of the action performed by the subject (agent). 
Goldberg believes that caused-motion and resultative constructions are 
related by a metaphorical mapping: 
... resultatives are understood as coding a metaphorical change of location. The 
necessary metaphor is a general systematic metaphor that involves understanding a 
change of state in terms of movement to a new location. The mapping involved is 
simply this:  
 motion -> change 
 location -> state.  (Goldberg, 1995: 83) 
 
Goldberg’s view is questioned by Boas (2003), who revisits the 
metaphorical extension issue and shows that there is no need for a metaphorical 
extension analysis of the caused-motion to the resultative construction in order 
to account for the data: 
 
Metaphorical interpretation does not automatically have to be represented in terms of a 
metaphorical link between the two constructions ... the metaphorical interpretation can 
also be arrived at in terms of more general metaphorical mapping principles that hold 
for the language in general and are able to map linguistic structures from source to 
target domains across the entire language. On this view, metaphorical extensions fall 
out naturally. (Boas, 2003: 95) 
 
Regarding the distinction between caused-motion and resultative 
constructions, Boas (2003) argues that the patient-test proposed by Goldberg is 
not always relevant, so he does not find it necessary to posit the existence of 
two distinct constructions. For instance, the cause-motion construction in ‘Joe 
moved the bottle onto the table’ does have a patient argument encoded by 
‘bottle’.  
What Boas stresses instead is that the crucial information whether a verb 
can occur in a given syntactic frame is contained in the verb’s lexical semantic 
information and does not stem from the construction’s contributing specific 
meanings to the verb. For example, the difference in interpretation between 
‘John hit the table’ and ‘John hit the ball across the field’ is due to the distinct 
conventionalized senses of the verb ‘hit’, i.e. the ‘physical impact’ sense and 
the so- called ‘sports sense’. Therefore, the sports sense of ‘hit’ is no longer 
regarded as a product of the fusion of the pure ‘physical force’ sense with the 
caused motion construction, but as a distinct, related sense of ‘hit’ stored in the 
lexicon. 
In what follows, I shall go deeper into the issue of fusion (the process 
whereby a verb’s participant roles are integrated with a construction’s argument 
roles) and then discuss two classes of figurative uses of the caused-motion 
construction: the first relates to motion without motion verbs and the second 
refers to figurative motion indicating a change of state. 
 
5. Constraints on the caused-motion construction: the Lexical 
Constructional Model (LCM ) approach 
 
A classical example of an instantiation of the caused-motion 
construction is (26): 
 
(26) They laughed the poor guy out of the room. 
 
In order to understand how an intransitive, non-motion verb can 
participate in the caused-motion construction such as the instantiation in (26), 
we have to understand the way internal and external constraints license lexical-
constructional integration or fusion. Jackendoff (1990) uses the term ‘fusion’ to 
designate the combining of semantic constraints on distinct but coindexed slots 
within a given lexical entry, while Goldberg (1995: 50) uses it to capture “the 
simultaneous semantic constraints on the participant roles associated with the 
verb and the argument roles of the construction”. 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2008), the founders of the Lexical 
Constructional Model (LCM), a cognitively-oriented constructionist approach, 
replace Goldberg’s term of ‘fusion’ by the term ‘lexical constructional 
subsumption’, which they define as “the principle-regulated fusion of a lexical 
template into a higher-level constructional pattern”.  
In the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) lexical templates are “low-
level semantic representations of the syntactically relevant content of predicates 
which capture lexical structure. Constructional templates are “high level or 
abstract semantic representations of syntactically relevant meaning elements 
abstracted away from multiple lower-level representations”. The LCM 
recognizes a number of constructional types, such as the caused-motion 
construction, the resultative construction, and the benefective construction. 
The LCM sees lexical constructional integration as a cognitive process 
that is constrained by a number of internal and external principles. Internal 
constraints refer to the metalinguistic units encoded in a lexical representation, 
while external constraints invoke higher conceptual and cognitive mechanism 
like high level metaphoric and metonymic operations.  
High level metaphor underlies subcategorial conversion processes, such 
as the change of a verb with a prepositional complement (e.g. laughed at 
someone) into a purely transitive verb (e.g. laugh someone). A sentence like 
Peter laughed John out of the office can be understood by analogy with Peter 
kicked John out of the office. The mapping at work is the high level metaphor 
‘EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION’ (i.e. an action that has 
a direct physical effect on the object). High level metonymy has also been 
found to motivate categorial and subcategorial conversions processes. For 
example, the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION motivates the 
categorial conversion of a noun into a verb (He hammered the nail into the 
wall).  
 
5.1. Real motion without motion verbs 
Besides example (26), other instantiations of the caused-motion 
construction, where motion is expressed, but no motion verb is used are given 
below: 
(27) Sam frightened Bobby under the bed. 
(28) The students shouted him out of the lecture hall.  
(29) She winked him into her bedroom. 
 
Regarding the verb ‘frighten’, Goldberg (1995: 166) observes that, 
although it refers to a psychological state, it does not entail the existence of a 
cognitive decision, as it can apply equally well to rodents, as in ‘Sam 
frightened/coaxed /lured the mouse out of its hiding place’. As for the verb 
‘shout’ in (28), I believe it expresses an activity performed with the intention of 
causing the motion of the theme argument out of the present location. In (29), 
like in (27), the path of motion is more specific, presumably because the 
causing event and the pragmatic context determine the entire path of motion.  
Besides the high level metaphor ‘EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS 
EFFECTUAL ACTION’, Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2008) identify other 
high level metaphors that constrain lexical-constructional subsumption. For 
example, in (30 a), the metaphor COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IS 
EFFECTUAL ACTION licenses a subcategorial conversion process, whereby 
the receiver of the message is seen as if directly affected by the action of talking 
rather than as the goal of the message: 
 
(30)  a. Firefighters coaxed the man down from the roof. 
 b. She lured him into the room.. 
 c.*Sam convinced/persuaded him into the room.  
   d. Sam convinced/ persuaded me to go into the room. 
 
Semantically related verbs, such as ‘convince’ and ‘persuade’ (30c), do 
not appear in the caused-motion construction. Goldberg (1995) finds examples 
such as ‘Sam convinced /persuaded //instructed/encouraged him into the room’ 
unacceptable. However, verbs such as ‘coax’ and ‘lure’ do appear (30 a, 30 b). 
The explanation lies in the existence of a cognitive decision made by the entity 
denoted by the direct object. This cognitive decision mediates between the 
causing event and the entailed motion. Example (30d) shows that it is possible 
to use the verbs ‘convince’ and ‘persuade’ in a caused motion sense, without 
making direct use of the caused motion construction. This constraint does not 
apply in cases of figurative motion to which we turn in the next section. 
 
5.2 Figurative motion indicating a change of state 
A further interesting issue to discuss is the difference, if any, between 
the caused motion construction (31a) and the object + infinitive construction 
(31b):  
(31). a.  Sam persuaded me into business. 
 b. Sam persuaded me to go into business. 
 
While (31a) instantiates a figurative use of the caused-motion 
construction, (31b) is a realization of the object + infinitive construction. Ruiz 
de Mendoza and Mairal (2010) argue that the former, focusing on the result (the 
speaker goes into business), contrasts with the latter, which focuses on the 
process of the speaker doing whatever is necessary to become a business 
person. 
The strongly resultative character of the caused-motion construction, 
obvious in figurative uses such as ‘He scared me out of my wits’, can be better 
understood by using high level metaphors.   
A high level metaphor which accounts for the adaptation of the lexical 
meaning of the verb to the constructional meaning is AN ACTIVITY IS AN 
EFFECTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENT. In (32) this metaphor allows us to 
interpret the originally intransitive predicate ‘drink’ in terms of a transitive 
structure of the ‘actor – reflexive object’ kind: 
 
   (32) He drank himself into a stupor. 
 
The high level metaphor AN EMOTIONAL STATE IS AN 
EFFECTUAL ACTION underlies a sentence like (34), where the sensor is 
treated as an effector and the phenomenon as an effectee: 
 
   (33) Peter loved Mary back into life. 
 
5.3. Metaphorical motion with motion verbs 
Uses of the caused-motion construction which illustrate the case where 
there is a caused-motion verb but there is no real motion, i.e. caused-motion is 
figuratively used to express a change of state,  include in the following:  
 
(34) She drove me into a depression. 
(35) His words shook her out of her bad mood.  
(36) The work pushed him to the brink of insanity. 
(37) The discovery threw her into a state of great excitement.  
(38) A terrible noise pulled him out of his thoughts.  
(39) The news quickly knocked her out of her complacency. 
 
So far we have seen that in the LCM, external constraining factors on 
the lexical-constructional fusion process are conceptual and cognitive 
operations (e.g. high level metaphorical mappings) that affect the subsumption 
process (by entailing aktionsart changes).   
In what follows, I shall discuss internal constraints on lexical-
constructional subsumption. Internal constraints specify the conditions under 
which a lexical template may modify its internal configuration.  
Internal constraints refer to the semantic properties of lexical and 
constructional templates and do not affect the aktionsart (i.e. the inherent 
temporal properties) of the predicate. Very briefly, internal constraints refer to 
metalinguistic units encoded in a lexical representation. For example, the 
lexical representation of ‘persuade’ is [do (x) CAUSE [think’ (y, z)], where x, 
y, z represent the three arguments that have syntactic visibility and ‘think’ 
represents the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) primitive. ‘Persuade’ 
may refer to a mental disposition regarding a possible action in the future as in 
(30d). 
The most representative internal constraints are Full Matching, 
Predicate-Argument Conditioning and Internal Variable Conditioning (Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Mairal, 2009). Full Matching relates to the conditions for a 
lexical template to be regarded as internally compatible with or in need to be 
adapted to a constructional template. It stipulates that there must be full 
identification of variables, subevents, and operators between the lexical 
template and the constructional template. For instance, the predicate ‘break’ can 
take part in the effectual variety of the transitive construction, because it shares 
with the construction the relevant elements of structure, i.e. an effectual action 
that causes a change of state.  
Predicate-Argument Conditioning and Internal Variable Conditioning 
deal with the instantiation conditions of constructional variables.   
Predicate-Argument Conditioning refers to cases in which the lexical 
template can place restrictions on the kind of instantiating element that we can 
have for a constructional argument. For example, in the caused-motion 
construction with the structure ‘X-predicate-Y-Z’, where Y is an NP and Z is a 
PP, after the predicate and PP slots have been filled in, this choice constrains 
the kind of Y element that we can have. So, in She drove me into a depression, 
the Y element has been realized by a human verb role; we cannot have a non-
human element (cf. *She drove the cobblestones into a depression). 
Internal Variable Conditioning arises from the internal configuration of 
the lexical template instantiating the predicate slot of a constructional template.  
The internal predicate variables place constraints on the nature of both 
the predicate and constructional arguments. A clear example is supplied by the 
use of the verb ‘skulk’ in ‘He skulked me into a depression’. The lexical 
template of the predicate ‘skulk’ contains indications of (a) the manner in 
which the motion is carried out (i.e. furtively, secretly) and the reason why the 
motion is carried out in such a manner (i.e. because of fear, shame, and/or 
cowardice). This specific aspect of the meaning of ‘skulk’ (i.e. the fact that it is 
caused by feelings of fear, shame and/or cowardice) clashes with the choice of 
an axiologically positive destination, so that we cannot say *He skulked me into 
a laugh or *He skulked me into happiness. Perez and Pena (2009) state that 
such cases are accounted for by “pragmatic aspects of what constitutes 
acceptable human behaviour.” (Perez and Pena, 2009)  
To conclude, I can say that internal predicate variables capture world 
knowledge elements and determine what kind of instantiations the Z argument 
can have. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has discussed the following figurative uses of the caused-
motion construction:  
a. motion involved only when the conditions of satisfaction of the 
predicate are realized (section 3, examples 8-20). Such cases include force 
dynamic verbs like verba persuadendi, verba permitendi, verba impediendi, 
verba assistendi in which the feature [+ CAUSATIVE] is not central, but 
secondary;  
b. literal, actual motion, without motion verbs (section 5, examples 26-
31); 
c. figurative motion indicating a change of state (section 5, examples 32-
33); 
d. metaphorical motion with motion verbs  (section 5, examples 34-39). 
 In relation to the arguments of the caused-motion construction, I have 
noticed that it is not responsible for selecting the causer argument (the X 
element) in terms of notions such as agent or natural force (examples 36-
40).What does count for the selection of the causer argument is the subject’s 
“force-emitting” properties. Regarding the theme argument (the Y element) 
allowed in the caused-motion construction, it is linguistically realized as a 
human entity in most cases. The path argument (the Z element) tends to be 
axiologically negative (and have instantiations as depression, panic, madness, 
desperation, apathy, rage, terror), when the lexical template of the predicate (the 
lexical semantic information attached to the verb) contains indications of 
specific negative aspects (e.g. verbs such as ‘skulk’,  ‘scorn’, etc). This is 
accounted for by the internal constraint called ‘internal variable conditioning’. 
External constraints, such as high level metaphors (e.g. 
EXPERIENTIAL MOTION IS EFFECTUAL MOTION, COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION and AN EMOTIONAL STATE IS AN 
EFFECTUAL ACTION) seem to operate when verbs that are not independently 
caused-motion verbs (e.g. laugh, coax, love) are coerced into such a verb class.  
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1. Introduction 
Verbs, as argument-taking elements, show extremely complex sets of 
properties. As such, native speakers can make subtle judgments concerning the 
occurrence of verbs with a range of possible combinations of arguments and 
adjuncts in various syntactic expressions. For instance, speakers of English 
know which diathesis alternations verbs may participate in. In this sense, they 
know that verbs such as spray and load may express their arguments in two 
different ways, displaying the so-called locative alternation; but they also know 
that some verbs, like fill and cover, although apparently closely related to the 
previous verbs, do not allow both options. In the same way, speakers of English 
know whether a verb may participate in transitivity alternations found in 
English. There are verbs, like break and freeze, which allow both transitive and 
intransitive uses; this possibility, known as the causative-inchoative alternation, 
is not available for a verb like appear. Furthermore, the middle construction is 
available only to a certain semantically defined class of verbs: those whose 
meaning involves the notion of causing a change of state. There are restrictions 
also in the type of verbs resultative constructions can be built on. The present 
paper will analyze the difference between the types of verbs licensed in English 
and Romanian resultative constructions. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I present various 
approaches to verb classification and explain why I am in favour of 
Ramchand’s (2008) l-syntax approach. In section 3, I illustrate English and 
Romanian resultatives, focusing on one of the most important differences 
between them. Finally, section 4 is one of general conclusions.  
 
2. Approaches to verb classification 
 
Three approaches to verb classification will be presented here. It will 
hopefully be demonstrated that neither the argument-based classification given 
in 2.1, nor the aspectual typology presented in 2.2 proves to be the right way of 
explaining the basic difference between English and Romanian resultative 
verbs. Instead, Ramchand’s (2008) l-syntax approach is adopted and largely 
discussed in 2.3. 
 
2. 1. Argument-based classification 
Based on the evidence that certain components of verb meaning 
determine verb behaviour, Levin (1993:111-276) builds up a system of verbs 
whose members belong to certain classes on the basis of shared meaning 
components. Thus, the important theoretical construct is the notion of meaning 
component, and not the notion of verb class. Class members have in common a 
range of properties including the possible expression and interpretation of their 
arguments, as well as the existence of certain morphologically related forms. As 
far as resultatives are concerned, Levin (1993:101) concludes that a wide range 
of verbs is found in these constructions, so no specific classes of verbs should be 
identified. However, there are some clear constraints on these verbs, since, for 
instance, stative verbs and perception verbs are excluded from this construction. 
Resultatives can be grouped according to several criteria related to the 
syntax and semantics of the matrix verb. As such, there are resultatives built on 
transitive verbs (1a), intransitively used transitive verbs with non-subcategorized 
postverbal determiner phrase (henceforth DP)(1b), unaccusative (1c) and 
unergative verbs (1d): 
(1) a. Mother painted the door white. 
b. The guests drank the teapot empty. 
c. The vase broke into pieces. 
d. The boy shouted the neighbours awake. 
 
Not all of these constructions are possible in Romanian, as illustrated in (2): 
 (2) a.  Mama  a vopsit  uşa în alb. 
  mother aux paint-pst door in white 
   ‘Mother has painted the door white.’ 
 
 b.  *Musafiri-i       au  băut   ceainic-ul  gol. 
       guests-art       aux drink-pst  teapot-art empty 
  ‘The guests have drunk the teapot empty.’ 
  
 c.   Vaz-a         s-a  spart  in bucăţi. 
       vase-art     refl-aux  break-pst in pieces 
  ‘The vase has broken into pieces.’ 
 
 d.   *Băiat-ul     a           strigat vecini-i  treji. 
          boy-art     aux       shout-pst neighbours-art awake-pl. masc 
  ‘The boy has shouted the neighbours awake.’ 
 
The immediate difference that we notice in the classification of English 
and Romanian resultative constructions is that in English they can be freely 
built on all these four types of verbs; whereas in Romanian they can be built 
only on transitive and unaccusative verbs. In Romanian, as generally in all 
Romance languages, resultatives are less well represented and they are built 
around a limited class of verbs. There are no unergative-based resultatives and 
the class of such structures based on unaccusative verbs is also restricted. 
However, this approach does not reflect the real difference between the 
types of verbs allowed only in English resultatives and the ones allowed both in 
English and in Romanian. This approach cannot explain why some transitive-
based resultatives, like paint the door red or break the window into splinters do 
have a direct correspondent in Romanian and why other transitive-based 
resultatives, like hammer the metal flat or span the sheets dry do not.   
 
2. 2 The aspectual classification of verbs 
Rothstein (2004:4-5) argues that lexical aspectual classes are not 
generalizations over verb meanings, but sets of constraints on how the grammar 
allows us to individuate events. Telicity and atelicity are properties of VPs and 
the status of the VP with respect to telicity will depend on the interaction of the 
meaning of the V with other elements of the VP. It is argued that events are 
countable entities, they denote sets of events and they are classified into lexical 
classes depending on the properties of the events in their denotations relative to 
that particular description. In this sense, lexical aspectual classes are not 
generalizations over verb meanings, but sets of constraints on how the grammar 
allows us to individuate events. According to Rothstein (2004:114), ‘states’, 
‘activities’, ‘accomplishments’ and ‘achievements’ are properties of verbs, 
whereas telicity and atelicity are properties of VPs (a verb cannot be inherently 
telic or atelic). Thus, a VP like build a house is a telic VP, based on an 
accomplishment verb, whereas build houses is an atelic VP, with the same 
accomplishment verb. In the same way, processes are not inherently telic or 
atelic, but they are telic or atelic under a particular description. Hence, the same 
event can be described as running (atelic) or running to the store (telic).  
The roots of this approach are undoubtedly Vendler (1967) and Dowty 
(1979) on the aspectual classification of verbs into states, activities, 
accomplishments and achievements, which reflects the properties of the events 
in their denotation (a fifth class of eventuality has been identified in the 
literature in the class of the so-called semelfactives, which are instantaneous 
like achievements, but atelic like activities; therefore, they do not fit neatly into 
the classification of verbal predicates usually discussed in the literature). In 
what follows, I shall briefly present these four aspectual classes. 
States, like know, love, be (curious) etc., are non-dynamic situations, 
because we cannot identify stages in their development. The reason why they 
are excluded from resultatives is that in these constructions the verb must 
necessarily affect the object, as noted in Simpson (1983:146) and resultatives 
involve culminations. For an event to have a culmination, it requires that it be 
non-static, but states are non-dynamic situations. They are static and no 
developmental structure can be imposed on them, as they do not and cannot 
have culminations.  
Activities, like run, walk in the park, laugh etc., are open-ended 
processes, which can be analyzed into stages. They denote situations where a 
change occurs, but without manifesting any inherent ending; it is virtually 
possible for such events to go on indefinitely. The notion of completion is 
irrelevant in this case, because activities stop, but do not finish.  
Accomplishments, like eat a sandwich, drink a glass of wine, build a 
house, are changing situations with an intrinsic natural endpoint. They 
lexicalize the result of the action denoted by the verb; they are activities which 
move toward a culmination. The notion of completion is essential in these 
verbs, as they finish or are completed.  
Achievements, like find, reach the top, notice, realize etc., are near-
instantaneous events which are over as soon as they have begun. They are 
(minimal) changes of state not associated with a preceding activity. Similarly to 
accomplishments, they have a natural intrinsic endpoint, which is determined by 
the description of the eventuality. What is important for my research is that verbs 
of change-of-state are considered accomplishment or achievement-type verbs. 
That activity-type verbs are open-ended processes where a change occurs, 
but without manifesting any inherent ending (as opposed to accomplishment- and 
achievement-type verbs, which do have a natural intrinsic endpoint) is also 
represented in the event structure of these verbs. Activity-type verbs are assigned 
the simple event structure given in (3a), whereas accomplishment-type verbs are 
generally assigned a complex event structure involving an abstract STATE or 
PLACE event besides the event of action, as illustrated in (3b). Achievement-type 
verbs are assigned the structure illustrated in (3c): 
 
(3)  a. [ x ACT] 
  b. [ [ x act] CAUSE [BECOME [ y <STATE/PLACE>] ] ] 
  c. [become [x <STATE/PLACE>] ]  
                                           (Rappaport Hovav & Levin 1998:104) 
 
Accomplishment- and achievement-type verbs lexicalize the result of 
the action denoted by the verb; thus, adding a result predicate to such a 
(change-of-state) verb would only mean adding a result phrase, which only 
further specifies the change already lexicalized by the verb. The fact that 
accomplishment-type verbs, contrary to activity-type verbs allow only such a 
result predicate is supported exactly by the event structure evidence. In the case 
of an accomplishment-type verb, like paint, where the template associated with 
it cannot be augmented further, no other achieved state can be added to a 
sentence with this verb, except result phrases, which would only 
specify/lexicalize the STATE incorporated in the meaning of the verb. With the 
transitive V paint all that the attached sentence-final predicate could express in 
a resultative configuration is the lexicalization of this painted state, namely a 
color, but not the lexicalization of a change of state, like to pieces. The only 
case where it is possible to use the result predicate into pieces with the V paint 
is when this verb is intransitively used with a non-subcategorized postverbal 
DP, like in paint the brush to pieces.  
 My approach refuses the purely lexical/aspectual approach and adopts 
the more recent, l-syntax approach according to which the distinctions between 
different verb types are built into the syntax. More specifically, we focus on 
Ramchand’s (2008) l-syntax approach. The basic issue is that whereas English 
freely allows [init, proc], as well as [(init), proc, res] verbs in resultatives 
(which in the Vendlerian terminology correspond to activity-, respectively 
accomplishment- and achievement-type verbs), Romanian mostly allows [(init), 
proc, res]-based resultatives (accomplishment and achievement-type verbs). 
This approach is presented in more detail in the following subsection. 
 
2. 3. The l-syntax approach 
According to Ramchand (2008:38-42), there is a structural format given 
for eventive predicates in which telicity is structurally expressed. All VPs are 
broken down into smaller parts and the distinctions between different verb 
types are built into the syntax. The structure is built on thematic participants, 
like INITIATOR/CAUSER, UNDERGOER, RESULTEE, PATH, RESULT-RHEME and three 
subevental components, like initP, procP and resP. This is illustrated in (4), a 
structure that applies to all natural languages: 
 
According to this approach different lexical verbs project different 
syntactic structures; that is, the lexical semantics of the verbs is syntactically 
represented. The analysis relies on Dowty’s (1979) decomposition approach, 
according to which the semantic representation of sentences is derived by 
means of aspectual operators, like DO, CAUSE and BECOME. Whereas in Dowty 
these operators are part of the lexical representation of the verb, in Ramchand it 
is assumed that decomposition is in the syntax. The event structure and the event 
participants are directly represented in syntax and their semantics is built up 
compositionally as opposed to being explicitly stated in the lexical entries of 
verbs. Within this syntax the information classically seen to reside within 
lexical items is decomposed into a set of distinct categories with specific 
syntactic and semantic modes of combination. 
The connection to traditional aspectual classes goes as follows: activity-
type verbs correspond to either [init, proc] or [proc] verbs, accomplishment-type 
verbs are [init, proc] verbs with incremental theme or PATH complements and 
achievement-type verbs are [init, proc, res] or [proc, res] verbs. What is essential 
to my approach is that activity-type verbs, as opposed to accomplishment and 
achievement-type verbs do not contain the resP in their structure. A note is in 
order here: some verbs cannot be homogeneously classified into one class or 
another. Verbs such as wipe, polish seem to have both an [init, proc] as well as 
an [init, proc, res] reading, as illustrated in (5) 
 
(5) a. John wiped the table/scrubbed the floor for fifteen minutes. 
 
 b. John wiped the table/scrubbed the floor in fifteen minutes. 
 
In (5a) the verb denotes a set of simple activity events. The verb in this 
use does not necessarily entail a resulting state in the contacted surface; the 
emphasis is on the activity of wiping/scrubbing. In (5b) the V denotes a set of 
complex accomplishment eventualities, each of which consists of an activity 
eventuality incrementally related to a BECOME event. On this reading, the 
sentence presents an event with a natural final endpoint. 
If we compare an [init, proc]-based adjective phrase (henceforth AP) 
resultative, illustrated in (6), with an [init, proc, res]-based AP resultative, 
illustrated in (7), one can see that the basic difference between these two types 
of constructions is the difference between the type of the matrix verb: 
 
 
 
The difference between these two structures is the following: hammer is 
an [init, proc]-type of verb, hence, in resultatives, it allows the res functional 
head to be phonologically silent; whereas break is an [init, proc, res]-type of 
verb, where the idea of change is incorporated in the verb by this functional 
head and all the added result predicate does is to further specify this change. In 
Romanian, as, in most Romance languages, there are mostly resultatives of this 
latter type. We will discuss this in detail in the next section of the paper.  
 
3. Differences between English and Romanian resultative verbs 
 
English allows a large variety of [init, proc] as well as [init, proc, res]-
type of verbs in resultative constructions, like gallop the horse lame, dance 
one’s feet sore, sing oneself hoarse, cry oneself to sleep, respectively colour the 
hair black, kill somebody dead, burn the toast black. 
As opposed to this, in Romanian there are mostly resultatives based on 
change-of-state [init, proc, res]-type of verbs, like a creşte ‘grow’, a (se) zdrobi 
‘smash’, a sfărâma ‘shatter’, a (se) rupe ‘tear’, a (se) sparge ‘break’, a fărâmiţa 
‘crumble’, a tăia ‘cut’, a măcina ‘grind’, a vopsi ‘paint’ etc. This is illustrated 
in the following: 
(8)  a. Ea     a   măcinat  cafeaua  pudră. 
  she AUX  grind-PST coffee-ART    powder. 
  ‘She has ground the coffee into powder.’ 
 
  b.  Maria      s-a  vopsit   blondă. GALR (2005: 170) 
    Mary REFL-AUX dye-PST  blonde-FEM 
  ‘Mary has dyed her hair blonde.’ 
 
Evidence in favour of the lexical entailment of the result predicate in the 
meaning of the verb is supported by the definition of the matrix verbs 
Romanian resultatives can be built on. As such, a creşte ‘grow’ is defined as a 
se mări ‘to grow’, a deveni mai mare ‘to become bigger’ and the possible 
resultatives with this verb are apele au crescut mari ‘waters have grown big’ 
and ea a crescut înaltă ‘she has grown tall’. Although these structures are not 
considered as redundant as their Italian correspondents, cf. Napoli (1992:72), 
there is evidence that the sentence-final predicate is lexically entailed in the 
meaning of the verb. Other examples are the verb a rupe ‘tear’, defined as a 
face bucăţi ‘to make pieces’ and the corresponding resultative a rupe ceva în 
bucăţi ‘tear something into pieces’, respectively the verb a sparge ‘break’, 
defined as a preface în bucăţi/cioburi ‘to make in pieces/splinters’ and the 
corresponding resultative a sparge geamul în cioburi ‘break the window into 
splinters’. http://dexonline.ro/. Two apparent exceptions, where the main verb is 
not necessarily a change-of-state [init, proc, res]-type of verb, are a bate albuşul 
spumă ‘beat the egg whites until foamy’ and a fierbe ouăle tari ‘boil the eggs 
hard’.  
With this approach, I would also like to change the view generally 
adopted in the literature about the lack of AP resultatives in Romanian. The 
basic issue is that there are AP resultatives in Romanian, but only when they are 
built on change-of-state [init, proc, res]-type of verbs.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the present paper, I have focused my attention on verb types licensed 
in English and Romanian resultative constructions. I have shown that neither 
the argument-based classification, nor the aspectual one can shed light on the 
real difference between the resultative verbs in these two languages. Instead, I 
have opted for Ramchand’s (2008) l-syntax approach. The general conclusion is 
that, whereas English freely licenses [init, proc] as well as [init, proc, res]-type 
of verbs in resultative constructions, Romanian mostly licenses change-of-state 
[init, proc, res] verbs in the correspondent constructions.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of my paper is to analyse English and Serbian in contrast 
considering the effects of animacy in external argument position within motion 
event constructions, when verbs of sound emission combine with path 
arguments in directed motion formal syntatctic structures. This will be done 
considering both argument structure and lexical specification of the relevant 
verb class, when verbs of emission surface in these constructions. The class of 
verbs under investigation here are verbs of sound emission (in further text 
VSE), initialy established as a semantically based verb class in English by Beth 
Levin (1993:233-238). For the class of Serbian verbs of sound emission see 
Milivojević 2007 and Arsenijević & Milivojević 2009. The overview of the 
paper is as follows: 
(a) The first part of the paper offers the theoretical background of the 
analysis. English and Serbian relevant verb classes (VSE) will be established on 
the levels of lexical and contextual equivalency. The syntactic and semantic 
potential of VSE to surface in directed motion constructions in English and 
Serbian will be examined and discussed. 
(b) The next section of the paper will compare the specific syntactic and 
semantic features of these constructions in English in Serbian, paying additional 
attention to both external arguments and animacy effects as means of formal 
restrictions on the construction realization and arguments internal to the verb, 
namely the path arguments. The projected arguments structures to relevant 
verbs will be analyzed against the initial lexical specifications of the verbs of 
(sound) emission. 
(c) The closing part of the paper puts forth wider theoretical 
implications of the research regarding the theoretically based semantic V 
classes, Talmy’s language typology, and the practical and empirically 
confirmed availability of such constructions in specific languages. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
The dominant theoretical background of the investigatoon is the 
proposal made by Leonard Talmy on the two-way language typology according 
to motion expression. Talmy (1975, 1985, 1991, 2000) had proposed that 
languages fall into two main types, on the basis of where the path is represented 
in a sentence expressing a motion event - or, more generally, where the core 
schema is represented in a sentence expressing a macro-event (allowing for it to 
consist of at least two micro events or subevents).  This means that another 
semantic component, the co-event - usually the manner or the cause of the 
motion - might show up in a particular constituent other than the one occupied 
by the path. In this two-category typology, if the path is characteristically 
represented in the main verb or verb root of a sentence, the language is verb 
framed, but if it is characteristically represented in the satellite or in a P 
element, such as prepositional phrase, case inflection, etc. (cf Gehrke (2008) for 
further elaboration), the language is satellite framed. For example:  
 
(1) a. The truck rumbled  through the gate. (English) 
 
 b. Kamion  je tutnjao ulicom. (Serbian) 
  truck  is rumbled down the street 
 
 c.  Je suis entré dans  la maison (en boitant) 
  I  am  entered in  the house (in limping)  
 
 d. La botela entro a la cueva flotando. 
  the bottle entered in to the cave (floating) 
 
In the examples 1a and 1b, that is in the English sentence as well as in 
the Serbian one, what the verb lexicalizes is the manner of movement of the 
figure within the given directed motion construction. In 1b and 1c. French and 
Spanish example respectivelly, the verbs lexicalizes the path (in wider terms 
the scale) of movement of the figure, with the manner modification expressed 
by the satelite. Or, in more formal terms, the verbs in 1a and 1b conflate motion 
and manner, while verbs in 1c and 1d conflate motion and path. 
What is interesting about sentences 1a and 1b is that the verbs surfacing 
as verbs of movement (or motion) are in fact verbs of sound emission. We look 
here at the emission verb class as it is outlined in Levin (1993: 233-238), and at 
their Serbian (lexical) equivalents. Verbs of sound emission (VSE) are a subset 
of verbs of a larger class of emission verbs, along with verbs of light, smell and 
substance emission. They describe either the emission or production of sound. 
They are differentiated from each other by the physical properties of the sound 
that they lexicalize, as well as by its manner of production. Some of these verbs 
also figure among the verbs of manner of speaking, verbs of sounds made by 
animals or verbs of impact. They are generally intransitive, but may sometimes 
appear with an object (especially with cognates) and they allow for a certain 
predefined range of external arguments to the verb.  English verbs of sound 
emission are the following: 
 
applaud, babble, bang, beat, beep, bellow, blare, blast, bleat, boom, bubble, burble, 
burr, buzz, chatter, chime, chink, chirr, chitter, chug, clack, clang, clank, clap, clash, 
clatter, click, cling, clink, clop, clump, clunk, crack, crackle, crash, creak, crepitate, 
crunch, cry, ding, dong, dingdong, drone, explode, fizz, fizzle, groan, growl, guggle,  
gurgle, hiss, hoot, howl, hum, jangle, jingle, knell, knock, lilt, moan, murmur, patter, 
peal, ping, pink, pipe, plonk, plop, plunk, pop, purr, putter, rap, rasp, rattle, ring, roar, 
roll, rumble, rustle, scream, screech, shriek, shrill, sing, sizzle, snap, splash, splosh, 
splutter, sputter, squawk, squeak, squeal, squelch, strike, strum, swish, swash, swoosh, 
thrum, thud, thump, thunder, tick, ting, tinkle, toll, tootle, trill, trumpet, twang, ululate, 
vroom, wail, wheeze, whine, whir, whish, whistle, whoop, whoosh, whump, zing. (The 
class contains 124 verbs.) 
 
The present class is a revised verb class initially established by Levin 
(1993: 234-237). Certain verbs have been left out due to infrequent use, while 
some new verbs have been added to the class used as the basis of the present 
research. The English data were checked against the Wordnet online database 
for English (available at http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn). English 
verbs which were left out form the original class are : blat, chir, clomp, plink, 
thunk. English verbs added to the original verb class through Wordnet are: 
chirr, clop, dingdong, drone, guggle, gurgle, splosh, strum, swash, whoop.  
 I base my analysis for Serbian on the class of Serbian lexical 
equivalents of Levin’s class and on the corpus of contextualized V lexemes (a 
sentential corpus), made up of both literary language sentential examples, and 
sentential examples from the Corpus of Contemporary Serbian. I specifically 
look at those members of the class which are found with directional phrases and 
investigate Serbian VPs involving a sound emission component with respect to 
their capacity to combine with directional phrases and receive motion 
interpretation. The Serbian verbs of sound emission are: 
 
aplaudirati  blebetati  blejati  brbljati  brektati  brujati   bubnuti  bučati  ciknuti  
cviljeti cvoknuti  cvokotati  cvrčati  cvrkutati  čangrljati  čavrljati  čegrtati  ćućoriti  
ćurlikati  dahtati  dobovati  drečati  dreknuti  drndati   eksplodirati  fijukati  fiskati  
frfljati  grgotati  grmjeti  groktati  grunuti  gruvati  gudjeti  hripati  hroptati  hrskati  
hučati  hujati  izbrbljati  izlupati  izviždati  ječati   jeknuti  klepetati  klokotati   
kloparati  klopotati  krckati  krcnuti  krčati  kričati  kriještati   krkljati   kucati  lupiti  
lupnuti   meketati  mrmoriti  odjekivati  odzvanjati  odzvoniti  oriti se  otkucati  pisnuti  
pištati  pljeskati  pljesnuti  pljusnuti  pozvoniti  praskati  prohujati   promrmoriti  
prošištati  prozviždati  prožuboriti  prštati  pucati  puckarati  puckati  pucketati  
pucnuti   pući  rastrubiti  režati  rikati  romoriti   soptati  stenjati  strugati  svirati   
šištati  škljocati  škljocnuti  škripati  šljapati   šljapkati  štektati  štropotati  šumjeti  
šuškati  šuštati  tandrkati  treskati  tresnuti    treštati   trubiti  tuliti  tutnjati  urlati  
uzdisati  vrčati  vrisnuti  zagrmeti  zalupiti se   zaštektati  zavijati  zazvečati   zujati  
zveckati  zvečati  zveketati  zveknuti  zviznuti  zviždati   zviždukati  zvižduknuti   zvoniti  
zvrndati  žagoriti  žamoriti  žuboriti  (The class contains 134 verbs.) 
 
VSE in English may become verbs of directed motion; in such cases, 
they require a directional phrase as a complement, be it a directional phrase PP 
or some other XP with a directional (frequently unaccusative) interpretation. In 
this use, they describe the motion of an entity, characterized by the concomitant 
emission of the sound whose nature is lexicalized in the verb. Contrary to Levin 
(1993: 234, 236, 237), I claim that verbs of emission other than sound emission 
may appear with directional phrases in English with both animate and 
inanimate subjects in external argument position (2a is an example of VSE, 
while 2b-d are examples of verbs of light emission (VLE)): 
 
(2)  a. The elevator whizzed upward. 
 b. The light flashed into the sky. 
 c. The firefly flickered into the room. 
 d. The paint oozed across the table. 
What is more, I claim that there is more freedom along a structural 
continuum of motion expression than is initially proposed in Levin’s 
projectionalist approach. The same kind of construction variety is present in 
Serbian as well: 
 
(3) a.  Svitac  je svetlucao preko polja. 
  the firefly  is sparkled across  rhe field 
 
 b.  Voda je izbijala ispod belog kamena. 
     water is beat.out under white stone 
 
This kind of explanation also offers empirical evidence against some 
constructional approaches (see Goldberg and Jackendoff 2004, Culicover and 
Jackendoff 2005 among others), where it is claimed that directed motion 
constructions with (sound) emission verbs are “English specific”, also ruling 
out this type of formal structure with any other emission type verb. 
 
3. Syntactic and Semantic Features 
 
Generally, VSE are intransitive verbs, taking the emitter argument as 
subject (allowing both animate - human or not - and inanimate subjects, but 
disallowing abstract nouns in this position). According to Levin, in English 
these verbs take a very limitted range of subjects, since the verbs in a sense 
describe (or refer to) the intrinsic properties of the sound that they lexicalize. 
Another generalization I propose as an update on Levin (1993) is that the agents 
of such verbs must be teleologically capable (cf. Folli and Harley 2008) of 
relevant sound production, rather than be simply animate or volitional.  
According to Folli and Harley (2008:2), teleological capability is the inherent 
ability of the entity to participate in the eventuality denoted by the predicate, 
while animacy and agency are mutualy dissociated. What it takes for a non-
agentive subject to be teleologically capable is the ability to instigate and/or 
conduct the emission event on its own, be it a willed or a non-willed action. The 
relevant notion which distinguishes agents from causers, for example, is the 
subject’s internal teleological capability of generating the event on its own, 
from start to finish—not the animacy of the subject. Causers (both animate and 
inanimate) may trigger the initiation of an event, but do not exercise control 
over its unfolding, due to their teleological incapability. This kind of 
formalization actually allows for both animate and inanimate external 
arguments with VSE in both English and Serbian.  
Another important point in our analysis is the definition of the lexical 
specification of the verb. Lexical specification is the internal semantic content 
of the verb lexeme, which triggers its argument structure realization. In terms of 
motion events, what is relevant is whether or not a certain verb will project both 
relevant arguments to the construction: agent and path argument. According to 
Folli and Harley (2006:24), VSE are the so-called minus path verbs (-path Vs), 
which means that their lexical specification does not normally project a path 
argument. This can be illustrated by Table1: 
 
 +path  -path 
+agent walk, run, swim whistle, hiss, sing 
-agent roll, float, slide shudder, tremble 
 
What the table actually shows is that for a VSE to receive a directed 
motion interpretation, the lexical specification of the verb has to be changed, or 
shifted into a lexical specification of the verb of directed motion, such as walk 
or run. In other words, when combining with a prepositional path argument, 
VSE becomes a directed motion verb. 
The following English and Serbian examples were taken from English 
and Serbian online corpora as illustrations of the above mentioned facts, 
namely The British National Corpus (BNC) (available at 
http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/in (4), and the The Corpus of Contemporary Serbian 
(available athttp://www.korpus.matf.bg.ac.yu/korpus/login.php) in (5) : 
 
(4) a. As the tramcars rattled, roared and clanged  along Norfolk Street, 60 yards or so 
from our tenement building, and horse-driven carts rumbled by, the kids of the street 
were playing, shouting, yelling --; or wiping snotters away with the sweat. It was after 
school, 4.30 on a nice afternoon... 
b. Outside, the rain gurgled in shining gutters.  
c. Thick, black rain clouds massed in the sky and, as I fell asleep,   rattling 
raindrops pattered against the wooden shutters.  
d. A nurse rustled into the tiny space. Kate could smell Pears soap   and the smell 
brought back memories of when she had been younger.  
 
(5) a. ...pajtaš iz Italije , prešao pešaka granicu . Ja to nisam znala , odradim lepo svoj 
posao , a njega zatvore . Sledeći dan škripe kočnice iza ćoška , Giška izleće iz kola i 
pravo pred mene ... 
’breaks squeal around the corner’ 
b. Dok automobil stenje u krivinama koje su toliko spiralne da se čak ne bi mogle 
uporediti ni sa zavrtnjem , kroz maglu koja dočarava visoke planinske vrhove... 
’the car gasps through the curves’ 
c. Nes je to primio kao još jedan dobar znak . Slušao je trenutak , dva , kako voda pršti 
po kadi , a onda je obukao čistu belu košulju i izvadio novac koji je iz pretinca u 
kolima prebacio u jedan od svojih kofera... 
’water is splashing in the tub’ 
d. .Za to vreme voz je , dahćući , puštajući naglo paru, kloparao visokim nasipom 
između požutelih kukuruznih polja , između retkih riđih šuma , između talasastih 
livada... 
’the train clatters uphil’ 
 
Verbs of light emission (VLE), on the other hand, relate to the emission 
of light, and some of them (both in English and in Serbian) allow a transitive 
use with a causative interpretation, as well as locative alternations. I also want 
to claim here that they may denote either fictional or real motion (possibly also 
in combination with directional prepositional phrases to denote pure light 
emission along a projected scale) both in English (examples are given in 6) and 
in Serbian (examples are given in 7). The examples below were also extracted 
from the online corpora mentioned in the previous section of the paper: 
 
(6) a. If we could have beamed, her down like in Star Trek, it would have been all 
right, but she just couldn't cope with getting on a plane or a boat. 
b. With binoculars the chances are obviously much less, but one never knows --; and it 
is true that in 1885 a supernova blazed out in the Andromeda Spiral and almost 
reached naked-eye visibility. 
c. The mass of new, hot rock forcing its way up through the crater floor had both 
helped to displace the water from the crater, and heated it up to nearly boiling point, so 
it was a scalding torrent that flashed down the valley, travelling at a speed of 
something like ninety kilometres an hour. 
d. His double-headed axe flickered in his powerful hands, light as a birch twig. 
 
 (7)a. Kiša je lila pre neko veče, caklio se asfalt u Knez - Mihailovoj ulici ,                          
kao pokisli golubovi sklanjali su se prolaznici  u kafanu Kolarac. 
’asphalt was glowing on the street’ 
b. A nad okeanom treperi, i onih dana prepunih sunca , neka snena izmaglica, kao 
prozirni plašt pare. 
’the mist flickers above the ocean’ 
c. Pođe, pođe, dođe na mesto gde se skreće lepotici. Skrenu. Dođe pred brvnaru. A u 
brvnari gori veliki oganj i svetli kroz prozore. 
’the fire is glowing through the windows’ 
 
What the English VLE examples in (6) show is that light emission verbs 
can in fact surface in constructions where they denote directed movement, as in 
6a and 6c, or metaphorical motion meaning as in 6b, and finally something like 
implied movement (either momentary or iterative) as in 6d. The Serbian 
examples in (7) illustrate the fact that VLE behave similarly to English VLE 
verbs, allowing for a similar range of motion meanings: implied movement 
accompanied by light reflection in 7a, 7b and and light emission along the 
projected path (in other words, the product of the emission, but not the emitter, 
moves along an unbounded scale) in 7c. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
What can be concluded from the discussion and the examples so far is 
that Serbian exhibits a kind of morphosyntactic potential in expressing motion 
events which is similar to the satellite-framed English. Both verb classes 
examined so far, namely VSE and VLE in English and in Serbian, will surface 
in motion constructions, with the manner co-event on the verb, and the path 
(which in these cases equals the scale of motion) expressed by the satellite, 
with various types of subjects, animate and inanimate alike.  In the remainder of 
the paper, I will illustrate some points of divergence between English and 
Serbian. Let’s take a look at the following set of examples: 
 
(8) a. *Peter yelled  down the street. 
 
 b. Jovan  je vikao  niz ulicu. 
     Jovan  is yelled  down street 
 
 c. Metak je prozviždao  pored prozora. 
      bullet  is  whistled through  by window 
 
 d. ??*Metak je uzviždao kroz  prozor. 
      bullet is whistled. in through window 
 
While the English sentence in 8a is ungrammatical, i.e. there is no 
available motion reading for the VP, the Serbian example is grammatical. 
Example 8b is in fact ambiguous between two readings, where, in the first one, 
the animate subject, which is the emitter of the sound, is not moving, while the 
emitted sound is the theme (or the figure) of motion, while in the second 
available reading, both the emitter of the sound and the sound produced are 
moving along the path. This is an interesting instance in terms of event 
structure, showing that Serbian exhibits more freedom in motion event 
encoding than English does. Examples 8c and 8d show that Serbian sound 
emission verbs combine more freely with paths implying unbounded scales, 
than with those with bounded scales (or goals).  
The next point in the analysis is illustrated in the following sets of 
examples: 
 
(9) a. Peter hammered the metal flat. 
 b. John slammed the door shut. 
 
The sentences in (9) are the instances of the so-called adjectival 
resultatives (AP resultatives), or secondary resultative predicates. Namely, 
there is a general correlation between the ability of combining telic, bounded 
path PPs, with manner of motion verbs and the availability of secondary 
resultative predicates. Such resultative constructions are generally unavailable 
in languages that have been classified as verb-framed (cf. Gehrke 2008). Folli 
and Ramchand (2005:91), for example, note that resultative constructions with 
adjectival phrases (APs) are grammatical in English (10a) but ungrammatical in 
Italian (10b). 
 
 (10) a. John broke the vase open. 
  b.*Gianni ha rotto il vaso aperto. 
      Gianni has broken the vase open.  
 
The data call for a unified account of the integration of PPs and APs into 
event structure according to which PPs can be integrated as secondary 
resultative predicates and thus derive an accomplishment structure under certain 
conditions. Surprisingly enough, Serbian behaves like verb-framed Italian in 
this respect. Examples in 11 are instances of such constructions with animate 
subjects: 
 
 (11) a.*Jovan je lupio vrata otvorena. 
      Jovan  is  slam    door    open 
 
 b. Jovan  je  zalupio   vrata/ vratima. 
     Jovan  is  slam.to   door/ with door 
 
 c. Jovan  je  tresnuo   vrata. 
     Jovan  is  banged    door 
 d. Jovan  je  zalupio      sušalicu. 
  Jovan  is  banged.down  phone 
 
There are no constructional Serbian to English equivalents of AP resultatives – 
those sentences will be ruled out as ungrammatical. In terms of semantics and 
usage, the lack of AP resultatives in Serbian is compensated by prefixes, that is, 
again by available P elements. Gehrke (2008:216) argues that the focus on 
Talmy’s cross-linguistic variation has to be  
  
shifted away from the restriction on paths expressed on the verb or elsewhere, to the 
question whether or not an accomplishment structure can be built relying on the 
integration of a non-verbal predicate into an activity structure. 
 
Given this shift in the analysis, then, Serbian (along with Russian and 
Czech, according to Gehrke’s data) behaves like a verb-framed language. 
Furthermore, Beavers at al. (2010) argue that that the observed cross-linguistic 
variation arises primarily from the interaction of motion-independent 
morphosyntactic and lexical factors. First, while the verb is one of several 
lexical categories that can encode either manner or path, it is unique among all 
categories in being the only obligatory element across all clauses that describe 
motion (since it heads the VP that forms the nucleus of the clause). Second, the 
semantic component which is not expressed in the verb, if it is not inferrable 
from context or is unimportant and thus omissible, may (or must) be expressed 
by some other constituent.  
In sum, Talmy’s typology is too coarse-grained to provide a full picture 
of the way motion events are expressed across different languages. Serbian 
seems to be more liberal than English in expressing eventualities that involve 
both motion and sound emission. VP and the directional phrase have somewhat 
independent argument structures (the agent of one being the theme of the 
other), but still one line of projection (as only one can have an agent). Verb 
classes based solely on semantic properties of the verb, excluding the 
conceptual properties of verb arguments, may not be the best solution to the 
appropriate description of verb meaning in general, as verbs both incorporate 
(root meaning) and project (arguments) – some stricter, more formal criteria at 
syntax-semantics interface may at play. 
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EPISTEMIC MODALITY:  
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Abstract: Cognitive linguistics, with its experience-related background can naturally 
broaden the view of epistemic modality from the traditional truth-oriented probability 
judgment to the speaker’s assessment of what is going on: a choice between alternative 
cognitive models. The speaker has to find an appropriate relationship and choose a set 
of participants from among a number of potential candidates. The paper will analyze 
linguistic evidence of some processes that may be involved. 
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1. Introduction. Formal semantics and modality 
When semantics returned to the forefront of linguistic interest around 
the middle of the 20th century, this was done predominantly on a formal (mainly 
logical) basis. Apart from external or accidental factors, there was also the 
theory-internal reason that, following Saussure and later Chomsky, the 
theoretical linguistics of the time confined its scope of interest to the language 
system, leaving no room for any serious consideration of the role that language 
use and the user may have in its formulation. 
This applies to a great extent to modality, which was defined entirely in 
terms of the possible worlds previously found useful in formal logic, although 
intuition and also more recent studies strongly suggest that it is crucially about 
relationships among human participants. It is not difficult to see that both 
natural language and the logical system suffer in this association.  
                                                          
* Work on the present paper was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the project OTKA NI 68436 and by the project TÁMOP 
4.2.1./B‐09/1/KONV‐2010‐0007. 
Formal semanticists often profess their interest in formal systems, 
maintaining that their findings only apply to natural languages to the extent that 
it conforms to formal languages. There has been little development in this 
respect in the past decades, although the recent introduction of the notions of 
Modal base and Ordering source into formal systems (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997, 
Tóth 2008) may be a significant move in this direction, since it may be seen as 
the first steps away from a strictly system-based approach. 
Cognitive grammar, to be introduced in the next section, offers more 
radical solutions to the discrepancies between the two systems referred to 
above. (Among other things, it resolves the problem of epistemic must by 
postulating a dynamic evolutionary model, based on the speaker’s experience 
(Langacker 1991:240-9), which makes more room for the actual world in the 
system.) 
 
2. The cognitive approach to modality: the grounding predication 
 
Perhaps the most significant property of Langacker’s cognitive grammar 
is that it is admittedly usage-based, a radical break from system linguistics. 
Modality (called epistemic grounding in this framework) appears as a 
relationship between the system and its use or users. 
The grounding relationship is defined as relating (the linguistic 
expression of) a process or thing (a verb or a noun) to the situation of its use: 
speaker/hearer knowledge, time and place of utterance, etc. In Langacker’s 
formulation: 
 
An entity is epistemically grounded when its location is specified relative to the 
speaker and hearer and their spheres of knowledge. For verbs, tense and mood ground 
an entity epistemically; for nouns, definite/indefinite specifications establish epistemic 
grounding. Epistemic grounding distinguishes finite verbs and clauses from nonfinite 
ones, and nominals (noun phrases) from simple nouns. (Langacker 1987:489) 
 
Although we cannot go here into all the necessary detail, it is important 
to note that the grounding relationship, a product of the reference-point 
construction and of subjectification, has exceptional semantic (and, 
consequently, also syntactic) properties. Being a reference point, the grounding 
predication never remains in profile: attention shifts from it to the rest of the 
predication. In technical terms: the profile determinant is the grounded head, cf. 
Langacker (1991). As suggested in Mortelmans (2002, 2006), Nuyts (2002), 
and Pelyvás (2000, 2001a, 2006), this property of the grounding predication, 
with an extension of Langacker’s original system, can also account for a 
number of phenomena in the irregular syntactic behaviour of cognitive 
predicates. 
In what follows we will briefly introduce Langacker’s system, indicate 
possible modifications and extensions in the direction of cognitive predicates 
and then show how some marked syntactic constructions (e.g. ‛raising’), 
possible only or predominantly with cognitive predicates, like likely or know in 
the epistemic field, or order in the deontic one, can express modality. But this 
notion of modality is much closer to the speaker’s choice of a cognitive model 
that s/he finds most approppriate for describing a state of affairs (or the 
modification of this choice), than to the traditional or logical understanding of 
the term. 
 
2.1. Langacker 
Although Langacker’s semantic notion of epistemic grounding as given 
above is potentially all-inclusive, there is a formal property in his system of 
grammar that limits the range of possible grounding predications to almost a 
minimum. The situation is briefly as follows:  
• since Tense is a property of the grounding predication (e.g. the modal 
auxiliary, which is always finite), the complement (grounded head) can never 
carry it (cannot be finite); 
• since the ultimate profile determinant of the clause is the grounded 
head (cf. the shift of attention associated with reference points described in 
Section 2 above), this element must profile a process, since the whole clause 
profiles a process; 
• a non-finite verbal form cannot profile a process, since in Langacker’s 
system it is summarily scanned; 
• the grounded head cannot be finite (cannot have Tense), but cannot be 
non-finite (summarily scanned) 
This limits the range of possible grounding predications to the English 
modals (both deontic and epistemic), which characteristically take their 
complements in the bare infinitival form, which Langacker sees as the only 
form that is neither finite nor non-finite (the pure verb).  
 
2.2. An extension: Mortelmans, Nuyts, Pelyvás 
One problem with Langacker’s system, which we do not have the space  
to examine here, is whether the set that his rules select is too large: do English 
deontic (or, for that matter, dynamic) modals really establish epistemic 
grounding? The problem that directly concerns us here is whether the set is too 
small, since the semantic definition of the grounding predication would 
certainly permit the inclusion of the (epistemic) modals in languages where the 
form they take is clearly non-finite (e.g. German), or cognitive matrix 
predicates like likely, think, expect, believe, know, etc., which take finite subject 
or object clauses, but are also noted for clearly non-finite complementation in 
structures called Raising or Exceptional Case Marking in generative grammar.  
Langacker (2004:85), while acknowledging that ‘[i]t would ... be quite 
reasonable to use the term grounding for this wider range of phenomena’, still 
chooses to ‘understand grounding in the original, narrow sense’. For a 
thorough discussion of this problem area, see also Mortelmans (2002, 2006), 
Nuyts (2002) or Pelyvás (1996, 2000, 2006). 
In this paper, I propose to use the term grounding in the wider sense 
referred to above. This is partly because it seems possible to find ways of 
accommodating the semantic and syntactic side of Langacker’s definition, by 
postulating that 
• a non-finite form, being transitional in some sense, need not be 
summarily scanned; 
• a finite form need not be grounded by definition.  
Another reason is that Langacker’s proposed way out--cognitive 
predicates overriding values of grounding (in the narrow sense) already 
established in the clause, seems decidedly counterintuitive: the explanation that 
in (1) the speaker first establishes John as a criminal and then withdraws or 
overrides it by introducing likely seems to lack psychological reality. 
 
 (1) It is likely that John is a criminal. 
 
The most important reason, however, is that it is exactly the inclusion of 
this set of cognitive predicates into the set of grounding predications that gives 
us an opportunity to break away from a conception of (epistemic) modality as 
basically a probability scale or probability judgment by the speaker (which 
Langacker’s system still is). This step provides an opportunity to formulate 
epistemic modality in terms of the speaker’s finding, selecting, modifying or 
discarding cognitive models that (s)he finds fit or unfit for talking about a 
situation, and that the most important evidence for this is the ‘irregular’ 
syntactic behaviour of cognitive predicates, which brings them in many ways 
close to modal auxiliaries, and so makes them susceptible of being grounding 
predications (cf. Pelyvás 2001b:112-6). 
 
Syntactic evidence is given in what follows. 
As is well known, most cognitive predicates behave in ‘irregular’ ways 
in syntax (‘Raising’, ECM, long-distance movement, etc), which suggests that 
they are not easy clause members (disjuncts like probably) and not clearly 
matrix predicates, since movement with them can occur across what generative 
grammar regards as (transparent) clause boundaries. These phenomena find a 
natural solution if it is assumed that what we really have here is a grounding 
predication + grounded head complex, which is in many ways similar to what 
traditional grammar sees as a simple clause (but is in cognitive terms the 
combination of a grounding predication left implicit or expressed by a modal + 
a grounded head). The different acceptability of (2a) and (2b) clearly indicates a 
shift of attention from the grounding predication to the grounded head: 
 
 (2) a.  *I don’t think that John is a criminal, do I? 
 b.    I don’t think that John is a criminal, is he? 
 
3. Further extension. Epistemic grounding as the formation of an Idealized 
Cognitive Model 
 
3.1. The Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM) 
The basic idea behind this extension is that replacing the notion of the 
speaker’s probability judgment (of one option) with the speaker’s assessment of 
a number of options: his/her choice of an appropriate Idealized Cognitive 
Model is easily seen as organic development in the system of cognitive 
grammar. All conceptualization is essentially subjective, as it essentially 
consists in the conceptualizer making and revising hypotheses about what is 
going on, that is the creation of cognitive models. Epistemic modality can be 
seen as a marked instance of this process, when there may be some factors that 
force the speaker/conceptualizer to stop and think his position over.  
  The ICM is best defined as a situation: its participants and the 
relationships holding among them, as construed by the conceptualizer. Besides 
being highly subjective, it is also a very active process. The effort required can 
be measured by the ‘work’ required when one sits down to watch a film that has 
been running for a while (‘tuning in’), or when a psychotic patient tries to 
process a scene that would be child’s play to almost anyone. The following 
excerpt comes from a schizophrenic patient’s attempt at describing the scene of 
a little girl buying ice-cream:  
I saw a little girl who was moving a counter for some reason and I don’t know what 
the heck that was about. She was pressing against it okay. In the beginning I saw a 
white car with a red vinyl top and then this little girl was looking in the store was 
looking in the trash can or something and then she turned around and she went on she 
talked to her mother  and her father and neither one was listening to her …  (Chaika 
and Alexander (1986), discussed in terms of ICM formation in Pelyvás 1996: 95-102) 
 
3.2. ICM formation 
The complexity of the task may vary considerably in different situations. 
Sometimes it is easily seen as a simple probability judgment, as no alternative 
conceptualizations are imminent, as in (3), 
 
 (3) John may be an idiot 
 
but in cases where participants and relationships can form a more 
complex network, the formation of the most likely ICM may be a more 
complex process, as in (4): 
  
(4) Q: What’s that noise? 
 A: John may be building a ship in the basement. 
 
This answer can be regarded as the addressee’s search for a cognitive 
model that appropriately describes the situation. Some of the options are: 
• This may not be true. 
• Perhaps John is building sth. else (one participant has changed – the 
patient). 
• Perhaps John is repairing/destroying, etc. the ship (the content of the 
relationship has changed – still agentive) 
• Perhaps it is the wind (the nature of the relationship changes radically 
– no longer agentive) 
• Perhaps someone else is building a ship (one participant has changed – 
the agent) … etc., (e.g. What’s John building/doing? Who is building a 
ship? ….) 
 
 
3.3. Cognitive predicates 
It must be admitted that the English expressions containing only modals  
do not seem to provide much room for the linguistic expression of these 
differences, except perhaps for the possibilities given by passivization and 
stress or intonation, but it is possible to extend our means of expression by 
including cognitive predicates. There are marked differences between the 
examples in (5), similar to the ones that had to remain hidden in (4): 
 
 (5) a. It is likely that John is building a ship in the basement. 
 b. John is likely to be building a ship in the basement. 
 c. *That John is building a ship in the basement is likely. 
 
(5a) affords ‘global’ entry to the situation, (5b) symbolizes entry 
through a salient participant of the ICM – a reference point (cf. Langacker 
1995). Since a reference point is normally taken for granted, John is firmly 
established as a participant in the situation, even though all else may not be 
very certain. 
The ungrammaticality of (5c) is explained by the fact that a finite clause 
is normally taken to be grounded in immediate reality (fact) unless indicated 
otherwise, but the warning must be given in advance; the structure in (5c) 
would be grammatical if the matrix predicate were ‘strange’. 
Are alternative constructions in free variation? It might seem so, if we 
compare (6a) and (6b): 
 
 (6) a. It is likely that John is a criminal. 
 b. John is likely to be a criminal. 
 
But the structure in (6b) is about 13 times more frequent than (6a), in 
contrast with unlikely, where the two are roughly on a par (cf. Pelyvás 2002). 
The explanation may take us to epistemic grounding again: unlikely 
appears to be less of a grounding predication than its positive counterpart. 
 
3.4. Raising and the correction of an ICM 
One of the main tenets of cognitive grammar is that different 
grammatical forms are the manifestations of different conceptualizations. And, 
since there is a symbolic relationship between the two, the nature of the 
semantic difference motivates (if not determines in the strict mathematical 
sense) the grammatical form. One case in point is the raising (or Exceptional 
Case Marking - ECM) construction, which is often associated with the 
correction of a previously selected ICM. Let us begin with a few well-known 
examples. 
 
remember 
 (7) a  I remembered that John was bald. 
 b  I remembered John to be bald. 
 
know 
 (8) a  I know that John is honest. 
 b  I know John to be honest. 
 c  ?I have known that John is honest. 
 d  I have known John to be honest. 
 
(8b) may express uncertainty. The problem with (8c) is that a kind of 
incompatibility appears between the Present Perfect form of know, which 
suggests that the situation is now changing, and the fully grounded finite form 
of the subordinate clause. The effect that a previously established ICM is being 
changed, because it has now proved incorrect or inappropriate, is particularly 
strong in (7b) and (8d). 
Relying on the data obtained from the examples given in (5) to (8) 
concerning the nature of the ‘raising’ (ECM) construction, a hypothesis can 
now be formed that in most (if not) all cases there is a considerable difference 
in the factuality of the complement between the finite and the Raising (ECM) 
constructions. In the simplest cases, this means only unreliability of judgment 
(a probability scale), but in more complicated ones it may mark the speaker’s 
intention to discard a cognitive model previously seen as appropriate for 
describing a situation in favour of an other one seen now as more adequate.  
The conceptualizer can easily misconstrue a situation (a common source 
of misunderstanding among humans). When the mistake is understood and 
corrected, linguistic expression can be given to the correction, and a ‘raising’ 
construction appears to be a suitable tool for the purpose. It can also be 
hypothesised that the non-finite form occurring in the subordinate clause of the 
construction, with its less-than-fully grounded status, is in a symbolic 
relationship with this conceptual content.  
Compare now the sentences in (9): 
 
(9) a. I saw Steve steal your car, but at the time I thought that he was only 
borrowing it. 
 b. I saw Steve stealing your car, but … 
 c. *I saw that Steve stole your car, but … 
 
The difference between (9a and b) on the one hand and (9c) on the other 
is not in the grounding of the whole structure (something that the speaker does 
at the time of speaking), but in that of the subordinate structure marked in 
italics. The less than fully grounded non-finite form indicates a (now corrected) 
problem in conceptualization or ICM formation (borrowing vs. stealing), 
something that the conceptualizer does (or rather did) at the time of perception. 
The event was not conceptualized as stealing. 
 
3.5. Other structures marking the correction of an ICM 
To find further support and also a higher level of generalization for the 
hypothesis that the forms appearing in the complement of a cognitive predicate 
are in a symbolic relationship with its status relative to grounding, we can 
examine another language. Hungarian almost totally lacks raising, but still 
seems to have a much wider array of choices in the expression of ICM 
correction. Consider the possible Hungarian equivalents of the English 
sentences in (9):  
 
 (10) a. Láttam, hogy Pista *ellopta  az autódat,  
 I-see-Past that  Steve steal-Perf.-Past your car  
 
 de akkor azt   hittem,     hogy  csak kölcsönveszi. 
 but  then that I-believe-Past   that only he-borrow-Pres.= relative past  
 
 b.   ?ellopja 
   steal-Perf. Present = relative tense 
 
 c.    *lopta 
   steal-Imperf. Past 
 
 d.   *lopja 
                  steal-Imperf. Present = relative tense 
 
The unacceptable (10a) combines a finite object clause with the Past 
Tense, which is to be seen here as absolute: it relates the time of the situation to 
the time of utterance, giving it fully grounded status, in contrast to the relative 
tense appearing in (10b). The Present Tense form of (10b) relates the time of 
the event ‘only’ to the time of the matrix clause, but even that change will make 
the sentence only marginally acceptable. The imperfect forms in (10 c and d) 
only make the situation worse: they appear to strengthen a false link between 
seeing something and conceptualizing it as stealing at the time of the event. 
In (11) the object clause is replaced with a clause of manner, which 
improves the situation considerably, since the sentence is now more about the 
ingredients of the ICM that were observable to the conceptualizer at the time of 
conceptualization than about his/her formation of an (incorrect) cognitive 
model. The status of (11 c and d) do not seem to change: 
  
(11) a. Láttam,    ahogy Pista ellopta  az autódat, de akkor …  
 I-see-Past    how     Steve steal-Perf.-Past    your car         but  then... 
 
 b.   ellopja 
  steal-Perf. Present = relative tense 
 
 c.   *lopta 
  steal-Imperf. Past 
 d.   *lopja 
  steal-Imperf. Ppresent = relative tense 
 
In (12) we have a time clause in subordination, which only permits 
absolute tense. The marginal acceptability of (12b) may be attributable to the 
fact that the imperfect form, in opposition to its role in (10), an object clause, 
now marks the incompleteness of the experience, making its conceptualization 
more difficult. This contrast is similar to the difference between the English 
sentences in (9a) and (9b): 
 
 (12) a. Láttam,   amikor Pista     ellopta                 az autódat,     de akkor … 
 I-see-Past   when    Steve   steal-Perf.-Past     your car         but  then … 
 
 b.  ?lopta  
      steal-Imperf. Past 
 
Finally, structures similar to English ‘raising’ are also possible in 
Hungarian, even though only (13a) would be more than a very rough 
equivalent. In (13b) to (13d), the subject NP is easily seen as part of the 
conceptual content of the matrix clause as well: 
 (13) a.  Láttam            Pistát         ellopni          az  autódat, de akkor azt hittem … 
       I-see-Past    Steve-Acc    steal-Inf.         your car       but  then … 
 
 b.  Láttam           Pistát,          ahogy          ellopta            az autódat, de akkor...   
         I-see-Past      Steve-Acc    as/how        he-steal-Past     your car     but  then  
 
 c.  ahogy      ellopja  
  as/how      he-steal-Present = relative tense  
 
 d.   amikor    ellopta 
  when      he-steal-Past  
 
These sentences bring us back to an observation made in Section 3.3, in 
connection with the sentence (5b): the matrix object status (even if only 
transformationally introduced, but cf. Langacker (1995)) establishes the given 
participant as a reference point, whose correct conceptualization at least is to be 
regarded as certain. The reference point provides a salient point of entry to the 
situation—other participants or relationships in it may not be quite as certain. 
4. Conclusion 
Let me now give a brief summary of the constructions that may be 
regarded as being in a symbolic relationship with a less-than-fully grounded 
ICM: 
• The ‛raising’ (reference-point) construction. The ‛raised’ NP, serving as 
a reference point,  provides an ideal entry to a situation, also making sure that at 
least this participant’s status is unchallenged in the process of ICM selection. 
Almost anything else may be subject to change. 
• Absolute vs. relative tense. Tense is a grounding predication, which is 
always absolute in English (it relates a situation to the time of utterance). In 
Hungarian a relative tense also occurs in some constructions, which relates a 
situation to another situation – a less than fully grounded construction: this is 
only possible with a non-finite form in English. Absolute tense suggests that the 
original conceptualization is still valid. Only relative tense can convey the 
meaning that the original conceptualization (now seen as incorrect) has now 
been changed. 
• The type of clause. An adverbial clause establishes a far weaker 
connection from the point of view of conceptualization than an object clause 
does: the object is a conceptual reification that often requires fully established 
grounding. The adverbial clause does not have to say what I saw: it can afford 
to concentrate on only some of the participants or relationships observed on the 
scene, leaving the precise formulation of the ICM till later. 
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Abstract: In the ‘standard’ view of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
Kövecses 2002), metaphorical creativity arises from the cognitive processes of 
extending, elaborating, questioning, and combining conceptual content in the source 
domain (Lakoff and Turner 1989). I will propose that such cases constitute only a part 
of our metaphorcal creativity. An equally important and common set of cases is 
comprised by ‘context-induced’ metaphors; five such types will be discussed, which 
have not been investigated systematically so far, though they seem to form a large part 
of our metaphorical creativity. 
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1. Introduction 
In the ‘standard’ view of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980; Kövecses, 2002), metaphorical creativity arises from the cognitive 
processes of extending, elaborating, questioning, and combining conceptual 
content in the source domain (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). I will propose that 
such cases constitute only a part of metaphorical creativity. An equally 
important and common set of cases is represented by what I call “context-
induced” metaphors. I will discuss five such types: metaphors induced by (1) 
the immediate linguistic context itself, (2) what we know about the major 
entities participating in the discourse, (3) the physical setting, (4), the social 
setting, and (5) the immediate cultural context. Such metaphors have not been 
systematically investigated so far, though they seem to form a large part of our 
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metaphorical creativity.One of the criticisms of conceptual metaphor theory 
(CMT) is that it conceives of metaphors as highly conventional static 
conceptual structures (the correspondences, or mappings, between a source and 
a target domain). It would follow from this that such conceptual structures 
manifest themselves in the form of highly conventional metaphorical linguistic 
expressions (like the metaphorical meanings in a dictionary) based on such 
mappings. If correct, this view does not easily lend itself to an account of 
metaphorical creativity. Clearly, we often come across novel metaphorical 
expressions in real discourse. If all there is to metaphor were static conceptual 
structures matched by highly conventional linguistic expressions, it would seem 
that CMT runs into difficulty in accounting for the many unconventional and 
novel expressions we find in discourse. I will discuss various types of 
metaphorical creativity in this paper. 
The paper will examine the interrelations among metaphor, discourse, 
and metaphorical creativity. I will propose (1) that metaphorical creativity in 
discourse can involve several distinct cases and (2) that conceptualizers rely on 
a number of contextual factors when they use novel metaphors in discourse.  
 
2. Metaphorical creativity in discourse 
 
Metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve a variety of distinct 
forms. In my Metaphor in Culture (2005), I distinguished two types: creativity 
that is based on the source domain and creativity that is based on the target 
domain. “Source-related” creativity can be of two kinds: “source-internal” and 
“source-external” creativity. Source-internal creativity involves cases that 
Lakoff and Turner (1989) describe as elaboration and extending, where unused 
source-internal conceptual materials are utilized to comprehend the target. 
“Source-external” cases of creativity operate with what I called the “range of 
the target,” in which a particular target domain receives new, additional source 
domains in its conceptualization (Kövecses, 2005). The type of creativity in 
discourse that is based on the target was also described by Kövecses (2005). In 
it, a particular target, that is conventionally associated with a source, “connects 
back” to the source, taking further knowledge structures from it. We can call 
this “target-induced” creativity. 
In the remainder of the paper, I will suggest that there is yet another 
form of metaphorical creativity in discourse – creativity that is induced by the 
context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes place. This kind of 
creativity has not been systematically explored in the cognitive linguistic 
literature on metaphor. 
I will term the creativity that is based on the context of metaphorical 
conceptualization ‘context-induced’ creativity. This occurs where the 
emergence of a particular metaphorical expression is due to the influence of 
some aspect of discourse. In particular, five such contextual aspects, or factors, 
seem to produce unconventional and novel metaphors: (1) the immediate 
linguistic context itself, (2) what we know about the major entities participating 
in the discourse, (3) physical setting, (4) social setting, and (5) the immediate 
cultural context. There are surely others, but I will limit myself to the 
discussion of these five. 
  
2.1. The effect of the linguistic context on metaphor use 
Let us provisionally think of discourse as being composed of a series of 
concepts organized in a particular way. The concepts that participate in 
discourse may give rise to either conventional or unconventional and novel 
linguistic metaphors. I propose that metaphorical expressions can be selected 
because of the influence of the immediate linguistic context, that is, the 
concepts that surround the conceptual slot where we need a word or phrase to 
express a particular meaning. Jean Aitchison (1987) made an interesting 
observation that bears on this issue. She noted that in newspaper articles and 
headlines about (American) football games, the names of the teams may select 
particular metaphors for defeat and victory. She found such examples as 
follows in the sports pages of American newspapers: “Cougars drown 
Beavers,” “Cowboys corral Buffaloes,” “Air Force torpedoes the Navy,” 
“Clemson cooks Rice” (Aitchison, 1987: 143). The metaphors used in these 
sentences are selected on the basis of the names of football teams. Since 
beavers live in water, defeat can be metaphorically viewed as drowning; since 
cowboys corral cattle, the opponent can be corralled; since navy ships can be 
torpedoed, the opponent can be torpedoed, too; and since rice can be cooked, 
the same process can be used to describe the defeat of the opponent. The 
metaphors in the above sentences indicate that the target domain of DEFEAT can 
be variously expressed as drowning, corralling, etc., the choice depending on 
the concepts (in this case, corresponding to the names of the teams) that make 
up the utterances in which the metaphor is embedded.  
Defeating an opponent is a form of symbolic control, in the same way as 
the sports activities themselves are symbolic activities. In general, defeating an 
opponent is conceptualized as physically and/or socially controlling an entity 
(either animate or inanimate). The high-level, schematic conceptual metaphor 
DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL  AND/OR SOCIAL CONTROL is pervasive in English (and also 
in other languages); metaphorical words for this conceptualization abound: 
beat, upset, subdue, knock out, clobber, kill, demolish, conquer, crush, dash, 
destroy, dust, lick, overcome, overwhelm, ruin, stump, vanquish, thrash, 
trample, trounce, and literally hundreds of others. The words all indicate some 
form of physical or social control. The words cook and torpedo from 
Aitchison’s examples could be added to this list, although they seem to be 
somewhat less conventional than the others. Since defeat is conceptualized as 
physical and social control, it makes sense for the author to use the words cook 
and torpedo in the conceptual slot in the neighborhood of the concepts RICE and 
NAVY, respectively. It makes sense because the frame for RICE involves 
COOKING and the frame for NAVY can involve the weapon TORPEDO, on the one 
hand, and because COOKING and TORPEDOING are ways of physically controlling 
an entity, on the other.  
There is, however, more complication we need to be aware of. In the 
SPORTS COMPETITION frame, or more specifically, the AMERICAN FOOTBALL 
frame, there are two opponents, there is an activity on the basis of which the 
winner is decided, and a resulting relationship between the two opponents: one 
opponent defeating the other. Given these minimal elements in the frame, we 
can say that one team defeats another and we can choose a word from the list 
above to express this meaning. We do this on the basis of the metaphor DEFEAT 
IS PHYSICAL/SOCIAL CONTROL. However, how do the concepts of RICE and NAVY 
that are used in the source domain of this metaphor end up in the AMERICAN 
FOOTBALL frame? American football teams are not identical to RICE and NAVY; 
these are concepts that we primarily associate with very different entities, such 
as plants and the armed forces, respectively. Football teams are not plants or 
armed forces. Obviously, they enter the frame, because they are the names of 
the two football teams. They enter it on the basis of the metonymy NAME FOR 
THE INSTITUTION (i.e., NAME OF THE TEAM FOR THE TEAM). This metonymy is 
crucial in understanding the selection of the particular linguistic expressions for 
defeat. Without the metonymically introduced names for the teams, it would be 
much less likely for the author to use the terms cook and torpedo.  
The other two words in the set of examples offered by Aitchison, corral 
and drown, require similar treatment. We should note, however, that corralling 
and drowning are even less conventional cases of talking about defeat than cook 
and torpedo are. What nevertheless makes them perfectly understandable and 
natural in the context is that the frame for AMERICAN FOOTBALL contains the 
names Cowboys and Beavers. The words corral and drown are coherent with 
these names, on the one hand, and they also fit the DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/SOCIAL 
CONTROL metaphor, on the other.  
In other words, there seem to be three constraints on the use of such 
metaphorical expressions in discourse. First, the words used must be consistent 
with an element of the conceptual frame that occurs in the discourse (such as 
that for DEFEAT). This would simply ensure that we use literal or metaphorical 
linguistic expressions for DEFEAT, and not for something else. Second, the 
linguistic metaphor must be consistent with a high-level, schematic metaphor, 
conventionally used for that element (such as DEFEAT). In the case above, it 
would be DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/ SOCIAL CONTROL. Third, the linguistic metaphors 
chosen on the basis of such metaphors should (probably must would be too 
strong a word here) be consistent with other more specific elements in the same 
frame (such as AMERICAN FOOTBALL). Such more specific elements within the 
AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame would be the names of the teams.  
 
2.2. The effect of knowledge about major entities in the discourse on 
metaphor use 
In other cases, it seems to be our knowledge about the entities 
participating in the discourse that plays a role in choosing our metaphors in real 
discourse. Major entities participating in discourse include the speaker 
(conceptualizer), the hearer (addressee/ conceptualizer), and the entity or 
process we talk about (topic). I shall discuss two such examples, involving the 
topic and the speaker/ conceptualizer. 
To begin, I will reanalyze an example first discussed in Kövecses 
(2005). The Hungarian daily Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation) carried an 
article some years ago about some of the political leaders of neighboring 
countries, who were felt at the time to be antagonistic to Hungary. One of them, 
the then Slovak president, Meciar, used to be a boxer. This gave a Hungarian 
journalist a chance to use the following metaphor that is based on this particular 
property of the former Slovak president: 
 
A pozsonyi exbokszolóra akkor viszünk be atlanti pontot érő ütést, ha az ilyen 
helyzetekben megszokott nyugati módra “öklözünk”: megvető távolságot tartva. 
(Hungarian Nation, September 13, 1997) 
We deal a blow worth an Atlantic point to the ex-boxer of Bratislava if we box in a 
western style as customary in these circumstances: keeping an aloof distance. (my 
translation). 
 
Confrontational international politics is commonly conceptualized as 
war, sports, games, etc. There are many different kinds of war, sports, and 
games, all of which could potentially be used to talk about confrontational 
international politics. In all probability, the journalist chose boxing because of 
his knowledge (shared by many of his readers) about one of the entities that 
constitute the topic of the discourse.  
In using the metaphor CONFRONTATIONAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IS 
BOXING, the author is relying both on some conventional and unconventional 
mappings. What is common to the war, sports, and games metaphors is, of 
course, that they all focus on and highlight the notion of winning in relation to 
the activity to which they apply. This is their shared “meaning focus” 
(Kövecses, 2000, 2002) and this is what makes up the conventional part of the 
metaphor. The boxer corresponding to the politician and the blows exchanged 
corresponding to the political statements made are explicitly present in the 
discourse in question. In addition, we also assume that both boxers want to win 
and that the participating politicians want the same (whatever winning means in 
politics). However, the manner in which the boxers box and politicians argue is 
not a part of the conventional framework of the metaphor. “Keeping an aloof 
distance” probably comes into the discourse as a result of the author thinking 
about the target domain of politics. In the author’s view, politics regarding 
Meciar should be conducted in a cool, detached manner. What corresponds to 
this way of doing politics in boxing is that you box in a way that you keep an 
aloof distance from your opponent.  
In the previous case (Meciar as the topic), the metaphor was selected 
and elaborated as a result of what the conceptualizer knows about the topic. 
It is also possible to find cases where the selection of a metaphor 
depends on knowledge that the conceptualizer has about himself or herself. 
What is especially intriguing about such cases is that the author’s 
(conceptualizer’s) knowledge about him/herself does not need to be conscious. 
The next example, taken from my previous work (Kövecses, 2005), but 
reanalyzed here, demonstrates this possibility. As one would expect, one 
important source of such cases is the area of therapy or psychological 
counseling. In a therapeutic context, people commonly create novel metaphors 
as a result of unique and traumatic life experiences. The metaphors that are 
created under these circumstances need not be consciously formed. The 
example that I am going to give comes from an article in the magazine A & U 
(March, 2003) about photographic artist Frank Jump.  
Frank Jump photographs old painted mural advertisements in New York 
City. He has AIDS, but he has outlived his expected life span. His life and his 
art are intimately connected metaphorically. The conceptual metaphor operative 
here could be put as follows: SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE 
CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR 
EXPECTED “LIFE SPAN.” At first, Jump was not consciously aware that he was 
working within the frame of a conceptual metaphor that relies on his condition. 
In his own words:  
 
In the beginning, I didn’t make the connection between the subject matter and my own 
sero-positivity. I was asked to be part of the Day Without Art exhibition a few years 
ago and didn’t think I was worthy—other artists’ work was much more HIV-specific. 
… But my mentor said, “Don’t you see the connection? You’re documenting 
something that was never intended to live this long. You never intended to live this 
long.” [p. 27; italics in the original] 
 
The mentor made the conceptual metaphor conscious for the artist. I 
believe something similar is happening in many cases of psychotherapy and 
counseling.  
It is clear that the metaphor SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO 
THE CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR 
EXPECTED “LIFE SPAN” is anything but a conventional conceptual metaphor. The 
metaphor is created by Frank Jump as a novel analogy – the unconscious but 
nevertheless real analogy between surviving one’s expected life span as a 
person who has AIDS and the survival of the mural advertisements that were 
created to be around on the walls of some buildings in New York City for only 
a limited amount of time. In this case, (unconscious) self-knowledge leads the 
conceptualizer to find the appropriate analogy. The analogy is appropriate 
because the source and the target domains share schematic structural 
resemblance; namely, an entity existing longer than expected. The resulting 
metaphor(ical analogy) is novel and creative and it comes about as a result of 
what the conceptualizer knows about himself. 
 
2.3. The effect of physical setting on metaphor use 
The physical setting may also influence the selection and use of 
particular metaphors in discourse. The physical setting possibly includes, 
among other things, the physical events and their consequences that make up or 
are part of the setting, the various aspects of the physical environment, and the 
perceptual qualities that characterize the setting. I shall briefly discuss an 
example for the first two. 
The first of these, physical events and their consequences, is well 
demonstrated by a statement made by an American journalist who traveled to 
New Orleans to do an interview with Fats Domino, the famous American 
musician and singer, two years after the devastation wreaked by hurricane 
Katrina, when the city of New Orleans was still struggling with many of the 
consequences of the hurricane. The journalist comments:  
 
The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino’s life, though he’s loath to confess any 
inconvenience or misery outside of missing his social circle … (USA TODAY, 2007, 
September 21, Section 6B) 
 
The metaphorical statement “The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino’s 
life” is based on the general metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and its more specific 
version LIFE IS A SEA JOURNEY. The SEA JOURNEY source domain is chosen 
probably because of the role of the sea in the hurricane. More importantly, it 
should be noted that the verb capsize is used (as opposed to, say, run aground), 
though it is not a conventional linguistic manifestation of either the general 
JOURNEY or the more specific SEA JOURNEY source domains. I suggest that this 
verb is selected by the journalist as a result of the (still) visible consequences in 
New Orleans of the hurricane as a devastating physical event. The physical 
setting thus possibly triggers extension of an existing conventional conceptual 
metaphor and causes the speaker/ conceptualizer to choose a metaphorical 
expression that best fits that setting. 
Next, let us consider environmental conditions as a part of the physical 
setting. The physical setting as a potential cause of, or factor in, what 
metaphors we choose was first studied by Boers (1999). He started from the 
following general hypothesis: people will make more extensive use of a source 
domain when that particular source domain becomes more salient for them 
under certain circumstances. In other words, certain changes in the 
circumstances of the communicative situation may make people more aware of 
a particular source domain, and this may result in an increased use of the source 
domain in metaphorical conceptualization. The specific hypothesis was that the 
source domain of HEALTH will be especially productive of linguistic expressions 
in winter, because this is the time when, at least in countries of the northern 
hemisphere, people are more aware of their bodies through the more frequent 
occurrence of illnesses (such as colds, influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis). The 
particular target domain that was selected for the study was ECONOMY. Thus, 
according to this hypothesis, we can expect an increase in the relative salience 
of the ECONOMY IS HEALTH metaphor in the winter period. The salience of the 
HEALTH domain was assessed in terms of the frequency of health-related 
metaphorical expressions for economy.  
In order to test his hypothesis, Boers counted all the metaphorical 
expressions that have to do with economy and that are based on the HEALTH 
source domain in the editorials of all issues of the English weekly magazine 
The Economist over a period of ten years. The study resulted in a sample of 
over one million words. Here is a selection of some of the metaphorical 
expressions that he identified: “healthy companies,” “sickly firms,” “economic 
remedy,” “symptoms of a corporate disease,” “a financial injection,” “arthritic 
markets,” “economic recovery,” and many others. The heavy presence of such 
and similar expressions shows that economy is commonly talked and thought 
about in terms of bodily health. The question for the researcher was whether 
there was any fluctuation in the frequency of use of the HEALTH metaphor from 
season to season. Boers found that the frequency of the metaphor was  
systematically highest between the months of December and March in the ten 
years under investigation. During this period, the frequency of health-related 
metaphors for economy went up and stayed higher in the winter. This finding 
supported the hypothesis. When the HEALTH domain becomes more salient for 
people, they make more extensive use of it than when it is less salient.  
We can reinterpret Boers’ findings in the following way. Since the 
physical setting is part of the communicative situation, it may play a role in 
selecting particular metaphorical source domains. In the present example, 
wintertime is more likely to lead to the selection of health-related metaphors 
than to other metaphors, simply because such metaphors may be higher up in 
awareness than others, due to the adverse impact of the physical environment 
on conceptualizers.  
 
2.4. The effect of social setting on metaphor use 
When we use metaphors, we use them in a social context. The social 
context can be extremely variable: it can involve anything from the social 
relationships that obtain between the participants of the discourse through their 
gender roles to the various social occasions in which the discourse takes place. 
Let us take an example for the last possibility from the American newspaper 
USA TODAY. 
As mentioned above, in 2007 the newspaper carried an article about Fats 
Domino, one of the great living musicians, based in flood-stricken New 
Orleans. In the article, the journalist describes in part Domino’s life after 
Katrina – the hurricane that destroyed his house and caused a lot of damage to 
his life and that of many other people in New Orleans. The subtitle of the article 
reads: 
The rock ‘n’ roll pioneer rebuilds his life—and on the new album ‘Goin’ Home,’ his 
timeless music. (USA TODAY, 2007, September 21, Section 6B) 
 
How can we account for the use of the metaphor “rebuilds his life” in 
this text? We could simply suggest that this is an instance of the LIFE IS A 
BUILDING conceptual metaphor and that whatever meaning is intended to be 
conveyed by the expression is most conventionally conveyed by this particular 
conceptual metaphor and this particular metaphorical expression. But then this 
may not entirely justify the use of the expression. There are potentially other 
conceptual metaphors (and corresponding metaphorical expressions) that could 
also be used to achieve a comparable semantic effect. Two that readily come to 
mind include the LIFE IS A JOURNEY and the LIFE IS A MACHINE conceptual 
metaphors. We could also say that x set out again on his/her path or that after 
his/her life broke down, x got it to work again or restarted it. These and similar 
metaphors would enable the speaker/ conceptualizer and the hearer to come to 
the interpretation that the rebuilding idea activates. 
 However, of the potentially possible choices, it is the LIFE IS A BUILDING 
metaphor that is selected for the purpose. In all probability this is because, at 
the time of the interview, Domino was also in the process of rebuilding his 
house that was destroyed by the hurricane in 2005. If this is correct, it can be 
suggested that the social situation (rebuilding his house) triggered, or 
facilitated, the choice of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A BUILDING. In other 
words, a real-world instance of a source domain is more likely to lead to the 
choice of a source concept of which it is an instance than to that of a source 
domain of which it is not. In this sense, the social setting may play a role in the 
selection of certain preferred conceptual metaphors, and hence of certain 
preferred metaphorical expressions in discourse.  
 In such cases, the emerging general picture seems to be as follows: 
There is a particular social setting and there is a particular meaning that needs 
to be activated. If the meaning can be activated by means of a metaphorical 
mapping that fits the social setting, speakers/ conceptualizers will prefer to 
choose that mapping (together with the linguistic expression that is based on the 
mapping). More simply, if the social setting involves an element that is an 
instance of an appropriate source domain, speakers are likely to use that source 
domain.  
 
2.5. The effect of the immediate cultural context on metaphor use 
The social setting can be relatively easily distinguished from the cultural 
context when we have to deal with social roles, social relations, and social 
power. However, the social setting is less clearly distinguishable from what I 
call the “cultural context” in many other cases. The situation I wish to describe 
in this section is probably more cultural than social, in that it lacks such 
straightforward social elements and characteristics as power, relations, and 
roles.  
Consider the following example, taken from the San Francisco 
Chronicle, in which Bill Whalen, a professor of political science at Stanford 
and an advisor to Arnold Schwarzenegger, uses metaphorical language about 
the actor who later became the governor of California: 
 
“Arnold Schwarzenegger is not the second Jesse Ventura or the second Ronald 
Reagan, but the first Arnold Schwarzenegger,” said Bill Whalen, a Hoover Institution 
scholar who worked with Schwarzenegger on his successful ballot initiative last year 
and supports the actor’s campaign for governor. 
“He’s a unique commodity – unless there happens to be a whole sea of immigrant body 
builders who are coming here to run for office. This is ‘Rise of the Machine,’ not 
‘Attack of the Clones.’” (San Francisco Chronicle, A16, August 17, 2003) 
 
Of interest in this connection are the metaphors He’s a unique 
commodity and particularly This is ‘Rise of the Machine,’ not ‘Attack of the 
Clones.’ The first one is based on a completely conventional conceptual 
metaphor: PEOPLE ARE COMMODITIES, as shown by the very word commodity to 
describe the actor. The other two are highly unconventional and novel. What 
makes Bill Whalen produce these unconventional metaphors and what allows 
us to understand them? There are, I suggest, two reasons. First, and more 
obviously, it is because Arnold Schwarzenegger played in the first of these 
movies. In other words, what sanctions the use of these metaphorical 
expressions has to do with the knowledge that the conceptualizer (Whalen) has 
about the topic of the discourse (Schwarzenegger). Second, and less obviously, 
but more importantly, he uses the metaphors because these are movies that, at 
the time of speaking (i.e., 2003), everyone knew about in California and the 
US. In other words, they were part and parcel of the immediate cultural context. 
Significantly, the second movie, Attack of the Clones, does not feature 
Schwarzenegger, but it is the key to understanding the contrast between 
individual and copy that Whalen is referring to. 
Given this knowledge, people can figure out what Whalen intended to 
say, which was that Schwarzenegger is a unique individual and not one of a 
series of look-alikes. But figuring this out may not be as easy and 
straightforward as it seems. After all, the metaphor Rise of the Machine does 
not clearly and explicitly convey the idea that Schwarzenegger is unique in any 
sense. (As a matter of fact, the mention of machines goes against our intuitions 
of uniqueness.) However, we get this meaning via two textual props. The first 
one is a series of statements by Whalen: “Arnold Schwarzenegger is not the 
second Jesse Ventura or the second Ronald Reagan, but the first Arnold 
Schwarzenegger” and “He’s a unique commodity – unless there happens to be a 
whole sea of immigrant body builders who are coming here to run for office.” 
What seems to be the case here is that the speaker emphasizes the idea of 
individuality before he uses the MACHINE metaphor. But not even this prior 
emphasis would be sufficient by itself. Imagine that the text stops with the 
words “…This is ‘Rise of the Machine.’” I think most native speakers would be 
baffled and have a hard time understanding what Whalen meant to say in this 
last sentence. Therefore, in order to fully understand the discourse, we badly 
need the second textual prop, which is: “not ‘Attack of the Clones.’” It is 
against the background of this phrase that we understand what the metaphorical 
expression Rise of the Machine might possibly mean.  
In other words, in this case, we have an entirely novel (but contextually 
motivated) metaphor in the discourse. In order to understand the meaning of 
this metaphorical phrase we need support from the neighboring linguistic 
context. In the present example, it is provided in the form of the two contextual 
props discussed above.  
 
2.6. The combined effect of factors on metaphor use 
For the sake of the clarity of analysis, I have tried to show the relevance 
to the selection of discourse metaphors of each of the factors one by one. But 
this does not mean that in reality they always occur in an isolated fashion. As a 
matter of fact, it is reasonable to expect them to co-occur in real discourse. For 
example, a person’s concerns, or interests, as a factor may combine with 
additional knowledge about himself or herself, as well as the topic of the 
discourse, and the three can, in this way, powerfully influence how the 
conceptualizer will express himself or herself metaphorically. The next and 
final example demonstrates this possibility in a fairly clear way. 
At the time of working on the present article (January through March, 
2008), there was heated debate in Hungarian society about whether the country 
should adopt a health insurance system, similar to that in the U.S.A., based on 
competing privately-owned health insurance companies, rather than staying 
with a single, state-owned and state-regulated system. As part of the debate, 
many people volunteered their opinion on this issue in a variety of media, the 
Internet being one of them. As I was following the debate on the Internet, I 
found an article that can serve, in my view, as a good demonstration of a 
situation in which one’s use of metaphors in a discourse is informed by a 
combination of factors, not just a single one.  
A Hungarian doctor published a substantial essay in one of the 
Hungarian news networks about the many potential undesirable consequences 
of the proposed new privatized system. He outlines and introduces what he has 
to say in his essay in the following way (given first in the Hungarian original):  
 
Dolgozatom a gondolkodási időben született. 
Célkitűzése a törvény várható hatásainak elemzése. 
Módszereiben az orvosi gondolkodást követi. 
A magyar egészségügyet képzeli a beteg helyzetébe. 
Kezelőorvosnak a kormányt tekinti, és konzulensként a szakértőket illetve a szerzőt 
magát kéri fel. 
A prognózis meghatározás feltételének tekinti a helyes diagnózist. 
Végül röviden megvizsgálja van-e alternatív kezelési lehetőség. 
 
Here’s an almost literal translation of the text into English: 
 
This paper was born in the period when people think about the issue. 
Its objective is to analyze the expected effects of the law. 
In its methods, it follows the way doctors think. 
It imagines Hungarian health care as the patient. 
It takes the government as the attending physician, and invites experts and the author 
(of the article) himself to be the consultants. 
It considers the correct diagnosis to be the precondition for predicting the prognosis. 
Finally it briefly examines if there is an alternative possibility for treatment. 
 
Unless the author of the article deliberately wishes to provide an 
illustration for the use of metaphors in discourse and/or has read Lakoff and 
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, and/or, even less likely, that he has read my 
Metaphor in Culture (and I doubt that either of these is the case), this is a 
remarkable example of how a combination of contextual factors can influence 
the way we often speak/write and think metaphorically. The author of the 
article is a doctor himself/herself, we can assume he has a great deal of interest 
in his job (he took the trouble of writing the article), and he is writing about 
Hungarian health care. The first of these is concerned with what I called 
knowledge about the speaker/conceptualizer; the second corresponds to 
personal concern, or interest (related to the speaker) (see Kövecses, 2005); and 
the third involves what was called the topic of the discourse. It seems that the 
three factors are jointly responsible for the way the author uses metaphors in the 
discourse (and, given this example, for how he, in addition, actually structures 
what he says). Needless to say, many other combinations of factors can be 
imagined and expected to co-occur in and influence real discourse.  
 
3. An extended view of metaphorical creativity 
 
We are now in a position to discuss two important issues regarding 
metaphorical creativity. First, we can ask what the sources of metaphorical 
creativity are, and second, we can try to tackle the issue of the role of the 
communicative situation in metaphorical creativity.  
 
3.1. What are the sources of metaphorical creativity? 
The “standard” version of CMT operates with largely uncontextualized 
or minimally contextualized linguistic examples of hypothesized conceptual 
metaphors. The conceptual metaphors are seen as constituted by sets of 
mappings between the source and the target domains. The mappings are 
assumed to be fairly static conceptual structures. The linguistic metaphors that 
are motivated by such static correspondences are entrenched, conventional 
expressions that eventually find their way to good, detailed dictionaries of 
languages. Dictionaries and the meanings they contain represent what is static 
and highly conventional about particular languages. In this view it is 
problematic to account for metaphorical creativity. How does this somewhat 
simplified and rough characterization of “standard” CMT change in light of the 
work reported in this paper?  
If we look at metaphors from a discourse perspective and if we try to 
draw conclusions on the basis of what we have found here, we can see three 
important sources of metaphorical creativity. The first is the type of creativity 
that arises from the source domain (in its source-internal and source-external 
versions), the second derives from the target domain, and the third emerges 
from the context. Since I have discussed the first two elsewhere (see Kövecses, 
2005), I shall deal with the third type only. 
The third type of metaphorical creativity is what I call “context-
induced” creativity. To the best of my knowledge, apart from some sporadic 
instances (such as Aitchison, 1987; Koller, 2004; Kövecses, 2005; Semino, 
2008; Benczes, to appear), the issue of context-induced metaphorical creativity 
has not been systematically investigated. A considerable portion of novel 
metaphorical language seems to derive from such contextual factors as the 
immediate linguistic context, knowledge about discourse participants, physical 
setting, and the like. It remains to be seen how robust the phenomenon is and 
whether it deserves serious further investigation. Based on an informal 
collection of data from a variety of newspapers, it appears that the context 
provides a major source of motivation for the use of many novel metaphors. 
These metaphors are clearly not, in Grady’s (1999) classification, either 
resemblance or correlation-based cases. They seem to have a unique status, in 
that they are grounded in the context in which metaphorical conceptualization is 
taking place.  
 
3.2. The role of context in metaphorical creativity 
Many of the examples of unconventional metaphoric language we have 
seen in this paper could simply not be explained without taking into account a 
series of contextual factors. Five such factors have been identified, but possibly 
there are more. My claim is that in addition to the well studied conceptual 
metaphors and metaphorical analogies used to convey meanings and achieve 
rhetorical functions in discourse, conceptualizers are also very much aware and 
take advantage of the various factors that make up the immediate context in 
which metaphorical conceptualization takes place. 
The linguistic context is constituted by the various conceptual frames 
(including temporary mental spaces) and symbolic units (form-meaning pairs, 
or, simply, words) representing and activating the frames. Metaphorically-used 
expressions (i.e., metaphoric symbolic units) are placed into this flow of frames 
and words at appropriate points in the manner explained in the discussion of 
several of the examples. Thus the most immediate context in which 
metaphorical expressions are used is the linguistic context; more specifically 
and precisely, the frames that immediately precede and provide the slot into 
which linguistic metaphors can be inserted. This flow of discourse can be 
imagined as a line of successive (though not necessarily temporally arranged) 
frames (with the frames commonly nested in more general frames).  
The major entities that participate in the discourse are the speaker/ 
conceptualizer, the topic, and the hearer/ conceptualizer. The speaker and the 
hearer are both also conceptualizers in the sense that both the production and 
the understanding of discourse requires the activation of literal, metonymic, and 
metaphoric frames. More importantly for the present purpose, the speaker may 
have, sometimes detailed, knowledge about him- or herself, the hearer, and the 
topic. As we have seen, in the case of the speaker, this knowledge need not be 
conscious. The knowledge the speaker has about these entities may form the 
basis of the use of both conventional and unconventional metaphors in 
discourse.  
Discourses do not occur in a vacuum. The three types of situations that I 
have considered in the paper include the physical environment, the social 
setting, and the immediate cultural context. This means that the speaker and the 
hearer are communicating about a topic (i.e., producing and reproducing a 
discourse) in a specific and immediate physical, social, and cultural context. 
The use of metaphors is affected by less specific and less immediate contexts as 
well, such as the “broader cultural context” (see Kövecses, 2005), but this 
larger context was not the focus of this paper. Moreover, as was noted above, 
each of these contextual factors comes in a variety of distinct forms, and they 
can shade into each other. Finally, all the factors can affect the use of metaphors 
in discourse simultaneously, and they can do so in various combinations.  
We can imagine the three factors as frames that are nested in one 
another, such that the physical setting as the outermost frame includes the social 
frame that includes the cultural frame, where we find the speaker/ 
conceptualizer, the hearer/ conceptualizer, and the topic, as well as the diagram 
for the flow of discourse. These contextual factors can trigger, or prime, singly 
or in combination, the use of conventional or unconventional and novel 
metaphorical expressions in the discourse. We can represent the joint workings 
of these factors in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
As noted, all the factors can trigger the use of metaphors in discourse. In 
some cases, the contextual factors will simply lead to the emergence and use of 
well-worn, conventional metaphorical expressions, but in others, they may 
produce genuinely novel expressions. We can call this mechanism the “pressure 
of coherence,” a notion I introduced elsewhere (Kövecses, 2005). The pressure 
of coherence includes all the mechanisms that lead to the use of particular 
metaphors in discourse. The core idea is that we try to be coherent, in addition 
to the body, with most of the other, especially contextual, factors that regulate 
what we say and think.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The paper has examined the interrelations among the notions of 
metaphor, discourse, and creativity. Several important connections have been 
found. 
First, metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve several distinct 
cases: (a) the case where a novel source domain is applied or novel elements of 
the source are applied to a given target domain (source-induced creativity); (b) 
the case where elements of the target, originally not involved in a set of 
constitutive mappings, are utilized and found matching counterparts in the 
source (target-induced creativity); (c) the case where various contextual factors 
lead to novel metaphors (context-induced creativity).  
Second, context plays a crucial role in understanding why we use certain 
metaphors as we produce discourse. Conceptualizers seem to rely on a number 
of contextual factors when they use metaphors in discourse. The ones that have 
been identified in the paper include the immediate linguistic context, the 
knowledge conceptualizers have about themselves and the topic, the immediate 
cultural context, the social context, and the physical setting. Since all of these 
are shared between the speaker and hearer (the conceptualizers), the contextual 
factors facilitate the development and mutual understanding of the discourse. 
Given the evidence in the paper, we can conclude that conceptualizers 
try and tend to be coherent not only with their bodies (as is the case with 
correlational metaphors), but also with the various facets of the context in the 
course of metaphorically conceptualizing the world. The study of these 
phenomena may lead us to recognize so far unexplored aspects of metaphorical 
creativity in everyday language and thought, and beyond (see, Kövecses, in 
press/2010). 
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 Abstract: Proposing a cognitive semantic exploration of the metaphorical 
representations of careers in English, the article seeks to reveal the conceptual display 
of metaphorical patterns across a range of distinct discourse areas. Career interviews, 
business articles focused on career development in the business written press, as well 
as career opportunities sections on company websites are interrogated for this 
purpose.  
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1. Introduction 
While the career-focused literature does mention and explore the 
intricacies of some of the career metaphors in English, it does little to restore 
and highlight the linguistic-conceptual link underlying the metaphorical 
dimensions of texts. Inkson’s (2007) theoretical and practical examination of 
career case studies, which excels at anchoring psychology into real life, lacks a 
sustained interaction with an unremittingly linguistic insight into career 
descriptions. El Sawad’s (2005) attempt to unlock career metaphors zeroes in 
the conceptual-linguistic interplay, but it is restrained to the career accounts of 
twenty graduate level employees, obtained through free elicitation. Although 
the results of Sawad’s analysis mark an important step in career studies, they lie 
within the perimeter of the controlled experiment. The persons’ profiles and 
interview contexts in which the quest for metaphorical career patterns will be 
herein conducted are destined to parallel the inquiries into the manipulation of 
career metaphors in English, by adding an unexplored discoursal frame to the 
targeted conceptions of careers. 
The research presented in the current study has two main aims: on the 
one hand, to survey three directions of the written business and economics 
discourse, seeking to reveal the spectrum of the ‘canonical’ career metaphor 
patterns; on the other hand, to suggest that the selection of metaphors is not 
accidental in each genre.  
The identification of metaphorical patterns is based on Charteris-Black’s 
(2004) and Cameron’s (1999) proposals. Thus, the linguistic metaphorical 
layer, which constitutes the potential activator of the conceptual mappings 
between the target concept domain and the source domain, is identified on the 
basis of a set of necessary conditions: first, if reference to a Topic domain is 
made by a Vehicle term (or terms); second, if there is potentially an incongruity 
between the domain of the Vehicle term and the Topic domain; third, if it is 
possible for a receiver (in general, or a particular person), as a member of a 
particular discourse community, to find a coherent interpretation which makes 
sense of the incongruity in its discourse context, and which involves some 
transfer of meaning from the Vehicle domain. These linguistic criteria, taken 
over from Cameron (1999: 118), are supplemented with a concern for the 
cognitive role delivered by such linguistically validated metaphorical 
constructions and with a particular discourse function (cf. Charteris-Black 
2004).  
The written business and economics discourse area is epitomized by 
three monitor corpora with different orientations. The first corpus (C1) reunites 
10 career-counselling articles (27 334 words), the second (C2) is made up of 10 
career interviews (9 627 words), while the third (C3) corpus consists of 10 
samples of career statements displayed on company websites (2863 words).  
The ten articles in C1, released between 1993 and 2006, originate from 
Fortune or Fortune International (Europe). They all have attention-getting 
headlines, such as ‘So, you want to change your job’, ‘Is your family 
wrecking your career? (and vice versa)’, ‘Offshoring could boost your career’ 
etc.  
In C2, the career interviews belong to a regular section of People 
Management, and the ten samples span 2007 to 2010. The interviewees are 
successful professionals such as managers, consultants, Chief Executive 
Officers and a welfare officer.   
Finally, the companies whose websites have offered career-focused 
material for C3 are among the Forbes 2008 best managed big companies. Their 
range includes diverse business areas, such as aerospace and defense, banking, 
capital goods, restaurants, drinks, chemicals, media, insurance, etc.  
 
 
2. Common metaphorical patterns 
 
The collection of metaphorical patterns exhibited by all monitor corpora 
includes most of the conceptual-linguistic patterns considered as key metaphors 
by Inkson (2007). Their distribution is illustrated in Chart 1.   
According to the computed statistics, the most impressive, most frequent 
and most deeply entrenched is the JOURNEY metaphor. In all three corpora, 
careers are introduced as a person’s movement, coming, going, leaving, 
heading for a destination, advancing or veering, jumping or rising, etc. The list 
of V-terms is numerous and varied, covering different types of journey in terms 
of destination, speed, ground covered, etc.  
 
(1) ‘He started his career seven and a half miles from here’ 
(2) ‘How to succeed without really rising’ 
(3) ‘It was a turning point in his life and career’ 
(4) ‘That makes moving up harder.’ 
 
Vivid, evocative images convey details about what a certain person’s 
career journey is like and they enable readers to identify themselves instantly 
with that person’s experience. However, despite the diversity of career journey 
types, this metaphor has the potential to allow the senders and recipients of the 
message to think productively about their careers. Every journey can be 
evaluated in terms of its destination or aimlessness, of its speed, its trajectory 
(upwards, downwards or sideways), of its route (linear, winding, random), of 
the experience and enjoyment it brings along. 
 
Chart 1. Distribution of key common metaphors across the monitor corpora 
 
One favoured pattern was identified – that of CAREERS AS UPWARD 
JOURNEYS. This may be because we tend to conceptualize occupations and 
organizations in terms of status hierarchies. Society’s expectations are folded 
into the route upwards, and being ‘on track’ is of utmost importance: 
 
(5) ‘He started as a line cook at Red Lobster and rose to the top over 30 years.’ 
(6) ‘Our employees are always seeking to reach higher.’ 
(7) ‘There are careerists whose ambition is to climb the ladder (even if it’s a 
stepladder).’ 
  
The metaphor’s ideological potential is at work, and it is revealed as 
such in one of the articles in the corpus where moving around in several ways 
in the organization is encouraged: 
 
(8) ‘lateral moves have become the commonest ways to reenergize the troops’ 
(9) ‘One GM side-stepper is Johanne Eberhardt’ 
(10) ‘Employees can move several ways in an organization.[…] For example, they can 
move sideways, with no change in salary or title, to a more dynamic department; head 
for the exit and perhaps a more rewarding career elsewhere; stay put and make peace 
while they enhance their skills and explore new horizons; or move down – move what 
– to a job that may carry less weight but promises more growth.’ 
 
Careers as CONTAINERS (11), (12) and as ADVENTURES (13), (14) 
recast the data in the journey frame: in the corpus, containers are recipients that 
temporarily accommodate the traveller, and adventures are just a specific type 
of journey: 
 
(11) ‘Even those in the whirl of success want out sometimes.’ 
(12) ‘Others who want out of their niches leap even further -- into entrepreneurship.’ 
(13) ‘Lehane clearly enjoys the challenges of operating in a private company.’ 
(14) ‘Explore a Lockheed Martin career’ 
 
Another metaphorical pattern cross-cutting the corpora is the 
INHERITANCE metaphor: 
 
(15) ‘The more skills you acquire and use, the more you can earn -- even if you don't 
jump to the next rung on the corporate ladder.’ 
 
The structural factors which affect careers are, as signaled through 
metaphor, differences in wealth, skills, qualifications, power, race, education, 
gender. While inheritance is an important aspect in career development, the 
metaphor is beneficially employed by those who act it out and try to redress the 
balance through their actions and choices, through a redemptive change. This 
leads the way to careers as ACTIONS:  
 
(16) ‘a user-friendly book that helps people make career choices based on personality 
types’ 
 
This metaphor suggests that careers result not just from social structure 
and natural human cycles (as the CYCLE metaphor exemplified in (17) 
implies), but also from deliberate action – people are seen as agents 
determining their careers through choices, self-expression, taking 
responsibility, etc.  
 
(17) ‘the support we offer for professional development’ 
 
In close connection with the agency focal point of the ACTION 
metaphor is the focal point of two other key conventional metaphors – careers 
as BUILDINGS (18) and as OBJECTS (19), (20), i.e. the results of an agent’s 
activity in which typical ingredients are hard work, resilience, and creativity.  
(18) ‘spending your evenings and all your other available time building your career.’ 
(19) ‘The jobs that have shaped my career.’ 
(20) ‘our careers can be in no better hands than our own.’ 
 
Neverthesless, careers as GAMES downplay human agency and 
emphasize spells of luck, chance, opportunities: 
 
(21) ‘In 2003 I got the chance to move to the Industry and Parliament Trust as chief 
executive.’ 
(22) ‘only if you understand the new rules of the career game.’ 
 
Apart from the preponderance of the JOURNEY metaphor in all three 
corpora, careers as GAMES feature prominently in C3. This may be surprising 
only if we forget the strategic dimension of career sections on public company 
websites. Careers are conceptualized as games of luck in which there are 
chances, opportunities and good luck. The role attributed to the organization is 
that of the divinity that generously distributes chances and opportunities. 
 
3. Corpus-specific metaphorical patterns 
 
Fourteen other metaphors were scattered through the corpora in an 
uneven fashion, i.e. without being identifiable in all three corpora. Statistically, 
the occurrence of such metaphorical patterns is recorded in Table 1. below:  
 
Metaphors C1 (Career- 
counselling articles) 
C2 (Career 
Interviews) 
C3 (Career 
Sections on Company 
Websites) 
FIT 6 2
% 
0 0
% 
5 4
% 
EXTREME 
PHENOMENON 
5 1
% 
0 0
% 
0 0
% 
ROLES 5 1
% 
2
1 
1
2% 
0 0
% 
VEHICLE 5 1
% 
0 0
% 
0 0
% 
RELATIONS
HIPS 
6 1
% 
4
  
2
% 
0 0
% 
PERSON 4 1
% 
1 0
% 
0 0
% 
HANDICRAF
T 
3 1
% 
0 0
% 
0 0
% 
MACHINE 3 1
% 
0 0
% 
0 0
% 
FIRE 1 0
% 
0 0
% 
0 0
% 
BATTERY 1 0 0 0 0 0
% % % 
STORY 0 0
% 
0 0
% 
2 1
% 
LESSON 0 0
% 
5 2
% 
0 0
% 
RITUAL 0 0
% 
1 0
% 
0 0
% 
LIVING 
ORGANISM 
1
3 
4
% 
0 0
% 
1
2 
1
0% 
Table 1. Corpus-specific metaphorical patterns 
 
C1 is the richest in less conventional patterns that provide alternative 
solutions for readers who want to cope with their careers. People are invited to 
reconsider their careers in extreme circumstances (and disaster-proof their 
careers (23), or to deal with careers as with LIVING ORGANISMS (24), or 
FIRE (25), or VEHICLES (26):  
 
(23) ‘Disaster-proofing your career.’ 
(24) ‘The move will likely mean career death’ 
(25) ‘Five ways to ignite your career’ 
(26) ‘That overseas job could derail your career’ 
 
In C2, interviewees seem to attach increased value to careers as ROLES 
(12%) and RELATIONSHIPS (2%) – hence the need for networking and 
human interaction.  
 
(27) ‘In my current role, I am responsible for 215 staff worldwide in 22 countries.’ 
(28) ‘My career advice to others would be to find an industry that you enjoy and 
network within that.’ 
 
As all of the interviewees are successful managers, it is understandable 
that they place a new emphasis on two alternative patterns.  
In C3, authors are particularly keen on careers as FIT (29), (30) and 
LIVING ORGANISMS (10%), (31), in which the metaphorical focus is 
frequently growth: 
 
(29) ‘We have a range of positions to suit you.’ 
(30) ‘Select the profile that fits you best.’ 
(31) ‘Our Growth Planning and Performance Excellence processes help you grow in 
your current role.’ 
 
In all the monitor corpora, there are rare or one-shot novel metaphors, 
which strike the readers as new mindsets in the context of the other 
conventional metaphors. Consider the corpus samples below:   
 
(32) ‘The ‘very hostile’ industrial relations at the plant made it ‘a real baptism of fire’ 
(A CAREER IS A RITUAL). 
(33) ‘That’s when my career really began to take off.’ (A CAREER IS A VEHICLE) 
 
These new approaches count as refreshing, restructuring, re-orienting 
resources for people who entertain rigid, fossilized ideas about careers. At the 
discourse level, the refreshing approach is achieved via counter-discursive 
metaphorical transfers, projected as destabilizing forces against pro-discursive 
conventional metaphors (e.g. careers as upward journeys, buildings, cycles, 
inheritance, etc.)   
 
4. Concluding remarks  
 
By studying the cross-discursive articulation of metaphors from 
ordinary language to the discourse of business and economics, two main 
conclusions have been reached. Firstly, the study reveals that there is a selective 
structuring of discourses by means of the cognitive linguistic resources. 
Secondly, there is a strategic side to the use and usage of metaphors in real 
discourse that needs to be acknowledged and further explored.  
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Abstract: The starting point of the paper is the observation that the focus of countless 
advertisements promoting beauty products in women’s glossy magazines is not so much on the 
material commodity itself, but on the representation of a body that will fully benefit from the 
commodities invested in it. The paper is an attempt to show that, through heavy reliance on 
descriptive vocabulary, mostly in the form of adjectives, these ads implicitly advertise a certain 
type of feminine body, whose most important component seems to be its skin. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the very nature of consumer culture, in which the human body is 
inevitably linked to consumption, product advertising always associates 
commodities, explicitly or implicitly, with the body. According to Côté and Daigle 
(1999: 178), the body is present in ads either as the main beneficiary of the 
advertised commodity (e.g. clothes, medicines, cosmetic products, etc.) or as an 
agent involved in using a commodity (e.g. cars, household appliances, etc.). My 
corpus of one hundred and fifty print ads, taken from British women’s glossy 
magazines (mainly Cosmopolitan, but also Glamour and Woman and Home), 
has nevertheless revealed that the great majority of these ads promote products 
aimed directly at the body, i.e. cosmetics and food. In addition, it should be 
emphasized that it is the surface of a woman’s body that is the primary target of 
print ads, and that all efforts directed at bodily management in print ads involve, 
above all, control of the outer body (cf. Kilyeni 2010). The focus of these ads is 
not so much on the material commodity itself, as on the representation of a 
body that will fully benefit from the commodity invested in it. In other words, it 
is not only products that are advertised, but also a certain type of feminine body 
whose most important component seems to be its skin. Therefore, in what follows, 
I shall try to illustrate how feminine skin is represented in discourse and advertised 
as a prototype, designed in accordance with contemporary gender ideologies. 
2. Advertising Skin 
 
The skin is, by far, the organ that receives the most attention in print ads 
addressed to women. There are tens of advertisements within one single glossy 
magazine that promise to enhance skin quality and appearance. In a consumer 
culture that “permits the unashamed display of the human body” (Featherstone 
1982: 22), the skin of a woman’s face, underarms, legs and whole body is 
exposed, both textually and visually, in print ads, being marked with signs of 
femininity and advertised openly. As we shall see, skin is never “just skin” in 
advertising; skin always comes along with specific feminine attributes. Below are 
examples of such attributes that linguistically “stick” to the skin: 
 
(1) “Discover nature’s secret for brighter, radiant skin”; “leaves skin feeling soft, 
smooth and refreshed”; “brighter, more radiant complexion” (Aveeno cleanser); 
(2) “clear, smooth, beautiful skin can be yours”; “Leaves Your Skin Smooth, Softer, 
Healthier-looking!” (Proactive solution); 
(3) “silky-smooth skin” (Clarins Eau Dynamisante); 
(4) “for brighter, more radiant skin” (Secrets of Boudoir No.7 foundation); 
(5) “For soft, smooth, moisturized skin”; “Nothing’s worse than dry, tight, lifeless skin” 
(E45 body lotion); 
(6) “for a sun-kissed look”; “for a matte complexion” (L’Oréal moisturizer); 
(7) “for a mat yet glowing complexion” (Bourjois blush); 
(8) “smoother, even toned, younger-looking skin”; “for a firmer outlook” (Elizabeth Arden 
restorative capsules); 
(9) “Result: a smooth, even and radiant natural complexion from morning till night” 
(Yves Saint Laurent foundation); 
(10) “keeps skin moisturized and velvety-soft from morning till night, while building a 
natural, sun-kissed look” (Garnier moisturizer and tanner); 
(11) “Skin feels silky and soft, looks flawlessly perfect day-into-night” (Maybelline 
foundation); 
(12) "their skin emerged twice as smooth, visibly twice as even and twice as beautiful” 
(Dove body moisturizer); 
(13) “skin is left purified and hydrated” (Garnier Pure A moisturizer); 
(14) “Smoother, protected, moisturized and brighter, your skin will look younger, 
longer” (Clarins moisturizer); 
(15) “Noticeably smooth, firmer looking skin”; “Your skin feels firmer, looks smoother” 
(St.Ives firming body lotion); 
(16) “skin that feels wonderfully firmer, every day of the year” (Nivea body moisturizer); 
(17) “for a natural look, just pat it onto the area that needs coverage” (Max Factor 
foundation); 
(18) “smooth, even skin instantly”, “shine-free skin all day” (Neutrogena shine control 
gel); 
(19) “for a flawless complexion” (Dior foundation). 
One can note that the focus of certain advertisements is not on the skin 
in general, but on a particular aspect of the skin. For instance, certain ads for 
face products place particular emphasis on skin appearance, which is usually 
referred to as “complexion” or “look”, while most ads for tanning products 
focus on skin colour, i.e. its tan: (20) “healthy, natural-looking tan that lasts 
for days (Neutrogena). Similarly, other adverts highlight the brightness of skin, 
i.e. its glow: (21) “a natural-looking golden glow” (Estée Lauder), (22) “healthy 
glow” (Dove), (23) “Get a sun-kissed glow” (Olay), (24) “for a natural, healthy 
glow” (Revlon). 
In addition, a certain part of the body can provide indexical reference 
to the skin. This is usually the case in advertisements promoting skin products 
that are meant for a body part other than the face. For example, in the following 
ads for deodorants, “underarm” stands for the skin covering that part of the body: 
(25) “The result: visibly softer and smoother underarms” (Dove deodorant), and 
(26) “leaving your underarms feeling smooth and silky” (Ban deodorant). By 
the same token, “leg”, “heel” and “elbow” can also replace “skin”, as in the 
following ads for Gillette razors and Vaseline body lotion, respectively: (27) 
“Reveal your Goddess Smooth legs”, (28) “Dry skin, cracked heels and rough 
elbows are a sure sign that your skin’s natural renewal process has been disrupted”. 
It is worth noting that, sometimes, not only particular body parts are used to refer 
to the skin, but the addressee herself, a woman, a complex human being, also 
functions as a metonym for skin. Consider, for instance, the way in which the 
pronoun “you” is used in the next two adverts, both as a deictic pronoun 
referring to an individual female addressee and as an index for the skin: the 
Aussie ad for hair removal gel promises (29) “no hair, just silky, smooth you”, 
while the Dove ad for soap explains that (30) “This works with this to give you 
a healthy glow”.  
Irrespective of their direct or indirect reference to skin, all the ads above 
point to the copywriters’ heavy reliance on descriptive vocabulary, mostly in the 
form of adjectives. The use of adjectives has long been seen as the most 
distinctive feature of advertising, due to the nature of this particular part of 
speech to express an attribute of something, and to its subsequent informative and 
persuasive potential (with special emphasis on the latter). As already noted by 
Leech back in 1966, “advertising language is marked by a wealth of adjective 
vocabulary” (1966: 151). Many other scholars have since stressed the 
pronounced preference for adjectives in advertising, due to their potential to add 
value to the advertised products, and have focused, to a lesser or greater extent, 
on the various ways in which adjectives fulfill their role of ascribing some 
positive quality to the referent, i.e. the promoted product (cf. Goddard 1998, 
Dyer 1999, Gieszinger 2001, Brierley 2002, Woods 2006). However, all the 
examples listed above point to the fact that the referent in our case is not the 
product, but the skin.  
In what follows, mostly following Gieszinger’s (2001: 129-154) 
account of the use of adjectives in print advertisements as a paramount 
means of describing a product in positive terms, I shall discuss the use of 
adjectives as an equally important device for the description, and hence, for the 
promotion of the feminine skin prototype. More precisely, I shall analyse the 
adjectives that collocate with the noun “skin” from a morphological, 
semantic, and syntactical point of view.  
 
3. The Use of Adjectives: Morphological Considerations 
 
From a morphological point of view, the adjectives used to describe skin 
fall into all three word-formation categories: simple adjectives (e.g. bright, 
soft, smooth, perfect, firm, matte, even, dry), derived adjectives (e.g. healthy, 
beautiful, natural, hydrated), and compound adjectives (e.g. healthier-looking, 
silky-smooth, shine-free, sun-kissed).  
Within the second category (derived adjectives), the great majority of 
adjectives are participial adjectives ending in “-ed”, such as refreshed, moisturized, 
toned, purified, hydrated, and protected. In my corpus, I have found only one 
participial adjective derived with the verbal inflectional suffix “-ing”: glowing. 
Other suffixes, such as “-ful”, “-y”, “-al”, “-less”, combine with nouns to form 
adjectives, e.g. beautiful, healthy, silky, natural and flawless.  
Regarding compound adjectives, we distinguish three structural 
patterns: adjective-adjective (e.g. silky-smooth, velvety-soft), noun-adjective 
(e.g. shine-free, oil-free, Goddess Smooth), and adjective-present participle (e.g. 
healthier-looking, younger-looking, natural-looking). Additionally, sun-
kissed is the only compound displaying the isolated noun-past participle pattern. 
The spelling of the same compound adjective may vary, i.e. the two elements in 
the compound may be hyphenated, non-hyphenated, or joined together, the 
first form being the most frequent and the last one, the least frequent and 
usually incorrect. The most illustrative example is the adjective referring to 
skin colour (i.e. the tan), found in all three forms (again, ordered according to 
its frequency of occurence): sun-kissed, sun kissed, and *sunkissed. This is 
possible due to the unbounded linguistic flexibility characteristic of 
advertising discourse, which has actually made linguistic deviation one of 
the trademarks of the genre (cf. Cook 1992: 139-140). However, it should be 
pointed out that deviation in adjective formation is not a common occurrence 
in our corpus. 
Concerning the use of a certain degree of comparison for the adjectives 
describing skin, my corpus confirms, to a certain extent, Gieszinger’s (2001: 
132-138) remarks on the adjectives describing an advertised commodity. Of the 
five groups of adjectives established by Gieszinger (base forms, comparatives, 
superlatives, intensifying adjectives and implicit superlatives), my corpus also 
reveals a high frequency of base forms (i.e. of the positive degree), such as firm, 
smooth, even, soft, bright, natural, matte, beautiful, clear, dry, moisturized, 
hydrated, toned, glowing. Their great number can be accounted for by the fact 
that, if compared to the other degrees of comparison, they create an impression of 
straightforward, factual description of skin. Physiological research in advertising 
has shown that people tend to perceive superlatives, but also comparatives, as 
over-persuasive, which weakens the credibility of the advertising message. As 
argued on product description by David Ogilvy, the British advertising 
practitioner with the highest reputation, there is no need to position the advertised 
product as superior to the competition, since “it convinces nobody” (1983: 82). 
In other words, there are more chances that people buy a product if the related 
advertisement focuses more on factual description (which involves the use of 
base forms), and less on overtly highlighting its superiority to other products 
(which involves the use of comparatives and superlatives). However, as will be 
pointed out, comparatives are not avoided when used to describe a woman’s 
skin, primarily because they do not involve competition, i.e. comparatives are 
not employed to position a product as superior to another and therefore, can be 
used without restraint.  
Contrary to Pârlog’s (1995: 145) observation that “the comparative 
degree is seldom used” in print ads, as well as to the results provided by 
Gieszinger’s (2001: 133) quantitative analysis, which show a significant 
difference in numbers between base forms and comparatives, I have noticed a 
pronounced preference for comparative adjectives (needless to say, they are all 
comparatives of superiority) when it comes to describing a woman’s skin (e.g. 
smoother, brighter, softer, more radiant, healthier, healthier-looking, younger-
looking, etc.). On the other hand, I do agree on the elliptical nature of the 
comparatives, as stressed by both scholars: in Pârlog’s words, “the second term 
of the comparison is absent” (1995: 145); in Gieszinger’s, “the object of 
comparison cannot be identified” (2001: 137). This allows advertisers to praise 
their own products as being better than other products, in legally safe terms. 
However, as far as my corpus is concerned, this explanation cannot account for 
the high use of comparative adjectives. Although the object of comparison is 
not explicitly stated, as can be seen in examples (1), (2), (4), (8), (14), (15), (16) 
and (25), it can nevertheless be easily inferred. There is no doubt that the 
missing component in the comparison is a woman’s skin prior to consumption, 
i.e. skin that has not yet experienced the benefits of the new product. I think that 
it is exactly because the absent component is known that copywriters rely so 
frequently on comparative adjectives. In print ads for (so-called) skincare 
products, the use of comparative adjectives to describe skin implicitly points to 
the following line of thought: your skin is X (where X stands for the adjective 
in its base form), but “the problem” is that it is not X enough; however, with the 
help of the product, your skin will be X-er/more X.  
Furthermore, I have found that past participial adjectives are less 
commonly used in the comparative degree and that the adjective beautiful 
seldom occurs in the comparative (when it does, it usually functions predicatively). 
Considering what I have just stated about the logic of comparative adjectives, I 
believe that the grammatical structure “more beautiful” is avoided due to its 
obvious negative implications for the addressees, since it implies that a woman’s 
skin, and hence the woman herself, is not beautiful enough in a rather direct 
manner.  
One special form of the comparative is also worth mentioning. There are 
ads where reference to skin quality is not made by means of a comparative of 
superiority, but of an intensified comparative of equality. Consider the 
following structure in (16): twice as smooth, visibly twice as even and twice as 
beautiful. The comparative of equality, expressed by the structure 
“as+adjective+as”, functions as any comparative of superiority discussed 
above, due to the fact that the modifier of degree (i.e. “as”) is intensified by the 
submodifier “twice”, placed before it (cf. Downing and Locke 2006: 492). 
However, the adverbial multiplicative numeral “twice” indicates the precise 
proportion in which the qualities in question will increase.  
When it comes to the use of superlative adjectives to describe skin, my 
corpus reveals that no such forms are found. Instead, copywriters favour implicit 
superlatives, i.e. adjectives “which express the idea of superiority not in the 
morphological form of the superlative, but in their denotative meaning” 
(Gieszinger 2001: 132). By far the most frequent implicit superlative related to a 
woman’s skin is “flawless”, followed by “perfect”, as in examples (19) and 
respectively (11). However, implicit superlatives referring to skin do not abound in 
print ads for cosmetic products. Again, this observation runs counter Gieszinger’s 
findings on adjectives describing commodities, which show that superlatives 
and implicit superlatives are more numerous than comparatives (2001: 136). 
Her research nevertheless indicates a sharp drop in the number of superlatives 
and implicit superlatives over the years, which she accounts for as being the 
result of the aforementioned pronounced tendency to avoid comparatives and 
superlatives in modern advertising. 
As for the intensified adjectives, i.e. adjectives that “are premodified by an 
intensifying adverb” (Gieszinger 2001: 132), such as “very”, “highly”, “much”, 
“really”, “extremely” and “incredibly”, I can state that they are almost absent from 
my corpus. In the few instances where I have spotted such adjectives, the adverb 
used for intensification is one that makes reference to one’s visual ability, i.e. 
“noticeably”, as in (15): noticeably smooth. Gieszinger’s analysis of product 
adjectives in print ads also highlights the very low frequency of such forms. 
However, it should be pointed out that I have found examples of intensified 
comparatives, such as wonderfully firmer in (16), visibly twice as even in (12), 
visibly softer and smoother in (25), and even of intensified superlatives, such as 
flawlessly perfect in (11), and utterly gorgeous in (31) below. As can be noticed, 
the structure “flawlessly perfect” is another example of linguistic deviation, 
since the adverb “flawlessly” is used redundantly. However, this structure is not 
only completely acceptable in advertising, but it also makes perfect sense, as it 
both explains and reinforces the meaning of “perfect”.  
 
4. The Use of Adjectives: Semantic Considerations 
 
From a semantic point of view, adjectives can be analyzed according to 
their denotative (or conceptual, cf. Leech 1981) and connotative meanings. 
Meaning includes both denotation and connotation. While the former is usually 
described as “the definitional, ‘literal’, ‘obvious’, ‘commonsense’ meaning […] 
the dictionary attempts to provide”, the latter refers to “the socio-cultural and 
‘personal’ associations (ideological, emotional, etc.)” attached to a linguistic sign 
(Chandler 2002: 140). 
From a denotative point of view, adjectives describing skin may be 
primarily descriptive or primarily evaluative (cf. Gieszinger 2001: 139). The main 
difference between the two is that the former are supposed to provide specific 
information about the skin, while the latter provide some general assessment of the 
skin. In line with Gieszinger (2001: 140), who maintains that descriptive 
adjectives are much more numerous than evaluative adjectives when it comes to 
product presentation in print ads, one can notice the same trend towards description 
rather than evaluation when it comes to the linguistic depiction of a woman’s 
skin. The adjectives that are most widely used to describe skin are smooth, soft, 
bright, radiant, firm, sun-kissed, matte, even, moisturized and hydrated.  
Descriptive adjectives can be grouped into two categories, according to 
their relation to the two most prominent themes in print ads targeted at women: 
• descriptive adjectives that relate to physical appearance: bright, clear, 
cracked, dry, even, firm, flaky, glowing, golden, lifeless, luminous, matte, oil-free, 
radiant, rough, shine-free, silky, smooth (Goddess smooth, silky-smooth), soft 
(velvety-soft), sun-kissed, tight. 
• descriptive adjectives that relate to health: hydrated moisturized, purified, 
refreshed, toned. 
As can be noticed, most descriptive adjectives relate to physical 
appearance, while less than a third relate to health - although these, too, 
implicitly invoke health in the name of physical appearance (cf. Kilyeni 
2008: 145) Consider, for instance, the use of “moisturized” and “toned” in 
examples (5), (8), (10) and (14). Syntactically, they are embedded in a string of 
two, three or even more adjectives that refer to skin texture or appearance. 
As a result, their primary reference to health is reduced to a minimum, just 
to be replaced with a newly acquired reference, which has been “infused” 
from the neighbouring adjectives and which is thus perceived as prominent. Due 
to their connotations of beauty, all the adjectives in the string actually become 
relatively synonymous.  
By contrast, evaluative/attitudinal adjectives, such as beautiful, perfect, 
gorgeous, natural, natural-looking, flawless, healthy, healthier-looking, younger-
looking, give little or no specific information about skin features. Instead, they 
specify the advertisers’ subjective assessment of and attitude towards a 
woman’s skin (cf. Gieszinger 2001: 139, Downing and Locke 2006: 437).  
Contrary to Downing and Locke, who assert that “attitudinal adjectives are 
usually placed before descriptive ones” (2006: 438), I have noticed that, 
generally, evaluative adjectives almost always come last in a string  
of adjectives (i.e. after the descriptive adjectives), as in (2) and (8), or are 
syntactically separated from descriptive adjectives, again, the structure that 
contains them occurring in final position, as in (10), (11) and (14).  
Not surprisingly, the either descriptive or evaluative nature of skin-
related adjectives also becomes evident due to their collocational patterns, 
when they occur in predicative position. Thus, as examples (1), (11), (14), 
(15) and (16) illustrate, descriptive adjectives usually collocate with the verb 
“to feel”, which highlights their specificity and concreteness, while evaluative 
adjectives collocate with “to look”, which, in contrast, emphasizes their 
subjective, impalpable character. As far as the evaluative adjectives are concerned, 
the same effect is achieved when they function attributively, premodifying the 
noun “look”, as in (10), or when they occur in compounds with the present 
participial “looking” (e.g. healthy-looking). Moreover, in print ads that focus on a 
particular characteristic of skin, such as skin colour (i.e. tan) and skin brightness 
(i.e. glow), only evaluative adjectives are used [cf. (20) – (24)]. This is because it 
is rather difficult to describe skin tan and glow in objective, precise terms.  
A more careful look at the adjectives that I have characterized as descriptive 
indicates that they also have an evaluative tinge, which means they are not 
exclusively descriptive. Actually, as will soon become obvious when I bring 
connotation into discussion, all the descriptive adjectives above include 
evaluative aspects as well, which are sometimes emphasized by premodifying 
evaluative adverbs (e.g. “wonderfully”), or by their collocating with “to look”, 
“look” or “-looking”, which also imply subjectivity (cf. above). For example, 
adjectives such as bright, clear, radiant, glowing, golden and sun-kissed also 
express appreciative evaluation, which is not part of their literal (i.e. denotative) 
meaning. It is the positive connotations that our culture associates with light, 
in general (as opposed to darkness; cf. Kövecses 2002: 85), that make these 
adjectives both descriptive and evaluative. We note that “golden” and “sun-kissed” 
have stronger positive connotations, due to their association with the 
preciousness of gold, on the one hand, and with the pleasant feeling of warmth 
(sent by the sun or felt when being kissed), on the other. Similarly, soft, smooth, 
even and silky form another group of primarily descriptive adjectives, whose 
evaluative nature can be this time accounted for by the positive connotations 
generally attached to neatness, lack of irregularities and roughness, which, in 
this particular case, apply to the touch. When these adjectives occur in 
compounds, such as Goddess smooth, silky-soft or velvety soft, their connotative 
meaning becomes even more pronounced, due to the premodifying element. For 
instance, “silky” and “velvety” add more positive connotations, both due to the 
highly appreciated characteristics of the two fabrics, silk and velvet, i.e. fine to 
the touch and naturally shiny, and to their preciousness, as silk and velvet are 
fabrics of higher quality (luxury fabrics). “Goddess”, on the other hand, triggers 
positive associations linked to deities in general, such as prestige, superiority and 
perfection, and to representations of female deities in our culture endowed 
with great beauty (in sculpture, the feature “pleasant to the touch” is usually an 
inherent characteristic of beauty due to the material properties of statues).  
On the contrary, flaky, rough, dry and cracked express pejorative 
evaluation, because of the negative connotations associated with coarseness to 
the touch, while in the case of lifeless and tight, with dullness and rigidity. 
These are actually the only adjectives in my corpus describing skin in negative 
terms. It should also be mentioned that they are seldom used, because of the 
unpleasant associations they evoke.  
Moreover, it is interesting to note that, while the concept “light” has 
positive connotations, as discussed above, too much light is perceived negatively in 
relation to skin. If shiny or glossy are adjectives with positive connotations when 
they refer to hair or lips, they are perceived negatively when they collocate with 
“skin”. By contrast, adjectives that denote lack of shine, such as matte/mat, shine-
free and oil-free, are connoted positively. The adjective firm also carries positive 
connotations when it modifies a noun denoting a part of the human body 
(including the skin). Needless to say, so do all the adjectives primarily related to 
skin health, which were mentioned at the beginning of my semantic 
considerations. This is because, in cognitive linguistic terms, HEALTH IS UP, i.e. 
it is regarded as positive (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2002). 
 
5. The Use of Adjectives: Syntactical Considerations 
 
The first observation to be made is that, syntactically, adjectives may 
function attributively and predicatively. In the former case, adjectives 
premodify the noun in a noun phrase, as in many of the examples in my corpus: 
brighter, radiant skin; clear, smooth, beautiful skin; silky-smooth skin; soft, 
smooth, moisturized skin; for a mat yet glowing complexion; a natural, 
healthy glow; visibly softer and smoother underarms; etc. When adjectives 
function as predicatives, they are not part of the noun phrase headed by the noun 
they modify. Predicative adjectives operate either as subject complements, as in: 
skin feels silky and soft; skin looks flawlessly perfect; skin feels firmer, looks 
smooth, or as object complements, as in: leaves your skin smooth, softer, healthier-
looking; keeps skin moisturized and velvety-soft. I have noticed that adjectives 
may also function as detached predicative supplements, which, from a syntactic 
point of view, are not part of the noun group which they apparently accompany, 
but such instances are less numerous. One such example is (14): “Smoother, 
protected, moisturized and brighter, your skin will look younger, longer”. As 
this example illustrates, the role of such predicatives is “to add supplementary 
information to a referent which is already defined” (Downing and Locke 2006: 
446).  
A characteristic feature of print ads is a linguistic phenomenon called 
“stacking” (Cowan 2008: 238), which is represented by strings of two, three 
or four adjectives. Downing and Locke (2006: 438) remark that such strings 
are common in advertisements, especially in personal classified ads, due to 
their marked effect. My corpus confirms this phenomenon: indeed, an adjective 
referring to a woman’s skin almost never occurs in isolation; on the contrary, it is 
accompanied by one or two more adjectives (sometimes even three more), as can 
be seen in most of my examples from (1) to (31). The adjectives in such 
strings are always in a relation of coordination, being connected either 
asyndetically or with the help of the linguistic coordinator “and” [“yet” is also 
used, as in (7), but only on rare occasions].  
The high frequency of strings composed of three adjectives is 
accounted for by Atkinson’s (1988) “three-part list” – a rhetorical strategy that 
uses three similar items to summarize a message (e.g. Julius Caesar’s “Veni, 
vidi, vici”, Mark Anthony’s “Friends, Romans, countrymen”, and the motto of 
the French Republic, “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”). In his analysis of political 
speeches, Atkinson reaches the conclusion that three-part verbal formats are 
particularly effective persuasive devices, due to the impression of unity and 
wholeness (similar to the beginning-middle-end story structure) they send out, 
as well as to their capacity “to strengthen, underline and amplify almost any kind 
of message” (Atkinson 1988: 60). Following Atkinson, Woods (2006: 29) touches 
upon the use of the three-part list as a common advertising practice. Indeed, my 
corpus of print ads for cosmetic products has also revealed many three-part lists 
[sometimes two within the same ad, as in (2) and (5)]. Examples (1), (2), (3), 
(5), (8), (9), (11) and (12) are cases in point for the use of adjectives as stacked 
descriptors of skin. 
It is interesting to note that the examples in my corpus display a 
particular arrangement of the adjectives in such strings. More specifically, the 
last in the string is usually less specific and less precise than the previous two. For 
instance, if we consider examples (2), (8) and (12), we notice that the first two 
adjectives in the list are descriptive, while the last one is evaluative. Example 
(11) provides a variation of this pattern, in which the three-part list is somehow 
interrupted, due to the fact that the two descriptive adjectives occur in 
collocation with the verb “to feel”, while the evaluative adjective with “to look”: 
“feels silky and soft, looks flawlessly perfect”. This strategy is part of a wider 
advertising trend I have touched upon when discussing evaluative adjectives, 
which is characterized by the syntactic separation of descriptive and evaluative 
adjectives. Examples (1) and (5) show that descriptive adjectives related to 
health can also occur in third position, while the descriptive adjectives related to 
physical appearance in first and second position. 
This particular arrangement confirms Atkinson’s (1988: 57) observation 
that usually the third item in the three-part list is typically vaguer and more 
general than the previous two, because it is often difficult to find. In speech, the 
third term is often an “unimaginative improvisation one resorts to” (Atkinson 
1988: 57). In print ads, however, the more general nature of the third item 
expressed by an evaluative adjective can also be accounted for by another 
advertising strategy, which also applies for strings of more than three adjectives 
(i.e. it is not restricted to three-part lists). Namely, it points to a smooth shift 
from adjectives that highlight the concrete, physical benefits that the advertised 
product will bring to a woman’s skin (e.g. smooth, soft, firm, matte, etc.) to rather 
imprecise and much more subjective benefits (e.g. beautiful, healthy-looking, 
younger-looking, etc.) that are not confined to skin alone. If both descriptive and 
evaluative adjectives are directly related to a woman’s skin, the latter involve an 
implicit transition from the skin to women’s general well-being. In other words, 
although these adjectives signal an explicit emphasis on the skin, they also 
implicitly point to the benefits a woman can enjoy as far as her personal well-
being and social status are concerned.  
In other ads, the same idea is expressed in a more explicit manner. 
Consider the following example from an ad for Veet hair removal cream: (31) 
“Smooth, silky and utterly gorgeous. These are just some of the words that 
describe the feeling that Veet gives you”. Not only is the aforementioned idea 
implied by the use of a three-part list, but it is also reinforced by the double 
reading of the noun “feeling”. In relation to the descriptives “smooth” and 
“silky”, the noun refers mainly to the physical sensation of the skin to the touch, 
while in relation to the evaluative “gorgeous”, to the affective state of mind 
derived from having skin that feels that way. The advertising message is 
obvious. Ads actually suggest that, through consumption, not only does skin 
become clear, smooth, even, toned, soft, etc., but also beautiful, younger and 
healthy, and consequently, skin endowed with such attributes contributes to 
women’s well-being, on the one hand, and to a highly positive assessment of 
women in society, on the other. Another ad states this idea in a very explicit 
way, right from the headline: (32) “It’s all about looking and feeling great!”. 
Nothing can be worse than skin that does not possess such qualities [cf. (5)], as 
it may ruin a woman’s day [cf. (28)]. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
My analysis has shown that adjectives, traditionally perceived as highly 
valuable linguistic tools in the language of advertising, are used to a rather 
different end when it comes to print ads in women’s glossy magazines (as already 
stated, most such ads are for cosmetic products): adjectives provide little or no 
reference to features of the promoted commodities; instead, they are used to describe 
various parts of the female body, in general, and its skin, in particular.  
From a grammatical point of view, it can be noticed that adjectives are 
used to describe skin mostly in the same way they are used to describe 
commodities. However, my analysis has highlighted certain peculiarities in 
their use, from among which we mention: the lack of linguistic deviation in 
adjective formation, the pronounced preference for adjectives in the comparative 
degree (which are often intensified by means of an adverb), the absence of 
superlative adjectives and the very low frequency of implicit superlatives, the 
collocational patterns of descriptive and evaluative adjectives with the verbs “to 
feel” and “to look”, respectively, and the particular arrangement of adjectives in 
three-part lists.  
My analysis has also led to the conclusion that print ads in women’s 
glossy magazines are more concerned with advertising feminine skin, i.e. skin 
characterized by certain well-defined attributes, than with advertising products. 
This demonstrates, once again, that advertising involves much more than mere 
product promotion and that it is closely linked to contemporary gender ideologies, in 
general, and consequently, to the promotion of some standard feminine body, in 
particular. My research has revealed that skin in advertising has nothing to do 
with anatomy or medicine, i.e. with its being the largest organ of the body’s 
integumentary system. On the contrary, advertising solely focuses on skin as a 
cultural gendered sign, whose meanings are not found in any dictionary. Every 
single ad in my corpus reveals that, in the discourse of advertising, a woman’s skin 
is first and foremost associated with beauty. Skin in advertising is not a mere 
protective surface covering of the body, but a beautiful surface presentation of 
the body that enhances well-being. 
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Abstract: This study presents a small-scale comparison of e-advertisements in 
four different languages. It analyses the similarities and differences between 
politeness strategies and systems in the texts and discusses them from a 
cultural perspective. The findings, not totally consistent with current theory, 
suggest the influence of socio-political changes and globalisation. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, I analyse advertising discourse across several languages: 
English, Peninsular Spanish, Costa Rican Spanish and Romanian. I am going to 
look, first, at power relations and politeness strategies following Brown and 
Levinson’s theory (1978) and, then, at politeness systems, as proposed by 
Scollon and Scollon’s model (2000). Having this in mind, my aim is twofold: 
(1) describe, analyse and compare the similarities and differences of the 
linguistic choices in the four languages in this particular genre and (2) see 
whether these linguistic choices can be accounted for from the point of view of 
cultural differences. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Advertising discourse 
Advertisements can be influenced both by social discursive practices of 
commercial exchange and by intimate kinds of exchange, depending on the 
intended interaction, as pointed out by Bex (1996: 161). Moreover, since ads 
directly and consciously aim at people’s feelings (Goddard 2002: 73), the 
advertisers have to be aware, know and deeply understand the audience needs 
and wishes (Zdrenghea 2000: 7). 
A new type of advertising is becoming more and more popular 
nowadays, i.e. e-advertising. Some researchers consider it more direct and 
explicit in its persuasion than other advertising media, due to its preference for 
imperatives and economy grammar reduction strategies (Pop 2006: 189). 
          
2.2. Power relations 
Advertising discourse, as suggested by Goddard (2002: 55), is an 
addressing discourse that needs to be received and expects a reply in return, 
under the form of confirmation. In order to persuade and incite the reader to 
action, the writer informs and manipulates at the same time; s/he negotiates 
meaning, takes particular positions and constructs role relations of power and 
solidarity with the reader. Usually, power relations are built according to face 
and are manifested in politeness strategies (Scollon & Scollon 2000: 49). 
Therefore, the analysis of politeness strategies and systems can reveal the type 
of power relation built. 
 
2.2.1. Politeness strategies 
Brown and Levinson (1978: 61) consider face as something emotionally 
invested that must be attended to in interaction and can be lost, maintained or 
enhanced. The interlocutor’s positive or negative face can be damaged by face 
threatening acts. The degree of threat depends on three main variables: social 
distance and power relationship between participants, and the weight of 
imposition given by culture (Brown & Levinson 1978: 79). The interlocutor can 
save face by employing different politeness strategies: bald-on-record – no 
threat minimisation, positive –minimisation of threat, negative – distance 
emphasis and avoidance of imposition, and off-record – indirect language use 
(ibid: 94-227). 
 
2.2.2. Politeness systems 
The types of face, politeness strategies and variables mentioned can 
build different politeness systems, as proposed by Scollon and Scollon (2000: 
44-47), such as hierarchical – participants recognize and respect their different 
positions, deference – participants treat each others as equals, but use a lot of 
independence strategies out of respect, and solidarity – participants are friends 
and use a high level of involvement.  
 
 
2.2.3. Politeness classification 
Even if Brown and Levinson (1978: 21, 62) consider their model 
universally valid, they also admit that it can vary from one culture to another. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that cross-cultural analysis requires awareness of 
face expectations and politeness preferences (Lorenzo-Dus 2001: 109), cultural 
values (Vilkki n.d.: 326) or influences of the context of communication (Koike 
et al. 2001: 88). The cultures under discussion in this paper tend to use different 
politeness strategies. For example, English culture has a tendency towards 
negative politeness, individuality and deference, whereas Spanish culture 
emphasizes positive politeness and solidarity (Lorenzo-Dus 2001: 109). 
Moreover, both Latin American and Romanian cultures prefer indirect 
conventional forms and a high degree of formality and deference (Iglesias 
Recuero 2007: 26; Pârlog 1994: 49). Nevertheless, there are studies, such as 
Şerbănescu (2007) or Rovenţa-Frumuşani (2005), that contradict this 
classification. The present study investigates whether the politeness strategies 
used in the ads are consistent with their classification.  
Furthermore, the choice of politeness reflects and reinforces cultural 
values. Language is influenced by social appropriate norms and contains 
universal mechanisms for achieving cooperation. Thus, politeness norms vary 
across cultures and, at the same time, have international characteristics. The 
study of politeness strategies and systems can give details about participants, 
their relation and their culture.   
 
3. Cultural framework 
 
This section provides the background for the analysis of cultural 
features. Even if there are many dimensions that can show cultural differences, 
I have chosen the variable of power distance, since it seemed more relevant for 
the present study, as it focuses on power relations.  According to Hofstede 
(2010), this variable affects the behaviour of a culture and represents the extent 
to which its members expect and accept that power is unequally distributed. He 
distinguishes two types of power distance cultures: small power distance, which 
minimises inequalities and proposes interdependency between less and more 
powerful people, and large power distance, in which inequalities are both 
expected and desired (Neuliep 2006: 76). Nonetheless, deviations from the 
main cultural pattern can occur in certain contexts and situations, since cultures 
are “dynamic, continuously developing, and evolving” (Neuliep 2006: 45), 
being influenced by different factors, such as geographical, historical, religious, 
economical, social or politic (Şerbănescu 2007: 155). 
On the power distance parameter, studies (Hofstede 2010; Neuliep 
2006: 77; Şerbănescu 2007: 147) suggest that the cultures under discussion can 
be classified as follows: English and Costa Rican cultures are considered low 
power distance cultures, while Spanish and Romanian cultures are defined as 
high power distance cultures. The present study investigates whether the ads 
are consistent with their cultural classification.  
 
4. Data selection and methodology  
 
The corpus of my study consists of four ads taken from Internet travel 
agencies offering honeymoon packages. They share the following similarities: 
field (honeymoon holidays), function (persuade the couple to buy the luxury 
advertised), mode (Internet) and format (contain a picture and a text of around 
160 words). The main difference is that they belong to different languages, 
countries and cultures. These features have been established from the beginning 
as selection criteria for the corpus of analysis. I started the selection by typing 
the word honeymoon in Google. When the search was complete, I took the 
results one by one and selected the first that fitted in these criteria. I proceeded 
in the same way for each language. I excluded international travel agencies and 
translated ads. After gathering the corpus, I identified the main politeness 
strategies and systems in order to do a contrastive analysis and see the 
similarities and differences between the ads. I took into consideration also the 
variables of power, distance, culture and context of communication. 
 
5. Analysis and findings 
 
The linguistic analyses and their results are presented in relation to the 
politeness and cultural classifications considered for each ad, showing how the 
language follows or deviates from the typical pattern. First, I shall present the 
ad that seems most consistent with the theory, i.e. the English one. Then, I 
focus on the ads deviating from their classification: the Romanian, Costa Rican 
and Spanish. For each ad, I include the text and its translation so that the 
analysis will be clearer and easier to follow.    
 
 
5.1. The English ad 
With some of the most exotic locations in the world and a selection of the finest hotels 
in the world booking your dream honeymoon with us could not be more simple. 
Members of a dedicated honeymoons and weddings team, with first hand experience of 
the resorts, are able to recommend the best hotels to suit your requirements. Many of 
the resorts also have fantastic honeymoon packages and offers – making the very 
special even more special – so call one of the team now on 0161 233 0110. To see the 
very latest and best honeymoon offers, please click here. If you are looking to combine 
two destinations within your honeymoon - be it an African Safari with an Indian Ocean 
Island, a journey around the Far East, or perhaps a Caribbean island with an American 
city -we can tailor make your perfect itinerary. Please see the Experiences section on 
our website for inspiration. More Details... 
 
The English ad combines negative politeness strategies with positive 
ones, having a certain tendency towards the first type. Negative strategies are 
used to minimise the writer’s imposition on the reader and are usually 
expressed by modalization, such as could, impersonal structures (‘making the 
very special even more special’) or plural pronouns (‘we’). However, positive 
strategies address the reader, you, directly and attend his/her wants (‘you are 
looking to’). In addition, there are several instances of bald-on-record 
strategies, such as orders (‘call’), and off-record strategies like indirect offers 
(‘many of the resorts have fantastic honeymoon packages’). Considering the 
use and combination of strategies, it seems that the writer imposes his ideas on 
the reader in an impersonal way, for the reader’s benefit. Typically for ads, the 
advertiser presents a product in such a way, that the client can find him/herself 
reflected in it and, thus, identify with it.   
The distance between interlocutors is reduced; the agency, as an expert 
acquaintance willing to help, situates itself neither too close nor too far away, in 
order to make persuasion more effective. Both agency and client are assigned 
different roles, as if power were negotiated; the agency has the power and 
knowledge to impose and the ability to recommend and customize, whereas the 
client has the power to accept or ignore the hints suggested. All in all, the 
relation between writer and reader is suitable for the purpose of the ad, i.e. to 
sell.   
The politeness system construed is mixed; it combines solidarity with 
independence strategies – involvement is used to impose and deference not to 
offend, both aiming to persuade the reader. Nevertheless, sometimes the 
balance tends more towards deference.  
To sum up, the resources used in the English ad seem typical of small 
power distance cultures, especially due to the equalitarian relation created 
among participants. 
 
5.2. The Romanian ad 
Spune Da paradisului! După atâta oboseală, stres, după atâtea întrebări care par fără 
sfârşit: care să fie culoarea rochiei, alb sau ivory?…, locaţia ar arăta bine decorată cu 
alb şi auriu sau ar merge ceva orange să mai învioreze puţin spiritul? trandafiri sau 
orhidee?…unde îi pun pe prietenii naşilor?…e înspirată alegerea tortului din frişcă în 
luna iulie?… atâtea griji, care vor dispărea într-o zi ca un nor vaporos fără nici 
măcar să vă daţi seama foarte bine ce s-a întâmplat! Chiar că meritaţi o vacanţă! Şi 
nu oricare, ci o lună de miere! Prima oprire pe acest drum pe care aţi păşit împreună! 
No Surprises te ajută să alegi de la efectele benefice ale masajului thailandez şi ale 
cremelor din plante exotice, de la atingerea nisipului fin şi energia băilor de soare, 
până la atingerea corpurilor electrizate de muzică în renumitele cluburi de noapte din 
Ibiza. România sau o insulă îndepărtată din Pacific, totul este posibil! Tu decizi! 
 
(“Say Yes to paradise! After so much fatigue, stress, after so many questions which 
seem endless: which should the colour of the dress be, white or ivory?..., the location 
would look nice decorated in white and gold or would something orange be better in 
order to refresh the spirit a little? roses or orchids?...where do I place the godparents’ 
friends?...is it the choice of a cream cake in the month of July inspired?…so many 
worries, which will disappear in one day, like a wispy cloud without even realizing 
very well what has happened! You really deserve a holiday! And not just any holiday, 
but a honeymoon! The first stop on this road you have set out on together! No 
Surprises helps you choose from the healthy effects of the Thai massage and of the 
creams from exotic plants, from the touch of the fine sand and the energy of the 
sunbaths, to the touch of bodies electrified by music in Ibiza’s famous night clubs. 
Romania or a far away island in the Pacific, everything is possible! You decide!”) 
 
The Romanian ad combines positive with negative politeness strategies, 
with the exception of the bald-on-record instance at the beginning of the text 
(spune ‘say’). This seems, however, minimised, since it seeks the reader’s 
agreement. Positive strategies aim to minimise the threat to the reader’s face 
and to attend his/her interests by solidarity markers such as T forms (tu ‘you’), 
advice (chiar că meritaţi o vacanţă ‘you really deserve a holiday’), suggestions 
(România sau o insulă îndepărtată din Pacific ‘Romania or a far away island in 
the Pacific’), offers (No Surprises te ajută să alegi ‘No Surprises helps you 
choose’) and desire for common ground and agreement (spune Da ‘say Yes’). 
At the same time, the ad contains impersonal structures, mainly 
nominalisations, such as după atâta oboseală (‘after so much fatigue’), which 
defocus the agent and respect the reader’s freedom. His/her independence is 
further emphasized by the final remark which points out who is taking the 
decision (tu decizi ‘you decide’). Considering that the text is an ad, it seems that 
the writer adopts a stance of getting involved with the reader, while treating 
him/her with deference. In this way, the writer sounds both convincing and 
respectful. 
Due to these strategies, the relation between reader and writer is a little 
ambiguous. On one hand, the writer uses nominalizations and creates a distant 
and formal relation with the reader, in which neither has any responsibility. 
S/he also refers to the agency by name, maybe in order to appear authoritative 
and distant. On the other hand, the writer gets involved with the reader by 
seeking agreement and attending to his/her interests all through the text. 
Moreover, s/he directly addresses the reader and develops an interaction similar 
to a spoken conversation. Bearing this combination in mind, I think the writer 
gets close enough to the reader to suggest or give advice, and distant enough to 
sound reliable. As for the power relations between agency and reader, they 
appear to be built in the same line. Both agency and reader seem to have no 
power or responsibility, due to the number of impersonal structures used. 
However, the agency has sufficient power to presume common ground, give 
advice and help, whereas the reader is assigned sufficient power and 
responsibility to decide and have the last word. In the ad, the reader is made to 
feel both attended to and free from imposition even if her/his opinions and 
choices are controlled, guided and imposed by the writer.  
The politeness system built is mixed, because it combines deference 
with solidarity strategies. The writer seems to be formally persuasive since s/he 
marks deference and gets involved; the reader is altogether given independence, 
drawn into interaction and controlled.  
Thus, the resources in the Romanian ad seem typical of small power 
distance cultures, due to the use of involvement strategies which build an 
equalitarian relation among participants, and large power distance cultures, 
since the authoritative voice of the agency can lead to inequality.  
 
5.3. The Costa Rican ad 
! Costa Rica es el lugar perfecto para los enamorados! Ofrece un exótico ambiente, 
cautivadoras playas solitarias y una cultura romántica. En "Costa Rican Trails" 
hemos cuidado cada detalle para esta ocasión especial. Creemos que son los pequeños 
detalles los que importan, ¡los que crean algo especial! Imagine su luna de miel con 
una cena a la luz de la velas en medio de un místico bosque, escuchando los ruidos de 
los animales silvestres, mirando la puesta del sol en un jacuzzi privado en la colina 
con una exuberante vista de las aguas del Pacífico, o presenciar una erupción 
incandescente del volcán en la comodidad de su bungalow privado. Prepárese a 
relajarse en las aguas termales naturales, ser tratado como la realeza; o a recibir un 
masaje al lado de una catarata cristalina o relájese simplemente sintiendo la brisa del 
mar en su piel. Escoja uno de nuestros itinerarios y disfrute la belleza natural de este 
Jardín del Edén.” 
 
(“Costa Rica is the perfect place for lovers! It offers an exotic atmosphere, captivating 
solitary beaches and a romantic culture. In “Costa Rica Trails”, we have taken care of 
each detail for this special occasion. We believe that it's the little details that matter, 
the ones that make something special! Imagine your honeymoon having dinner by 
candle lights in the middle of a mystical forest, listening to the noises of wild animals, 
watching the sunset from a private Jacuzzi on the hill with an exuberant view of the 
Pacific waters, or witnessing an incandescent eruption of the volcano from the comfort 
of your private bungalow. Prepare yourself to relax in the natural thermal springs, to be 
treated like royalty; or to receive a massage next to a crystalline waterfall or just relax 
feeling the sea breeze on your skin. Choose one of our tours and enjoy the natural 
beauty of this Garden of Eden.”) 
 
The writer of the ad is usually conventionally indirect since s/he 
employs negative and off-record politeness strategies. The indirect suggestion 
ser tratado como la realeza (‘be treated like royalty) and indirect offer ofrece 
un exótico ambiente (‘it offers an exotic atmosphere’) refer to the destination 
and to different possible ways of spending one’s honeymoon. The possible 
imposition they can set on the reader is minimised by their impersonal 
structures, which build a detached relation between reader and writer. Apart 
from these strategies, there are instances of bald-on-record such as imagine 
(‘imagine’) or escoja (‘choose’), which go against the overall indirect tone of 
the text. There are also a few instances of positive strategies, such as creemos 
que son los pequeños detalles los que importan (‘we believe that it's the little 
details that matter’), used when the writer wants to get involved with the reader 
and obtain his/her agreement. On the whole, the writer wants to persuade in a 
covert and indirect manner, by implying meaning, dropping hints and formally 
addressing the reader.  
The relation between writer and reader is distant due to the frequency of 
impersonal structures and V-singular forms and to the lack of reference to both 
agency and client. Sometimes, the agency comes closer to the reader by 
expressing its beliefs; however, solidarity is still built from a distant position, 
since the agency refers to itself by a first person plural pronoun. As for the 
power relations between participants, the agency is presented as a reliable 
expert company that gives advice and indications to the client. Sometimes, by 
using many imperatives, it even sounds authoritative. The reader has the power 
to choose whether to take the agency’s hints into consideration or ignore them. 
S/he is formally addressed and so placed in a higher position. The agency, then, 
tries to persuade the reader by presenting itself as a reliable and expert company 
taking care of every detail, giving instructions and allowing freedom of 
imagination and choice. 
The politeness system built is one of deference; participants share an 
equal relation of formality and distance, as if they were strangers. However, the 
agency sometimes situates itself in a higher position by imposing and 
restraining the reader possibilities.  
In general, the resources used in the Costa Rican ad seem typical of 
large power distance cultures due to the distant and formal relation between 
participants and the agency’s authoritative voice. Nevertheless, participants 
sometimes share power, being equally powerful, which may indicate a small 
power distance type of culture. 
 
5.4. The Spanish ad 
DA EL <SI QUIERO> Casarse, ya es en si un precioso problema, verdad? Que mejor 
escusa para escapar tras la ceremonia que un viaje irrepetible y original, de forma 
que os quede un recuerdo imborrable en vuestra memoria. A nosotros nos encantará 
prepararos vuestra Luna de Miel, para que se convierta en La Experiencia de Vuestra 
Vida. No importa en lo que esteís pensando nosotros os asesoraremos de todas las 
mejores opciones y posibilidades tras conocer vuestros deseos, por que no es lo mismo 
combinar Estados Unidos con el Caribe, que convivir una semana con los Toraja, y 
sin embargo tienen algo en común, el deseo de que sea  especial hasta el ultimo 
segundo. Lee atentamente los ejemplos que ya hemos realizado con éxito, para que te 
sirva de inspiración, y dejanos saber cual sería tu Luna de Miel perfecta, te 
sorprenderá las posibilidades que te ofreceremos y disfrutaras de lo que sin duda será 
la experiencia de vuestra vida. 
 
(“SAY "I WILL" Getting married, that is itself a lovely problem, isn’t it? What better 
excuse to escape after the ceremony than an unrepeatable and unusual trip, in order to 
have an unforgettable memory. We would love to prepare your Honeymoon, so that it 
becomes The Experience of Your Life. Whatever you have in mind, we will advise 
you on the best options and possibilities of all after knowing your desires, because it is 
not the same thing to combine United States with the Caribbean or to spend one week 
with the Torajas, and yet, they have something in common, the desire to be special 
until the last second. Read carefully the examples we have already designed 
successfully to find inspiration, and let us know which your perfect Honeymoon will 
be; you’ll be surprised by the possibilities we offer you and you will enjoy what 
undoubtedly will be the experience of your life.”) 
 
The politeness strategies used in this ad are predominantly positive. The 
writer establishes a relation of intimacy and solidarity with the reader by 
making offers (nosotros os asesoraremos ‘we will advise you’) and promises 
(disfrutaras ‘you will enjoy’), seeking agreement (verdad? ‘isn’t it?) and 
attending the reader’s interests (os quede un recuerdo imborrable en vuestra 
memoria ‘have an unforgettable memory’). On the other hand, bald-on-record 
strategies are used sometimes to give orders, such as da (‘say’) or lee (‘read), to 
the reader. However, in the Spanish culture, imperatives are not considered 
impolite in close relations; they are used to strengthen social relations and 
demonstrate familiarity (Lorenzo-Dus 2001: 109). Apart from these strategies, 
there are some instances of negative politeness expressed by impersonal 
structures, such as para que se convierta en la Experencia de Vuestra Vida (‘so 
that it becomes the Experience of Your Life’). To sum up, the politeness 
strategies used indicate that the writer tries to build an intimate relation with the 
reader, maybe because closeness makes persuasion easier and imposition 
possible. 
The distance between interlocutors is close, as if they were friends or 
members of the family. The writer builds a relation of intimacy and solidarity 
with the reader; s/he addresses the reader directly, asks questions, answers, 
provides solutions, explains his/her own requests and encourages the reader’s 
participation in the interaction. Considering this, there seems to be no power 
difference between agency and reader; they appear as equally powerful. The 
agency is assigned power, by presuming reliability and knowledge, while the 
reader is made to feel powerful by being consulted and attended in all his/her 
wishes. Taking into account the genre of the message, I think power is used to 
manipulate and convince: the reader is made to think that his/her wishes are 
commands for the agency, when in fact power belongs to the agency, in the 
form of knowledge and expertise.  
The politeness system construed is one of solidarity; the power relations 
are symmetrical, the participants are friends and the predominant strategy type 
is involvement.  
Thus, the features of the Spanish ad seem to be typical of small power 
distance cultures, due to the emphasis laid on equality and solidarity.  
 
 
5.5. Summary of findings 
The results of my linguistic analyses of the ads, summarized in the table 
below, show several inconsistencies with the theory considered (Lorenzo-Dus 
2001; Iglesias Recuero 2007; Pârlog 1994; Hofstede 2010; Neuliep 2006; 
Şerbănescu 2007). 
 
 ENGLISH ROMANIAN C. RICAN SPANISH 
Politeness 
strategy 
 
negative & 
positive 
 
negative & 
positive 
conventionalized 
indirectness 
positive 
 
Distance & 
Power 
‘middle’ – 
expert 
acquaintance 
‘middle’ – 
expert 
acquaintance 
distant - expert 
 
close - 
reliable friend 
Politeness 
systems 
Mixed 
 
mixed 
 
Deference 
 
solidarity 
 
Culture Small large (small) large (small) Small 
Table 1 – Summary of findings 
 
With reference to politeness classification, the English and the 
Romanian ads seem not totally consistent with the theory, since they use more 
positive politeness than expected. The Spanish and Costa Rican ads appear 
consistent with their definitions as highly positive and, respectively, mainly 
indirect.  
Regarding cultural classification, the English ad seems to be consistent 
with the theory, having features of small power distance cultures, whereas the 
Spanish ad is not at all consistent with its classification, its resources being 
typical of small power distance cultures. The Romanian and Costa Rican ads 
are not totally consistent with their cultural classification either, because they 
combine features of both small and large power distance cultures, with a 
tendency towards the latter type. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the English ad seems the only stable example, except for 
the amount of positive politeness, which can be explained by the fact that the ad 
may be addressing an international client, considering the international 
character of English. If representative, the ad suggests the domination of 
English, since it is not permeable to other cultures. In the case of the other ads, 
the inconsistencies may be indicative of different cultural changes. Spanish and 
Romanian cultures may be influenced by recent changes in politics, economy, 
society and culture and/or the influence of globalisation and English culture. 
Costa Rican culture might be influenced by Latin America, from the south, 
and/or United States, from the north. The inconsistencies can also be explained 
by the context of communication (advertising) and its medium (Internet), whose 
register is more oral, economical, direct and informal (Pop 2006: 192-195).  
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Abstract: The term ’dimunitive’ is generally supposed to convey the meaning ’small’. 
The primary aim of my paper is to show that the dimunitive in English doesn’t have 
this single meaning, but instead constitutes a category of meanings which behave in a 
variety of distinct ways. Nevertheless, they appear to be related to one another, 
exhibiting fuzziness and family resemblance. 
Key words: diminutives, categories, fuzziness, family resemblance 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The term ’diminutive’ used in morphology refers to an affix added to a 
word to convey the meaning ’small’, used literally or metaphorically, such as a 
quality named, intimacy, affection, endearment or informality. Sometimes it 
also marks the off-spring of animals, resemblance or imitation. It is the opposite 
of an augmentative, which indicates large size or high – often excessive – 
degree. (Quirk et al. 1985:1584, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1677, Mayor 
2009:472 and www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diminutive) 
In many languages, diminutives are mainly formed by adding suffixes, 
which is a productive word formation process. While most languages apply the 
grammatical diminutive to nouns (common and proper nouns), a few also use it 
for adjectives and even other parts of speech, such as verbs, adverbs, pronouns 
or numerals. In English diminutive suffixes are primarily added to common 
nouns (booklet), proper nouns (Johnny) and rarely to adjectives (sickish), 
numerals (tennish) and verbs (nibble). 
Besides various suffixes, English diminutives are often formed through 
clipping, either alone (Bess from Elizabeth, Tony from Anthony) or combined 
with a suffix, e.g. hanky (handkerchief), brolly (umbrella), Britters (Britney 
Spears) and Bodder (Bodleian Library), etc. (Huddleston and Pullum 
2002:1677-78). 
In comparison with many other languages, productive diminutives are 
not very common in English. Nevertheless, most dialects of English, e.g. 
Scottish, Australian and New Zealand English feature a fair number of 
diminutives and some suffixes seem to be generally spreading in present-day 
informal, colloquial English, such as -ie/y in druggie (a habitual user of drugs), 
prezzie (present), –er in footer (football) or -ers in preggers (pregnant), etc. 
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78). 
The primary aim of my paper is to explore how the seemingly distinct 
meanings of the diminutive are related to one another, and to show in what 
framework they could be analysed best. By analysing the diminutive in English, 
I also mean to justify the cognitive approach to categories. It was cognitive 
linguists, such as Taylor (2003:170-176) and Evans and Green (2006:28-31), 
who pointed out that categories - human and linguistic - have fuzzy edges and 
in spite of the fact that members of a category exhibit distinct behaviour, they 
are related to one another, with some appearing to be more central and others 
more peripheral. 
 
2. The diachronic, morphological and semantic properties of diminutives in 
English 
 
Before attempting to give a cognitive analysis of the diminutives in 
English, it seems to be worthwhile to examine them in terms of their origin and 
their diachronic development with reference to their productivity and changes 
in their morphology and semantics. 
As far as the origin of diminutives in English is concerned, they are 
partly of Anglo-Saxon origin, such as -ock (hill - hillock), -n/-en (maiden), -o 
(arvo), -a (Gazza), -er (soccer), -s(y)  (Betsy), -ers/-ster (Britters), -ish (sickish) 
and –le (pebble), and they are partly borrowings from other languages, such as -
ie/y (doggie), -ling (duckling), -kin (bumpkin), -let (piglet), -ette (kitchenette), -
rel, -erel (cockerel) and –een (velveteen), etc. (Huddleston and Pullum 
2002:1677-78). 
First, let us look at the diminutive suffixes of Anglo-Saxon origin. It is 
noteworthy that some of these are not productive any more and seem to have 
lost their diminutive sense, while others have a very informal tone. (cf. 
Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78, Quirk et al. 1985:1584 and www. 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diminutive) 
In Old English -ock used to be a productive suffix forming diminutives. 
In fact, it was –oc, -uc, as in bulluc BULLOCK (young male cow that cannot 
breed) and hassoc HASSOCK (a small cushion for kneeling on in a church), 
etc. The number was extended in ME and later, illustrated by HILLOCK (a 
little hill) or PADDOCK (a small enclosure or field of grassland, especially for 
horses). Special Scottish formations are bittock, lassock, and proper names, 
such as Bessock, Jamock. The relatively new mullock (related to OE myl ~ dust) 
is used in Australian E meaning ’waste material from a mine’, dating back to 
the 19th century (cf. Onions 1966: 622). The suffix , however, seems to have 
lost its original sense here. 
Similarly, -en was also a common suffix forming (chiefly) diminutives, 
especially in names of animals: OE. –en =OHG, -in, Goth. ein, Germ. –inam, 
formally the neuter of –inaz, as in ćicen CHICKEN( young fowl), late ME 
kitoun KITTEN (young cat) or in mæġden MAIDEN (girl, young woman). 
However, the final suffix –en got lost in some cases, like chick (OE. ćycen), 
maid (OE. mæġden) or eve (ME. even) (cf. Onions 1966: 331). Interestingly 
enough, the suffix –en was also a marker of the feminine gender in Old English, 
such as in biren (she-bear), gyden (goddess) and vixen (she-fox), the last of 
which is the only surviving example in present-day English (cf. Onions 
1966:311). 
Discussing diminutives, Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1678) also refer 
to the suffixes –o, -a, -er and –s, which occur in informal embellished 
clippings. The first is particularly common in AustE: arvo (afternoon), birdo 
(bird-watcher), smoko (a short, often informal break), but it is also found more 
generally in English: aggro (aggravation), ammo (ammunition), garbo (garbage 
collector), etc. It is used in some BrE informal expressions like billyo (an 
intensifier meaning an unimaginably large amount, ’It rained like billyo’, lie 
doggo (in hiding and keeping quiet), weirdo (a strange person), wacko (an 
eccentric or irrational person), muso (musician), thicko (someone who is very 
stupid) lingo (language) or medico (medic). Fatso (an insulting word for 
someone who is fat), politico (politician) and pinko (an insulting word for a 
Socialist) have negative connotations. As pointed out by the authors, the use of 
this suffix has as much to do with rhythm and decoration as with the expression 
of emotional attitude (2002:1678). 
The minor variant –a is almost restricted to proper names: Gazza (refers 
to English former footballer Paul Gascoigne), Macca (a common British 
nickname for somebody whose surname begins with the Gaelic prefix Mac or 
Mc (meaning ’son of’) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1678). 
The –er suffix is used in English public school and university slang 
formations made by adding it to the first syllable of a word, which are 
sometimes themselves deformed. For example, bedder (bedroom), bed-sitter 
(bed-sitting room), Divvers (Divinity Honours Moderations), ekker (exercise), 
footer (football), fresher (freshman), Radder (Radcliffe Camera, Oxford), 
rugger, soccer (Rugby/Association football), Taggers (Torpids (boat races)), 
Staggers (St Stephen's House) and Adders (Addison’s Walk, Magdalen College, 
Oxford), etc. (cf. www. wapedia.mobi/en/Oxford_-er -). 
There have been casual or transitory uses, such as wagger pagger bagger 
(waste paper basket) (cf. Onions 1966:323). This change can be seen in bedder, 
which now means ’bedmaker’ and is a housekeeper in a college of the 
University of Cambridge and the University of Durham (cf. 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bedder). Terms from Harrow School include bluer (blue 
blazer) and yarder (school yard). Other examples are tucker (AustralE food), 
boner (blunder, a spectacularly bad or embarrassing mistake’) or brekker, 
breakker or brekkers (breakfast). 
As illustrated by divvers, ddders and taggers above, the suffix –er often 
occurs in combinations with –s, such as in preggers (pregnant), starkers (not 
wearing any clothes, naked), bonkers (totally crazy), champers (champagne), 
Twickers (The stadium at Twickenham in South West London) or Wimbers (the 
annual lawn tennis championships at Wimbledon). 
The –er suffix in combination with plural –s is also used with personal 
names, such as in Beckers (former England football captain David Beckham) 
and Britters (American singer Britney Spears). Tollers is the Oxford nickname 
of writer J. R. R. Tolkien and Pragger Wagger refers to various holders of the 
title of Prince of Wales. 
The plural suffix -s is also found alone in a diminutive sense expressing 
affection in various terms of address, such as in ducks (used to speak to 
someone, especially a woman, in a friendly way), Pops or Moms. 
The suffix -ish originating in OE –isć = OS, OHG –isc was added to 
adjectives from XIV onwards with the sense ’approaching the quality of ~ 
‘approximately/somewhat ~’, first to adjectives of colour, e.g. blueish and 
reddish, etc. but later also to other adjectives, such as coldish, largish, sickish, 
stupidish and youngish, etc. The same meaning applies when it is added to 
numbers: tennish ’about ten’ (especially for times and ages: ’about ten o’clock, 
about ten years old’) (cf. Onions 1966:486). The suffix –ish also forms 
denominal adjectives with the meaning ’resembling ~ in some way’, often 
pejoratively, such as bookish, boyish, brutish, sheepish and waspish, etc. (cf. 
Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677). 
When applied to some nouns, the suffix –le (OE –el) can also have a 
diminutive sense, such as in pebble (OE papel) and thimble (OE þimel). When 
added to verbs, it sometimes has a diminutive force, such as in nibble (XV. 
probably of Low Dutch origin nibbeln ~ take little bites of something) (cf. 
Onions 1966: 609), or it designates the metaphorical extension of smallness in 
squabble, quibble (argue about something unimportant or some small, 
unimportant details in a petty manner). In some cases the suffix –le acquires a 
frequentative force, chiefly expressive of repeated action or movement, for 
example, babble, bubble, chuckle, giggle, drizzle, scribble, tickle, twinkle and 
wriggle, etc. (cf. Onions 1966:520). These verbs designate a process of 
intermittent quality, sometimes denoting familiarity. 
Besides the diminutive suffixes of Anglo-Saxon origin mentioned 
above, we can also find several foreign ones in English. It shows that when 
producing new diminutives, English has also borrowed liberally from other 
languages, such as German, French and Dutch, e.g. -ie/-y (doggy), -ling 
(duckling), -kin (lambkin), -kins (Laurakins), -le/-ule/-ulum (particle, granule), 
-ette (kitchenette) or -let (piglet) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78). 
Similarly to the diminutive suffixes of Anglo-Saxon origin, some of these are 
also lexicalized and, in many contexts, they do not function as proper 
diminutives in modern English any more. 
The most productive of the diminutive markers in present-day English, 
especially in Scottish, Australian and New Zealand varieties is –ie/y, which 
originates in hypocoristic Scottish formations, e.g. birdie, brownie (XVI. G. 
Douglas), dearie (XVII), doggie, Jeanie and Willie (cf. Onions 1966:460). First 
of all, it is found in numerous hypocoristics (pet names), such as in Willie, 
Betty, Robbie, Maggie, Richie and Susie, etc, where the diminutive suffix-ie/y is 
added to a contracted form of the pet name. In fact, hypocoristics are often a 
contracted form of a given name, such as Benjamin → Ben, David → Dave, 
Franklin → Frank and Peter → Pete, etc., which represent a shortening, 
generally to the first syllable. 
Although most often applied to the names of children, the –ie/y suffix is 
not uncommon in adult names; the diminutive is used especially by family, 
friends and close acquaintances: Anne → Annie, George → Georgie, James → 
Jamie, Jim → Jimmy, Robert → Rob/Bob → Robbie/Bobby, William → 
Will/Bill → Willie/Billy. No doubt the most productive name, with a great 
variety of pet names, is Elizabeth → Bess, Bessie, Bette, Bet, Betty, Beth, Betsy, 
Eliza, Elise, Elsa, Elsie, Elle, Ella, Lisa, Lisbeth, Lissie, Lily, Libby, Liddy, 
Lizbeth, Lizzie, Liz, Liza, Lilibet (cf. www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypocorism). 
In the case of children, the diminutive forms of names generally connote 
smallness and/or endearment. However, when used for an adult, their meaning 
can oscillate between tenderness and condescension. It is noteworthy that in 
informal English, besides first names, -ie/y can also be found in other proper 
nouns as well, such as Brummie (someone from the city of Birmingham) and 
Fergie (Sarah Ferguson, the Princess of York), etc. 
Thirdly, the -ie/y suffix is commonly used in baby-talk, i.e. the language 
spoken to or by children, for example, daddy, mummy, doggie, horsey, kitty, 
piggy, sweetie, drinky, potty, tummy, blankie, beddy-bye, oopsie-daisy, comfy, 
goody, easy-peasy and teeny, etc. In both cases the role of the suffix is to mark 
emotional attachment rather than small size. However, small size may be 
concomitantly involved in piggy or kitty. Pinkie (mainly AmE and ScotE) 
means ’little finger’, i.e. the smallest on the hand’, but the base pink itself 
means ’small’ (not finger) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677). 
In playground words, the diminutive marker –ie also occurs with the 
suffix –s, such as in onesies, twosies, kneesies, jumpsies, walkies, runsies, and 
widesies, which represent diminutives typically used in children’s games. 
Furthermore, tootsies are informal toes. The word is also used as a form of 
address - children use it or they may be addressed in this way; undies refer to 
underwear informally. 
The -ie suffix can also be found in many other informal clippings in 
which the first syllable takes the suffix with some change in its form: Aussie 
(someone from Australia), bicky (biscuit), brolly (umbrella), budgie 
(budgerigar), cardie (cardigan), chappie (chap), chevie (chevrolet), footie 
(football), goalie (goalkeeper), habbie (haberdashery), hanky (handkerchief), 
hubby (husband), mozzie (mosquito), offie (off-licence), prezzie (present), 
prossie (prostitute), sandie (sandwich) and telly, etc.  
Some colloquial words involve the reduplication of the suffix, e.g. arty-
farty (pretentiously artistic), hanky-panky (sexual activity) and lovey-dovey (too 
romantic), etc. In such cases, just like in recent coinages in which a 
monosyllabic word takes the suffix, such as druggie/ druggy (a habitual user of 
drugs), gifty (gift) and groupie (a young woman person who seeks emotional 
and sexual intimacy with a musician or other celebrity), etc. the suffix –ie/y 
contributes to marking the style as informal, often adding some derogatory 
connotation. 
In addition, in some words, –ie/y serves to form a noun from an 
adjective, often having an informal, familiar overtone. For example, cutie 
(someone who is attractive and nice), greenie (a freshly packed hit of 
marijuana; an environmentalist; a member of a Green Party), hottie (someone 
who is very sexually attractive), softie/softy (someone who is easily affected by 
feelings of pity or sympathy, or who is easily persuaded) and weirdie (someone 
unpleasantly strange or eccentric), etc. The diminutive –ie can form a noun 
even from a verb, e.g. cookie (a small flat sweet cake). 
The less productive suffix –ling is of common Germanic origin. As in 
Old Norse, it is diminutive in sense, and is used to indicate small or young 
animals: codling, duckling, gosling and spiderling. Consider also formations 
like nurseling (an infant still being nursed), suckling (a young mammal that has 
not been weaned), and the nouns referring to plants, such as sapling (a young 
tree) and seedling (a young plant that is grown from a seed). Applied to adult 
persons, it indicates contempt, just like in OE hireling (someone who will work 
for anyone who will pay them). Princeling (a prince judged to be of minor 
status or importance), squireling (a petty squire), lordling (a lord regarded as 
immature or insignificant) and weakling (someone who is not physically strong) 
are new diminutive formations which appeared in the 16th century. Added to an 
adjective to form nouns, -ling denoted, even in OE, a person having this feature 
implied: e.g. dẽorling DARLING or underling (an insulting word for someone 
who has a low rank). (cf. Onions 1966:629) 
The suffix –kin originates in Middle Dutch –kijn, -ken, Middle Low 
German –kin, Old High German -chin (G. –chen). First it was found in the 13th 
c. in personal names, which were adoptions or imitations of diminutive or 
hypocoristic forms, current in the Low Countries, e.g. Watekin ’Little Wat or 
Walter’, Wilekin ’little Will’. Formations on common nouns appeared in the 
14th c.: boykin, ladykin and lambkin. Some are plain adoptions from Dutch such 
as bumpkin (an awkward, unsophisticated person), catkin (flowers found in 
willows), napkin (piece of linen for wiping the lips), mannikin (a very small 
person; a model of a human body, used for teaching art or medicine) and 
ramekin (a small dish in which food for one person can be baked and served). 
Others are, however, of different origin, e.g. bodkin (Celtic, a small pointed 
instrument) or archaic, literary welkin (OE, weolcen~ sky), etc. (cf. Onions 
1966:305) 
The suffix –let, originating in French, has been used since the 14th c. to 
form diminutives, such as in OF bracelet (dim. of bracel) (cf. Onions 1966: 
524). It indicates small size in booklet, flatlet, hamlet, leaflet, millet, necklet, 
notelet, ringlet, tartlet and rivulet, etc. Furthermore, -let is also used with a few 
animal names to denote offspring, such as auklet, eaglet, piglet and owlet, etc. 
This suffix is occasionally found with other meanings, e.g. eyelet (a small hole 
or perforation, usually rimmed with metal, cord, fabric, or leather, used for 
fastening with a cord or hook), which is probably best glossed as ’resembling 
~’, though an eyelet is also small. The –let of anklet (an ornament worn around 
the ankle), wristlet (a band of material worn round the wrist for warmth or 
support) is, however, probably a different (non-diminutive) suffix. (cf. Onions 
1966:524) 
The fairly productive suffix –ette is also of French origin (OF -ete). It 
formed diminutive nouns being the feminine corresponding to masculine (O)F 
–et. In ME the French –et and ette were not clearly distinguished and survive in 
bullet, casket, closet, gadget, hatchet, pellet, tablet, trinket and turret, etc. The 
spelling –ette is preserved in adoptions, dating from the 17th c. onwards, in 
kitchenette, dinerette, statuette, novelette and maisonette, in which it marks 
small size, and also cigarette (with specialisation of meaning). In the 19th c., it 
began to be extended to English nouns, e.g. lauderette and especially in names 
of materials to indicate imitation, as in flannelette and leatherette, or female sex 
as in usherette and suffragette (cf. Onions 1966:329). Nevertheless, widget (a 
small piece of equipment that you do not know the name of) and ladette (a 
young woman who likes to do things that young men typically do) are new 
formations in informal style. 
There are some other suffixes, such as –rel, -erel or –een, which have 
been used with a diminutive force during the history of English, but many of 
the resultant words are often no longer morphologically analysable.  
–Rel, -erel, the ME suffix of diminutive and deprecatory force is also of 
French origin, found first in animal names as macquerel MACKEREL (sea 
fish) (13th c.), followed by DOGGEREL (comic verse, usually irregular in 
measure) (14th c.), COCKEREL (a young rooster) (15th c.), and later by 
SCOUNDREL (a worthless or villainous person). (cf. Onions 1966:753) 
The –een suffix is recognisable with its ’imitation’ meaning in a few 
words, like velveteen and sateen (with modification of the word satin). It 
originates in French –ine, as in ratteen (a thick twilled woollen fabric)(F. 
ratine) and it is used in names of fabric denoting one inferior to or coarser than 
that denoted by the original word (cf. Onions 1966:302). Interestingly enough, -
een also exists as a diminutive suffix in Irish, as in boneen ~ ‘young pig’, 
colleen ~ ‘a girl or a young woman’, boreen ~ ‘lane’, and dudeen ~ ‘short 
tobacco pipe’, etc. (cf. Onions 1966:302) 
 
3.  A cognitive analysis of the diminutive in English 
 
How are all these meanings of the diminuitive related and how could 
they be analysed in a unified framework? The answer to these questions seems 
to be given by cognitive grammarians, such as Taylor (2003:170) and Evans 
and Green (2006:29), who pointed out that fuzziness and family resemblance 
are not just features that apply to human categories, i.e. physical objects like 
cups, tables and birds, etc., but to linguistic categories as well. Linguistic 
categories – whether they relate to morphology, syntax or phonology – also 
appear to exhibit these phenomena. In other words, the members of a category 
exhibit degrees of family resemblance, with the category borders not clearly 
defined. Formal approaches to linguistics have tended towards the view that a 
particular category exhibits uniform behaviour which characterizes the 
category. In the cognitive view, however, linguistic categories, despite being 
related, often do not behave in a uniform way. Instead, they reveal themselves 
to contain members that exhibit quite divergent behaviour, with some category 
members being more central, prototypical, and others more peripheral. 
The discussion above might suggest that present-day English lacks one 
productive diminutive affix and those which seem to have been borrowed from 
other languages. It is also true that some of them are lexicalized, and in many 
contexts, they cannot be really recognised as proper diminutives in modern 
English. Nevertheless, the different meanings of the dimunitive seem to be 
somehow related. 
How could the cognitive approach to linguistic categories be applied to 
the diminutives? As for the word class of the base word, we can see that with a 
few exceptions of adjectives, verbs and numerals, the majority of diminutives 
are added to nouns. With respect to the meanings of nouns, it can be stated that 
the central sense of the diminutive expresses the small size of a physical entity 
(booklet, kitchenette), often offsprings of animals (duckling, piglet). Besides, 
the diminutive is also used in numerous cases when smallness is not an issue. In 
other words, the diminutive suffixes often mark emotional attachment 
(affection, endearment) or contribute to marking the informal style, sometimes 
adding even a derogatory connotation. Used in a type of slang, they indicate 
appurtenance to a social group, such as family or school, etc., strengthening the 
feeling of relation and closeness. 
As noted by Taylor (2003: 174), the extension of the diminutive to 
express an attitude of affection is an instance of metonymic/metaphoric 
transfer. Thinking of entities with a small size can evoke a range of different 
attitudes. Small things can be regarded with affection or contempt. Human 
beings have a natural suspicion of large creatures, while small animals and 
small children can be cuddled and caressed without embarrassment or fear. This 
might account for the fact that the diminutive is commonly used in 
hypocoristics such as Jimmy, Annie, in baby talk, for example, blankie, doggie, 
tummy, or to denote young animals like piglet, kitten or cockerel. Especially the 
suffix -y/ie, which is undoubtedly the most productive suffix in present-day 
English, seems to be widespread in informal style, being illustrated by footie, 
hanky, hubby, mozzie, prezzie and sandie, etc. It also reflects emotional attitude, 
such as familiarity, intimacy, playfulness and informality. Similarly, the 
suffixes –o, -a, and –er(s) also occur in informal clippings, e.g. arvo, Macca, 
ekker, champers and Adders, etc, the last two being particularly popular in 
English school and university slang. 
The association between small size and affection must be the reason 
why certain suffixes used to denote diminutive can refer to female animals or 
persons, such as vixen or usherette, with females being regarded as more 
graceful and dainty. The transfer of smallness to affection, intimacy is thus 
grounded in the co-occurrence of elements within an experiential frame. 
If smallness is associated with an attitude of positive emotion, smallness 
also goes with lack of worth. The experiential base is obvious: superior worth 
correlates with increased size, decreased size with diminished worth. Hence, the 
diminutive can express not only affection, but also an attitude of depreciation, 
contempt thus having a derogatory connotation (Taylor: 2003:174), such as –
ling in hireling, princeling, lordling, –rel in scoundrel, –y/ie in prossie, 
druggie/ druggy, groupie or -o in fatso, politico. In its other connotative 
meaning, the diminutive can also denote imitation, e.g. –ette in leatherette, or –
een in velveteen, which is, however, a rather marginal usage. The use of the 
diminutive suffix here may be accounted for by the fact that imitation of a 
material has less value than the real material. The transfer from the small size to 
less value may be the motivation for the meaning of these suffixes. The suffix –
le in verbs like squabble, quibble, which mean arguing about something 
unimportant, also implies the metaphorical extension of smallness into the 
abstract domain. 
The suffix -ish added to adjectives, such as blueish, coldish and 
numbers, like tennish has the meaning ‘approximately/somewhat ~’, i.e. the 
smaller degree of the quality. In Taylor’s view (2003:174), it is related to the 
dismissive sense of the diminutive, i.e. things which are small are of little 
importance. The above examples suggest that the exact value is unimportant, or 
that the speaker excuses herself/himself for not being precise. 
It seems that as we move away from the central sense, diminutive 
suffixation begins to become less productive. Nevertheless, the affectionate, 
informal use of the diminutive is highly productive, while the deprecatory and 
dismissive uses are restricted to a relatively small number of instances. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Although the diminutive in English constitutes a category of meanings 
which behave in a variety of distinct ways, they do appear to be related to one 
another. The different meanings of the diminutive are motivated by its central, 
prototypical meaning, i.e. smallness and a metonymy/metaphor with 
experiential bases in our conceptual system. In other words, the diminutive 
emerges as a polysemous category, whose various extended meanings, such as 
affection, endearment, informality, depreciation, contempt, approximation, 
resemblance and imitation are linked to the central sense, i.e. smallness in 
physical space. Hence, the category exhibits degrees of family resemblance 
with a central and some more peripheral members. 
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Abstract: Universal 1926 maintains that front vowels and palatal consonants prevail 
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languages. 
Key words: diminutives, evaluative morphology, sound symbolism 
 
 
1. Introduction: theoretical and research points of departure 
Evaluative morphology deals with the structure and function of 
diminutive and augmentative affixes, i. e. evaluative morphemes (cf. Scalise 
1984). 
According to Universal #1926 (originally 1932) as specified in Plank 
and Filimonova’s (2000) Universals Archive, which summarizes more than 
2000 language universals based on the relevant results of cross-linguistic 
typological research, diminutives are characterized by high front vowels and 
augmentatives by high back vowels. Ultan (1978) and Niewenhuis (1985) have 
extended this observation with the claim that palatal and alveo-palatal (i.e. post-
alveolar in the current IPA terminology) consonants prevail in diminutives. 
Thus, the cited Universal and several authors indicate that the formal 
expression of diminutive meaning in languages is to a large extent influenced 
by sound symbolism. 
According to Sieberer (1947), there is some inner psychological 
connection between the meaning of words and preference for some sounds in 
words with the given meaning. Sound symbolism – phonetic iconicity – is 
connected with this idea of an inner psychological relationship between certain 
sounds and certain areas of meaning, and supposes that vowels and consonants 
signal the meaning of words that contain them. It means that segments 
articulated in the area of the palatum, i.e. the hard palate (high front vowels and 
palatal and/or palatalized consonants), are considered to be the iconic symbols 
of diminutiveness.  
However, previous research in this field has not proved this universal 
tendency. Bauer (1996), for example, who analyses the data in 50 languages of 
the world, concludes that there does not appear to be any universal principle of 
sound symbolism operating  in markers of the diminutive and augmentative 
such that palatal articulation  correlates with diminutives and not with 
augmentatives (Bauer 1996: 201).  
Assuming that Universal #1926 did not emerge out of nothing, without 
any justification, we have decided to take up a cross-linguistic research into 
phonetic iconicity in evaluative morphology in the languages of Europe. 
In our research (Štekauer et al. 2009), evaluative morphemes in 24 
European languages were analysed. The following languages were included in 
the first analysis:  Slavonic (West Slavonic – Czech, Polish, Slovak; East 
Slavonic – Russian, Ukrainian, Belorusian;  South Slavonic – Bulgarian, 
Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian), Germanic (English, German, 
Swedish, Danish), Romance (French, Italian, Romanian, Portuguese, Spanish, 
Catalan) and Finno-Ugric languages (Finnish, Hungarian, Estonian). 
For the purposes of our analysis, we proposed a core vocabulary of 35 
lexical items covering four major word-classes: nouns, verbs, adjectives and 
adverbs. The selection of these lexical items was based on Swadish’s 
glottochronology (1972), which assumes that the core vocabulary of languages 
is stable and it changes at a constant stable rate. Thus, it can be supposed that 
the selected words are the part of the lexicon of all or most of the world 
languages. The data sheets with 35 lexical items were filled out by linguists. 
Only the most productive pattern for each lexical item was taken into account. 
This first stage of our research into phonetic iconicity in evaluative 
morphemes of European languages has shown that segments indicated as iconic 
symbols of diminutiveness (high front vowels; palatal and post-alveolar 
consonants) represent only 3% of all vowels and consonants in evaluative 
markers in the sample as a whole. In augmentatives, both vowels and 
consonants seem to be anti-iconic (Štekauer et al. 2009). The research has also 
shown that there are differences between the individual language families: the 
iconicity rate is the highest in Romance languages (47% of vowels and 20% of 
consonants are iconic) and the lowest in Germanic (no iconic vowels and 17% 
of iconic consonants) and Finno-Ugric languages (no iconic consonants and 
only 2% of iconic vowels). In Slavonic languages, 39% of vowels and 7 % of 
consonants are iconic. 
Since the analysis of evaluative markers in the languages of Europe has 
not validated the Universal #1926, the next step of our research was oriented 
towards the analysis of diminutive and augmentative morphemes in Indo-
European, Austronesian and Niger-Congo language families.  
The second, typologically and geographically extended, analysis 
encompassed the following languages: Indo-European languages – Kashmiri, 
Slovak, English, Italian, Latvian, Greek, Irish, Persian; Niger-Congo languages 
– Bafut, Bemba, Luwanga, Kiluba, Xhosa, Jita, Akan, Yoruba; and 
Austronesian languages – Maori, Toqabaquita, Jarai, Javanese, Melayu Papua, 
Muna, Tagalog, Matbat. 
A detailed analysis of diminutive and augmentative affixes in the 
sample of languages from the mentioned language families, supported by 
frequency distribution histograms, indicates that high front vowels are typical 
of augmentatives rather than diminutives. Diminutive affixes are acoustically 
realized by central vowels. Similarly, the behaviour of consonants contradicts 
any universal expectations: alveolar and velar consonants slightly prevail in 
both augmentatives and diminutives (Gregová, Körtvélyessy, Zimmermann 
2010). 
However, having analysed evaluative markers in various languages, I 
have noticed that, in some of them, diminutive affixes seem to cause 
(mor)phonological changes in word-stems, which are not part of the evaluative 
morphology. For example, in Slovak, the process of palatalization changes the 
consonant before the diminutive affix, e.g. palic-a ‘stick’ > palič-k-a ‘a little 
stick’. Consequently, I have decided to aim my attention at those 
(mor)phonological changes in the word-stems of diminutives caused by 
evaluative affixes.  
The material point of departure for my research into the (mor)phonology 
of diminutives was represented by the data sheets gained originally for the 
purposes of evaluative morphology. The analysis was carried out on a sample 
of the following Indo-European languages: 
Slavonic branch (11): West Slavonic – Slovak, Czech, Polish; East 
Slavonic – Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian; South Slavonic – Serbian, 
Macedonian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Slovenian;  
Romance branch (6): French, Italian, Spanish, Catalan, Portuguese, 
Romanian 
Germanic branch (6): German, English, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, 
Afrikaans 
Baltic branch (1): Latvian 
Celtic branch (1): Irish 
Hellenic branch (1): Greek 
Indo-Aryan branch (1): Kashmiri 
Indo-Iranian branch (1): Persian 
The selection of languages included is quite random since it is based 
predominantly on the availability of the material for analysis. Although some of 
the branches are represented only by one language, I suppose that the sample 
can be considered representative for my ‘research probe’. My assumption is 
based on the fact that if the mentioned (mor)phonological changes belong to the 
phonology/morphophonology of  the Indo-European language family as a 
whole, then they will be observable even in the sample of 28 languages. The 
more detailed division of languages in terms of branches is useful for practical 
reasons: it enables a more transparent account of the results obtained, as will be 
seen later. 
The achievements of my present research, aimed at the analysis of the 
changes in word-stems of diminutives triggered by diminutive affixes, will 
simultaneously be compared to the results of the previous analysis aimed at 
segments in evaluative markers.  
 
2. Research results 
 
2.1. Slavonic languages 
All eleven Slavonic languages are inflectional and display a high 
number of various diminutive markers (cf. Štekauer et al. 2009). Although – as 
already mentioned – diminutive morphemes themselves cannot be evaluated as 
iconic, they trigger palatalization changes in word-stems. These changes are 
quite similar in the analysed Slavonic languages and can be interpreted 
together.  
Overall, 29% of evaluative morphemes in Slavonic languages cause 
such neutralization and alternation processes in word-stems of diminutives that 
shift the articulation of vowels and consonants closer to the hard palate. The 
consonantal changes (Table 1) are much more common than those of vowels 
(Table 2).  
 
CONSONANTS  
type of change Example 
alternation k/č Slovak, Czech, Polish   
ok-o (eye) > DIM oč-k-o 
 
 Ukrainian 
ruk-a (hand) > DIM ruč-eň-a 
 
alternation h/ž Czech 
 knih-a (book)> DIM kníž-k-a  
alternation k/š Polish 
 ptak (bird)> DIM ptasz-ek   
alternation c/č Czech 
měsíc (moon) > DIM měsíč-ek  
Russian 
ptic-a (bird)> DIM ptič-k-a 
Bulgarian 
slnc-e (sun) > DIM slnč-ic-e 
 
alternation g/ž Croatian 
knjig-a (book)> DIM knjiž-ic-a  
    
alternation ch/š  Ukrainian 
ptach (bird) > DIM  ptaš-eň-a 
 
neutralization d/ď Slovak 
 vod-a (water) > DIM voď-ičk-a  
 
neutralization l/ľ Slovak 
mal-ý (little)> DIM maľ-ičk-ý  
 
neutralization t/ť Czech 
 tát-a (father)> DIM tať-ínek  
 
neutralization n/ň Bulgarian 
       grozn-a (ugly)>DIM grozň-ičk-a
  
Table 1. Consonantal changes in word-stems of Slavonic diminutives triggered by diminutive 
morphemes 
 
 
VOWELS  
Type of change Example 
alternation o/e Belarusian 
agoň (fire) > DIM ageň-čik 
 
alternation e/í  Czech 
kámen (stone) > DIM kamín-ek  
 
alternation a/e Bulgarian,  
goljam (big) > DIM golem-ičik 
 
Table 2. Vocalic changes in word-stems of Slavonic diminutives triggered by diminutive 
morphemes 
 
The data for the individual languages also indicate certain differences 
between the language phyla and the languages analysed. While the 
(mor)phonological changes caused by the diminutive marker approach almost 
40% in West Slavonic languages, there is only a 30% occurrence in East 
Slavonic phylum and in South Slavonic languages the changes in word- stems 
occur only in 23.5% of the cases. 
As for the differences between the individual languages, vocalic 
alternations seem to be the most frequent in Czech and Belarusian, and 
consonantal alternations or/and neutralizations are typical of Slovak and 
Bulgarian. On the other hand, in Macedonian there is almost no palatalization 
change of consonants or change of vowels articulation in the stems of words. 
But all evaluative affixes delimited in Macedonian tend to be iconic – they 
contain either high front vowel or palatalized consonant (cf. Gregová  2010). 
 
2.2. Romance languages 
Compared to the Slavonic languages, in Romance languages 
diminutives can be formed with a considerably lower range of affixes. Changes 
in word-stems caused by these evaluative markers are rather miscellaneous. 
Therefore the six analysed Romance languages have to be treated separately. 
In French, diminutive markers do not cause any phonological changes 
that would lead to the higher occurrence of high front vowels and/or palatal 
(post-alveolar) consonants in word-stems. In French diminutives, consonant /l/ 
is usually placed between the word-stem and the diminutive affix (e.g. oeil 
‘eye’ > DIM oeill-et) or the final consonant of the word-stem is geminated (e. 
g. maison ‘house’ > DIM maisonn-et). 
Typical changes accompanying the process of diminutivization in Italian 
are the omission of the stem-final vowels o, e, a (connected to gender change), 
e.g. animale (animal) > DIM animal-in-o) or the insertion of a consonantal 
sound between the stem and the diminutive suffix (fior-e ‘flower’ > DIM 
fiorell-in-o), and, of course, a shift of stress also takes place. 
Although Spanish is a language rich in diminutives, its evaluative 
markers cause no significant changes in word-stems (e.g. niñ-o ‘child’ > DIM 
niñ-it-o, flor ‘flower’ > DIM flor-ecilla), but as the previous research has 
shown, 85% of vowels in diminutive morphemes are iconic (the high front 
vowel prevails, cf. Štekauer et al. 2009). 
Romanian is also rich in diminutives and its diminutive suffixes often 
trigger various changes in word-stems. In my research material, there is a vowel 
alternation of open central unrounded a into mid central unrounded ă, connected 
to stress alternation (e.g. animal ‘animal’ > DIM animăl-uţ, scaun ‘chair’ > 
DIM scăun-el) as well as a consonant change - the velar plosive [k] turns into 
the palatal affricate č [t∫] (copac ‘tree’ > DIM copăc-el).  
Catalan diminutive suffixes do not trigger any relevant changes in word-
stems. Rarely u is changed into ü  that represents [w] between k, g and a front 
vowel (e.g. aigua ‘water’ > DIM aigü-et-a) or c [k] is changed into qu which is 
used to represent its hard (i.e. velar) pronunciation before e (e.g. bonic ‘nice’ > 
DIM boniqu-et).  
There are no changes in word-stems of diminutives in Portuguese, (e.g. 
livr-o ‘book’ > DIM livr-inh-o), but vowels in its diminutive markers –zinh(o), 
-zinh(a), -inh(o), inh(a) - display a 100 % iconicity. 
To sum up: although the palatalization of word-stem consonants may 
occur in Romanian diminutives, diminutive markers in the other analysed 
Romance languages do not trigger changes that would increase the number of 
high front vowels and/or palatal (post-alveolar) consonants. But, in some of 
them (Spanish, Portuguese), diminutive markers are themselves iconic, at least 
in terms of the vowels they contain (cf. Štekauer et al. 2009). 
 
2.3. Germanic languages 
The process of diminutivization is less frequent in Germanic languages 
than in Romance languages. Similarly to Romance languages, changes in word-
stems are rather miscellaneous and have to be analysed separately. 
In German, the diminutive morpheme -lein occurring in my research 
material causes the fronted pronunciation of vowels in stems, i.e.  the so-called 
Umlaut (e.g. Buch ‘book’ > DIM Büch-lein, Hammer ‘hammer’ > DIM 
Hämmer-lein).  
The rare diminutive suffixes in English cause no palatalization changes 
in word-stems (e.g. bird > DIM bird-ie), but 85 % of the vowels in these 
evaluative suffixes are iconic (Stekauer et al. 2009). 
Diminutive forms in Danish, Swedish and Norwegian are very rare, too. 
They trigger no relevant changes in word-stems, although some of the vowels 
included in the diminutive markers can be evaluated as iconic (e.g. Danish fugl 
‘bird’ > DIM pip-fugl, Swedish liten ‘small’ > DIM pytte-liten, Norwegian barn 
‘child’ > DIM små-barn). 
The evaluative affixes in Afrikaans do not cause any changes in word-
stems of diminutives, but vowels in diminutive morphemes are totally iconic 
(diminutive markers contain [i:] – a high front vowel: e. g. vader ‘father’ > 
DIM vader-tjie, tree ‘tree’ > DIM tree-tjie). 
To sum up, there are no (mor)phonological changes in the Germanic 
languages caused by diminutive morphemes, except in the German language, 
where diminutivization by the suffix -lein  leads to the fronted pronunciation of 
vowels in word-stems, the so-called Umlaut, which is a characteristic feature of 
German phonology. 
  
2.4. Baltic language 
Latvian is rich in diminutive markers. There are 26 of them, falling into 
6 types in the vocabulary sample analysed.   In 17% of the cases, these suffixes 
cause a change of the stem-final k, which is velar, into c, that, when followed 
by the i from the affix, is pronounced as palatal (e.g. rok-a ‘hand’ > DIM roc-
iņ-a). Moreover, iconic vowels dominate in Latvian evaluative markers.   
 
2.5. Celtic language 
In Irish, my only representative of the Celtic language branch, the 
diminutive morpheme -ín contains an iconic vowel. Furthermore, this 
diminutive morpheme triggers such changes in word-stems that lead to the 
higher occurrence of high front vowels and palatal (or post-alveoalar) 
consonants, i.e. iconic segments: the vowel /i/ is inserted in the stem (e.g. casúr 
‘hammer’ > DIM casúir-in, mór ‘big’ > DIM móir-in); the pronunciation of 
some consonants is shifted closer to the hard palate (e.g. grian ‘sun’ > DIM 
griain-ín [griæinjn], [nj] being post-alveolar).  
 
2.6. Hellenic language 
Modern Greek is rich in diminutive markers, but they do not trigger 
significant changes in the word-stems of diminutives.  
 
2.7. Indo-Aryan language 
In Kashmiri, there are no morphological diminutive forms. 
 
2.8. Indo-Iranian language 
In Persian, evaluative markers do not cause any relevant changes in the 
word-stems of diminutives.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
According to Universal #1926 from Plank and Filimonova’s Universals 
Archive, and Ultan’s (1978) and Niewenhuis’s (1985) theories, high front 
vowels and palatal and/or post-alveolar consonants (i.e. segments articulated in 
the area of the hard palate) are the iconic symbols of diminutiveness. 
However, the previous research, aimed at the analysis of diminutive 
markers in the Indo-European, Niger-Congo and Austronesian languages, has 
not proved the universal nature of this iconic tendency.  
The various analyses also indicate substantial differences in the 
character of diminutive markers of the languages belonging to one language 
family (cf. Štekauer et al. 2009, Panocová 2009, Gregová, 2010). The 
dominance of high front vowels and palatal (or palatalized) consonants in 
diminutive affixes seems to be language specific and not language universal. 
This idea supports the areal nature of phonetic symbolism, as already 
mentioned by Niewenhuis (1985).  
But the cited analyses have revealed that though there are no 
palatalization tendencies in the evaluative markers of some languages, those 
markers trigger various (mor)phonological changes in the word-stems of 
diminutives which are not the part of the evaluative morphology. 
Thus my current research was aimed at the analysis of the influence of 
diminutive affixes on word-stems. The research was carried out on a sample of 
diminutives from 28 Indo-European languages falling into 8 language branches.   
The research results are as follows: 
a/ the assumption about the dominant occurrence of high front vowels 
and/or palatal consonants in word-stems of diminutives as a result of the 
diminutive marker influence was not proved in the sample of 28 Indo-European 
languages; 
b/ when evaluating the individual branches of the Indo-European 
languages (especially those represented by more than one language), one can 
hardly speak about a substantial change in the features of sounds occurring in 
the word-stems of diminutives, caused by the diminutive affixes: only 29% of 
the word-stems in the Slavonic diminutives display (mor)phonological changes, 
with an increased rate of high front vowels and/or palatal (post-alveolar) 
consonants; these changes are sporadic in Romance and Germanic diminutives; 
c/ when evaluating the individual languages, it is clear that, in some of 
them, diminutive suffixes trigger neutralization and alternation changes in 
word-stems that increase the occurrence of the segments  considered  as the 
iconic symbols of diminutiveness (e.g. German, Latvian). 
The comparison of the results of a previous research into phonetic 
iconicity in evaluative morphology (Štekauer et al. 2009) with the present 
results of my research into the ‘phonetic iconicity of segments in word-stems’ 
as a consequence of diminutive marker influence indicates that languages either 
tend to have diminutive affixes with iconic segments (e.g. Macedonian, 
Spanish) or diminutive markers are not iconic, but they cause changes in word-
stems that shift the articulation of vowels and/or consonants closer to the 
palatum (e.g. German, Slovak). 
In order to prove or disprove the validity of Universal #1926, the 
diminutive (word-stem + evaluative affix) should be taken into consideration as 
a whole. It seems that any other type of analysis – either the analysis of the 
evaluative affix, or the analysis of the word-stem – is only partial and it does 
not reflect the phonological and morphological regularities of the given 
language in its complexity. 
Moreover, the cited Universal claims which type of segments prevail in 
diminutives, but it does not specify whether high front vowels and/ or palatal 
(and post-alveolar) consonants exist in the diminutive markers or whether they 
occur in the word-stems as the result of neutralization and alternation processes 
triggered by the evaluative morphemes. 
In a follow-up research, it will be necessary to extend the sample of 
languages analysed, as well as the number of lexical items included; this may 
bring about more relevant results. 
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